There are four kinds of idols that besiege the minds of people. In order to study them, let's give them names. Let us call the first type the idols of the clan, the second - the idols of the cave, the third - the idols of the square and the fourth - the idols of the theater ...
Idols of the clan find their foundation in the very nature of man... for it is false to assert that man's feelings are the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions, both of the senses and of the mind, rest on the analogy of man, and not on the analogy of the world. The human mind is likened to an uneven mirror, which, mixing its own nature with the nature of things, reflects things in a distorted and disfigured form.
Cave idols essence of the delusion of the individual. After all, in addition to the mistakes inherent in the human race, everyone has their own special cave, which weakens and distorts the light of nature. This happens either from the special innate qualities of each, or from education and conversations with others, or from reading books and from authorities before whom one bows, or due to a difference in impressions, depending on whether they are received by souls prejudiced and predisposed, or souls cold-blooded and calm, or for other reasons... That is why Heraclitus rightly said that people seek knowledge in small worlds, and not in the big, or in general, world.
There are also idols that appear, as it were, due to the mutual connection and community of people. We call these idols, referring to the fellowship and fellowship of people that gives rise to them, the idols of the square , people are united by speech. Words are established according to the understanding of the crowd. Therefore, the bad and absurd establishment of words besiege the mind in a wonderful way.
The definitions and explanations with which learned people are accustomed to arm themselves and protect themselves in no way help the cause. Words directly force the mind, confuse everything and lead to empty and countless disputes and interpretations.
Finally, there are idols that have taken root in the souls of people from various dogmas of philosophy, as well as from the perverse laws of evidence. We call them theater idols, for we believe that, as many philosophical systems are accepted or invented, as many comedies are staged and played, representing fictional and artificial worlds ... In this case, we mean here not only general philosophical teachings, but also numerous principles and axioms of sciences that have gained strength due to tradition, faith and carelessness...
The human mind is not a dry light, it is held together by will and passions, and this generates in science what is desirable for everyone. A person rather believes in the truth of what he prefers ... In an infinite number of ways, sometimes imperceptible, passions stain and spoil the mind.
But to the greatest extent, the confusion and delusions of the human mind come from inertness, inconsistency and deceit of the senses, for that which excites the senses is preferred to that which does not immediately excite the senses, even if the latter is better. Therefore, contemplation ceases when the sight ceases, so that the observation of invisible things is insufficient or absent altogether ...
The human mind, by its very nature, is drawn to the abstract and thinks the fluid as permanent. But it is better to dissect nature into parts than to abstract. This was what the school of Democritus did, which penetrated deeper than others into nature. One should study more matter, its internal state and change of state, pure action and the law of action or movement, for forms are inventions of the human soul, unless these laws of action are called forms ...
Some minds are inclined to revere antiquity, others are carried away by the love of newness. But few can observe such a measure, so as not to reject what was justly established by the ancients, and not to neglect what is rightly proposed by the new. This causes great harm to philosophy and the sciences, for it is rather the result of a passion for the ancient and the new, and not a judgment about them. Truth is to be sought not in the luck of any time, which is impermanent, but in the light of the experience of nature, which is eternal.
Therefore, one must give up these aspirations and see that they do not subdue the mind...
Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as he has comprehended in its order by deed or thought, and beyond this he does not know and cannot.
Neither the bare hand nor the mind left to itself has much power. The work is done by tools and aids, which the mind needs no less than the hand. And just as the instruments of the hand give or direct movement, so do the instruments of the mind give directions to the mind or warn it.
Knowledge and power of man coincide for ignorance of the cause hinders action. Nature is conquered only by submission to her, and what in contemplation appears as a cause, in action appears as a rule.
The subtlety of nature is many times greater than the subtlety of feelings and reason, so that all these beautiful contemplations, reflections, interpretations are a meaningless thing; only there is no one to see it.
The logic now in use serves rather to reinforce and preserve errors based on conventional notions than to find a person. Therefore, it is more harmful than useful.
Syllogisms consist of sentences, sentences of words, and words are signs of concepts. Therefore, if the concepts themselves, which form the basis of everything, are confused and thoughtlessly abstracted from things, then there is nothing solid in what is built on them. So the only hope is in true induction.
Neither in logic nor in physics there is nothing sound in concepts. "Substance", "quality", "action", "suffering", even "being" are not good concepts; even less so - the concepts: “heavy”, “light”, “thick”, “rarefied”, “wet”, dry, “generation”, “decomposition”, “attraction”, “repulsion”, “element”, “ matter," "form," and others of the same kind. They are all fictional and poorly defined.
What is still open to the sciences belongs almost entirely to the realm of ordinary concepts. In order to penetrate into the depths and distances of nature, it is necessary to abstract both concepts and axioms from things in a more sure and careful way, and in general, a better and more reliable work of the mind is necessary.
By no means can it be that the axioms established by reasoning have the power to discover new things, for "the subtlety of nature is many times greater than the subtlety of reasoning. But the axioms, duly abstracted from particulars, in their turn, easily indicate and determine new in this way the sciences are made effective.
The axioms which are now in use, spring from meager and simple experience and the few particulars which are commonly encountered, and nearly correspond to these facts and their scope. Therefore, there is nothing to be surprised if these axioms do not lead to new particulars. If, more than hopefully, an example is discovered which was previously unknown, the axiom is rescued by some whimsical distinction, while it would be truer to correct the axiom itself.
The knowledge which we usually apply in the study of nature, we shall, for the purposes of instruction, call anticipation of nature, because it is hasty and immature. The knowledge which we properly extract from things, we will call interpretation of nature.
The best of all proofs is experience.... The way people use experience now is blind and unreasonable. And because they wander and wander without any right path and are guided only by those things that come across, they turn to much, but move forward little. Even if they take up experiments more thoughtfully, with greater constancy and diligence, they invest their work in any one experiment, for example, Gilbert in a magnet, alchemists in gold. This way people act is both ignorant and helpless...
On the first day of creation, God created only light, devoting the whole day to this work and not creating anything material on that day. In the same way, first of all, from a variety of experience, one should extract the discovery of true causes and axioms, and one should look for luminous, and not fruitful, experiments. Correctly discovered and established axioms arm practice not superficially, but deeply, and entail numerous series of practical applications...
In all sciences we meet with the same trick, which has become commonplace, that the founders of any science turn the impotence of their science into a slander against nature. And what is unattainable for their science, they, on the basis of the same science, declare it impossible in nature itself ...
Those who practiced the sciences were either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like an ant, only collect and are content with what they have collected. Rationalists, like the spider, produce cloth from themselves. The bee, on the other hand, chooses the middle way: she extracts material from garden and field flowers, but arranges and changes it according to her ability. The true work of philosophy does not differ from this either. For it does not rest solely or predominantly on the powers of the mind, and does not deposit in the mind untouched the material drawn from natural history and from mechanical experiments, but changes it and processes it in the mind. And so, one should put good hope in a closer and more indestructible (which has not been so far) union of these abilities - experience and reason.
Nevertheless, it should not be allowed that reason jumps from particulars to remote and almost the most general axioms (what are the so-called principles of sciences and things) and, according to their unshakable truth, would test and establish average axioms. So it has been until now: the mind is inclined to this not only by natural impulse, but also because it has long been accustomed to this by proofs through syllogism. For the sciences, however, goodness is to be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous and not interrupted steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle ones, one above the other, and finally to the most general ones. For the lowest axioms differ little from bare experience. The highest and most general (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid in them. (The middle axioms are true, firm and vital, human affairs and destinies depend on them. And above them, finally, are the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly limited to these middle axioms.
Therefore, it is necessary to give the human mind not wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they restrain its every jump and flight ...
To construct axioms, one must invent another form of induction than what has been used so far. This form must be applied not only to the discovery and testing of what are called principles, but even to lesser and intermediate ones, and finally to all axioms. Induction by mere enumeration is a childish thing: it gives shaky conclusions and is endangered by contradictory particulars, making judgments for the most part on fewer than necessary facts, and only those that are available. Induction, however, which will be useful in discovering and proving the sciences and arts, must divide nature by proper distinctions and exceptions. And then, after a sufficient number of negative judgments, it should conclude positive. This has not yet been accomplished... But one should use the help of this induction not only to discover axioms, but also to define concepts. In this induction lies, undoubtedly, the greatest hope..
Rene Descartes
(Extracts)
The unintelligent animals, which have only to take care of their bodies, are ceaselessly and occupied only in seeking food for it; for a person, the main part of which is the mind, in the first place should be the concern for gaining his true food - wisdom. I am firmly convinced that many would not fail to do this, if only they hoped to be in time and knew how to carry it out ...
...highest good, as shown, even apart from the light of faith, one natural reason, there is nothing else than the knowledge of the truth from its first causes, that is, wisdom; occupation of the latter is philosophy. Since all this is quite true, it is not difficult to be convinced of this, provided that everything is deduced correctly. But since this conviction is contradicted by experience, which shows that people who are most engaged in philosophy are often less wise and do not use their understanding as correctly as those who have never devoted themselves to this occupation, I would like here to briefly state what those are composed of. sciences that we now possess, and what degree of wisdom these sciences reach. First stage contains only those concepts which, by virtue of their own light, are so clear that they can be acquired without reflection . Second step covers everything that gives us sensory experience. The third is what communication with other people teaches . Here you can add in fourth place, reading books, certainly not all, but mostly those written by people who are able to give us good instructions; it's like a kind of communication with their creators. All the wisdom that is generally possessed is, in my opinion, acquired in these four ways. I do not include here divine revelation, for it does not gradually, but all at once, lift us up to an infallible faith...
In studying the nature of various minds, I noticed that there are hardly any so stupid and stupid people who would not be able either to assimilate good opinions, or to rise to higher knowledge, if only they were guided in the right way. This can be proven as follows: if the beginnings are clear and nothing is deduced from anything except by means of the most obvious reasoning, then no one is so deprived of reason as not to understand the consequences that follow from this ...
In order that the purpose which I had in the publication of this book may be correctly understood, I would like to indicate here the order which, it seems to me, should be observed for my own enlightenment. First, he who possesses only ordinary and imperfect knowledge, which can be acquired through the four above-mentioned ways, should first of all draw up for himself moral rules sufficient to guide in worldly affairs, for this does not suffer delay and our first concern should be a right life. . Then you need to deal with logic, but not the one that is studied in schools ...
I know that many centuries may elapse before all the truths that can be drawn from these beginnings are deduced, since the truths that are to be found depend largely on individual experiments; the latter, however, are never accidental, but must be sought out by discerning men with care and expense. For it does not always happen that those who are able to carry out experiments correctly will acquire the opportunity to do so; and also many of those who excel in such abilities form an unfavorable view of philosophy in general, owing to the defects of the philosophy hitherto in use, on the basis of which they will not try to find a better one. But whoever finally catches the difference between my principles and the principles of others, as well as what series of truths can be drawn from here, will be convinced of how important these principles are in the search for truth and to what a high level of wisdom, to what perfection of life, to what bliss. can bring us these beginnings. I dare to believe that there will not be anyone who would not go towards an occupation so useful to him, or at least who would not sympathize with and would not wish to help those who work fruitfully at it with all his might. I wish our descendants to see its happy end.
When I was younger, I studied a little of philosophy, logic, and of mathematics, geometrical analysis and algebra—these three arts or sciences, which, it would seem, should give something to the realization of my intention. But studying them, I noticed that in logic its syllogisms and most of its other precepts
rather help to explain to others what we know, or even,
as in the art of Lull, stupidly talk about what you do not know, instead of studying it. And although logic does indeed contain many very correct and good precepts, however, so many others are mixed in with them - either harmful or unnecessary - that it is almost as difficult to separate them as it is to discern Diana or Minerva in an unworked block of marble ... Like how the abundance of laws often serves as an excuse for vices - why the state order is much better when there are few laws, but they are strictly observed - and how, instead of a large number of rules that form logic, I found it sufficient to strictly and unshakably observe the following four.
First - never accept as true anything that I would not know as such with obviousness, in other words, carefully and shy away from rashness and prejudice and include in my judgment only what appears to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that it does not give me any reason question them.
Second — to divide each of the difficulties I am investigating into as many parts as possible and necessary for the best overcoming of them.
Third - adhere to a certain order of thinking, starting with the simplest and most easily cognized objects and gradually ascending to the knowledge of the most complex, assuming order even where the objects of thinking are not at all given in their natural connection.
And the last - always make lists so complete and reviews so general that there is confidence in the absence of omissions.
Long chains of arguments, quite simple and accessible, which geometers are wont to use in their most difficult proofs, led me to the idea that everything accessible to human knowledge, however, follows one from the other. Thus, being careful not to accept as true what is not, and always observing due order in conclusions, it can be seen that there is nothing so far away that it could not be reached, nor so hidden that it could not be discovered. It didn't cost me much trouble to find out where to start, since I already knew that I should start with the simplest and most understandable; considering that among all those who had previously investigated the truth in the sciences, only mathematicians were able to find some evidence, that is, to present arguments undeniable and obvious, I no longer doubted that one should begin precisely with those that they investigated.
Since the senses do not deceive, I thought it necessary to admit that there is not a single thing that would be such as it appears to us; and since there are people who err even in the simplest questions of geometry and admit paralogism in them, I, considering myself capable of erring no less than others, rejected all the false arguments that I had previously taken as proofs. Finally, considering that any idea that we have in the waking state may appear to us in a dream, without being reality, I decided to imagine that everything that ever occurred to me was no more true than the visions of my words. . But I immediately drew attention to the fact that at the same time, when I was inclined to think about the illusory nature of everything in the world, it was necessary that I myself, reasoning in this way, actually exist. And noticing that the truth I think, therefore I am, is so firm and true that the most extravagant assumptions of skeptics cannot shake it, I concluded that I could safely accept it as the first principle of the philosophy I was looking for. Then, carefully examining what I myself am, I could imagine that I had no body, that there was no world, no place where I would be, but I could not imagine that as a result of this I did not exist, on the contrary , from the fact that I doubted the truth of other things, it clearly and undoubtedly followed that I exist. And if I stopped thinking, then, even if everything else that I ever imagined was true, there was still no basis for the conclusion that I exist. From this I learned that I am a substance whose whole essence or nature is thought, and which for its being does not need any place and does not depend on any material thing. Thus, my I, the soul, which makes me what I am, is completely different from the body and is easier to know than the body, and even if it did not exist at all, it would not cease to be what it is.
Then I considered what is generally required for this or that proposition to be true and certain; for having found one proposition to be reliably true, I must also know what this certainty consists in. And noticing that in the truth position I think, therefore I exist, I am convinced by the only clear idea that for thinking it is necessary to exist, I concluded that the following can be taken as a general rule: everything that we represent quite clearly and distinctly is true. However, some difficulty lies in the correct discrimination of what exactly we are able to represent quite clearly.
As a result, thinking about that since I doubt, it means that my being is not completely perfect, for I quite clearly discerned that complete comprehension is something more than doubt, I began to look for where I had acquired the ability to think. About something more perfect than myself, and I clearly understood that
it must come from something naturally more perfect. As for thoughts about many other things that are outside of me - about the sky, the Earth, light, heat, and a thousand others - I did not find it so difficult to answer where they came from. For noticing that there was nothing in my thoughts about them that would put them above me, I could think that if they were true, it depended on my nature, since it was endowed with some perfections; if they are false, then they are with me from being, that is, they are in me, because I lack something. But this cannot refer to the idea of a being more perfect than me: it is clearly impossible to obtain it from nothing. Since it is unacceptable to admit that the more perfect is the result of the less perfect, as well as to assume the emergence of any thing from nothing, I could not create it myself. Thus, it remained to be assumed that this idea was put into me by someone whose nature is more perfect than mine and who combines in himself all the perfections that are accessible to my imagination - in a word, God.
This word - true - in its own sense means the correspondence of thought to an object, but when applied to things that are beyond the reach of thought, it means only that these things can serve as objects of true thoughts - whether ours or God; however, we cannot give any logical definition that helps to know the nature of truth.
D. Locke. Sensational concept of the mind.
D. Locke(1632-1704) - English philosopher, sensualist.
Questions:
1. What is the role of the mind in knowledge according to Locke?
2. Why does the mind change a person?
3. What underlies the sensationalist concept?
“If, as has been shown, general knowledge consists in the perception of the conformity or inconsistency of our ideas, and the knowledge of the existence of all things outside of us ... is acquired only through our senses, then what room is left for the activity of any other faculty besides the external sense and inner perception? What is the mind for? For a lot of things: both to expand our knowledge and to regulate our recognition of something as true. Reason ... is necessary for all our other intellectual faculties, supports them, and actually includes two of these faculties, namely, insight and the ability to draw conclusions. With the help of the first ability, he seeks out intermediate ideas, with the help of the second, he arranges them in such a way that in each link of the chain he finds the connection that holds the extreme members together, and thereby, as it were, pulls out the desired truth. This is what we call "inference" or "conclusion" ...
Sensual experience and intuition are enough for very little.
The greater part of our knowledge depends on deduction and mediating ideas.... The faculty which finds the means and applies them correctly to establish certainty in the one case and probability in the other, is what we call "reason"...
Reason penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, raises our thoughts to the heights of the stars, leads us through the vast expanses of the great universe. But it does not cover the real area even of material objects, and in many cases it betrays us...
Reason completely betrays us where there are not enough ideas. Reason does not and cannot reach beyond ideas. Reasoning therefore breaks off where we have no ideas, and our reasoning comes to an end. If we reason about words, which do not designate any ideas, then reasoning deals only with sounds, and with nothing else ... "
Issues for discussion:
1. Subject and object of knowledge. Structure and forms of knowledge.
2. Features of the sensual and rational in cognition..
3. The problem of truth and error. Criteria, forms and types of truth.
4. Dialectics of the cognitive process. Agnosticism in philosophy.
Terms:
Subject, object, knowledge, sensory, rational, theoretical and empirical levels of cognition, cognitive sphere, sensation, perception, representation, concept, judgment, conclusion, abstract, epistemological image, sign, meaning, thinking, reason, mind, intuition, feeling, truth, error, falsehood, experience.
Tasks for checking the level of competencies:
1. There is a well-known theory of knowledge. Its essence is expressed in the following words: "... after all, to seek and to know - this is exactly what it means to remember ... But to find knowledge in oneself - this is what it means to remember, isn't it?"
a) What is the name of this theory?
c) What is the meaning of "remembering"?
d) What is common between this theory and the methods of scientific research?
2. Comment on Leonardo da Vinci's statement:
"The eye, called the window of the soul, is the main way through which the common sense can, in the greatest richness and splendor, contemplate the endless works of nature ... Don't you see that the eye embraces the beauty of the whole world?"
a) What does Leonardo consider the main way of knowing?
b) Is the path of cognition chosen by Leonardo philosophical, scientific, or perhaps it is a different path of cognition? Explain your answer.
3. Read F. Bacon's statement:
“Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as he has comprehended in the order of nature by deed or reflection, and beyond this he does not know and cannot.”
a) What role does F. Bacon assign to a person in the process of cognition? Should the researcher wait for nature to manifest itself or should he be actively involved in scientific research?
b) Does F. Bacon limit human possibilities in the study of nature? Explain your answer.
4. “For the sciences, however, goodness should be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous, and not interrupted steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle ones, one above the other, and finally to the most general ones. For the most the lower axioms differ little from bare experience, while the higher and most general ones (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid in them, but the middle axioms are true, solid and vital, on which human deeds and destinies depend. , finally, the most general axioms are located - not abstract, but correctly limited to these average axioms.
Therefore, it is necessary to give the human mind not wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they hold back its every jump and flight ... "
a) What is the method of cognition?
(b) What steps must a person go through in the process of cognition?
5. Expand the meaning of F. Bacon's slogan "Knowledge is power".
(a) What prospects does it reveal for humanity?
b) What attitude towards nature does this slogan form?
c) Is not the possession of knowledge one of the causes of ecological catastrophe?
6. F. Bacon was of the opinion that "It is better to cut nature into pieces than to be distracted from it."
a) What logical devices are opposed by F. Bacon?
b) Is this opposition correct?
7. "Those who practiced the sciences were either empiricists or dogmatists. The empiricists, like the ant, only collect and are content with what they have collected. Rationalists, like the spider, produce fabric from themselves. The bee chooses the middle way: it extracts material from garden and wildflowers, but arranges and changes it according to his ability. The true work of philosophy does not differ from this either.
a) Do you agree with Bacon?
b) Why does Bacon compare his method to a bee?
c) Confirm with specific examples the close and indestructible union of experience and reason in science and philosophy.
8. "The best of all proofs is experience ... The way people use experience now is blind and unreasonable. And because they wander and wander without any right path and are guided only by those things that come across, they turn to many things, but little progress is made...
a) What mode of knowledge does Bacon reject?
b) Why is experience, according to Bacon, the best way to obtain truth?
9. F. Bacon formulates the concepts of ghosts that occur in the course of knowledge:
"There are four kinds of ghosts that besiege the minds of people ... Let's call the first kind of ghosts - the ghosts of the clan, the second - the ghosts of the cave, the third - the ghosts of the market and the fourth - the ghosts of the theater."
(b) What is the meaning of each of the ghosts?
c) What method of getting rid of the ghosts of knowledge does Bacon offer?
10. “Very little experience and intuition are enough. Most of our knowledge depends on deduction and mediating ideas… The faculty that finds means and applies them correctly to establish certainty in one case and probability in another, is what we call “reason” …
Reason penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, raises our thoughts to the stars, leads us through the expanses of the universe. But it does not cover the real area even of material objects, and in many cases it betrays us...
But reason completely betrays us where there are not enough ideas. Reason does not and cannot reach beyond ideas. Reasoning therefore breaks off where we have no ideas, and our reasoning comes to an end. If we reason about words, which do not designate any ideas, then reasoning deals only with sounds, and with nothing else ... "
a) What direction in epistemology is represented in this judgment?
b) According to Locke, what role does the mind play in the process of cognition?
c) What is the limitation of the human mind in the process of cognition?
11. Consider the statement of R. Descartes:
“In the objects of our research, it is not necessary to look for what others think about them, or what we ourselves assume about them, but something that we can clearly and obviously see or reliably deduce, for knowledge cannot be achieved otherwise.”
a) What method of cognition is referred to in this statement?
b) What are the steps of this method?
c) What criterion of true knowledge does Descartes offer?
d) What errors in the course of cognition does Descartes warn against?
e) What is the limitation of the proposed method of cognition?
12. The French philosopher R. Descartes believed: “We come to the knowledge of things in two ways, namely: through experience and deduction ... Experience often misleads us, while deduction or a pure inference about one thing through another cannot be poorly constructed, even minds very little accustomed to thinking."
(a) What fallacy follows from Descartes' statement?
b) What is the basis for such a high evaluation of the deductive method?
c) What way of thinking is found in Descartes' statement?
13. Diderot believed that a person in the process of cognition can be likened to a "piano": "We are instruments gifted with the ability to sense and memory. Our feelings are the keys that the nature around us strikes."
a) What is wrong with this model?
b) How is the problem of the subject and object of cognition considered in this process?
14. I. Kant noted in the Critique of Pure Reason:
"The intellect cannot contemplate anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their combination can knowledge arise."
Is this point of view correct?
15. "Knowledge of the spirit is the most concrete and therefore the highest and most difficult. Know yourself - this is an absolute commandment, neither in itself nor where it was expressed historically, it does not matter only self-knowledge aimed at individual abilities, character, inclinations and weaknesses of an individual, but the meaning of knowing what is true in a person, true in and for oneself, is the knowledge of essence itself as spirit...
Every activity of the spirit is, therefore, its comprehension of itself, and the goal of every true science is only that the spirit in everything that is in heaven and on earth cognizes itself.
a) What form of epistemology is represented in this judgment?
b) Is it correct to expand the Socratic principle "know thyself" to "knowledge of essence itself as spirit"?
16. “Pure science, therefore, presupposes a liberation from the opposition of consciousness and its object. It contains thought, insofar as thought is also the thing in itself, or it contains the thing in itself, since the thing is also pure thought.
As a science, truth is pure developing self-consciousness and has the image of selfhood, that what is in and for itself is a conscious concept, and the concept as such is in and for itself what is. This objective thinking is the content of pure science."
a) Analyze this text and determine what worldview positions the author stands on.
17. Once Hegel, to the remark that his theories do not agree with the facts, replied: "So much the worse for the facts."
How are theory and reality related?
18. According to the figurative comparison of W. Goethe: "The hypothesis is the scaffolding that is erected in front of the building and demolished when the building is ready; they are necessary for the developer; he should not only take the scaffolding for the building."
What errors in knowledge does Goethe warn against?
19. Comment on R. Tagore's poem "The Only Entrance":
We are afraid of delusions, we have locked the door tightly.
And the truth said: "How can I enter now?"
20. "Plato proclaimed to the world: "There is no greater misfortune for a person than to become a misologist, that is, a hater of reason ...
If it were possible to formulate Kierkegaard's most cherished thoughts in a few words, one would have to say: the greatest misfortune of a person is an insane trust in reason and rational thinking. In all his works, he repeats in a thousand ways: the task of philosophy is to break free from the power of rational thinking, to find the courage to "seek the truth in what everyone is accustomed to consider paradox and absurdity."
“Long before Socrates, Greek thought, in the person of great philosophers and poets, looked with fear and anxiety into the ominous inconstancy of our fleeting and painful existence. Heraclitus teaches that everything passes and nothing remains. Tragedies with a tension that we do not meet in world literature, painted a stunning picture of the horrors of earthly existence."
a) In what way does Shestov see the opposition between the philosophical tradition of scientism and Kierkegaard's anti-scientist conception of human being?
b) Did ancient ontology really lay the foundations for the existentialist concept of being?
c) Is reason "the greatest misfortune of man", as Kierkegaard believed? Express your opinion.
21. "How did it happen that A. Poincaré, who seriously thought about the relativity of physical phenomena, ... missed the opportunity to carry out a great feat in science that immortalized the name of A. Einstein? It seems to me that I answered this question when I wrote: "Poincaré took a rather skeptical position in relation to physical theories, considering that there are an infinite number of different logically equivalent points of view and images, which the scientist chooses only for reasons of convenience. This nominalism apparently prevented him from correctly understanding the fact that among logically possible theories there are theories that are closest to physical reality, are closer adapted to the intuition of the physicist and are more suitable to assist his search for truth.
a) What is the philosophical meaning of this reasoning of L. de Broglie?
b) How do theory and objective reality correlate from the standpoint of natural science?
c) Can intuition help a physicist to reach the truth about physical reality? Explain how?
d) What direction in epistemology was closer to A. Poincare?
22. “Varawka could speak so well that his words fell into memory like silver coins in a piggy bank. When Klim asked him: what is a hypothesis?” He immediately answered: “This is a dog with which they hunt for truth.”
What properties of the hypothesis are determined by the hero of the novel?
23. In the curiosities of science, the following fact takes place. If the speaker reported that all his experimental results perfectly confirm the prediction of the theory, then the physicist P. L. Kapitsa remarked: “Well, you have made a good“ closure ”. be explained in terms of existing concepts.
Did P. L. Kapitsa reveal a real contradiction in scientific knowledge?
Essay topics:
1. "Science is not limited to the accumulation of knowledge, but always strives to streamline and generalize them in scientific hypotheses" (S. Bulgakov)
2. "Cognitive activity always leads to truth or lies" (N.O. Lossky)
3. "Two extremes: cross out the mind, recognize only the mind" (B. Pascal)
4. "Science is the basis of any progress that makes life easier for mankind and reduces its suffering" (M. Sklodowska-Curie)
5. “Not that knowledge is valuable, which is accumulated in the form of mental fat, but that which turns into mental muscles” (G. Spencer)
6. "Knowledge is a tool, not a goal" (L. Tolstoy)
Abstract topics:
1. Rational and irrational in knowledge.
2. Cognition and creativity.
3. The concept of truth in modern philosophical concepts.
4. The relationship of language, thinking and the brain.
5. The value of experience in the process of cognition.
Basic literature from the collections of the SUSU Library:
1. Alekseev P.V. Philosophy: Textbook // Alekseev P.V., Panin A.V. - M., 2007.
2. Bachinin V.A. Philosophy: encyclopedic dictionary // V.A. Bachinin. - M., 2005.
3. Kanke V.A. Philosophy. Historical and systematic course: Textbook for universities // V.A. Kanke. - M., 2006.
4. Spirkin A.G. Philosophy: Textbook for technical universities // A.G. Spirkin. - M., .2006.
5. Philosophy: Textbook // ed. Kokhanovsky V.P. - M., 2007.
Additional literature:
1. Alekseev P.V., Panin A.V. Theory of knowledge and dialectics. M., 1991.
2. Gadamer H.G. Truth and method. M., 1988.
3. Gerasimova I.A. The nature of the living and sensory experience // Questions of Philosophy. 1997. No. 8.
4. Lobastov G.V. What is truth? // Philosophical sciences. 1991. No. 4.
5. Oizerman T.I. Theory of knowledge. In 4t. M., 1991.
6. Selivanov F.A. Good. True. Communication / F.A. Selivanov. - Tyumen, 2008.
7. Heidegger M. On the essence of truth // Philosophical sciences. 1989. No. 4.
Questions for self-control:
1. Define the specifics of the concepts of "subject" and "object" of knowledge?
2. Are there fundamental differences between agnosticism, relativism and skepticism?
3. What is the specificity of cognitive activity? How do the ideal and the material correlate in practice?
4. What conclusions follow from the absolutization of truth or the exaggeration of the moment of relativity in it?
5. Compare the concepts of "truth", "falsehood", "delusion", "opinion", "faith".
6. Describe the concept of truth from the point of view of conventionalism, pragmatism, dialectical materialism.
7. Can an objectively true value become false over time? If yes, please provide examples to support this.
1. The problem of method in the philosophy of modern times: F. Bacon's empiricism.
2. Rationalism of R. Descartes.
3. Mechanistic materialism of the Enlightenment
4. Man and society in the works of F. Voltaire and J.-J. Rousseau.
Literature
1. Bacon F. New Organon. // Op. T.2. M., 1972. S.7-36, 83-91.
2. Voltaire F. Philosophical writings. M., 1988.
3. Holbach P. Chosen. Philos. prod. In 2 vol. M., 1963.
5. Kuznetsov V.N., Meerovsky B.V., Gryaznov A.F. Western European Philosophy of the 18th Century. M., 1986.
6. Narsky I.S. Western European philosophy of the 17th century. M., 1984.
7. Rousseau J.-J.. Treatises. M., 1969.
8. Sokolov V.V. European Philosophy XV-XVII centuries. M., 1984.
The philosophy of the New Age of the 16th-18th centuries is the period of formation and formation of many natural sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics, mechanics, etc.). Therefore, the central place in the problems of this period was occupied by the question of the development of general scientific methods of cognition, and epistemology becomes the leading section of philosophy.
Enlightenment occupies a special place in the philosophy of modern times, and its significance goes far beyond the era when its representatives lived and worked. Almost the entire 19th century passed under the sign of the triumph of the ideas of the Enlightenment. One of the central in the philosophy of the Enlightenment was the doctrine of nature, which had a materialistic coloring and anti-metaphysical orientation. In the opinion of the Enlighteners, the basis of the doctrine of nature should be based on experiments and experiments. Please note that these views bear the seal of mechanism: in the 18th century, chemistry and biology were in their infancy, so mechanics remained the basis of the general worldview. The laws of mechanics in this period were considered universal and applied to both biological and social phenomena. As part of the second question, it is supposed to get acquainted with the ideas of P. Holbach (the work "The System of Nature") and the most striking example of mechanism - the views of J.O. La Mettrie (composition "Man-machine").
Enlighteners saw a radical means of improving man and society in the dissemination of knowledge, science, in enlightenment and the proper education of man. Their worldview and philosophy were based on the belief in the reasonableness of the universe, and therefore in the possibility of building a society in accordance with the reasonable principles of educating a “reasonable” person. It is on the basis of these premises that the third question of the seminar should be opened. What are the views of F. Voltaire and J.-J. Russov on the individual and society? What are their similarities and differences? What spoils human nature and how to fix it? What options did these philosophers offer?
Exercise 1.
“The difference in our opinions does not come from the fact that some people are more intelligent than others, but only from the fact that we direct our thoughts in different ways and do not consider the same things. For it is not enough to have a good mind, the main thing is to use it well. (R. Descartes. Izb. Prod. M., 1960. P. 260).
Questions:
a) Why, starting from the 17th century, did they begin to emphasize the methodological, cognitive aspect of philosophy?
b) Is it possible to put an equal sign between philosophy and epistemology? If not, why not?
c) What modern trend in philosophy reduces philosophy only to the problems of scientific knowledge?
Task 2.
“For the sciences, good should be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous, not interrupted steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle ones, one above the other, and finally to the most general ones. For the lowest axioms differ little from bare experience. The highest and most general (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid in them. The middle axioms are true, firm and vital; human affairs and destinies depend on them. And above them, finally, are the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly limited to these average axioms. Therefore, it is necessary to give the human mind not wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they hold back its every jump and flight ... "
Questions:
a) What is the method of cognition?
(b) What steps must a person go through in the process of cognition?
Task 3.
17th century French philosopher K. Helvetius compared the process of cognition with a trial: the five senses are five witnesses, only they can give the truth. His opponents, however, objected to him, stating that he had forgotten the judge.
Questions:
a) What did the opponents mean under the judge?
b) What is the epistemological position of Helvetius?
c) What is the merit of such a position? What is its one-sidedness?
Task 4.
“Having thus reversed all that which, one way or another, we may doubt, and even assuming all this to be false, we easily admit that there is no God, no Heaven, no Earth, and that even we ourselves have no body, - but we still cannot assume that we do not exist, while we doubt the exclusiveness of all these things. It is so absurd to suppose non-existent that which thinks, while it thinks that, despite the most extreme assumptions , we cannot but believe that the conclusion, "I think, therefore I am," is true.
Questions:
a) Which of the philosophers of the New Age owns the expressed idea?
b) What is the initial basic principle of cognition embedded in it?
c) What method (formulate it) will provide an opportunity to go through this path of knowledge, to comprehend the truth?
Task 5. F. Bacon (1561-1626)
1. What is truth, according to the philosopher?
2. What are the four idols that lead human knowledge to a false path, does F. Bacon single out?
3. Why does F. Bacon criticize ancient philosophers?
There are four kinds of idols that besiege the minds of people. In order to study them, let's give them names. Let us call the first type the idols of the clan, the second - the idols of the cave, the third - the idols of the square and the fourth - the idols of the theater ...
The idols of the race find their foundation in the very nature of man ... for it is false to assert that the feelings of man are the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions, both of the senses and of the mind, rest on the analogy of man, and not on the analogy of the world. The human mind is likened to an uneven mirror, which, mixing its own nature with the nature of things, reflects things in a distorted and disfigured form.
The idols of the cave are the delusions of the individual. After all, in addition to the mistakes inherent in the human race, everyone has their own special cave, which weakens and distorts the light of nature. This happens either from the special innate qualities of each, or from education and conversations with others, or from reading books and from authorities before whom one bows, or due to a difference in impressions, depending on whether they are received by souls prejudiced and predisposed, or souls cold-blooded and calm, or for other reasons... That is why Heraclitus rightly said that people seek knowledge in small worlds, and not in the big, or general, world.
There are also idols that appear, as it were, due to the mutual connection and community of people. We call these idols, meaning the communion and fellowship of people that gives rise to them, the idols of the square. People are united by speech. Words are established according to the understanding of the crowd. Therefore, a bad and absurd establishment of words besieges the mind in a wonderful way. The definitions and explanations with which learned people are accustomed to arm themselves and protect themselves in no way help the cause. Words directly force the mind, confuse everything and lead people to empty and countless disputes and interpretations.
Finally, there are idols that have taken root in the souls of people from various dogmas of philosophy, as well as from the perverse laws of evidence. We call them the idols of the theatre, because we believe that as many philosophical systems are accepted or invented, as many comedies are staged and played, representing fictional and artificial worlds ... Here we mean not only general philosophical teachings, but also numerous principles and the axioms of the sciences, which have gained strength through tradition, faith and carelessness...
Bacon F. New Organon // Works. V 2 vol.
Task 6. R .Descartes (1596-1650)
1. Expand the content of the expression "I think, therefore I am." Why was this expression laid the foundations of rationalism as the most influential trend in the philosophy of modern times?
2. On what basis does R. Descartes consider rational knowledge to be more accurate than sensory?
3. According to R. Descartes, what next cognitive steps should be taken after the substantiation of the initial principles?
4. List the basic rules of the deductive method according to R. Descartes. Can this method be considered strictly scientific?
5. What is the ultimate goal of knowledge in accordance with the rationalistic Cartesian method?
[RATIONALISM]
I am, I exist - this is certain. For how long? As much as I think, for it is also possible that I would cease to exist altogether if I ceased to think. Therefore, strictly speaking, I am only a thinking thing, that is, spirit, or soul, or mind, or mind.<…>. What is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, desires, does not desire, imagines and feels<…>.
[BASIC RULES OF THE METHOD]
And just as the abundance of laws often gives rise to the justification of vices and the state is better governed if there are few laws, but they are strictly observed, so instead of a large number of rules that constitute logic, I concluded that the following four would be enough, if only I made a firm decision to constantly observe them without a single deviation.
The first is never to accept as true anything that I would not know as such with obviousness, i.e. to be careful to avoid haste and prejudice, and to include in my judgments only those things which appear to my mind so clearly and so distinctly as to give me no reason to doubt them.
The second is to divide each of the difficulties I am considering into as many parts as it takes to best solve them.
The third is to arrange your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the simplest and easily cognizable objects, and ascend, little by little, as if by steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing the existence of order even among those that in the natural course of things do not precede each other.
And the last thing is to make lists everywhere so complete and reviews so comprehensive that you can be sure that nothing is missing.
... Thus, if one refrains from accepting as true anything that is not, and always observes the order in which one should be deduced from the other, then there can be no truths either so remote that they are incomprehensible, nor so hidden that it is impossible to reveal them ... And yet, perhaps I will not seem too vain to you if you consider that there is only one truth about every thing and whoever finds it knows everything that can be known about it . So, for example, a child who has learned arithmetic, having made the correct addition, can be sure that he has found everything that the human mind can find regarding the required amount.
Descartes R. Reasoning about the method ... / / Works: In 2 vols. - M., 1989. - T. 1. - P. 260 - 262.
[EMPIRICAL METHOD AND THE THEORY OF INDUCTION]
Finally, we want to warn everyone in general, so that they remember the true goals of science and aspire to it not for entertainment and not out of competition, not in order to look haughtily at others, not for the sake of benefits, not for the sake of fame or power or similar inferior purposes, but for the benefit of life and practice and that they perfect and direct it in mutual love. For angels have fallen from the desire for power, but there is no excess in love, and neither an angel nor a person has ever been in danger through it (3.1.67).
We regard induction as that form of proof which takes account of the data of the senses and overtakes nature and rushes towards practice, almost mingling with it.
Thus, the very order of the proof turns out to be directly reversed. Until now, things have usually been conducted in such a way that from feelings and particulars they immediately soar to the most general, as if from a solid axis around which reasoning should rotate, and from there everything else was deduced through middle sentences: the path, of course, is fast, but steep and not leading to nature, but prone to disputes and adapted for them. With us, however, axioms are continuously and gradually established, in order only to arrive at the most general last; and this most general itself is not obtained in the form of an empty concept, but turns out to be well defined and such that nature recognizes in it something truly known to her and rooted in the very heart of things (3.1.71-72).
But both in the form of induction itself and in the judgment obtained through it, we are contemplating great changes. For that induction which the dialecticians speak of, and which proceeds by means of a mere enumeration, is something childish, since it gives shaky conclusions, is endangered by a contradictory example, looks only at the habitual, and does not lead to a result.
Meanwhile, the sciences need a form of induction that would produce division and selection in experience and draw the necessary conclusions by means of due exceptions and rejections. But if that usual way of judging by the dialecticians was so troublesome and wearying such minds, how much more will one have to work with this other way, which is drawn from the depths of the spirit, but also from the bowels of nature?
But this is not the end yet. For we also lay the foundations of the sciences deeper and strengthen them, and we take the beginnings of research from greater depths than people have done so far, since we are testing what ordinary logic accepts, as it were, on someone else's guarantee (3.1.72).
After all, the human mind, if it is directed to the study of matter (by contemplating the nature of things and the creations of God), acts in relation to this matter and is determined by it; if it is directed at itself (like a spider weaving a web), then it remains indefinite and although it creates some kind of fabric of science, amazing in terms of the fineness of the thread and the enormity of the labor expended, this fabric is absolutely unnecessary and useless.
This useless refinement or inquisitiveness is of two kinds - it can refer either to the subject itself (such are empty speculation or empty disputes, examples of which can be found in theology and philosophy), or to the method and method of research. The method of the scholastics, however, is approximately the following: first, they raised objections to any proposition, and then looked for the results of these objections, these same results for the most part were only a division of the subject, while the tree of science, like a bunch of twigs in a famous old man, is not composed of individual rods, but represents their close relationship. After all, the harmony of the building of science, when its individual parts mutually support each other, is and should be a true and effective method of refuting all particular objections (3.1.107).
[ON THE Dignity and Multiplication of the Sciences]
Those who practiced the sciences were either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like an ant, only collect and are content with what they have collected. Rationalists, like the spider, produce cloth from themselves. The bee chooses the middle way:
she extracts material from garden and field flowers, but arranges and modifies it according to her skill. The true work of philosophy does not differ from this either. For it does not rest solely or predominantly on the powers of the mind, and does not deposit in the consciousness untouched the material drawn from natural history and from mechanical experiments, but changes it and processes it in the mind. So, one should put a good hope on a closer and more indestructible (which has not been so far) union of these abilities - experience and reason (3.11.56-57).
To construct the axioms, another form of induction must be devised than that which has been used hitherto. This form must be applied not only to the discovery and testing of what are called principles, but even to lesser and intermediate ones, and finally to all axioms. Induction by mere enumeration is a childish thing: it gives shaky conclusions, and is endangered by contradictory particulars, deciding for the most part on the basis of fewer facts than it should, and, moreover, only those that are available. Induction, however, which will be useful in discovering and proving the sciences and arts, must divide nature by proper distinctions and exceptions. And then, after enough negative judgments, it should conclude positive ones. This has not yet been done, or even attempted, with the exception of Plato, who partly used this form of induction to extract definitions and ideas. But in order to construct this induction or proof well and correctly, it is necessary to apply much that has hitherto not occurred to any mortal, and to expend more work than has hitherto been expended on the syllogism. One should use the help of this induction not only for the discovery of axioms, but also for the definition of concepts. In this induction lies, undoubtedly, the greatest hope (3.P.61-62).
The very same sciences, based more on fantasy and faith than on reason and evidence, there are three: this is astrology, natural magic and alchemy. Moreover, the goals of these sciences are by no means ignoble. After all, astrology seeks to reveal the secrets of the influence of the higher spheres on the lower ones and the dominance of the former over the latter. Magic aims to direct natural philosophy from the contemplation of various objects to great accomplishments. Alchemy attempts to separate and extract the foreign parts of things hidden in natural bodies; the bodies themselves, polluted with these impurities, should be cleansed; release what is bound, bring to perfection what is not yet ripe. But the ways and means which, in their opinion, lead to these ends, both in the theory of these sciences and in practice, abound in errors and all sorts of nonsense (3.1.110).
But the most serious of all errors is the deviation from the ultimate goal of science. After all, some people strive for knowledge by virtue of an innate and boundless curiosity, others - for the sake of pleasure, still others - in order to gain authority, fourth - to gain the upper hand in competition and dispute, the majority - for the sake of material gain, and only a very few - in order to get a given from God's gift of reason to direct for the benefit of the human race (3.1.115-116).
My purpose is to show, without embellishment or exaggeration, the true weight of science among other things and, relying on divine and human evidence, to ascertain its true meaning and value (3.1.117).
Indeed, education frees a person from savagery and barbarity. But the emphasis should be on this word "correct". After all, disordered education acts rather in the opposite direction. I repeat, education destroys frivolity, frivolity and arrogance, forcing to remember, along with the case itself, all the dangers and difficulties that may arise, to weigh all the arguments and evidence, both “for” and “against”, not to trust what the first to attract attention and seem attractive, and to enter into any path, only having previously explored it. At the same time, education destroys empty and excessive wonder at things, the main source of every unfounded decision, because people are surprised at things either new or great. As for novelty, there is no such person who, having deeply become acquainted with science and observing the world, would not be imbued with a firm thought: “There is nothing new on earth” (3.1.132-133).
Therefore, I want to conclude with the following thought, which, it seems to me, expresses the meaning of the whole reasoning: science attunes and directs the mind so that from now on it will never remain at rest and, so to speak, does not freeze in its shortcomings, but, on the contrary, constantly motivated himself to action and strived for improvement. After all, an uneducated person does not know what it means to plunge into oneself, to evaluate oneself, and does not know how joyful life is when you notice that every day it gets better; if such a person accidentally possesses some kind of dignity, then he boasts of it and parades it everywhere and uses it, maybe even profitably, but, nevertheless, does not pay attention to developing it and multiplying it. On the other hand, if he suffers from some defect, he will use all his skill and diligence to hide and hide it, but in no case correct it, like a bad reaper who does not stop reaping, but never sharpens his sickle. An educated person, on the contrary, not only uses the mind and all his virtues, but constantly corrects his mistakes and improves in virtue. Moreover, in general, it can be considered firmly established that truth and goodness differ from each other only as a seal and an imprint, for goodness is marked by the seal of truth, and, conversely, storms and downpours of vices and unrest fall only from clouds of error and lies (3.1.134 ).
Since college tutors “plant” and professors “irrigate,” I must now speak of the shortcomings in public education. I , Undoubtedly, I condemn in the sharpest way the paucity of pay (especially in our country) for teachers of both general and special disciplines. For the progress of science requires above all that the teachers of each discipline be chosen from among the best and most educated specialists in the field, since their work is not intended to satisfy transitory needs, but must ensure the development of science through the ages. But this can be done only if such remuneration and such conditions are provided with which any, the most outstanding specialist in his field, can be fully satisfied, so that it will not be difficult for him to constantly engage in teaching and there will be no need to think about practical activities. In order for the sciences to flourish, it is necessary to adhere to the military law of David: “So that an equal part goes to the one who goes into battle and remains in the wagon train,” otherwise the wagon train will be poorly guarded. Similarly, science teachers turn out to be, so to speak, the guardians and guardians of all its achievements, which make it possible to fight on the field of science and knowledge. And therefore, the requirement that their payment is equal to the earnings of the same specialists engaged in practical activities is quite fair. If the shepherds of the sciences are not given a sufficiently large and generous reward, then what will happen is what can be said in the words of Virgil:
And so that the hunger of the fathers does not affect the frail offspring (3.1.142-143).
The most correct division of human knowledge is that which proceeds from the three abilities of the rational soul, concentrating knowledge in itself. History corresponds to memory, poetry to imagination, philosophy to reason. By poetry we mean here a kind of fictitious story or fiction, for the verse form is essentially an element of style and thus belongs to the art of speech, which we will discuss elsewhere. History, properly speaking, deals with individuals who are considered under certain conditions of place and time. For although natural history is at first glance concerned with species, this is only due to the resemblance existing in many respects between all the objects that belong to the same species, so that if one is known, then all are known. If, however, objects are found somewhere that are unique, such as the sun or the moon, or significantly deviate from the form, such as monsters (monsters), then we have the same right to tell about them in natural history, with which we tell in civil history. stories about famous people. All this has to do with memory.
Poetry - in the sense as said above - also speaks of single objects, but created with the help of the imagination, similar to those that are objects of true history; however, exaggeration and arbitrary depiction of what could never actually happen is quite often possible. The same is true in painting. Because it's all a matter of imagination.
Philosophy does not deal with individuals and not with sensory impressions of objects, but with abstract concepts derived from them, the combination and separation of which, on the basis of the laws of nature and the facts of reality itself, this science deals with. This is entirely within the realm of reason (3.1.148-149).
Knowledge in its origin can be likened to water: waters either fall from the sky or arise from the earth. In the same way, the initial division of knowledge must proceed from its sources. Some of these sources are in heaven, others are here on earth. Every science gives us two kinds of knowledge. One is the result of divine inspiration, the other is the result of sensory perception. As for the knowledge that is the result of learning, it is not original, but is based on previously acquired knowledge, just as it happens with water streams that are fed not only from the sources themselves, but also take in the waters of other streams. Thus we divide science into theology and philosophy. Here we mean divinely inspired, i.e. sacred, theology, and not natural theology, which we will talk about a little later. And this first, i.e. inspired by God, we will take it to the end of the work in order to complete our reasoning with it, for it is the harbor and Sabbath for all human reflections.
Philosophy has a threefold subject - God, nature, man, and, accordingly, a threefold path of influence. Nature affects the intellect directly; as if by direct rays; God, on the other hand, acts on him through an inadequate medium (ie, through creations) with refracted rays; a person, becoming himself the object of his own cognition, affects his intellect by reflected rays. Consequently, it turns out that philosophy is divided into three doctrines: the doctrine of the deity, the doctrine of nature, the doctrine of man. Since the various branches of science cannot be likened to several lines radiating from one point, but rather they can be compared with the branches of a tree growing from one trunk, which, before dividing into branches, remains whole and unified in a certain area, then, before to proceed to the consideration of the parts of the first division, it is necessary to admit one universal science, which would be, as it were, the mother of the other sciences and in their development occupy the same place as that common section of the path beyond which the roads begin to diverge in different directions. We will call this science “the first philosophy”, or “wisdom” (once it was called the knowledge of divine and human things). We cannot oppose this science to any other, because it differs from other sciences rather in its boundaries than in content and subject, considering things only in the most general form (3.1.199-200).
We can say that the study of nature should be divided into the study of causes and the obtaining of results: into parts - theoretical and practical. The first explores the bowels of nature, the second remakes nature, like iron on an anvil. I am well aware of the close connection between cause and effect, so that sometimes in the presentation of this question it is necessary to speak of both at the same time. But since every solid and fruitful natural philosophy uses two opposite methods, one ascending from experience to general axioms, the other leading from general axioms to new discoveries, I think it most reasonable to separate these two parts - theoretical and practical - from each other and in intention of the author of the treatise, and in its very content (3.1.207).
And of course, without much damage to the truth, one could now, following the ancients, say that physics studies that which is material and changeable, while metaphysics is mainly that which is abstract and unchanging. On the other hand, physics sees in nature only external existence, movement and natural necessity, while metaphysics also sees mind and idea. [...] We have divided natural philosophy into investigating causes and obtaining results. The study of causes, we attributed to theoretical philosophy. The latter we divided into physics and metaphysics. Therefore, the true principle of the separation of these disciplines must inevitably follow from the nature of the causes that are the object of research. Therefore, without any ambiguities and roundabouts, we can say that physics is a science that investigates the active cause and matter, metaphysics is the science of form and final cause (3.1.209-210).
We believe that the most correct division of abstract physics is its division into two sections: the doctrine of the states of matter and the doctrine of aspirations (appetitus) and motions (3.1.220).
Let's move on to metaphysics. We attributed to it the study of formal and final causes. This might seem useless as far as forms are concerned, since it has long been firmly held that no human effort can reveal the essential forms of things or their true distinguishing features (3.1.225).
But even after many particulars have been properly brought before our eyes, as it were, one should not immediately proceed to the investigation and discovery of new particulars or practical applications. Or at least if it's done, it shouldn't stop here. We do not deny that after all the experiences from all the sciences have been collected and arranged in order and concentrated in the knowledge and judgment of one person, then from the transfer of the experiences of one science to another by means of that experience which we call scientific (literata), discover many new things that are useful for human life. However, not so much is to be expected from this as from a new light of axioms, which, according to a certain method and rule, are deduced from those particulars and in their turn indicate and determine new particulars. After all, the path does not pass through the plain, it has ascents and descents. First they ascend to the axioms, and then descend to practice.
Nevertheless, it should not be allowed that reason jumps from particulars to remote and almost the most general axioms (what are the so-called principles of sciences and things) and, according to their unshakable truth, would test and establish average axioms. So it has been until now: the mind is inclined to this not only by natural impulse, but also because it has long been accustomed to this by proofs through syllogism. For the sciences, however, goodness is to be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous and not interrupted steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle ones, one above the other, and finally to the most general. For the lowest axioms differ little from bare experience. The highest and most general axioms (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and they have nothing solid. The middle axioms are true, firm and vital; human affairs and destinies depend on them. And above them, finally, are the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly limited to these average axioms.
Therefore, the human mind should not be given wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they restrain its every jump and flight. But this, however, has not yet been done. When this is done, the best can be expected from the sciences.
To construct the axioms, another form of induction must be devised than that which has been used hitherto. This form must be applied not only to the discovery and testing of what are called principles, but even to lesser and intermediate ones, and finally to all axioms. Induction by mere enumeration is a childish thing: it gives shaky conclusions and is endangered by contradictory particulars, making judgments for the most part on fewer than necessary facts, and only those that are available. Induction, however, which will be useful in discovering and proving the sciences and arts, must divide nature by proper distinctions and exceptions. And then, after enough negative judgments, it should conclude positive ones. This has not yet been done, or even attempted, with the exception of Plato, who partly used this form of induction to extract definitions and ideas. But in order to construct this induction or proof well and correctly, it is necessary to apply much that has hitherto not occurred to any mortal, and to expend more work than has hitherto been expended on the syllogism. One should use the help of this induction not only for the discovery of axioms, but also for the definition of concepts. This induction is undoubtedly the greatest hope.
In constructing axioms by means of this induction, one must weigh and investigate whether the axiom being established is adapted only to the measure of those particulars from which it is extracted, or whether it is fuller and wider. And if it is fuller or wider, then we need to see if the axiom can not strengthen this breadth and completeness by indicating new particulars, as if by some kind of guarantee, so that we do not get bogged down in what is already known, and do not cover with an excessively wide scope only shadows and abstract forms, not solid and definite in matter. Only when this becomes a habit will a sure hope shine in justice.
Here it is necessary to repeat again what was said above about the expansion of natural philosophy and the reduction of particular sciences to it, so that there is no separation of sciences and a gap between them. For even without this, there is little hope of moving forward.
Thus we have shown that it is possible to eliminate despair and create hope, if we part with the errors of the previous time or correct them. Now we need to see if there is anything else that will give hope. And here comes the next consideration. If people, not achieving this but pursuing other goals, nevertheless discovered a lot of useful things as if by accident or in passing, then no one will doubt that if they start searching, doing directly what is needed, and go along a certain path and in a certain order, and not in jumps, they will open a lot more. Although it may sometimes happen that someone, by a happy coincidence, will make a discovery that previously eluded him who searched with great effort and diligence; but in the vast majority of cases, no doubt, the opposite happens. Therefore, much more, better, and obtained at shorter intervals, should be expected from the understanding, activity, direction and striving of people than from chance, animal instincts and the like, which hitherto gave rise to discoveries.
We can also cite the following circumstance, which gives hope. Not a little of what has already been discovered is such that, before it was discovered, it could hardly have occurred to anyone to expect anything from it; on the contrary, everyone would neglect it as impossible. People usually judge new things by the example of old ones, following their imagination, which is prejudiced and stained by them. This kind of judgment is misleading, because much of what is sought at the sources of things does not flow in the usual streams.
For example, if someone, before the invention of firearms, described this thing in terms of how it works, and would say this: “An invention has been made by which it is possible from a long distance to shake and destroy walls and fortifications, no matter how great they are ", then people, of course, would begin to make many different guesses about increasing the strength of projectiles and guns by means of weights and wheels and wall-beating devices of this kind. But hardly anyone's imagination and thought would imagine such a sudden and rapidly spreading and exploding fiery wind, for a person did not see close examples of this kind, except, perhaps, an earthquake and lightning, and these phenomena would be immediately excluded by people as a miracle of nature. which man cannot imitate.
In the same way, if someone, before the invention of silk thread, had spoken like this: “A thread of a certain kind was found for the needs of clothing and decoration, far superior to linen and woolen thread in fineness, but at the same time strength, as well as beauty and softness,” people would immediately begin to think of some silky plant, or the finer hair of some animal, or the feathers and down of birds. And of course, they would never have thought about the tissue of a small worm, about its abundance and annual renewal. And if anyone threw any word about the worm, he would no doubt be ridiculed, like a person who raves about some unknown cobweb.
In the same way, if someone, before the invention of the nautical needle, had said: “An instrument has been invented by which it is possible to accurately determine and indicate the cardinal points and the cardinal points of the sky,” then people would immediately, incited by the imagination, rush to various assumptions about the manufacture of more perfect astronomical appliances. The invention of such an object, the movement of which perfectly converges with the heavenly, although it itself is not from among the heavenly tols, but consists of stone or metal, would be considered completely impossible. However, this and the like, having remained hidden from men for so many times of the world, was not invented by philosophy or science, but by chance and coincidence. For these discoveries (as we have already said) are so different and remote from everything previously known that no previous knowledge could lead to them.
