The situation on the Soviet-German front and the plans of the parties for the summer of 1943

Before a new test

At the end of March 1943, after fierce winter battles, a relative calm set in on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet armies, which had advanced far to the west, consolidated on the achieved lines. Both belligerents were intensively preparing for new operations.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government were clearly aware of the difficult and complex tasks that the Soviet people would have to solve in order to achieve complete victory over the enemy. The information that came to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command testified to the firm intention of the rulers of Nazi Germany to take revenge for the defeat in the battle of Stalingrad, to conduct a total mobilization of the resources of the country and the occupied states of Europe to continue the war. Regarding the second front in Europe, the CPSU and the Soviet government had no particular illusions - it was clear that the ruling circles of the United States and Britain would not open a second front in 1943 either.

Assessing the prospects for waging war in the summer and autumn of 1943, the Soviet Supreme High Command could not ignore the fact that the military power of the Reich would continue to be concentrated in the East. And this meant that the war would require a new effort of all forces from the Soviet people and their army. The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No. 95 dated February 23, 1943 stated: “The Red Army faces a severe struggle against an insidious, cruel and still strong enemy. This struggle will require time, sacrifices, the exertion of our forces and the mobilization of all our capabilities.”

The Soviet Supreme High Command also took into account the fact that large contingents of the Japanese army were still at the Far Eastern borders. Soviet Union. This forced the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to keep significant forces here. The threat to the southern borders of the USSR from Turkey, which continued to focus on the fascist bloc, was not completely removed. As of April 1, 1943, the troops stationed in the Far East and on the southern borders of the USSR numbered 1955 thousand people, 18.8 thousand guns and mortars, 3.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 4.5 thousand combat aircraft. This amounted to more than a third of the personnel, more than a quarter of the guns and mortars, two thirds of the tanks, self-propelled artillery installations and combat aircraft of the army in the field. This fact completely refutes the false assertions of some bourgeois historians that the Soviet Union had the opportunity to use more than 90 percent of its military power against Germany, while Germany in 1943-1944. was forced to keep a significant part of its military power (35-45 percent) in other theaters.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government were faced with the most acute task of further mobilizing the country's material, human and spiritual forces for inflicting ever more powerful blows on the enemy. It was necessary to continue to make full use of the advantages of the Soviet social and state system, the socialist economy, to strengthen and improve the Armed Forces in every possible way, which was constantly taken care of by the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the same time, the experience of the war and the tasks that the troops had to solve were carefully taken into account.

Significant progress has been made in the technical equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces. By July 1943, the number of automatic weapons in the active army almost doubled compared to April, anti-tank artillery - 1.5 times, anti-aircraft artillery - 1.2 times, aircraft - 1.7 times and tanks - 2 times.

The saturation of the troops with new types of military equipment and weapons, the accumulation of combat experience, the growth of the military skills of the command staff made it possible to carry out a number of measures for the organizational improvement of the army. They were aimed primarily at ensuring the massive use and effective use of the latest military equipment in offensive operations, giving formations and formations greater fire and strike power and high maneuverability.

In the armored and mechanized troops, which constituted the striking and maneuvering force ground forces, military equipment of improved samples arrived - T-34 tanks with an improved chassis and engine, self-propelled artillery mounts SU-122 and SU-152. A powerful projectile of a 152-mm self-propelled artillery mount freely pierced the armor of tanks of all types. If on April 1, 1943, there were 4882 tanks and 94 self-propelled artillery installations in the active army, then on July 1 - 9831 tanks and 368 self-propelled artillery installations. Of the total number of tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, by the beginning of July, heavy and medium ones accounted for more than 64 percent.

Organizational changes in the armored and mechanized forces included the formation of tank and mechanized formations and tank formations. In the spring of 1943, tank armies were created according to the new state. The mixed tank formations that existed before, including rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry formations, by the summer of 1943 had become homogeneous. The new armies consisted, as a rule, of two tank and one mechanized corps, subunits and reinforcement and maintenance units, which had approximately the same speed of movement and maneuverability. This increased the combat capabilities of the tank troops, facilitated the maneuvering of large tank groupings, made it possible to use them massively in decisive directions, and also facilitated the command and control of formations and their material support. The creation of tank armies of the new organization practically solved the important issue of further organizational massing of tanks.

By the summer of 1943, four tank armies of uniform composition were created in the Soviet Armed Forces, and in July a fifth was formed. They were a means of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and were transferred to the operational subordination of the fronts operating in the main directions.

The organizational improvement of tank and mechanized corps provided for an increase in the independence of their actions in the operational depth. This was achieved by the fact that their states included artillery and mortar units. The combat capabilities of tank brigades and tank regiments increased, as they began to receive more heavy and medium tanks.

In the first half of 1943, the formation of self-propelled artillery regiments continued, used as artillery escort for infantry and tanks. The previously created self-propelled artillery with all the controls and logistical support, by a decree of the State Defense Committee in April, was transferred to the command of the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet army. Thus, the armored and mechanized troops acquired new capabilities, became more powerful, while continuing to be one of the decisive branches of the armed forces both in the offensive and in defense. Their use ensured an increase in the scope of operations and the achievement of decisive goals in them. It should be noted that due to losses, as well as the difficulties experienced by the industry, it was not always possible to bring the actual number of personnel and military equipment in tank formations to the standard. Thus, tank corps were usually equipped with 150-170 tanks instead of 209. However, this shortcoming was compensated by the skillful use of armored vehicles and the high skill of tank soldiers.

The increased supply of new types of weapons to the army contributed to a number of organizational measures in rifle and artillery units and formations. A major event carried out in the rifle troops was the reorganization of brigades, which had weak fire and striking power, into rifle divisions. According to the staff approved in July 1943, the number of rifle divisions compared to the end of 1942 decreased by 55 people, the number of rifles by 200, but the number of machine guns-pistols increased by 321, guns and mortars by 19. This was most in line with the offensive nature military operations. However, due to losses, the actual average number of rifle divisions during the summer and autumn of 1943 could not always be brought up to the regular strength. Usually in rifle divisions there were from 6 to 8 thousand instead of 9380 people.

The formation of rifle corps, begun back in 1942, continued. Their number in the active army increased from 34 in early April to 64 by July and to 128 by early December. With the creation of rifle corps, the control of combined-arms formations and their interaction with artillery and tanks improved, and massing of troops during the offensive was also ensured.

Artillery also underwent major organizational changes. The development of military artillery took place with the expectation of giving formations and formations more independence in battle, operations, expanding the ability of commanders and commanders to influence the course of hostilities, creating more favorable conditions for the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks, strengthening anti-tank and air defense of troops . So, in a rifle division, the number of 120-mm mortars increased from 18 to 21 and anti-tank guns from 30 to 48. The number of guns and mortars in the tank corps by the end of 1943 increased from 90 to 152 compared to the beginning of the year, in the mechanized corps - from 246 to 252. We got our own artillery and armies. Cannon, anti-tank, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments were organizationally assigned to each combined arms army. The tank army now had two anti-tank, two mortar, two anti-aircraft artillery regiments and two self-propelled artillery regiments.

The organization of the artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) was improved. In April, six-brigade artillery divisions began to form, which received the name breakthrough artillery divisions. They consisted of 356 guns and mortars instead of 248 in artillery divisions of four brigades. Of great importance was the GKO decree of April 12, 1943 on the creation of breakthrough artillery corps consisting of two breakthrough artillery divisions and one Guards mortar division. In total, the corps had 496 guns, 216 mortars and 864 M-31 launchers. The breakthrough artillery corps were a powerful firepower.

Organizational changes were also carried out in other types of artillery. By July, heavy howitzer artillery was reduced to high-capacity brigades (24 203-mm howitzers each). Heavy cannon artillery divisions were created. Mortar regiments of the RVGK were united into mortar brigades of the RVGK.

The development of anti-tank artillery proceeded at a rapid pace. Compared with the beginning of the war, the number of its guns in the artillery of the RVGK increased by almost 5 times. In the spring of 1943, anti-tank artillery brigades were created, which had high maneuverability. They were used in the most important areas to repel tank attacks of the Nazis.

Field rocket artillery has undergone significant organizational changes. By May 1943, the formation of rocket artillery divisions was completed. The division consisted of three homogeneous brigades. She fired a salvo of 3456 shells with a total weight of up to 320 tons. In addition, in 1943, regiments and divisions of rocket artillery were created specifically for tank, mechanized and cavalry formations. Until April 1943, the field rocket artillery was directly subordinated to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. By a GKO resolution of April 29, she was reassigned to the commander of the artillery of the Soviet army.

The formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions of four regiments continued (three regiments were armed with 37-mm and one regiment with 85-mm guns). This made it possible to hit enemy aircraft at altitudes up to 7 thousand meters. By July 1943, the number of anti-aircraft guns and machine guns in the active army had increased by more than 1.5 times compared to July 1942. This significantly strengthened the air defense of the troops.

As a result of organizational changes in artillery, the number of large formations has increased. If by the beginning of April the active army and the Stavka reserve had 60 artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and guards mortar divisions and 17 brigades, then by the beginning of July - 65 divisions and 51 brigades. In addition, 4 breakthrough artillery corps were formed. The number of guns and mortars in the RVGK artillery has increased. If in November 1942 she had about 17 thousand guns, mortars and rocket launchers, then in June of the following year their number was over 33 thousand.

The increase in the total number of RVGK artillery fully corresponded to the nature of the offensive operations of the Soviet troops. Large artillery formations, being a powerful means of reinforcing fronts and armies, provided greater opportunities for maneuver and concentration of artillery in the main directions, and contributed to a more precise organization of control over massive artillery fire.

There was a further organizational improvement and strengthening of units and formations of the engineering troops. In the first half of 1943, the formation of engineer-sapper and other special engineering brigades of the RVGK continued. In May, new formations of engineering troops were created - assault engineering and sapper brigades of the RVGK. Their task was to provide engineering support for breaking through heavily fortified defensive positions and fortified areas. In connection with the forthcoming forcing of large water barriers, the formation of separate motorized pontoon-bridge regiments of the RVGK with heavy bridge parks began. In March, light-duty fleets were introduced into the engineering brigades (except for special-purpose brigades). By the summer, the number of engineering and pontoon bridge brigades had increased. If at the beginning of April 1943 there were 57 of them in the ground forces, then by the middle of the year - 61.

The offensive nature of the upcoming hostilities required the reorganization of the signal troops and the improvement of communications. The number of radio stations at the disposal of the communications chiefs of the fronts and armies increased by 3 times. This made it possible to echelon radio equipment when moving headquarters and thereby achieve continuity of radio communications in offensive operations. The number of radio stations at the tactical level of command increased by 2-3 times, which made it possible in most divisions to bring radio communications up to and including the battalion, and in divisional artillery to the battery. The restoration of the corps link of command led to the formation of separate corps communication battalions from April. The quantitative and qualitative growth of communications technology made it possible to uninterruptedly control troops and organize interaction more clearly.

The special signal troops operating under the leadership of the state security agencies were strengthened in technical and organizational terms. They were entrusted with ensuring a stable closed telephone connection, through which negotiations were conducted between the leaders of the party and government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with the fronts and armies. The signalmen of the special forces built new air and cable communication lines, promptly suppressed the attempts of enemy saboteurs to disrupt their work.

There was a reorganization in the chemical troops. By the beginning of summer, technical teams were created to set up smoke screens and mask large objects.

Significant transformations took place in the Soviet Air Force, which received new types of aircraft. This made it possible, along with replenishment of losses and an increase in numbers, to improve the qualitative composition of front-line aviation and long-range aviation. The air armies were strengthened and new air formations were additionally formed. In the summer of 1943, the number of aircraft in the fighter and attack aviation regiments increased from 32 to 40, which significantly increased their combat capabilities.

The air armies created in 1942 turned out to be the most successful form of organizing aviation associations. By April 1, 1943, there were 13 air armies in the active fronts. In the winter and spring of 1943, the aviation corps of the reserve of the Supreme High Command were intensively formed. They included more than 40 percent of the combat aviation of the army in the field. In total, there were four fighter, nine mixed, three attack and three bomber aviation corps, with a total of 2601 combat aircraft. Aviation corps became a powerful maneuvering tool of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. They were intended to build up aviation forces in the main directions of operations of the troops of the fronts and, as a rule, were attached to the air armies for the period of the operation. If at the end of 1942 the air army, excluding the attached aviation of the RVGK, had an average of no more than 400 aircraft, then by July 1943 - up to 500. Attached aviation corps increased the fleet of air armies to 750-800 aircraft, and armies, operating in the main directions, until 1100-1200.

Concerned about strengthening long-range aviation, the State Defense Committee on April 30, 1943 decided to organize 8 aviation corps on the basis of the existing long-range bomber aviation divisions. The total number of long-range aviation aircraft by July 1, 1943 was increased to 950 combat vehicles.

In the Soviet Air Force, the main body of experienced flight personnel was preserved, which was replenished with pilots who graduated from educational institutions. In aviation educational institutions, reserve and training aviation regiments during 1943, 22,082 pilots, navigators, radio operator gunners and air gunners were trained and retrained. Many commanders of regiments and squadrons were retrained in advanced courses. Command personnel gained experience in managing aviation formations and units in defensive and offensive operations.

The increased production of aircraft of improved designs and the decrease in combat losses led to a steady increase in the number of Soviet aviation. As of April 1, the active army had 5,892 combat aircraft, of which 4,978 (84 percent) were new types. By the beginning of July, the total number of combat aircraft reached 10,252, and the number of new types of aircraft was 8,948 (87.3 percent).

Organizational changes took place in the airborne troops. In the summer of 1943, the airborne brigade became their main unit.

Replenished with military equipment of the Navy. Warships, transport and auxiliary vessels received more advanced automatic anti-aircraft installations. The equipment of warships with new radar and sonar stations has increased significantly. The air defense of naval bases and airfields was strengthened. The creation of formations and units of fighter, bomber, mine-torpedo and assault aircraft continued in the fleet. Aviation brigades were reorganized into aviation divisions, which were armed with new types of aircraft.

They received new military equipment of the Air Defense Forces of the country. New fighters began to enter service with the air defense aviation units. Parts of the medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery were re-equipped with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, received artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices (PUAZO-3), gun-guided radar stations, detection and guidance radar stations ("Redut-43" and "Pegmatit").

The Air Surveillance, Warning and Communications Service (VNOS) of the Air Defense Forces of the country was reorganized on a radio engineering basis. Starting from the summer of 1943, in all formations and formations of the Air Defense Forces of the country, radar stations began to be used not only to detect an air enemy and guide fighters, but also to orient aircraft in conditions of poor visibility or aircraft that had gone astray, as well as to escort bombers and attack aircraft and warning them about the appearance of enemy fighters, detecting enemy airfields and observing the flights of his aircraft behind the front line.

Major organizational changes were carried out in the Air Defense Forces of the country. The growth in the number of air defense formations and formations complicated their management. On June 29, 1943, the State Defense Committee decided to divide the Air Defense Forces into two fronts - Western and Eastern. The border between them passed to the east of Arkhangelsk, Kostroma, Krasnodar, Sochi. The Western Front was stronger in terms of its combat and numerical strength, since it had to operate in the zone of the most intense enemy air raids. It was entrusted with the air defense of Moscow and the entire Moscow industrial region, Murmansk, the Yaroslavl industrial complex, as well as front-line facilities and communications.

Part Western front included the Special Moscow Air Defense Army, created after the disbandment of the Moscow Air Defense Front, 11 air defense corps and divisional areas and 14 air defense fighter aircraft formations. The fighter aviation that defended Moscow was united into the 1st Air Defense Fighter Army. As of July 1, 1943, the Western Air Defense Front had: combat crews of fighter aircraft - 1012, medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns - 3106, small-caliber anti-aircraft guns - 1066.

The Eastern Air Defense Front provided air defense of the most important objects of the Northern and Southern Urals, the Middle and Lower Volga, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. It consisted of the Transcaucasian air defense zone, 7 air defense corps and divisional areas, 8 air defense fighter aircraft formations and consisted of 447 combat crews of fighter aircraft, 2459 medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns, 800 small-caliber anti-aircraft guns.

The office of the commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country was abolished, and their leadership was entrusted to the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army.

With the creation of air defense fronts, the control of formations and units of the Air Defense Forces has significantly improved. However, the abolition of the post of commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country turned out to be insufficiently justified. The artillery commander of the Soviet Army, due to the heavy workload, experienced significant difficulties in coordinating the actions of the air defense fronts.

In the summer, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft searchlight and anti-aircraft machine-gun divisions were created in the Air Defense Forces of the country. Separate VNOS radio battalions began to form. They turned out to be quite maneuverable, which made it possible to quickly organize the VNOS service in the territory liberated from the enemy.

Significant changes have taken place in the structure of the rear of the Armed Forces. By the GKO resolution of June 9, 1943, the Main Logistics Directorate was abolished and the direct subordination of the head of the rear services to the People's Commissar of Defense was established. The headquarters of the rear was formed. A number of departments were subordinated to the chief of logistics, including the Central Directorate of Military Communications, as well as two military academies - transport, logistics and supply. The new structure of the central apparatus of the rear of the Soviet army more fully corresponded to the tasks that were being solved by the Armed Forces.

The increase in the strength of the Soviet army and navy, the entry into service of a large amount of new military equipment, as well as the transition to decisive offensive operations, sharply increased the needs of the troops for material support, and, consequently, greatly expanded the scope of work for the rear of the center, fronts and armies. This required the additional formation of rear formations, units and institutions, especially railway, road and automobile units, the creation of warehouses and hospitals. The number of NPO central warehouses has increased. During the preparation of operations, a significant part of the warehouses was transferred to the fronts, mainly operating in the southwestern and western strategic directions.

When planning a strategic offensive for the summer and autumn of 1943, back in February - March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out the first relocation of the central warehouses of the main and central supply and support departments of the Soviet army during the war. They were moved west of Moscow and west of the Volga border - to the Rzhev-Vyazma, Kursk, Donbass and Taman directions, where major offensive operations were planned. This event had great importance for the rear support of the most important groups.

The most significant in the organization of the rear was the introduction of a new provision on the procedure for supplying material and technical means. Now the responsibility for their delivery to subordinate formations and units was assigned to the senior commander, which ensured an increase in the mobility and maneuverability of units and formations in battle and operation.

By the middle of the year, the number of vehicles in the automobile units of the Soviet Army had increased significantly. By the beginning of July 1943, there were 195,662 trucks in the active army, while in April - 168,434.

The constantly increasing volume of transportation by road, the construction and maintenance of military roads necessitated the creation of the Main Automobile and Main Road Directorates, and in the fronts and armies - departments and departments of automobile and road services. The expansion of restoration work on military highways and railway transport entailed a significant increase in the number of road and railway troops.

Engineering and airfield, airfield and technical parts were replenished with people and equipment. In connection with the strengthening of the rear of the Air Force, the engineering-aerodrome and aerodrome-technical support of aviation combat operations has improved.

New factories were created to repair armored vehicles, as well as mobile separate tank repair battalions, evacuation companies and detachments, assembly and distribution centers, etc. The repair of military equipment and weapons in the rear areas of the fronts and armies ensured their speedy return to the battlefield.

More advanced principles of sanitary evacuation and staged treatment of the wounded, specialization of hospitals were introduced into the practice of the military medical service. Created favorable conditions for the treatment of the sick and wounded in the operational and military rear. Front and army medical institutions were located closer to the troops, they were replenished with experienced medical personnel. Anti-epidemic protection has been significantly improved in the troops. For the first time in the history of wars, the front and rear of the Soviet army were spared dangerous epidemics.

The reorganization of the rear structure of the Soviet army provided an increase in the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces.

During the period of preparation for the summer-autumn offensive, the rear services carried out a huge amount of work. The active army received a colossal amount of military equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and medical equipment. The Bryansk, Central and Voronezh fronts received a significant part of the material resources. In March-July alone, 231,516 rifles, 276,714 submachine guns, 31,643 light and heavy machine guns, 21,868 anti-tank guns, 333 anti-aircraft guns, 7,365 ground artillery guns, including including 4384 anti-tank guns, and 4628 mortars. The Main Artillery Directorate did not send such a quantity of weapons to the troops either during the preparation of the counteroffensive near Moscow, or during the preparation of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. The task of providing the troops with ammunition, fuel, food was basically solved.

The Soviet command showed great concern for the everyday needs of front-line soldiers. The clothing service of the Soviet Army provided a seasonal change of uniforms for all personnel of the army in the field, supplied uniforms, shoes and equipment to new replenishment of the fronts and personnel of the formed units and formations of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

In the spring of 1943, by decision of the GKO, the structure and activities of the food service underwent some changes. In the active army, special bodies were created and officials were appointed, who were charged with the responsibility of organizing the catering of personnel. Central courses for food service workers and front-line schools for cooks were organized. Short-term gatherings of cooks in formations were held. The party demanded from commanders, political workers and business executives of all levels to constantly take care of the life of the fighters.

Carrying out such large and complex events in preparation for the upcoming battles was unthinkable without the efficient work of rail and road transport.

Operational and supply transportation during this period was carried out under the strong influence of enemy aircraft. Such railway junctions as Kursk, Shchigry, Uzlovaya, Yelets, Kastornaya and others were subjected to especially intense strikes. However, the enemy failed to disrupt or seriously disrupt military transportation. Railway troops and special formations of the NKPS quickly eliminated the destruction on the railways of the fronts and the front-line zone.

The delivery of goods to the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, for which transportation was carried out along the single-track line Kastornaya - Kursk, was very difficult. By the decision of the State Defense Committee of June 8, 1943, the railway units of the Voronezh Front were instructed to lay a new line - Stary Oskol - Rzhava, 95 km long, in two months. Its construction greatly facilitated the provision of troops located on the Kursk Bulge.

The Kursk regional party committee called on the workers of the region to help the construction site, and they warmly responded to the call. The construction of the new road was completed in 32 days, that is, almost a month ahead of schedule established by the GKO. Over 450 construction participants were awarded orders and medals for the early completion of the construction of the new railway line.

The total volume of operational and supply centralized and intra-front rail transportation during the preparation of the Battle of Kursk along the Bryansk, Central and Voronezh fronts amounted to 167,623 wagons.

In the transportation of troops and supply cargoes, the automobile units of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, operational formations and units of the army played an important role. A particularly large volume of traffic was carried out by road transport on the Central Front.

The road troops of the fronts did a great job of restoring and maintaining the front and army military highways, as well as the military highways of the Supreme Command Headquarters, in a passable condition.

Great concern for the timely provision of the fronts with the material resources necessary for combat was shown by the political departments and party organizations of the rear organs, units and institutions. Taking into account the importance and specifics of the tasks to be solved, they ensured that each officer and soldier of the rear unit, unit or institution knew exactly their duties and clearly performed them.

Preparation for new battles required the additional staffing of the existing fronts with command, political, engineering and technical personnel. In this regard, the officer corps has increased. If on April 1, 1943 there were 939,884 officers in the active fronts, then by July 1, 1943 there were already 1,033,934 of them. In addition, about 220 thousand officers were in the reserve. However, secondary military educational institutions did not fully meet the needs of the troops for highly qualified personnel at the platoon-company level. Therefore, the front-line and army junior lieutenant courses that arose during the war continued to operate, where the best junior commanders and fighters were enrolled.

In 1943, a worthy contribution to the struggle of the Soviet army against fascism was made by the national formations formed in the fraternal union republics. The creation of such formations made it possible to organize military and political training of soldiers of one or another nationality in their native language. The working people of the union republics and regions sent new reinforcements, military equipment, weapons, food to volunteer regiments, divisions, corps, national military formations, and maintained close ties with the front.

The Soviet Union, fulfilling an international mission, united the efforts of all anti-fascist forces in their just struggle against the Nazi invaders. One of the most important forms of support for the liberation struggle of the peoples was comprehensive assistance in the formation, equipment and training of foreign units and formations on the territory of the USSR.

On April 29, the GKO decided to form the 1st Czechoslovak separate infantry brigade, and in May 1943, the creation of the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko began. In the second half of July, the deployment of the Polish 1st Separate Fighter Squadron and the 1st Training Aviation Squadron began. Romanian and Yugoslav units were also created.

By the summer of 1943, the level of leadership of troops by commanders, commanders and staffs of all levels had increased. Generals and officers acquired rich combat experience and skills in command and control. The bodies of the highest military leadership - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, the commanders and headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and branches of service - went through a big school. Through its representatives, the Headquarters was closely connected with the fronts.

The Communist Party was well aware that, despite the heavy defeats suffered by the fascist German army on the eastern front in the winter of 1942-1943, the enemy continued to be strong and dangerous, that he would try to take revenge for the winter's failures. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took measures to strengthen party influence in the troops, urged Soviet soldiers strain all your strength to achieve victory. In early April, Pravda wrote: “The Red Army faces a difficult struggle against an insidious and cruel enemy, which is mobilizing all its forces and all the reserves of vassal states ... Days of severe battles and difficult trials await us.”

A surge of new strength among the personnel of the army and navy was caused by the May Day appeals of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. They reflected the urgent requirements of the military-political situation in which the Soviet country found itself, clearly and concretely formulated the tasks of the fighters and commanders of the Soviet Army and Navy: to consolidate and develop the successes of winter battles, not to give the enemy a single inch of reclaimed land, to prepare for decisive battles with the Nazi enslavers, to take revenge on them for the plunder and destruction of cities and villages, violence against women and children, for the murder and deportation of Soviet people into German slavery.

To fulfill these tasks, it was necessary to further improve the military skills of the personnel. Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, in May Day Order No. 195, demanded that all soldiers continue to tirelessly improve their combat skills, and from commanders of all branches of the military and combined arms commanders - to become masters of driving troops, to skillfully organize the interaction of all branches of the military and manage them in battle , study the enemy, improve intelligence. These instructions formed the basis of Party political work among the troops.

A new scope was given to it by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of May 24, 1943 "On the reorganization of the structure of party and Komsomol organizations in the Red Army and the strengthening of the role of front-line, army and divisional newspapers." The reorganization was caused primarily by the need to further strengthen the connection of the Communist Party with the masses of soldiers and to increase the role of the primary party and Komsomol organizations in the education of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. Almost two years of war experience showed the need to expand the network of primary party organizations. This was especially important to do on the eve of new battles for which the troops were preparing. In offensive battles, special efficiency in party work was required, when it was difficult, and sometimes impossible, to hold general party meetings in regiments and equal units, and the bureau of the regimental primary party organization to direct the activities of 25-30 company party organizations, especially since the number of communists in them grew continuously. In addition, the abolition of the institute of deputy commanders of companies, batteries, squadrons and squadrons for the political part by the GKO decree of May 24 required an expansion in the number of party activists, improvement of party work in companies and equal units.

In accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, primary party organizations were now created in battalions, divisions, squadrons, and in regiments - party bureaus to manage primary and company organizations. In companies and equal units, party organizations or party groups were retained. Komsomol organizations in the Soviet army were reorganized in accordance with the structure of party organizations.

A similar restructuring of the structure of party and Komsomol organizations took place in the Navy.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, taking into account the experience of the past months of the war, introduced the institution of appointed party organizers and Komsomol organizers in all units and subunits at the front and in the rear. In the active army, in cases where it was difficult to hold party and Komsomol meetings, members of the bureau were also appointed. The released party organizers and Komsomol organizers began to work in the party and Komsomol organizations of battalions and divisions.

The change in the structure of party organizations in the Soviet army made it possible to increase the number of primary party organizations from 40,262 on June 1 to 60,414 by the beginning of summer operations, that is, one and a half times, more than 400 thousand activists were nominated for leading party and Komsomol work. As of July 1, 1943, there were 1,818,385 communists in the Soviet army - more than half of the party's membership - and 2,493,396 Komsomol members. This further enhanced the role of Party organizations in solving combat missions and strengthened Party influence on personnel.

The front and army press was of great importance in solving the problems facing the troops. In accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Main Political Directorates of the Soviet Army and Navy, military councils and political agencies carried out a number of measures that made it possible to improve the work of front-line, army and divisional newspapers, increase their role in the political, military and cultural education of personal composition.

Front press organizationally strengthened. Newspapers became a constant companion of the soldiers. In July 1943, the one-time circulation of dailies alone at the front was 1,624,000 copies. The military councils and political agencies improved the management of the press, ensured an increase in the ideological level of the newspapers, and helped turn them into genuine centers of political work among the troops.

In the spring and summer of 1943, all party political work in the Soviet Armed Forces was built in close, inextricable connection with the preparation of troops for decisive offensive operations. In connection with the reorganization of the structure of party and Komsomol organizations and the reduction in the number of political workers, the Main Political Directorates of the Soviet Army and Navy took measures to increase the role and responsibility of unit commanders for conducting continuous political work in battle. A new system of training party and Komsomol activists was introduced, a reserve was created in the troops to replace party organizers and Komsomol organizers who had fallen out of action, and the responsibility of party organizations for the activities of communists in field departments and command and control headquarters was increased.

The main political departments have gained rich experience in managing political agencies, and their connection with the troops and navy has improved. They began to more quickly influence the activities of the military councils and political agencies of the fronts and fleets, armies and flotillas, the study, generalization and implementation of the best practices of party political work were more widely practiced. In April 1943, all-army meetings of agitators, assistant chiefs of political departments of fronts and districts for Komsomol work, employees of special propaganda departments of political agencies of the fronts were held, in May - a meeting of the heads of front-line, district and army Houses of the Red Army, in July - a meeting of editors of front-line and army newspapers . They developed specific measures to improve agitation and propaganda work, the activities of cultural and educational institutions, party and Komsomol activists in the context of the deployment of broad offensive operations.

The meeting in April 1943 with the participants of the All-Army Conference of agitators, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. I. Kalinin, contributed to the increase in the activity and effectiveness of agitation and mass work among the troops. He gave agitators advice on how to conduct conversations with fighters, how to prepare for thematic performances, urged them to be carriers and conductors of high discipline, striving to improve military skills, and take care of the fighters, especially the wounded. These advices of an outstanding party and statesman were of great importance not only for agitators, but also for all those involved in the political education of personnel.

A great deal of work in preparing troops for offensive battles was carried out by military councils, commanders and political agencies of formations and formations. They paid their main attention to improving the quality of combat training, improving the military skills of fighters, and the ability of commanders to lead troops in defense and offensive. Political organs and party organizations disseminated the advanced experience gained by fighters and commanders in the winter offensive. They instilled in the soldiers a high political consciousness, selfless love for the Motherland, courage and selflessness, a sense of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, strengthened socialist ideals in the minds of soldiers and commanders.

The concern of the party and the government to encourage the heroes of the battles contributed to the increase in the morale and fighting spirit of the soldiers. The number of those awarded with orders and medals grew. The ranks of the Soviet guard increased. On June 11, 1943, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the samples of the Red Banners for the guards armies and guards corps. From now on, not only regiments, brigades and divisions, but already entire corps and armies fought under the shadow of the guards banners.

As a result of the enormous work of the Communist Party, the personnel of the army in the field were prepared morally, politically and psychologically for the summer and autumn operations of 1943. The soldiers and commanders were determined to wear down the enemy in defensive battles and achieve decisive victories in the upcoming summer offensive.

In the spring of 1943, the state security agencies waged a tense struggle with German intelligence. The Abwehr continued a wide and extremely fierce secret war against the USSR. In 1943, the number of enemy agents sent to the Soviet army, the rear of the fronts and the deep rear areas of the USSR increased one and a half times compared to 1942.

Spies and saboteurs thrown into the Soviet Union were supplied with weapons, explosives, by special means to commit terrorist acts, radio stations, ciphers, military and civil documents.

The Soviet state security organs resolutely suppressed the actions of the enemy's reconnaissance, selflessly defended the Soviet rear from spies and saboteurs. From April to December 1943 alone, they neutralized more than 12,000 enemy agents at the front and in the rear.

The Soviet command paid much attention to summarizing the experience of the war. The armed struggle, which engulfed vast territories, provided valuable material for analyzing the development of military art. The Soviet Armed Forces have accumulated a particularly rich experience. At the beginning of 1943, the draft Field Manual (PU-43) was published. By July, the charters and instructions of some military branches and aviation entered the troops. These documents were a concentrated expression of the main achievements of Soviet military-scientific thought, military art and technical progress of that time.

The lull at the front was used by the command for combat training of troops, improving the tactical skills of rifle, tank and artillery formations, units and subunits. The commanders worked hard to improve the combat skills of the personnel. Infantrymen and tankers, gunners, pilots, sappers were trained in an environment as close as possible to combat.

The scope and nature of the upcoming operations demanded that special attention be paid to the accumulation of strategic reserves. If by the beginning of April there were 614.5 thousand people, 7849 guns and mortars (excluding 50-mm mortars), 919 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the ground forces, then by July - up to 1111 thousand people , 16,782 guns and mortars, 2,688 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts. In addition, by the beginning of July, the Headquarters had 662 aircraft in reserve. The highest form of organization of strategic reserves was the Steppe Military District. The associations included in the district constituted the second echelon of the strategic formation of Soviet troops in the Kursk direction. In a report to I. V. Stalin on the state of the reserves on May 28, 1943, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General A. I. Antonov, reported: “The unification of 50 percent of all the troops of the Stavka reserve as part of the Steppe Military District made it possible to better organize leadership and control over the course military training."

As a result of the enormous work carried out by the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters and the General Staff, the command of the fronts and armies, as well as political agencies in the spring of 1943, the combat power of the army in the field increased significantly. The number of personnel from April to July increased by 782 thousand people, the number of military equipment increased: guns and mortars - by 22,714, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations - by 5223, combat aircraft - by 4360.

By July, the Soviet Armed Forces, replenished with personnel and military equipment and having two years of war experience, were ready to solve new tasks of a large strategic scale.

The efforts of fascist Germany to build up the power of the armed forces were carried out in 1943 on a wide scale and were aimed mainly at increasing the combat capability of the troops operating on the Soviet-German front.

On January 14, 1943, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces put forward a proposal to carry out a "general action to arm the troops of the eastern front." The next day, Hitler issued an order according to which all military products in the coming months should be sent to the troops in the East in order to "equip a certain number of divisions at an accelerated pace with modern combat weapons, turn them into full-fledged offensive formations." The most trained human contingents, the latest and the best views military equipment was immediately sent to equip the divisions operating on the eastern front.

However, in solving this problem, the command of the Wehrmacht met with great difficulties. According to the German General Staff, during the two years of the war with the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht lost more than 4,126 thousand people killed, missing, wounded and evacuated due to illness. During the same time, 3,896,295 people were drafted into the armed forces.

To replenish and form new formations, the fascist leadership had to call on a total mobilization of a significant number of workers reserved for military industry and transport enterprises, as well as 60-year-old men and 16-18-year-old boys. The quality of this contingent, both in terms of physical condition and combat training, was low. The newly drafted were sent to the active army after 4-6 months of training, which they underwent in the army of the reserve and in the restored or formed divisions. But often the preparation was frustrated due to huge losses in the East. The command of the Wehrmacht was forced, after 6-8 weeks of training, to send these contingents to the front. With great difficulty, the replenishment of the officer corps took place. Military educational institutions did not have time to make up for the losses in command personnel. By the end of 1943, 80 percent of all young officers had only three months of training.

The decrease in the combat capability of the Wehrmacht caused alarm to the fascist leadership. On June 22, Hitler signed Order No. 15 on raising the combat capability of the infantry. It noted: “... in the fourth year of the war, for obvious reasons, it is in the infantry, which suffers the heaviest casualties and loses its best people, that certain shortcomings in the training, reserves, business qualities of junior commanders appear, it is difficult to replenish their ranks for youth account. The elimination of these shortcomings is the duty of military leaders of all degrees ... ".

In order to somehow cope with the problem of replenishing the Wehrmacht, the Nazi command resorted to downsizing the rear units and subunits.

As a result of total mobilization, more than 2 million people were drafted into the army. This made it possible in the first half of 1943 to create new divisions and replenish formations that suffered losses in the winter of 1942-1943. Since March, the accelerated restoration of the divisions defeated at Stalingrad and in North Africa began. In total, in the first half of the year, the fascist command again formed and completed 50 divisions for the ground and air forces and 4 divisions of the SS troops. However, despite the mobilization of new contingents, the Wehrmacht command was forced, due to huge losses, to transfer infantry divisions to reduced staffing. According to the new state, instead of nine infantry battalions, only six remained in the division. The division's headcount was reduced from 16,859 to 12,708. At the same time, its fire capabilities increased as a result of an increase in the number of automatic weapons, 120-mm mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.

The troops received new artillery weapons - anti-tank 75-mm and 88-mm guns. And yet, as before, the Wehrmacht did not have a powerful enough tool to deal with Soviet tanks. Former officer of the Wehrmacht General Staff E. Middeldorf wrote: “Anti-tank defense, without a doubt, is the saddest chapter in the history of the German infantry ... Since the first appearance of the T-34 tank ... an acceptable anti-tank infantry weapon has not been created.”

The bulk of the infantry formations were still on the Soviet-German front. Of the 253 infantry divisions and 2 brigades that were in the German armed forces by July 1943, 169 divisions (up to 70 percent) and two infantry brigades operated on the Soviet-German front.

The Nazi leadership attached exceptional importance to the resupplying and formation of tank and motorized divisions. The inspector of the armored forces, General G. Guderian, wrote in March 1943: “The point is to immediately create fully combat-ready tank divisions, while it is better to have a few full-fledged divisions instead of a large number of poorly equipped formations ... If we manage to solve this problem , then we, in cooperation with the air force and the submarine fleet, will win. If it fails, the ground war will become protracted and costly.” Much attention was paid to providing tank divisions with more advanced combat equipment. The troops received tanks "Tiger", "Panther" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand". These machines were the last word in German military technology. They had powerful weapons, strong armor protection and perfect sights, but they had insufficient maneuverability. The previous types of tanks - T-III and T-PV - were also improved.

During the first half of 1943, the fascist German command again formed two motorized divisions and converted the same number into infantry divisions.

The rest of the motorized and tank formations were understaffed to the state. Of the 41 tank and motorized divisions on the Soviet-German front, there were 20 tank and 6 motorized divisions, or over 63 percent of all formations of the armored forces. The vast majority of armored vehicles were also sent to the eastern front.

Urgent measures were taken to replenish aviation formations with military equipment and personnel. The solution to this problem was complicated by the heavy losses suffered by German aviation on the eastern front. The shortage of flight personnel did not allow replacing aviation units battered in battles. They were replenished on the spot with individual crews and aircraft, while many crews did not have combat experience. Field Marshal A. Kesselring, describing the situation in German fighter aviation in 1943, noted: “The quality of training of new pilots who replenished the ranks of aviation no longer met the requirements that were imposed on pilots by new forms of defense. Along with a noticeable shortage of teachers and instructors, training aircraft and, above all, fuel for training and combat flights, in the last two years of the war, the flight personnel were very tired and their combat readiness was reduced. If in March 1942 the bomber aviation of Nazi Germany had 127 reserve crews, then in March 1943 it lacked 364 crews.

And yet, despite the difficulties, the Nazi command managed to create a strong aviation grouping on the Soviet-German front, transferring many air formations there from Germany and from other theaters of war. By the summer of 1943, out of 4,900 combat aircraft, up to 2,700 (55%) were on the Soviet-German front and 2,200 aircraft (45%) on other fronts and in Germany. The German Air Force was united into six air fleets, of which four operated on the Soviet-German front and two in the West.

By the beginning of July 1943, the fascist German aviation and the aviation of the satellite countries on the Soviet-German front had 2980 aircraft, including 2041 bombers, 586 fighters and 353 reconnaissance aircraft.

Ammunition production has increased significantly. In 1943, their output in tons exceeded the level of 1941 by 4.7 times. In an effort to secure their rear, the fascist command made great efforts to defeat the partisan movement in the occupied Soviet territory, especially in areas where the main communications of troops aimed at attacking Kursk passed. For this, significant forces of regular units and formations were allocated and the troops of Germany's satellites were widely used. However, attempts to defeat the partisan formations were in vain. The fire of the people's war flared up more and more intensely.

In the fourth year of the war, the political and military leaders of Germany took decisive steps to indoctrinate the population and the army. Strict requirements were imposed on officers to strengthen the ideological education of their subordinates. In May, the Supreme High Command, as a model, circulated the order of the commander of the mountain rifle corps, General F. Scherner, to instill morale among the soldiers. He urged the officers to exercise ideological influence and to achieve conscious participation in the war and those soldiers who "relate to what is happening with stupid indifference."

With great zeal, Nazi propaganda undertook to strengthen the Germans' faith in victory, which had been greatly shaken. In the spring of 1943, the influence of the fascist party in the Wehrmacht was further strengthened. However, the number of political speeches increased every month. The army created a central special court-martial for "the speedy trial of political crimes against confidence in the political or military leadership."

The Nazi leadership paid great attention to the issues of ideological influence on the personnel of the Soviet army. Soviet counter-propaganda exposed the enemy's ideological sabotage in a timely manner, instilled in Soviet soldiers faith in the power of their weapons, in the triumph of a just cause. Subsequent events showed the complete collapse of fascist propaganda.

By the summer of 1943, total mobilization allowed the Nazi military leadership to significantly increase the combat power of the army. The armed forces of the fascist bloc on the Soviet-German front increased from April to July: personnel - by 266 thousand, the number of guns and mortars - by 5.4 thousand, tanks and assault guns - by 2.5 thousand. increased.

In addition to the German divisions, the troops of the Reich's allies continued to operate on the eastern front, numbering 32 divisions and 8 brigades. In total, by the beginning of July, the Soviet army was opposed by 232 divisions (including ten infantry brigades, equated to five divisions).

The Hitlerite command was quite satisfied with the technical equipment of the Wehrmacht and its readiness to deliver new strikes on the eastern front. Speaking on June 5, 1943 at the Fuhrer's headquarters in Sonthofen, W. Keitel stated: “Such a military-industrial power of Germany and such weapons not only compensate for the material losses resulting from well-known events, but also create such a level of weapons German army that will surpass anything that has ever existed."

He was echoed by A. Speer, who made a speech on the same day at a meeting of Nazi functionaries in Berlin: “We provide the front with new weapons, new tanks, aircraft and submarines in such a quantity that will enable our soldiers not only to withstand this fight but also achieve final victory. However, the Nazi clique hastened to conclusions, once again making a fatal mistake - overestimating the forces of the Wehrmacht and underestimating the Soviet Armed Forces. This was evidenced by the balance of forces that had developed on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of July 1943.

* Excluding 50mm mortars and rocket artillery.

** Excluding submarines based in the Baltic Sea.

As can be seen from the table, total mobilization gave significant results; The fascist German command invested all the might of its military machine in the forthcoming third offensive on the Soviet-German front, but there were significant changes in the balance of forces and means in favor of the Soviet army.

The Hitlerite command failed to bring the total number of its armed forces in the East to the level reached by mid-November 1942, nevertheless Germany continued to be a powerful adversary and the forces concentrated by it for a new offensive were huge.

The plans of the Soviet command

The Soviet command began developing a war plan for the summer and autumn of 1943 at the end of March, immediately after the end of the winter battles. The development of the plan went through a number of stages. This complex work involved the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, the command and headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and combat arms, the command and headquarters of a number of fronts.

Initially, it was planned to start the campaign with broad offensive operations, delivering the main blow to the south westbound. The Supreme High Command proceeded from the fact that the Soviet army had the strategic initiative and was superior to the Wehrmacht in terms of forces and means. Already in early April, the Stavka reserve had six combined-arms and two tank armies, as well as a number of separate formations. However, these plans were soon changed.

In an effort to unravel the intentions of the enemy, the Soviet command closely followed his actions. The headquarters of the Supreme Command demanded that the most serious attention be paid to the organization of intelligence of all kinds. The directive of the Headquarters of April 3, 1943, in particular, pointed out the need to “be sure to achieve the capture of prisoners in order to constantly monitor all changes in the enemy’s grouping and timely determine the directions in which the enemy is concentrating troops, and especially his tank units.” The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement were tasked with finding out the presence and location of reserves, the course of regroupings and the concentration of troops transferred from the countries of Western Europe.

All types of intelligence contributed to the disclosure of the plans of the Nazi command. Military intelligence worked hard. Only in combined arms formations and units of the Central and Voronezh fronts from April to July 1943 more than 2,700 reconnaissance observation posts were organized, not counting commander's and artillery ones. The troops of these fronts carried out reconnaissance in force more than 100 times, carried out more than 2,600 night searches, and set up 1,500 ambushes. As a result, 187 Nazi soldiers and officers were captured. Conducted deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines. So, the reconnaissance group of senior lieutenant S.P. Bukhtoyarov discovered 7 airfields, 13 field ammunition depots, 8 fuel depots and captured more than 30 prisoners. The scouts reported to the command that the enemy had new types of tanks and assault guns, as well as information about the possibility of him going on the offensive.

Intensively carried out aerial reconnaissance revealed the areas of concentration of the main enemy groupings, the basing and composition of German aircraft, the air defense system of airfields, the nature of defensive structures, the location of strong points, artillery firing positions and areas for the location of reserves. Aerial photography provided valuable data on the regroupings of the Nazi troops, the concentration of forces and means in the Kursk direction. By mid-May, aerial reconnaissance had established a concentration of more than 900 enemy tanks in the Orel, Kromy region, and more than 580 aircraft at 16 airfields in this direction. Very valuable intelligence data was provided by partisans, as well as intelligence agencies.

The information received by the General Staff contained data on the plans of the fascist command, the number, armament and regrouping of enemy troops in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. So, in the spring, information was received from the Pobediteli operational group operating near Rovno about the transfer of Nazi troops to the Kursk direction. The intelligence officer of this group, N. I. Kuznetsov, at a reception at the Gauleiter of Ukraine E. Koch, established that Hitler was preparing a "surprise" for the Bolsheviks near Kursk. By "surprise" was meant a major offensive. Information about this was transmitted by radio to Moscow.

On May 7, human intelligence agencies informed the State Defense Committee about a major offensive operation being prepared in the Oryol-Kursk direction under the code name "Citadel". On May 23, they presented new data confirming reports of enemy preparations for a large strategic offensive in the Orel and Kursk region. On May 26, a report from one of the Soviet intelligence officers was transmitted: "The Germans are preparing an offensive from Orel to Yelets and from Kharkov to Voronezh with the task of encircling the grouping of Soviet troops in these areas." The intelligence officer reported on the deployment of fascist troops in the Orel region and north of the city. At the same time, the state security organs transmitted information about the intention of the Nazi command to use new tanks, including Tigers, in large numbers for the first time in the upcoming offensive operation.

Organized and purposeful activity of all types of reconnaissance helped the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to reveal the enemy’s plan, to establish the composition of his strike groups and the direction of the attacks being prepared, that is, to obtain important data for making the most appropriate decision. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, noting the complexity and variety of problems solved by headquarters and command in preparation for the summer-autumn campaign, wrote: “Processing the information received, the General Staff had to analyze them in depth, draw appropriate conclusions from all the numerous messages, among which could be both disinformation and erroneous. After all, such multifaceted work, as you know, is carried out by thousands of people in the agencies of undercover and military intelligence, partisans and people who sympathize with our struggle.

After the intentions of the enemy to launch a major offensive in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge became clear, the question of the nature of the actions of the Soviet troops arose before the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Under the circumstances, it was possible to adhere to the previous plan, take broad offensive actions and thereby forestall the attack that was being prepared. However, the Soviet command, having realistically assessed the forces of the still powerful enemy and the fact that Nazi Germany was again concentrating its main forces on the Soviet-German front, including large tank groups, recognized it as more expedient not to rush to the offensive, but to create a powerful defense in the Kursk direction , enable the Wehrmacht to strike first and, in the course of a carefully prepared defensive battle, weaken its most powerful strike groups concentrated in the Orel and Belgorod region, and then go on a counteroffensive and then on to a general strategic offensive. “Analyzing intelligence data on the preparation of the enemy for the offensive,” notes A. M. Vasilevsky, “the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters gradually leaned towards the idea of ​​​​transitioning to deliberate defense. This issue was repeatedly discussed in the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters in late March - early April.

On April 10, JV Stalin instructed the General Staff to prepare a meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer and autumn and to ask the opinion of the front commanders on the possible nature of the actions and probable directions of strikes by the Nazi troops. The commanders of the Central and Voronezh fronts expressed their firm conviction that the enemy would advance in the Kursk direction.

On April 12, a meeting was held at Headquarters to discuss the plan. It was attended by I. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky and Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov. The meeting participants came to the conclusion that the most likely goal of the Wehrmacht's summer offensive would be the encirclement and destruction of Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. Subsequently, the Nazis will try to develop an offensive in the eastern and southeastern directions, while the possibility of their offensive to the northeast to bypass Moscow is not ruled out. It was assumed that in the remaining sectors of the front the fascist German command would defend itself or conduct distracting actions, since there it did not have the forces necessary for large-scale offensive operations.

Although the strategic initiative was with the Soviet army and it had the opportunity to conduct active offensive operations, the Supreme Command Headquarters made a preliminary decision on a deliberate defense. It was deemed necessary to create a strong defense in depth in all the most important areas, and primarily in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. When developing a solution, it was taken into account that the Wehrmacht received new tanks and assault guns, the fight against which would present significant difficulties. It was supposed to use the strengths of the defense prepared in advance, wear down the powerful tank groups of the enemy during the defensive battle and create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. Defensive and offensive operations on the Kursk Bulge were organically united by a single plan and represented a system of operations, the implementation of which was supposed to ensure the firm retention of the strategic initiative and the transition to a general offensive in the most important strategic directions. The enemy offensive had to be stopped in the tactical defense zone, since a breakthrough of his tank formations in the Kursk region would put the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts in a difficult situation. It was in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge that a decisive defeat had to be inflicted on the main enemy forces.

Under the prevailing conditions, the transition to a temporary deliberate defense was the most advantageous way to wear down the Wehrmacht's shock groupings and create favorable conditions for a transition to a general offensive. Another option was envisaged at the meeting: the transition of the Soviet troops to active operations if the fascist command did not launch an offensive near Kursk in the near future, but postponed it to a later date.

The defense of the Soviet troops was not forced, but deliberate. The Soviet army did not lose the initiative captured in the winter battles, but chose the nature of military operations that was beneficial to it. The choice of the moment of transition to the offensive was made dependent on the development of the situation. There was a rare case in the history of wars - the strongest side deliberately went on the defensive. The adoption of such a plan testifies to the creative approach of the Soviet Supreme High Command to the solution of the strategic tasks of the war. The Soviet army would be able to deliver preemptive strikes. However, it is not difficult to imagine what colossal efforts and losses it would have cost in that particular situation, when the enemy was still very strong. Going on the counteroffensive after the enemy had been exhausted in the course of fruitless attacks made it possible to count on much greater successes with fewer losses. The development of events confirmed the absolute correctness of the plans of the Soviet command.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command believed that in the summer of 1943 the main events would take place in the zone of the Western (left wing), Bryansk, Central and Voronezh fronts. The General Staff, the command of the Central and Voronezh fronts were instructed to plan and prepare a defensive operation on the Kursk salient. At the same time, the development of plans for offensive operations in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions began. The readiness of the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and right wing of the Central Fronts to go on the offensive in the Oryol direction was scheduled for May 20. The tasks for these fronts were set in last days April.

On April 25, the Stavka reviewed the situation on the Voronezh Front, against which the enemy was concentrating a powerful group of troops, and approved the front defense plan submitted by his command. The completion date was set for May 10. At the same time, the Headquarters ordered the troops of the front to be ready for the offensive no later than June 1.

The troops of the Central Front had to repel the offensive of the Wehrmacht from the direction of Orel, and the troops of the Voronezh Front from the Belgorod region. After solving the problems of defense, it was planned that the Soviet troops would go on a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. This was to happen when the enemy had exhausted their forces in offensive battles. The offensive operation in the Oryol direction, which was to be carried out by the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and right wing of the Central Fronts, received the code name "Kutuzov". The defeat of the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of the enemy was to be carried out by the forces of the Voronezh Front and the Steppe District in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front. The plan of this operation was named "Commander Rumyantsev".

An important role in the battles was assigned to the Steppe Military District - a powerful strategic reserve of the Stavka. It was entrusted with preventing a deep breakthrough of the enemy both from the side of Orel and from the side of Belgorod, and when going over to the counteroffensive, his troops had to increase the force of the strike from the depths. The main thing for the district was the offensive task. Already on April 23, he received instructions from the troops "to prepare mainly for offensive combat and operations."

During the defeat of the Wehrmacht groupings in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet command envisaged launching a general offensive in the southwestern and western directions, inflicting defeat on the main forces of the Army Groups "South" and "Center". The main efforts were concentrated against Army Group South. The troops were tasked with going on the offensive and crushing the fascist German defenses on a huge front from Velikie Luki to the Black Sea and liberating the most important economic regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine, the Donbass, overcoming an important strategic line - the Dnieper River, pushing the front further away from Moscow and the Central Industrial Region, liberating eastern regions of Belarus, clear the Taman Peninsula of the enemy and seize a bridgehead in the Crimea.

The troops operating in the northwestern direction were to pin down the opposing Wehrmacht forces and prevent the enemy from maneuvering with reserves. The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were to thwart the enemy's impending attack on Leningrad by advancing on Mga, drawing his operational reserves into the battle.

In working out the plan for the summer and autumn, an important place was occupied by the choice of the direction of the main attack. The Military Council of the Voronezh Front suggested concentrating the main efforts south of Kursk and developing an attack on Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, seizing a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper with subsequent access to the Kremenchug, Krivoy Rog, Kherson line, and under favorable conditions - to the Cherkasy meridian, Nikolaev.

The defeat of the southern wing of the German front, which was envisaged in the proposals of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front, was of great importance. However, more promising, in the opinion of the General Staff, was an attack on Kharkov, Poltava, Kyiv. The liberation of the capital of Ukraine gave a huge political, strategic and economic gain. In this case, the enemy's front was split, interaction between its most important groupings was hampered, a threat was created to the flanks and rear of Army Groups "South" and "Center", Soviet troops occupied an advantageous position for the subsequent development of the offensive. This plan was accepted.

The plan of the Soviet command pursued decisive goals: the defeat of the most powerful groups of the Wehrmacht, the liberation of the most important economic regions, the resources of which were vital for the further conduct of the war, the rescue of millions of Soviet people from fascist captivity. The fact that the plan provided for the defeat of the most powerful enemy groups of all that the Wehrmacht had on the fronts of World War II meant that the Soviet Union, again, as in the previous stages of the war, took the brunt of the fight against Nazi Germany on its shoulders.

During the period of preparation for decisive operations, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command paid great attention to weakening the Wehrmacht aviation groupings. The main efforts of the Soviet Air Force were aimed at gaining and maintaining strategic air supremacy on the entire Soviet-German front, at assisting the ground forces in defeating enemy groupings, and at conducting aerial reconnaissance.

The Air Defense Forces of the country were entrusted with the task of defending large administrative and political centers of the USSR, as well as industrial regions and facilities, from air strikes; to cover the troops of the active army and protect its communications; build up the air defense system in the theater of operations in the course of a strategic offensive. When defending the communications of the army in the field, the efforts of the Troops of the Central Military District of the country were concentrated on reliable cover for the front-line railways, which were the basis of the entire communications system.

The Navy was entrusted with the task of securing the coastal flanks of the Soviet troops, protecting their communications and combating enemy sea communications.

A significant contribution to the fight against the enemy was to be made by the Soviet partisans. The central headquarters of the partisan movement was supposed to organize strikes on the communications of the Nazi troops on a vast territory behind enemy lines, unprecedented in scale, primarily in the Oryol and Kharkov regions.

The State Defense Committee, the Headquarters and the General Staff assigned an important role in the upcoming operations to the strategic reserves. They were created mainly through the withdrawal of army formations and formations from active fronts. At the beginning of July, there were nine combined arms, two tank and one air armies in the strategic reserve.

Reserve formations and formations were located in accordance with the plan of operations in the most important areas - Oryol, Kursk, Kharkov and Donbass. A significant part of them entered the Steppe Military District.

The planning of the rear support of the troops of the fronts was carried out by the General Staff in close cooperation with the artillery commanders, armored forces, Air Force, head of the logistics of the Soviet army, the main and central supply and support departments of the NPO.

On the basis of plans for combat operations, the size of the army, its saturation with military and transport equipment, as well as the actual production of all types of material and technical means during the preparatory period and during operations, calculations were made of the security and needs of the troops of the fronts. The bulk of military and transport equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and medical equipment and other material and technical means went to the troops operating in the southwestern direction. The Kursk region became the largest concentration of materiel and troops during the war. In accordance with this, measures were also planned for the organization and implementation of operational and supply transportation.

The Soviet Supreme High Command created in advance the necessary grouping of forces and means in the main strategic directions. In addition to the concentration of troops in the southwestern direction, a strong grouping was created in the western direction, which consisted of the troops of the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts.

On the Kursk Bulge in the strips of the Central and Voronezh fronts, taking into account the strategic reserves (the Steppe District), about one third of the people and combat aircraft, up to half of the tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and more than a quarter of the guns and mortars of the army were concentrated. The 11th Guards Army of the Western Front, the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District had about 20 million artillery and mortar rounds. The Soviet command consistently put into practice the principle of concentrating the main efforts of the rear on providing for the grouping that performs the main task.

By the beginning of July, the Soviet Supreme High Command succeeded in achieving a high degree of massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack and created powerful groupings of troops in the southwestern and western strategic directions.

Planning the summer offensive of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front

In the plans of the political and military leadership of Germany for the summer of 1943, the Soviet-German front still occupied the main place. It remained an insurmountable obstacle on the way to victory over the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The main efforts of Nazi Germany and its satellites were again directed here.

The fascist German command was in a hurry to carry out new strategic plans in the East. There were still fierce battles in the Kharkov region and northwest of Kursk, and on March 13, the Wehrmacht headquarters issued operational order No. 5, in which it determined the general goals of military operations for the summer period for the troops on the Soviet-German front. “It should be expected,” the order noted, “that the Russians, after the end of winter and spring thaw, having created stocks of materiel and partially replenished their formations with people, will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to preempt them as far as possible in the offensive in certain places in order to impose our will on them, at least on one of the sectors of the front, as is already the case at the present time on the front of Army Group South. In the remaining sectors of the front, the task is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy. Here we must create a particularly strong defense in advance ... ”In the development of this general orientation, specific tasks were assigned to each army group.

The order formulated the main ideas of Operation Citadel, the forthcoming attack on Kursk. The Kursk ledge, which was advanced far to the west, created, in the opinion of the Nazi command, favorable opportunities for encircling and subsequently defeating the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending here. This was assigned to the troops deployed on the adjacent wings of Army Groups Center and South. The troops of the Army Group "North" were to "conduct an operation against Leningrad" in early July. It was supposed to be carried out "with the maximum concentration of all available artillery, using the latest offensive weapons." The most important thing for Army Group "A" was "the release of forces for other fronts", as well as "holding the Kuban bridgehead and the Crimea at any cost." Thus, by Operational Order No. 5, three of the four army groups located on the Soviet-German front received active offensive missions.

However, the plans of the Wehrmacht command clearly did not correspond to the situation that developed in March - April. The fascist German troops, which suffered colossal losses in the winter campaign of 1942-1943, were not ready for a new major offensive and could not be replenished so soon. These circumstances forced the military leadership of the Reich to repeatedly delay the implementation of their plans.

The search began for solutions that, even before the start of Operation Citadel, would allow limited-scale actions to achieve certain results and provide more favorable conditions for the attack on Kursk. On March 22, Hitler gave the order for Operation Hawk. It was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 1st Panzer Army and the Kempf task force, which, with attacks in converging directions on Kupyansk, were supposed to surround and destroy the troops of the Southwestern Front in the Chuguev area. The success of the offensive would straighten and shorten the front line southeast of Kharkov, push it further east, deprive the Soviet troops operating in this sector of the opportunity to launch an offensive against Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, strengthen the position of the Nazi troops in the Donbass, and also ensure would be the flank and rear of the shock group created on the southern face of the Kursk salient.

The prospects opened up by Operation Hawk seemed so tempting that two days later Hitler instructed Army Group South to start developing another possible course of action - a larger operation code-named Panther. The operation was planned to be carried out by the forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies. Its goal was the encirclement and defeat of Soviet troops southeast of Kharkov, the crushing of the Soviet front on the line of the Seversky Donets River and reaching the line of Volchansk, Kupyansk, Svatovo, the Red River. The beginning of these operations was associated with a decrease in the water level in the Seversky Donets after the flood.

At the end of March, plans for Operations Citadel, Hawk, and Panther were under development. Operation "Hawk" was prepared in such a way that from April 13, the troops would be able to go on the offensive four days after the order was given. A clarification soon followed: if it is impossible to start Operation Hawk on the scheduled dates, it should be replaced by Operation Panther, the start of which is postponed to May 1. However, these instructions hung in the air. The troops and by this time were not ready for the offensive.

New adjustments were made to the plans of the fascist German command by the events on the extreme southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The offensive of the North Caucasian Front against the Taman group, which unfolded in April - May, fettered the enemy forces operating here, so that their transfer to the Kursk direction was delayed, and the air battle that unfolded over this area attracted significant German aviation forces, which could no longer be counted on during operations. "Hawk", "Panther" and "Citadel".

On April 15, the Wehrmacht Headquarters made the “final decision”, issuing Operational Order No. 6, in which the Wehrmacht’s initial operation plan on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1943 received its final expression. It stated: from April 28, the troops of the Army Group "Center" and "South" should be put on six-day readiness for the implementation of Operation Citadel. The fascist German command was forced to refuse to conduct operations "Hawk" and "Panther" before the offensive on Kursk. When determining the date for the start of Operation Citadel, the Nazi command again made a miscalculation. The time for the transition to the offensive on Kursk was postponed again and again - neither in May nor in June did they succeed in launching Operation Citadel.

Operation "Citadel" was assigned an extremely important role. The operational order noted: “Decisive importance is attached to this offensive. It must end with a quick and decisive success... In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. On the direction of the main attacks, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory near Kursk should be a torch for the whole world.

Powerful tank groups were deployed at the base of the Kursk salient. They were faced with the task of delivering converging blows to break through to Kursk, encircle, and then destroy the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk salient. The main stake was placed on bringing down a sudden massive attack by tank divisions, supported by large air forces, in narrow sections of the front. The idea of ​​encirclement and lightning-fast defeat of the Soviet troops west of Kursk was the subject of all the measures of the Nazi command. The operation was planned as a "single throw". The troops were tasked with "ensuring the maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow area, so that, using local overwhelming superiority in all means of attack (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), to break through the enemy defenses with one blow, to achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring. The main line of Soviet defense was supposed to break through within two days, and by the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the Wehrmacht strike groups were to connect east of Kursk. By encircling and defeating more than a million Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the fascist German command intended to take revenge for Stalingrad.

According to the plan of Operation Citadel, Army Group South attacked from the line of Belgorod, Tomarovka and was supposed to connect near Kursk and east of the city with the 9th Army of Army Group Center. To ensure an offensive from the east, it was necessary to reach the line of Nezhega, the Korocha River, Skorodnoye, Tim as soon as possible, while preventing the weakening of the forces advancing on Oboyan. Army Group "Center" struck from the Troen line, the area north of Maloarkhangelsk, concentrating the main efforts on its left wing. The 2nd Army, operating in the western sector of the Kursk salient, was ordered to pin down the Soviet troops with the start of the offensive, launching local attacks, and when they retreated, immediately go on the offensive along the entire front. In order to achieve quick success, the Nazi command decided to use armored formations in the first echelon of strike groups so that they, with powerful air support, would break through the tactical defense zone, and then rapidly develop the offensive. The depth of the operation was small, so a wide maneuver by tanks was not envisaged during it.

In order to carry out the outlined plans, major preparatory measures were taken in the second half of April: two new armies were concentrated on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient. By April 18, the 9th Army (13 divisions) was deployed north of Kursk under the command of Colonel-General Model, who was fanatically loyal to the fascist regime. By April 25, south of Kursk, the 4th Panzer Army (10 divisions) occupied a sector of the front. She was the successor to the 4th Panzer Army, defeated at Stalingrad. It was headed by Colonel-General Goth, who in the winter of 1942-1943. left his troops in the care of Paulus and was evacuated from the Stalingrad cauldron.

By the beginning of July, the following grouping of forces of the fascist German army had taken shape on the Soviet-German front. In the northern sector, from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga, the 20th Mountain German Army and two operational Finnish groups, Maselskaya and Olonetskaya, acted against the troops of the Karelian Front and the 7th Separate Army. Further south, to Velikiye Luki, the Finnish task force "Karelian Isthmus" and the German Army Group "North" defended themselves against the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts. In the area from Velikiye Luki to the area east of Orel, there were the 3rd Panzer, 4th Field and 2nd Panzer Armies of Army Group Center. They were opposed by the troops of the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, from Novosil to the Sea of ​​Azov, the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group Center and Army Group South operated. The troops of the Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern fronts were deployed against them. On the Taman Peninsula, the 17th German Army, which was part of Army Group A, was opposed by the North Caucasian Front. The remaining forces of Army Group "A" defended the Crimea.

Three armies and one operational group (9th, 2nd, 4th tank armies and the Kempf task force) were allocated for Operation Citadel. It was decided to carry out the offensive in a narrow sector, which accounted for about 13 percent of the total length of the front. In the Kursk direction, the fascist German command also carried out a decisive concentration of aviation forces.

In the plan for Operation Citadel, the desire of the Nazi strategists to maximize the concentration of forces and means for delivering the first strike was clearly expressed. This led to the fact that by the beginning of July 1943 the main command of the ground forces had extremely limited reserves at its disposal on the Soviet-German front: an infantry and security division and two infantry brigades.

Operation Citadel was only the first of the Wehrmacht operations planned for the summer and autumn of 1943 on the Soviet-German front. After it, it was planned to conduct subsequent offensive operations. Hitler wrote in Operational Order No. 6: “In the event of a planned development of the operation, I also reserve the right to immediately launch an offensive to the southeast (“Panther”) in order to take advantage of the confusion in the ranks of the enemy.” Thus, in mid-April, the fascist German command provided for Operation Panther after the offensive on Kursk had been completed.

The plan for Operation Panther was changed during May and June. By the end of this period, the operation was planned and worked out not only at the level of the OKW, OKH, the command of Army Group South, but also at the level of army headquarters. As follows from the “Assessment of the situation for the operation Citadel and its continuation” drawn up at the end of June by the command of the 4th Panzer Army, it was planned to involve the Kempf task force, the 4th and 1st tank army, as well as infantry formations of the 9th army after they reached the Kursk region. The plan provided for converging strikes on Kupyansk with the aim of destroying Soviet troops located in the bend of the Seversky Donets near Izyum, northwest of it and in front of the southern flank of the Kempf task force. The 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force struck with all their tank formations from the area east of Kursk to the southeast, west of the Stary Oskol-Kupyansk railway. From the north, this tank grouping, united by a common command, was covered by infantry formations of the 9th Army and the Kempf task force. The 1st Panzer Army attacked Kupyansk from the Slavyansk region.

According to the plans of the Nazi command, during the operations "Citadel" and "Panther" it was planned to encircle and defeat the troops of the most powerful Soviet fronts - the Central and Voronezh, as well as the main forces of the Southwestern Front. A decisive defeat was supposed to be inflicted on the strategic reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On June 18, 1943, in a telegram to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, called the decision to launch an offensive according to the Citadel plan the best. “It will force the enemy,” the telegram said, “to fall under the blow of our pincers. The offensive itself will develop rapidly due to the presence of large tank forces in both army groups. Having a large scale, it will inevitably draw into its orbit the main forces of all Russian troops, including those located north of Orel. If successful, it should bring maximum success. The latter is decisive.

Thus, in essence, it was planned to defeat the southern wing of the strategic front of the Soviet army, where a significant part of the forces of the army in the field was concentrated. This would radically change the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front and open up new prospects for the struggle for the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the Hitlerite command outlined its further actions only in a general form, making them dependent on the extent of the defeat of the Soviet army, on the availability of reserves in the Soviet command and on the state of its own troops.

The fascist German command envisaged the possibility, after the victory at Kursk and the successful conduct of Operation Panther, to develop a strike in a northeast direction with the aim of reaching deep in the rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops and creating a threat to Moscow. Keitel, testifying after the end of the war, noted that in the event of a particular success of Operation Citadel, it was supposed to move northeast in order to cut the railways leading from Moscow to the south. The success of operations "Citadel" and "Panther" was supposed to serve as a signal for the start of the German offensive on Leningrad. The fact that Operation Citadel was the initial offensive operation of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1943 on the eastern front is not denied by a number of West German historians. As V. Görlitz writes, after the defeat of “the last Russian reserves” in the Kursk region, Hitler “wanted to cross the upper reaches of the Don in order to either again reach the Volga line, or to threaten Moscow from the south.”

Since the second half of May, the preparations of Army Group North for an attack on Leningrad have noticeably intensified. Attempts by reconnaissance groups to invade the defenses of the Soviet troops became almost daily, the activity of aviation increased significantly, and the influx of railway trains into the Mga region sharply increased. From late February to May, the 18th Army, blockading Leningrad from the south, was reinforced by four infantry divisions. By the beginning of July, the 18th Army had 29.5 infantry and airfield divisions, that is, much more than in any other German army on the Soviet-German front. In addition, there were five divisions in the reserve of Army Group North.

Beginning in the second half of March 1943, the OKH and the command of the Army Group "North" carried out the development of a plan of attack on Leningrad. The operation was originally codenamed "Berenfang" ("Bear Hunt"). On April 21, 1943, the report of the operational department of the OKH noted that two possible solutions were possible: an attack on Leningrad from the positions currently occupied or a two-stage operation - an offensive to eliminate Leningrad’s land connection with the country’s territory and create a strong, receded east of the city of the front, and then an attack on Leningrad itself. To this end, it was considered necessary after the completion of the operations "Citadel" and "Panther" to reinforce the army group "North" with ten divisions, of which 2-3 tank divisions, if possible those that were near Sevastopol, 15-18 engineer-sapper battalions, 20 divisions heavy field artillery.

The concretization of the plan of attack on Leningrad was reflected in the theses of the report of the commander of Army Group North to Hitler on May 7, 1943. They noted the great difficulties of the upcoming offensive and supported the idea of ​​capturing Leningrad in two stages - creating a front line along the Volkhov, and then mastering the city itself . The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal G. Küchler, reported to Hitler: “2 tank and 20 infantry divisions will take part in the battles for the creation of a front along the Volkhov. Of these, 7 will remain at the front along the Volkhov, 4 along the Neva. Thus, 2 tank divisions, 9 infantry divisions are released.

On the front near Leningrad, 13 divisions occupy positions, therefore, 2 tank and 22 infantry divisions can take part in the operation against Leningrad ... It is desirable that the Finns organize a distracting offensive on their sector of the front. If the Finns are not able to do this, then the possibility of pulling up the forces of Colonel-General E. Ditl should be considered. The first stage of the attack on Leningrad received the code name "Parkplatz-I", the second - "Parkplatz-II".

When planning operations for the summer of 1943, the fascist German command still underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. It considered the crisis in the East to be overcome and believed that as a result of total mobilization, superiority in material and human resources for active offensive operations against the Soviet army would be achieved.

Carrying out the ideological indoctrination of the troops and the population before a new offensive, German propaganda trumpeted about the “valor of the Wehrmacht”, about changing the situation on the Soviet-German front in its favor. On May 10, Hitler wrote in his address: "Once again, thanks to the merits of our soldiers fighting in the East, a crisis has been successfully overcome, which no army in the world could withstand."

Hitler's generals were preparing to unleash new blows on the Soviet army, undermine its power, seize the strategic initiative, and change the course of the war in their favor. As they believed, a major success on the eastern front could restore the shaken prestige of the Reich, stop the process of disintegration of the fascist bloc, and strengthen the morale of the army and people.

In a number of works by bourgeois historians published in recent years, it is also recognized that the political and military leadership of fascist Germany attached exceptionally great importance to Operation Citadel. Thus, the American historian M. Caidin notes: “A lot more was at stake than just the city of Kursk or the advance across the area to the north, south and east, namely, what would never be reflected in the diagrams and maps - a merciless massacre over the Russians, and this was the essence of the German plan: to wear down, grind, disperse, kill and capture ... Later, if Operation Citadel went as Hitler had hoped, a big new attack on Moscow would follow. Later, he will put into practice his top secret plan "Arctic Fox", and the German armed forces will occupy Sweden with a lightning strike. Later he... would reinforce the troops in Italy to repulse the Allied invasion and throw them into the sea, for he knew that the time for that invasion was drawing near. He will send powerful reinforcements to the Atlantic Wall - perhaps enough to break the back of the invasion forces from England ... This was not only the Russian fate, which was to be decided near Kursk, but the fate of the war itself.

The Nazi leadership considered the offensive in the East both as a military and as a major political action. In May, at a meeting in the Reich Chancellery, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, Field Marshal Keitel, stated: "We must attack for political reasons." The fascist leaders again called on the German people and the Wehrmacht for an all-out war against the Soviet Union, for the destruction of the Soviet people. Speaking to officers of the SS Panzer Corps in Kharkov in April, Himmler declared: “Here, in the East, fate is decided ... Here the Russians must be exterminated as a people and as a military force and drown in their own blood.”

The Nazi command, planning operations for the summer of 1943, set itself far-reaching military-political goals. However, they did not correspond to the capabilities of the Wehrmacht and were put forward on the basis of an erroneous assessment of the balance of forces on the eastern front and the nature of the defense of the Soviet troops on the Kursk salient.

The Soviet Supreme High Command chose the most expedient form of armed struggle. His decision to temporarily switch to deliberate defense was fully consistent with the prevailing situation and provided the Soviet troops with the most favorable opportunities for achieving their goals.

The Great Patriotic War- the war of the USSR with Germany and its allies in - years and with Japan in 1945; an integral part of World War II.

From the point of view of the leadership of Nazi Germany, the war with the USSR was inevitable. The communist regime was regarded by him as alien, and at the same time capable of striking at any moment. Only the rapid defeat of the USSR gave the Germans the opportunity to ensure dominance in European continent. In addition, he gave them access to the rich industrial and agricultural regions of Eastern Europe.

At the same time, according to some historians, Stalin himself, at the end of 1939, decided on a preemptive attack on Germany in the summer of 1941. On June 15, Soviet troops began strategic deployment and advance to the western border. According to one version, this was done in order to strike at Romania and German-occupied Poland, according to another, to frighten Hitler and force him to abandon plans to attack the USSR.

The first period of the war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942)

The first stage of the German offensive (June 22 - July 10, 1941)

On June 22, Germany began a war against the USSR; Italy and Romania joined on the same day, Slovakia on June 23, Finland on June 26, and Hungary on June 27. The German invasion took the Soviet forces by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; The Germans managed to achieve complete air supremacy. During the fighting on June 23–25, the main forces of the Western Front were defeated. The Brest Fortress held out until July 20. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, which included eleven divisions. On June 29, the German-Finnish troops launched an offensive in the Arctic to Murmansk, Kandalaksha and Loukhi, but were unable to advance deep into Soviet territory.

On June 22, the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 was carried out in the USSR, and from the first days of the war, a mass registration of volunteers began. On June 23, in the USSR, an emergency body of the highest military administration, the Headquarters of the High Command, was created to direct military operations, and there was also a maximum centralization of military and political power in the hands of Stalin.

On June 22, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made a radio statement supporting the USSR in its struggle against Hitlerism. On June 23, the US State Department welcomed the efforts of the Soviet people to repel the German invasion, and on June 24, US President Franklin Roosevelt promised to provide the USSR with all possible assistance.

On July 18, the Soviet leadership decided to organize a partisan movement in the occupied and frontline regions, which gained momentum in the second half of the year.

In the summer-autumn of 1941, about 10 million people were evacuated to the east. and more than 1350 large enterprises. The militarization of the economy began to be carried out with harsh and energetic measures; all the material resources of the country were mobilized for military needs.

The main reason for the defeats of the Red Army, despite its quantitative and often qualitative (T-34 and KV tanks) technical superiority, was the poor training of privates and officers, the low level of operation of military equipment and the lack of experience among the troops in conducting major military operations in modern warfare. . The repressions against the high command in 1937-1940 also played a significant role.

The second stage of the German offensive (July 10 - September 30, 1941)

On July 10, Finnish troops launched an offensive and on September 1, the 23rd Soviet Army on the Karelian Isthmus withdrew to the line of the old state border, occupied before the Finnish war of 1939–1940. By October 10, the front had stabilized along the line Kestenga - Ukhta - Rugozero - Medvezhyegorsk - Lake Onega. - river Svir. The enemy was unable to cut the communication lines of European Russia with the northern ports.

On July 10, the Army Group "North" launched an offensive in the Leningrad and Tallinn directions. August 15 fell Novgorod, August 21 - Gatchina. On August 30, the Germans reached the Neva, cutting off the railway communication with the city, and on September 8 they took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad. Only the tough measures of the new commander of the Leningrad Front, G.K. Zhukov, made it possible to stop the enemy by September 26.

On July 16, the Romanian 4th Army took Kishinev; the defense of Odessa lasted about two months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October. In early September, Guderian crossed the Desna and on September 7 captured Konotop ("Konotop breakthrough"). Five Soviet armies were surrounded; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand. Left-bank Ukraine was in the hands of the Germans; the way to the Donbass was open; Soviet troops in the Crimea were cut off from the main forces.

The defeats on the fronts prompted the Headquarters to issue order No. 270 on August 16, qualifying all soldiers and officers who surrendered as traitors and deserters; their families were deprived of state support and were subject to exile.

The third stage of the German offensive (September 30 - December 5, 1941)

On September 30, Army Group Center launched an operation to capture Moscow (Typhoon). On October 3, Guderian's tanks broke into Orel and took to the road to Moscow. On October 6-8, all three armies of the Bryansk Front were surrounded south of Bryansk, and the main forces of the Reserve (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies) - west of Vyazma; the Germans captured 664,000 prisoners and more than 1,200 tanks. But the advance of the 2nd tank group of the Wehrmacht to Tula was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the brigade of M.E. Katukov near Mtsensk; The 4th Panzer Group occupied Yukhnov and rushed towards Maloyaroslavets, but was held up near Medyn by Podolsk cadets (October 6–10); the autumn thaw also slowed down the pace of the German offensive.

On October 10, the Germans attacked the right wing of the Reserve Front (renamed the Western Front); On October 12, the 9th Army captured Staritsa, and on October 14 - Rzhev. On October 19, a state of siege was declared in Moscow. On October 29, Guderian tried to take Tula, but was repulsed with heavy losses for himself. In early November, the new commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, with an incredible effort of all forces and constant counterattacks, managed, despite huge losses in manpower and equipment, to stop the Germans in other directions.

On September 27, the Germans broke through the defense line of the Southern Front. Most of the Donbass was in the hands of the Germans. During the successful counter-offensive of the troops of the Southern Front, Rostov was liberated on November 29, and the Germans were driven back to the Mius River.

In the second half of October, the 11th German Army broke into the Crimea and by mid-November captured almost the entire peninsula. Soviet troops managed to hold only Sevastopol.

Counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942)

On December 5-6, the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts switched to offensive operations in the northwestern and southwestern directions. The successful advance of the Soviet troops forced Hitler on December 8 to issue a directive on the transition to defense along the entire front line. On December 18, the troops of the Western Front launched an offensive in the central direction. As a result, by the beginning of the year, the Germans were pushed back 100–250 km to the west. There was a threat of coverage of the army group "Center" from the north and south. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army.

The success of the operation near Moscow prompted the Headquarters to decide on the transition to a general offensive along the entire front from Lake Ladoga to the Crimea. The offensive operations of the Soviet troops in December 1941 - April 1942 led to significant change the military-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front: the Germans were driven back from Moscow, Moscow, part of the Kalinin, Oryol and Smolensk regions were liberated. There was also a psychological turning point among the soldiers and the civilian population: faith in victory was strengthened, the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht was destroyed. The collapse of the lightning war plan gave rise to doubts about the successful outcome of the war, both among the German military-political leadership and among ordinary Germans.

Luban operation (January 13 - June 25)

The Lyuban operation was aimed at breaking through the blockade of Leningrad. On January 13, the forces of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts launched an offensive in several directions, planning to link up at Lyuban and encircle the enemy's Chudov grouping. On March 19, the Germans launched a counterattack, cutting off the 2nd shock army from the rest of the forces of the Volkhov Front. Soviet troops repeatedly tried to release it and resume the offensive. On May 21, the Stavka decided to withdraw it, but on June 6 the Germans completely closed the encirclement. On June 20, soldiers and officers were ordered to leave the encirclement on their own, but only a few managed to do this (according to various estimates, from 6 to 16 thousand people); commander A.A. Vlasov surrendered.

Military operations in May-November 1942

Having defeated the Crimean Front (almost 200 thousand people were taken prisoner), the Germans occupied Kerch on May 16, and Sevastopol in early July. On May 12, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the Southern Front launched an offensive against Kharkov. For several days it developed successfully, but on May 19 the Germans defeated the 9th Army, throwing it behind the Seversky Donets, went to the rear of the advancing Soviet troops and on May 23 took them into pincers; the number of prisoners reached 240 thousand June 28-30 began German advance against the left wing of the Bryansk and the right wing of the Southwestern Front. On July 8, the Germans captured Voronezh and reached the Middle Don. By July 22, the 1st and 4th tank armies had reached the Southern Don. On July 24, Rostov-on-Don was taken.

In the conditions of a military catastrophe in the south, on July 28, Stalin issued order No. 227 “Not a step back”, which provided for severe punishments for retreating without instructions from above, detachments to deal with unauthorized leaving positions, penal units for operations on the most dangerous sectors of the front. On the basis of this order, during the war years, about 1 million military personnel were convicted, of which 160 thousand were shot, and 400 thousand were sent to penal companies.

On July 25, the Germans crossed the Don and rushed south. In mid-August, the Germans established control over almost all the passes in the central part of the Main Caucasian Range. In the Grozny direction, the Germans occupied Nalchik on October 29, they failed to take Ordzhonikidze and Grozny, and in mid-November their further advance was stopped.

On August 16, German troops launched an offensive against Stalingrad. On September 13, fighting began in Stalingrad itself. In the second half of October - the first half of November, the Germans captured a significant part of the city, but could not break the resistance of the defenders.

By mid-November, the Germans established control over the Right Bank of the Don and most of the North Caucasus, but did not achieve their strategic goals - to break into the Volga region and Transcaucasia. This was prevented by the counterattacks of the Red Army in other directions (the Rzhev meat grinder, the tank battle between Zubtsov and Karmanovo, etc.), which, although unsuccessful, nevertheless did not allow the Wehrmacht command to transfer reserves to the south.

The second period of the war (November 19, 1942 - December 31, 1943): a radical change

Victory at Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943)

On November 19, units of the Southwestern Front broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army and on November 21 took five Romanian divisions in pincers (Operation Saturn). On November 23, units of the two fronts joined at the Soviet and surrounded the Stalingrad enemy grouping.

On December 16, the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts launched Operation Little Saturn on the Middle Don, defeated the 8th Italian Army, and on January 26, the 6th Army was cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern grouping led by F. Paulus capitulated, on February 2 - the northern one; 91 thousand people were captured. The Battle of Stalingrad, despite the heavy losses of the Soviet troops, was the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht suffered a major defeat and lost the strategic initiative. Japan and Turkey abandoned their intention to enter the war on the side of Germany.

Economic recovery and transition to the offensive in the central direction

By this time, a turning point had also occurred in the sphere of the Soviet military economy. Already in the winter of 1941/1942 it was possible to stop the decline in engineering. From March, the rise of ferrous metallurgy began, from the second half of 1942 - energy and fuel industry. By the beginning there was a clear economic superiority of the USSR over Germany.

In November 1942 - January 1943, the Red Army launched an offensive in the central direction.

Operation "Mars" (Rzhev-Sychevskaya) was carried out in order to eliminate the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead. The formations of the Western Front made their way through the Rzhev-Sychevka railway and raided the enemy rear, however, significant losses and a lack of tanks, guns and ammunition forced them to stop, but this operation did not allow the Germans to transfer part of their forces from the central direction to Stalingrad.

Liberation of the North Caucasus (January 1 - February 12, 1943)

On January 1–3, an operation began to liberate the North Caucasus and the Don bend. On January 3, Mozdok was liberated, on January 10-11 - Kislovodsk, Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Pyatigorsk, on January 21 - Stavropol. On January 24, the Germans surrendered Armavir, on January 30 - Tikhoretsk. On February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed troops in the Myskhako area south of Novorossiysk. On February 12, Krasnodar was taken. However, the lack of forces prevented the Soviet troops from encircling the enemy's North Caucasian grouping.

Breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad (January 12–30, 1943)

Fearing the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center on the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, the German command began on March 1 their systematic withdrawal. On March 2, units of the Kalinin and Western fronts began pursuing the enemy. On March 3, Rzhev was liberated, on March 6 - Gzhatsk, on March 12 - Vyazma.

The January-March 1943 campaign, despite a series of setbacks, led to the liberation of a huge territory (the North Caucasus, the lower reaches of the Don, the Voroshilovgrad, Voronezh, Kursk regions, and part of the Belgorod, Smolensk, and Kalinin regions). The blockade of Leningrad was broken, the Demyansky and Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledges were liquidated. Control over the Volga and Don was restored. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (about 1.2 million people). The depletion of human resources forced the Nazi leadership to conduct a total mobilization of older (over 46 years old) and younger ages (16-17 years old).

Since the winter of 1942/1943, an important military factor has become partisan movement in the German rear. The partisans caused serious damage to the German army, destroying manpower, blowing up warehouses and trains, disrupting the communications system. The largest operations were the raids of the detachment of M.I. Naumov in Kursk, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovograd, Odessa, Vinnitsa, Kyiv and Zhytomyr (February-March 1943) and S.A. Kovpak in Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kyiv regions (February-May 1943).

Defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge (July 5–23, 1943)

The Wehrmacht command developed Operation Citadel to encircle a strong group of the Red Army on the Kursk ledge through counter tank strikes from the north and south; if successful, it was planned to carry out Operation Panther to defeat the Southwestern Front. However, Soviet intelligence unraveled the plans of the Germans, and in April-June a powerful defensive system of eight lines was created on the Kursk ledge.

On July 5, the German 9th Army launched an attack on Kursk from the north, and the 4th Panzer Army from the south. On the northern flank, already on July 10, the Germans went on the defensive. On the southern wing, Wehrmacht tank columns reached Prokhorovka on July 12, but were stopped, and by July 23, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts pushed them back to their original lines. Operation Citadel failed.

The general offensive of the Red Army in the second half of 1943 (July 12 - December 24, 1943). Liberation of Left-bank Ukraine

On July 12, units of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the German defenses at Zhilkovo and Novosil, by August 18, Soviet troops cleared the Orlovsky ledge from the enemy.

By September 22, units of the Southwestern Front pushed the Germans back beyond the Dnieper and reached the approaches to Dnepropetrovsk (now the Dnieper) and Zaporozhye; formations of the Southern Front occupied Taganrog, on September 8, Stalino (now Donetsk), on September 10 - Mariupol; the result of the operation was the liberation of Donbass.

On August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts broke through the defenses of Army Group South in several places and captured Belgorod on August 5. On August 23 Kharkov was taken.

On September 25, by means of flank attacks from the south and north, the troops of the Western Front captured Smolensk and by the beginning of October entered the territory of Belarus.

On August 26, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched the Chernigov-Poltava operation. The troops of the Central Front broke through the enemy defenses south of Sevsk and occupied the city on August 27; On September 13, they reached the Dnieper at the Loev–Kyiv section. Parts of the Voronezh Front reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv-Cherkassy sector. The formations of the Steppe Front approached the Dnieper in the Cherkasy-Verkhnedneprovsk section. As a result, the Germans lost almost all of Left-Bank Ukraine. At the end of September, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper in several places and captured 23 bridgeheads on its right bank.

On September 1, the troops of the Bryansk Front overcame the Wehrmacht's defense line "Hagen" and occupied Bryansk, by October 3, the Red Army reached the line of the Sozh River in Eastern Belarus.

On September 9, the North Caucasian Front, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, launched an offensive on the Taman Peninsula. Having broken through the Blue Line, Soviet troops took Novorossiysk on September 16, and by October 9 they completely cleared the peninsula of the Germans.

On October 10, the Southwestern Front launched an operation to eliminate the Zaporozhye bridgehead and on October 14 captured Zaporozhye.

On October 11, the Voronezh (since October 20 - 1st Ukrainian) Front began the Kyiv operation. After two unsuccessful attempts to take the capital of Ukraine with an attack from the south (from the Bukrinsky bridgehead), it was decided to launch the main attack from the north (from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead). On November 1, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, the 27th and 40th armies moved to Kyiv from the Bukrinsky bridgehead, and on November 3rd, the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front suddenly attacked him from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead and broke through the German defenses. On November 6, Kyiv was liberated.

On November 13, the Germans, having pulled up their reserves, launched a counteroffensive against the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Zhytomyr direction in order to recapture Kyiv and restore the defense along the Dnieper. But the Red Army held the vast strategic Kyiv bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper.

During the period of hostilities from June 1 to December 31, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (1 million 413 thousand people), which it was no longer able to fully compensate for. A significant part of the territory of the USSR occupied in 1941–1942 was liberated. The plans of the German command to gain a foothold on the Dnieper lines failed. Conditions were created for the expulsion of the Germans from the Right-Bank Ukraine.

Third period of the war (December 24, 1943 - May 11, 1945): defeat of Germany

After a series of failures throughout 1943, the German command abandoned attempts to seize the strategic initiative and switched to a tough defense. The main task of the Wehrmacht in the north was to prevent the breakthrough of the Red Army into the Baltic states and East Prussia, in the center to the border with Poland, and in the south to the Dniester and the Carpathians. The Soviet military leadership set the goal of the winter-spring campaign to defeat the German troops on the extreme flanks - in the Right-Bank Ukraine and near Leningrad.

Liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea

On December 24, 1943, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive in the western and southwestern directions (Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation). Only at the cost of great effort and significant losses did the Germans manage to stop the Soviet troops on the Sarny-Polonnaya-Kazatin-Zhashkov line. On January 5–6, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front struck in the Kirovograd direction and captured Kirovograd on January 8, but on January 10 they were forced to stop the offensive. The Germans did not allow the connection of the troops of both fronts and were able to keep the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, which posed a threat to Kyiv from the south.

On January 24, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts launched a joint operation to defeat the enemy's Korsun-Shevchensk grouping. On January 28, the 6th and 5th Guards Tank Armies joined at Zvenigorodka and closed the encirclement. Kanev was taken on January 30, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky on February 14. On February 17, the liquidation of the "cauldron" was completed; more than 18 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers were taken prisoner.

On January 27, units of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck from the Sarn region in the Lutsk-Rivne direction. On January 30, the offensive of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts began on the Nikopol bridgehead. Having overcome the fierce resistance of the enemy, on February 8 they captured Nikopol, on February 22 - Krivoy Rog, and by February 29 they reached the river. Ingulets.

As a result of the winter campaign of 1943/1944, the Germans were finally driven back from the Dnieper. In an effort to make a strategic breakthrough to the borders of Romania and prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining a foothold on the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the Headquarters developed a plan to encircle and defeat Army Group South in Right-Bank Ukraine through a coordinated strike of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts .

The final chord of the spring operation in the south was the expulsion of the Germans from the Crimea. On May 7–9, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, stormed Sevastopol, and by May 12 they defeated the remnants of the 17th Army that had fled to Chersonese.

Leningrad-Novgorod operation of the Red Army (January 14 - March 1, 1944)

On January 14, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched an offensive south of Leningrad and near Novgorod. Having inflicted a defeat on the German 18th Army and pushed it back to Luga, they liberated Novgorod on January 20. In early February, units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts reached the approaches to Narva, Gdov and Luga; On February 4 they took Gdov, on February 12 - Luga. The threat of encirclement forced the 18th Army to hastily retreat to the southwest. On February 17, the 2nd Baltic Front carried out a series of attacks against the 16th German Army on the Lovat River. In early March, the Red Army reached the defensive line "Panther" (Narva - Lake Peipsi - Pskov - Ostrov); most of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions were liberated.

Military operations in the central direction in December 1943 - April 1944

As the tasks of the winter offensive of the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts, the Stavka set the troops to reach the Polotsk-Lepel-Mogilev-Ptich line and liberate Eastern Belarus.

In December 1943 - February 1944, the 1st PribF made three attempts to capture Vitebsk, which did not lead to the capture of the city, but exhausted the enemy's forces to the limit. The offensive actions of the Polar Front in the Orsha direction on February 22-25 and March 5-9, 1944 were not successful either.

On the Mozyr direction, the Belorussian Front (BelF) on January 8 dealt a strong blow to the flanks of the 2nd German Army, but thanks to a hasty retreat, it managed to avoid encirclement. The lack of forces prevented the Soviet troops from encircling and destroying the Bobruisk enemy grouping, and on February 26 the offensive was stopped. Formed on February 17 at the junction of the 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian (since February 24, the 1st Belorussian) fronts, the 2nd Belorussian Front began the Polessky operation on March 15 with the aim of capturing Kovel and breaking through to Brest. Soviet troops surrounded Kovel, but on March 23 the Germans launched a counterattack and on April 4 released the Kovel group.

Thus, in the central direction during the winter-spring campaign of 1944, the Red Army was unable to achieve its goals; On April 15, she went on the defensive.

Offensive in Karelia (June 10 - August 9, 1944). Finland's exit from the war

After the loss of most of the occupied territory of the USSR, the main task of the Wehrmacht was to prevent the Red Army from entering Europe and not to lose its allies. That is why the Soviet military-political leadership, having failed in their attempts to reach a peace agreement with Finland in February-April 1944, decided to start the summer campaign of the year with a strike in the north.

On June 10, 1944, LenF troops, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as a result, control was restored over the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the strategically important Kirov Railway connecting Murmansk with European Russia. By early August, Soviet troops had liberated all of the occupied territory east of Ladoga; in the Kuolisma area, they reached the Finnish border. Having suffered a defeat, Finland on August 25 entered into negotiations with the USSR. On September 4, she broke off relations with Berlin and ceased hostilities, on September 15 she declared war on Germany, and on September 19 she concluded a truce with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The length of the Soviet-German front was reduced by a third. This allowed the Red Army to free up significant forces for operations in other directions.

Liberation of Belarus (June 23 - early August 1944)

Successes in Karelia prompted the Headquarters to conduct a large-scale operation to defeat the enemy in the central direction with the forces of three Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts (Operation Bagration), which became the main event of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944.

The general offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23–24. The coordinated strike of the 1st PribF and the right wing of the 3rd BF ended on June 26–27 with the liberation of Vitebsk and the encirclement of five German divisions. On June 26, units of the 1st BF took Zhlobin, on June 27–29 they surrounded and destroyed the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy, and on June 29 they liberated Bobruisk. As a result of the rapid advance of three Belarusian fronts an attempt by the German command to organize a line of defense along the Berezina was thwarted; On July 3, the troops of the 1st and 3rd BF broke into Minsk and took the 4th German army in pincers south of Borisov (liquidated by July 11).

The German front began to crumble. Formations of the 1st PribF occupied Polotsk on July 4 and, moving downstream of the Western Dvina, entered the territory of Latvia and Lithuania, reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga, cutting off Army Group North stationed in the Baltic states from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. Parts of the right wing of the 3rd BF, having taken Lepel on June 28, broke through into the valley of the river in early July. Viliya (Nyaris), on August 17 they reached the border of East Prussia.

The troops of the left wing of the 3rd BF, having made a swift throw from Minsk, took Lida on July 3, on July 16, together with the 2nd BF - Grodno, and at the end of July approached the northeastern ledge of the Polish border. The 2nd BF, advancing to the southwest, captured Bialystok on July 27 and drove the Germans across the Narew River. Parts of the right wing of the 1st BF, having liberated Baranovichi on July 8, and Pinsk on July 14, at the end of July they reached the Western Bug and reached the central section of the Soviet-Polish border; On July 28 Brest was taken.

As a result of Operation Bagration, Belarus, most of Lithuania and part of Latvia were liberated. The possibility of an offensive in East Prussia and Poland opened up.

Liberation of Western Ukraine and offensive in Eastern Poland (July 13 - August 29, 1944)

Trying to stop the advance of Soviet troops in Belarus, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer formations there from the rest of the sectors of the Soviet-German front. This facilitated the operations of the Red Army in other areas. On July 13–14, the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front began in Western Ukraine. Already on July 17, they crossed the state border of the USSR and entered South-Eastern Poland.

On July 18, the left wing of the 1st BF launched an offensive near Kovel. At the end of July, they approached Prague (the right-bank suburb of Warsaw), which they managed to take only on September 14th. In early August, the resistance of the Germans intensified sharply, and the advance of the Red Army was stopped. Because of this, the Soviet command was unable to provide the necessary assistance to the uprising that broke out on August 1 in the Polish capital under the leadership of the Home Army, and by the beginning of October it was brutally suppressed by the Wehrmacht.

Offensive in the Eastern Carpathians (September 8 - October 28, 1944)

After the occupation of Estonia in the summer of 1941, the Tallinn Metropolitan. Alexander (Paulus) announced the separation of the Estonian parishes from the Russian Orthodox Church (the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church was established on the initiative of Alexander (Paulus) in 1923, in 1941 the bishop repented of the sin of schism). In October 1941, at the insistence of the German General Commissar of Belarus, the Belarusian Church was established. However, Panteleimon (Rozhnovsky), who headed it in the rank of Metropolitan of Minsk and Belarus, retained canonical communion with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky). After Metropolitan Panteleimon was forcibly retired in June 1942, Archbishop Filofei (Narko), who also refused to arbitrarily proclaim a national autocephalous Church, became his successor.

Given the patriotic position of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky), the German authorities initially hindered the activities of those priests and parishes who claimed to belong to the Moscow Patriarchate. Over time, the German authorities became more tolerant of the communities of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to the invaders, these communities only verbally declared their loyalty to the Moscow center, but in reality they were ready to assist the German army in the destruction of the atheistic Soviet state.

In the occupied territory, thousands of churches, churches, prayer houses of various Protestant denominations (primarily Lutherans and Pentecostals) have resumed their activities. This process was especially active on the territory of the Baltic States, in the Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev regions of Belarus, in the Dnepropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporozhye, Kyiv, Voroshilovgrad, Poltava regions of Ukraine, in the Rostov, Smolensk regions of the RSFSR.

The religious factor was taken into account when planning domestic policy in areas where Islam was traditionally spread, primarily in the Crimea and the Caucasus. German propaganda declared respect for the values ​​of Islam, presented the occupation as the liberation of peoples from the "Bolshevik godless yoke", guaranteed the creation of conditions for the revival of Islam. The invaders willingly went to the opening of mosques in almost every settlement of the "Muslim regions", provided the Muslim clergy with the opportunity to contact the believers through the radio and the press. Throughout the occupied territory where Muslims lived, the positions of mullahs and senior mullahs were restored, whose rights and privileges were equated with the heads of administrations of cities and settlements.

When forming special units from among the prisoners of war of the Red Army, much attention was paid to confessional affiliation: if representatives of the peoples who traditionally professed Christianity were mainly sent to the "army of General Vlasov", then to such formations as the "Turkestan Legion", "Idel-Ural", they sent representatives of the "Islamic" peoples.

The "liberalism" of the German authorities did not extend to all religions. Many communities were on the verge of destruction, for example, in Dvinsk alone, almost all of the 35 synagogues that operated before the war were destroyed, up to 14 thousand Jews were shot. Most of the Evangelical Christian Baptist communities that found themselves in the occupied territory were also destroyed or dispersed by the authorities.

Forced to leave the occupied territories under the onslaught of Soviet troops, the Nazi invaders took out liturgical objects, icons, paintings, books, items made of precious metals from prayer buildings.

According to the far from complete data of the Extraordinary State Commission for Establishing and Investigating the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders, 1670 Orthodox churches, 69 chapels, 237 churches, 532 synagogues, 4 mosques and 254 other prayer buildings were completely destroyed, looted or desecrated in the occupied territory. Among those destroyed or desecrated by the Nazis were priceless monuments of history, culture and architecture, incl. relating to the XI-XVII centuries, in Novgorod, Chernigov, Smolensk, Polotsk, Kyiv, Pskov. Many prayer buildings were converted by the invaders into prisons, barracks, stables, and garages.

The position and patriotic activities of the Russian Orthodox Church during the war

On June 22, 1941, the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky) compiled a "Message to the Shepherds and Flocks of the Orthodox Church of Christ", in which he revealed the anti-Christian essence of fascism and called on the faithful to defend themselves. In their letters to the Patriarchate, believers reported that voluntary collections of donations for the needs of the front and the defense of the country had begun everywhere.

After the death of Patriarch Sergius, according to his will, Met. Alexy (Simansky), unanimously elected at the last meeting of the Local Council on January 31-February 2, 1945, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. The Council was attended by Patriarchs Christopher II of Alexandria, Alexander III of Antioch and Kallistratus (Tsintsadze) of Georgia, representatives of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Serbia and Romania.

In 1945, the so-called Estonian schism was overcome, and Orthodox parishes and the clergy of Estonia were accepted into communion with the Russian Orthodox Church.

Patriotic activities of communities of other confessions and religions

Immediately after the start of the war, the leaders of almost all religious associations of the USSR supported the liberation struggle of the peoples of the country against the Nazi aggressor. Addressing the faithful with patriotic messages, they called for worthy fulfillment of their religious and civic duty to defend the Fatherland, to render all possible financial assistance the needs of the front and rear. The leaders of most religious associations in the USSR condemned those representatives of the clergy who consciously went over to the side of the enemy and helped to impose a "new order" on the occupied territory.

The head of the Russian Old Believers of the Belokrinitsky hierarchy, Archbishop. Irinarkh (Parfyonov), in his Christmas message of 1942, called on the Old Believers, a considerable number of whom fought on the fronts, to serve valiantly in the Red Army and to resist the enemy in the occupied territory in the ranks of the partisans. In May 1942, the leaders of the Unions of Baptists and Evangelical Christians addressed the believers with a letter of appeal; the appeal spoke of the danger of fascism "for the cause of the Gospel" and called for "brothers and sisters in Christ" to fulfill "their duty to God and to the Motherland", being "the best soldiers at the front and the best workers in the rear." Baptist communities were engaged in sewing linen, collecting clothes and other things for the soldiers and families of the dead, helped in the care of the wounded and sick in hospitals, and took care of orphans in orphanages. Funds raised in the Baptist congregations were used to build a Merciful Samaritan ambulance to transport seriously wounded soldiers to the rear. The leader of Renovationism, A. I. Vvedensky, repeatedly made patriotic appeals.

With regard to a number of other religious associations, the policy of the state during the war years remained invariably tough. First of all, this concerned “anti-state, anti-Soviet and savage sects”, which included the Dukhobors.

M. I. Odintsov. Religious organizations in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War// Orthodox Encyclopedia, vol. 7, p. 407-415

• http://www.pravenc.ru/text/150063.html

After the Germans were thrown back from Moscow, the fighting went on in this place for almost a year and a half.
The whole earth is in barbed wire, shells, cartridges.
The village of Studenoe was with the Germans, and the village of Sloboda (1 km to the East) was with ours
239th Red Banner Rifle Division: From 01 to 01/05/1942, unsuccessful battles were fought for Sukhinichi, then the division received an order to go to the Meshchovsk area, meaning to advance on Serpeisk in the future (two companies were left to block Sukhinichi). Participation in the capture of Meshchovsk was not required, the division moved to Serpeisk. On the afternoon of 01/07/1942, Serpeisk was occupied and continued the offensive in a north-western direction. On 01/12/1942, she fought in the Kirsanovo, Pyatnitsa, Shershnevo, Krasny Holm area, developing a strike in the direction of the Chiplyaevo station (8 kilometers northwest of Bakhmutov). From 01/16/1942 she was subordinate to the commander of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Re: 326th Roslavl Red Banner Rifle Division
« Reply #1: 02/28/2011 03:21:06 PM »
The new directive demanded that the 10th Army, by the end of December 27, go out with the main forces to the area of ​​​​the city of Kozelsk, by the same time mobile forward detachments capture a large railway junction and the city of Sukhinichi, and also conduct deep reconnaissance to the north-west in the directions of Baryatinskaya station, to the west to the city of Kirov and to the south of it to the city of Lyudinovo.
The 239th and 324th rifle divisions were already beyond the Oka and were approaching Kozelsk. To the left of them at the crossing was the 323rd rifle division, the 322nd and 328th divisions entered the battle for access to the left bank of the river in the Belev area. The 330th Rifle, 325th and 326th went behind the center of the army in the second echelon. On December 31, by order of the front commander, they took up defensive positions: the 325th in the Kozelsk region, the 326th in the Mekhovoe, Berezovka, Zvyagino regions, subsequently the 325th rifle division was ordered to advance on Meshchovsk, Mosalsk, i.e., north of Sukhinichey, the 326th rifle received the task of advancing on Baryatinsky along the Sukhinichi-Chiplyaevo railway.
At the stations of Matchino, Awakening and Tsekh, the 330th and 326th divisions captured large Soviet-made ammunition depots. On January 9, there were about 36 thousand shells and mines. This immediately made things easier for us. From the same warehouses, the 761st and 486th army artillery regiments that finally arrived, on January 25, to Sukhinichi, began to be supplied.
The commander of the 1099th regiment, Major F. D. Stepanov, decided to bypass Baryatinsky from the south with one battalion, and strike from the north, through Red Hill, with two battalions. The first attempt to occupy Baryatinsky on the move was not crowned with success. The enemy, already in Red Hill, put up stubborn resistance. It was January 10th. The fight dragged on until dark. A blizzard has risen. The battalion, advancing from the south, lost its way. The battalion commander Senior Lieutenant Romankevich figured out the mistake only when he left a little south-west of Baryatinsky. Communication with the regimental commander was lost. However, the battalion commander was not taken aback. By his decision, the battalion cut the country road to Studenovo and the railway going west to the Zanoznaya station. They quickly made snow trenches. Four fighters sent with reports from the battalion to the regiment, as it turned out later, were killed by the Nazis.
Having no information about this battalion, the division commander brought in the 1097th regiment from the south to act on Baryatinsky. By attacking two regiments, the station and the village of Baryatinskaya were liberated on the morning of January 11.
The battalion of Romankevich also played an important role here. The enemy, with all his convoys, rushed from Baryatinsky to the west, but suddenly, in the complete darkness of the night, he was met by fire from 12 machine guns of this battalion. Up to 300 Nazis were destroyed, many mortars and machine guns were captured, as well as a large convoy.
There was a large warehouse with Soviet ammunition at the station. They were abandoned by our troops during the retreat. During their retreat, the Nazis did not manage to destroy the warehouse. There were huge stocks of 76, 122, 152 and 85 mm shells, 82 mm mines, hand grenades and rifle cartridges. Subsequently, for several months, troops were supplied from this warehouse not only to our army, but also to neighboring ones (94).
Here, at the station, German warehouses with large reserves grain and hay. All this turned out to be very useful for us.
By the end of January 11, the 326th division occupied Staraya Sloboda, Perenezhye, Baryatinsky.
As the 326th and 330th rifle divisions approached Baryatinsky and Kirov, information was received that many enemy transport planes with troops were landing daily at a large airfield nearby. This information has been fully confirmed. Throughout January, the enemy hastily transported military units by air from the west. From Germany, the Goering Guard Regiment, the Airborne Regiment, the 19th Airfield Battalion and the 13th Aircraft Construction Battalion arrived to protect the airfield. The last two battalions had previously been in France. The capture of prisoners confirmed the presence in the area also of units of the 34th and rear of the 216th infantry divisions.
The enemy sent a police battalion to cover the Zanoznaya and Borets stations. In Zanoznaya there was also a detachment formed from vacationers of the 216th Infantry Division with a total strength of two battalions. It had up to 800 people. Wedesheim's anti-aircraft artillery group was located at the airfield itself. It also included batteries of field artillery. In general, in the area of ​​​​Shemelinka, Zanoznaya, Shaikovka, Goroditsa, Studenovo there were enemy forces up to an infantry division.
The nearby airfield played a very important role in the actions of enemy aviation. It needed to be taken. I assigned this task to the 326th and 330th divisions. The main task of capturing the airfield was assigned to the 326th Rifle Division. The 330th Rifle Division, with an attack by two regiments from the south, assisted it in the successful completion of the task. Having advanced to their lines by the end of January 12, parts of the divisions captured the airfield from the east, north, south and partly from the west. On the approaches to it, the enemy put up stubborn resistance. During the fighting, the increased landing of new military teams from Yu-52 aircraft did not stop.
By the end of January 15, the airfield was almost completely surrounded. The enemy could retreat only to the northwest near the villages of Priyut and Degonka.
During January 16 and 17, our regiments again attacked the airfield, but the attack was not successful. The attackers suffered severely from enemy air raids, having no cover against it. The fighting for the airfield was fierce. In these battles, the soldiers of both divisions showed dedication, steadfastness, courage, courage and resourcefulness. After putting the units in order and regrouping, the 326th Division on the night of January 19 again launched an attack on the airfield. Intense fighting continued throughout the day. However, we could not take the airfield. Despite the shelling, which was carried out from open positions by our few artillery, the landing and take-off of enemy transport and combat aircraft continued, although he suffered considerable losses in aircraft. From January 12 until the end of the month, our artillery knocked out 18 large enemy aircraft. In prolonged battles for the airfield area, our units were unable to break the enemy's resistance, mainly due to the action of his combat aviation, and suffered heavy losses. In the regiments of the 330th and 326th rifle divisions, 250-300 bayonets remained. Only for the period from January 9 to January 19, the 326th Rifle Division lost 2562 people killed and wounded. The offensive capabilities of both divisions were clearly exhausted.
At the same time, there was a threat of envelopment of units of the 330th and 326th rifle divisions from the flanks. This happened, firstly, in connection with the transition of the enemy to the offensive from Lyudinovo and Zhizdra in the direction of Sukhinichi with simultaneous attempts to help this strike with attacks from the Milyatinsky Zavod, Chiplyaevo, Fomino 2nd, Fomino 1st area. In this regard, both regiments of the 330th Infantry Division had to be taken from the airfield and returned to the Kirov area.

SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN 1943, the designation of military operations in the Great Patriotic War adopted in Russian literature from July to the end of December. At the end of March 1943, after fierce winter battles (see. Winter campaign 1942/43) on the Soviet-German front there was a relative calm. Both belligerents used the operational pause to intensify preparations for new operations.

Owls. the command led preparations for the struggle to hold the initiative and complete the radical turning point in the war. The army received more and more military equipment and weapons. By July 1943, the number of automatic weapons in the active army had almost doubled compared to April, anti-tank artillery - 1.5, anti-aircraft - 1.2, aircraft - 1.7, tanks - 2 times. Particular attention was paid to the accumulation of Stavka reserves. By summer, there were 8 combined arms, 3 tank and 1 air armies in the strategic reserve. At the same time, on the territory of the USSR, Foreign military formations from representatives of the peoples of some European countries.

The enemy by this time still possessed great power. Germany and its allies conducted a total mobilization, sharply increased the output of military products. Big hopes for him. the command assigned to the new tanks T-V "Panther", T-VI "Tiger", which had powerful armor and weapons, as well as assault guns "Ferdinand". The vast majority of human and material resources were directed to the Sov.-German. front, but the enemy did not have large strategic reserves here. By the beginning of July 1943, there were only 2 infantry, 3 security and 1 cavalry divisions, as well as 3 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades in the reserve of the main command of the German ground forces.

Planning military operations on the eastern front in the summer of 1943, it. the leadership understood that the Wehrmacht was not able to attack simultaneously in several strategic directions. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. No active hostilities were planned for the rest of the front in the first half of the summer. It was supposed to carry out an operation near Leningrad only in July.

Owls. The Supreme High Command revealed the enemy's plans for the summer of 1943 in a timely manner. In doing so, not only was the general plan of the German command established, but the groupings of the enemy's troops throughout the Sov.-German were precisely determined. front, the combat and numerical strength of his troops in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the general directions of their main attacks, and then the time of the start of the offensive. Considering these circumstances, the command decided to use deliberate defense to wear down and bleed the enemy strike groups in the Kursk region, and then to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions, to defeat the main forces of the army groups "South" and "Center". The task was set for the troops: after repelling the enemy’s offensive, they themselves would go on the offensive and crush his defenses on the front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. They had to liberate the Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass, overcome the river. Dnieper, move the front further from Moscow and the Central Industrial Region, liberate the eastern regions of Belarus, clear the Taman Peninsula and the Crimea from the enemy. The first operations were planned in detail, subsequent ones were outlined only in general terms.

The troops operating in the northwestern direction were to pin down the opposing enemy forces and prevent him from maneuvering with reserves. The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts had to attack the Mga to disrupt the enemy's impending attack on Leningrad, to draw his operational reserves into the battle. Thus, the main events in the Sov.-German. front in the summer of 1943 were to deploy in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

Prior to the start of the main events of the campaign, owls. the command decided to complete the liberation of the North Caucasus. At the end of March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan for the offensive operation of the North Caucasian Front to defeat the 17th German. army. Her plan was to bypass the village of Krymskaya - a key node of resistance on it. defensive line "Gotenkopf" - "Head of the Goth" (in Russian historiography - "Blue Line") - from the north and south, to seize it and the blows of the troops of the right wing and the center of the front to Varenikovskaya, and the left - to Anapa in parts to defeat the opposing enemy, then discard the rest of the German-Roman. troops from Taman to the sea. The main role in the operation, which was planned to be carried out in a relatively short time, was assigned to the 56th Army.

The offensive began after a week of preparation on 4 April. In all directions, owls. The troops encountered strong resistance. The enemy, having concentrated 820 combat aircraft, including 510 bombers, on the airfields of the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula, and also using up to 200 bombers based in the Donbass and in southern Ukraine, unleashed powerful bombing attacks on the attackers. The 4th and 5th air armies of the North Caucasian Front, together with the air group of the Black Sea Fleet, being inferior in the number of aircraft, could not provide the necessary resistance. Soon the enemy achieved significant air superiority over the Kuban.

On April 6, the offensive was suspended. Only on April 14, after the regrouping, it was resumed, however, this time the tasks were not completed. Since April 17, active hostilities have ceased in most sectors of the front. At the same time, fierce air battles in the Kuban 1943. In the second half of April - early May, the enemy made several attempts to eliminate the bridgehead captured by the owls. troops south of Novorossiysk, - the heroic "Little Land" However, all of his attacks were repulsed.

Meanwhile, the troops of the North Caucasian Front were preparing to continue the offensive operation. The armies were replenished with personnel and military equipment, their provision with material resources was significantly improved, and new tasks were assigned to the troops. On April 29, the offensive resumed. The main blow was delivered by the 56th Army north and south of Krymskaya. The strikes of other armies were coordinated with her actions. After heavy fighting on May 4, the village was liberated. But there was no longer any strength to develop success. On May 19, the 56th Army went on the defensive at the reached line, without completing the tasks defined by the operation plan. Later, from May 26 to June 7, and then in late June - early July, the North Caucasian Front undertook a number of private operations to break through the German-Roman defense. troops, but did not achieve decisive success. From the first days of July, the active operations of the North Caucasian Front ceased. The troops went on the defensive. The time has come for the decisive battles of the campaign in the Kursk region.

As a result of the winter 1942/1943 offensive of the owls. troops and their forced withdrawal in March 1943 from Kharkov formed the so-called. Kursk ledge. The configuration of the front line gave both sides certain advantages for conducting offensive operations, but at the same time created threats in the event that they went on the offensive. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts located on the Kursk ledge threatened the German flanks and rear. Army Groups "Center" and "South". In turn, these enemy groupings, occupying the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, had favorable conditions for inflicting flank attacks on the owls. troops defending in the Kursk region. The leadership of the Wehrmacht decided to take advantage of these conditions. It planned an offensive operation with the code name "Citadel". The plan of the operation provided for strikes in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk ledge on the 4th day of the offensive to surround and then destroy the owls here. troops. Subsequently, strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front and launch an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of owls. troops and creating a threat to Moscow.

To repel enemy attacks, the troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250–300 km.

There was no more than a hundred meters between the tanks - you could only fidget, no maneuver. This was not a war - beating tanks. They crawled and fired. Everything was on fire. An indescribable stench hung over the battlefield. Everything was covered with smoke, dust, fire, so that it seemed - twilight had come. Aviation bombed everyone. Tanks were on fire, vehicles were on fire, communications were down...

From the memoirs of V.P. Bryukhov, tanker

Second winter of the war

SS division "Totenkopf" before the offensive.

After fierce battles in the winter of 1942-1943. there was a lull on the Soviet-German front. The belligerents drew lessons from past battles, outlined plans for further actions, the armies were replenished with people and new equipment, and reserves were accumulated. Hitler understood that the Reich desperately needed a brilliant victory. In the winter of 1943, the “Russian barbarians” suddenly appeared as a strong and merciless enemy, and the German victories achieved in 1941 faded considerably. The jubilation of the Nazi army gave way to restraint, and then to alertness. In January 1943, Soviet troops inflicted a devastating loss on the German army near Stalingrad: the total losses of the Nazi troops from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. amounted to over 1,500,000 (killed and captured) people, about 2,000 tanks and assault guns, 3,000 aircraft.

In February 1943, Hitler demanded that his generals "recompense in the summer what was lost in the winter"; he needed a victory that would restore the image of the "invincible armada" to the German army. The fascist German command, planning the summer campaign of 1943, decided to launch a major offensive on the Soviet-German front in order to regain the lost strategic initiative. For the counteroffensive, the Reich generals chose the so-called Kursk ledge, which went into the location of the German troops up to 200 km, which was formed during the winter-spring offensive of the Soviet troops. The Citadel plan provided that the German army would encircle and destroy Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge with two simultaneous counter attacks in the general direction of Kursk: from the Orel region to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north. In the future, the German generals intended to expand the front of the offensive from the area east of Kursk - to the southeast - and defeat the Soviet troops in the Donbass.

This is what the plan of the Citadel looked like.

If you look at the front line that took shape in the spring of 1943, it will immediately catch your eye that the front in the Orel-Kursk-Belgorod-Kharkov region bizarrely curved back to the letter S - in the north a ledge was wedged into the Soviet defenses, in the center of which was Orel, and right under it was exactly the same ledge, which was held by the Soviet troops and the center of which was Kursk. Hitler liked the idea of ​​"cutting off this Kursk balcony" very much, and on March 13, 1943, he signed an order to begin preparations for Operation Citadel.

It is interesting: In this directive of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, an interesting quote can be noted: “It should be expected that the Russians, after the end of winter and spring thaw, having created stocks of materiel and partially replenished their formations with people, will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to preempt them as far as possible in the offensive in places with the aim of imposing their will, at least on one of the sectors of the front ... ”Thus, the defeat of the Red Army and the victorious end of the war were no longer discussed.

The start of the German offensive was planned for May 3 - the German command was counting on the surprise factor and the fact that the Russians would not be able to replenish personnel and equipment after exhausting battles in the winter. But, having carefully studied the state of the German troops, the Wehrmacht High Headquarters reported to the Fuhrer that "an offensive is possible only in June, after the arrival of reinforcements to the troops, since the equipment of the units is below 60%."

Despite the signed order for Operation Citadel, there were disputes in the German generals about the need for a summer offensive. The main argument of supporters of the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient was expressed by Field Marshal Keitel at a meeting with the Fuhrer: "We must attack for political reasons." To which Guderian, an ardent opponent of the Citadel plan, replied:

To this direct question, Hitler honestly replied that at the mere thought of the operation, his “stomach starts to hurt.” But Guderian could not dissuade the Fuhrer.

German training

The spring thaw gave the belligerents a break, which the Wehrmacht used to prepare for the offensive. High losses in people and equipment after the Battle of Stalingrad and the battles in Ukraine that followed it led to the fact that all German army reserves were exhausted, and there was simply nothing to restore the formations operating at the front. From January to March 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 2,500 tanks, which accounted for 60% of all combat vehicles produced in 1942. On the entire eastern front, at the end of January, 500 tanks remained in service!

The problem of a shortage of personnel was also acute, and on January 13, the Fuhrer signed a decree on "Total War", under which general mobilization was announced. Men from 16 to 60 years old, women from 17 to 45 were subject to conscription. An increased conscription into the German army in the occupied territories also began, Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, as well as Russians who emigrated to Europe after the revolution of 1917 were sent to the front and industry. In many concentration camps prisoners of war the Germans recruited prisoners of the Red Army in special units.

Nevertheless, all these measures could not close the gap in the human resources of the Wehrmacht, and from February 11, 1943, 15-year-old schoolchildren were called up for auxiliary positions in the German Air Force (however, let's not forget that women and children worked at the factories of the USSR at that time ).

All these measures, together with the significant industrial potential of Germany, albeit slowly, but restored the strength of the Wehrmacht. According to the plan of Operation Citadel, the breakthrough of the Russian defense was assigned to tank wedges, which were to be led by the latest T-5 and T-6.

On a note: in German military terminology, tanks were denoted by the index Pz.Kpfw (Panzerkampfwagen - armored fighting vehicle), and the model number - by Roman numerals. For example: Pz.Kpfw V . In this article, the names of German tanks are given in Russian transcription, with the index "T" and Arabic numerals.

"Panthers" on the march.

T-6 "Tiger"

Fire escort was supposed to be carried out with modernized T-4 tanks and self-propelled artillery, but a significant problem was in equipping tank divisions with new vehicles. The production of one T-6 "Tiger" required as much material resources and time as the production of three T-4s, and the production of "Panthers" was just being deployed. In addition, the latest T-5 Panther tank was not tested at the front and did not participate in battles, and no one knew how the vehicle would behave in combat conditions. The inspector of the tank troops of the Wehrmacht, General Guderian, told the Fuhrer that the tank was frankly “raw” and that it was simply stupid to throw the Panther into battle without modification.

But Hitler relied on the tactics of the "Tank wedge" and at the end of March demanded that the production of 600 T-5 tanks be set up. Despite all the efforts of the German industry, no more than 200 combat vehicles were produced by the end of May, and the refinement of the already assembled tanks to the required state was difficult, new defects and shortcomings were discovered.

Also lagging behind schedule was the production of the latest Ferdinand self-propelled gun. All this caused the date of the offensive to be postponed to June 12, and later to July 5.

At the end of June 1943, the German command concentrated forces:

The strike force in the Orel area consisted of 270,000 soldiers and officers, about 3,500 guns and mortars, about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns. She was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of the Orel-Kursk railway.

The strike force north of Kharkov consisted of 280,000 soldiers and officers, more than 2,500 guns and mortars, and up to 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns. It was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army along the Oboyan-Kursk highway and the auxiliary one with the forces of the Kempf task force in the direction of Belgorod-Korocha.

There were twenty more divisions (320,000 personnel) on the flanks of the strike groups.

In total, in order to carry out their plan, the fascist German command concentrated about a million soldiers and officers, about 10,000 guns and mortars, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, and over 2,000 combat aircraft on the Kursk salient.

Russian training

The action plan of the Red Army in the spring and summer of 1943 went in parallel with the planning of the German operation "Citadel" - from March to July. As in the generals of the Wehrmacht, Stalin's headquarters did not have a single view on whether to go on the offensive or go on the defensive.

Marshals of the Red Army Vasilevsky and Zhukov believed that it was necessary to give the initiative to the Germans and go on the defensive, destroying the advancing tank forces of the Nazis, counterattack and defeat the enemy. The opponents were the commanders of the Voronezh and Southern Fronts, Malinovsky and Vatutin, who believed that an immediate offensive was required until the Germans recovered from their defeat in the winter of 1943.

At the end of March, Marshal Zhukov visited the fronts and prepared a report for Stalin, in which he stated the following:

« I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better if we exhausted the enemy on our defenses, drove out his tanks, and then brought in fresh reserves; by switching to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping».

This report formed the basis of the defense plan in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. The Red Army embarked on a deliberate defense.

It is interesting: the plan of defense on the Kursk ledge was signed by Stalin at a meeting on April 12. On the same day, a draft of Order No. 6, a counterattack by German troops near Kursk, lay on the table to Hitler. This was the final version of Operation Citadel.

Secret Front of the Battle of Kursk

Experience 1941-1943 showed that in order to prepare an offensive operation, it is necessary to move a huge amount of manpower, tanks, guns, various military equipment, and ammunition to a certain sector of the front; set in motion hundreds of thousands of people over a vast territory, sometimes hundreds of kilometers from the intended point. Only in the case of more or less complete awareness of all these movements in the enemy rear will the command receive real benefit from the report of the scouts about the day of the offensive.

Regular reports on the movement and strength of enemy military units give a picture of the enemy's possible actions. And for this it is necessary to have a well-hidden, reliable, well-functioning intelligence service.

By 1943, hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers were working behind German lines. But the first serious information, which confirmed the correctness of the calculation of the Soviet command, was sent by the London residency. On April 25, 1943, British intelligence intercepted a telegram from the German General Weichs. It was a detailed plan for Operation Citadel and an assessment of the state of the Soviet troops in the Kursk salient. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, having read the text of the document after deciphering it, decided to hand it over to Soviet intelligence.

In early May, information began to arrive from front-line and strategic intelligence that the Germans were concentrating troops at the base of the ledge, transferring the most combat-ready units, new equipment. At the end of April, several groups of scouts were landed in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel occupied by the Germans, who informed about the movements of enemy troops.

Foreign intelligence of the USSR and the NKVD made its contribution to the defense of the Kursk Bulge. Disinformation was required, which would force the Wehrmacht generals to redeploy their units and transfer new reinforcements to the front. This will require additional time, which means it will postpone the German offensive and enable the Red Army to better prepare the defense and counteroffensive plan. In March 1943, the headquarters of the USSR command decided that disinformation data for the German command should be transmitted by A.P., a participant in the Monastery project. Demyanov.

Operation Monastery

At the very beginning of World War II, it became necessary to infiltrate the German intelligence network - the Abwehr - operating on the territory of the USSR. It was possible to recruit several agents - Abwehr radio operators - and use them to lure out other German agents.

But, firstly, such an operational game could not continue for a long time, and secondly, during it it was hardly possible to convey serious misinformation to the enemy. Therefore, Lieutenant General of the NKVD Sudoplatov decided to imitate the existence of the monarchist organization Throne in the USSR, which welcomes the victory of the Germans and wants to help them.

A candidate for the underground monarchist organization was soon found - it was Alexander Petrovich Demyanov, who came from a noble officer family. In 1939, he made contact with German intelligence officers in Moscow, and this contact developed so successfully that the Germans practically considered Demyanov their agent, giving him the nickname "Max".

On February 17, 1942, Demyanov's "flight" across the front line was organized. German counterintelligence at first was distrustful of the Russian intelligence officer - he was interrogated and checked with passion, not trusting the stories about the existence of the "Throne", on behalf of which he fled to the Germans to ask them for help. The Germans staged a shooting as a test, but Demyanov showed courage and did not split.

After an answer was received from Berlin to the request of the front-line division of the Abwehr that the defector - known to the Abwehr "Max", who can be trusted - the attitude towards him changed, and they began to prepare him for being thrown into the Soviet rear. His training was short-lived, but extremely intensive: Demyanov studied cryptography, cipher and radio business.

On March 15, 1942, only twenty-six days after the "transition to the Germans", he was dropped by parachute over the Yaroslavl region. On the same day he was delivered to Moscow with a report to the leadership of the NKVD.

Two weeks later, as agreed before the cast, "Max" went on the air. From that day on, he began regular radio contact with German intelligence. Operation Monastery developed successfully; it became clear that its capabilities go far beyond the goals outlined at the beginning. Now we could talk not only about "catching" German agents, but also about supplying the Germans with large-scale disinformation, prepared on the very high level.

In October 1942, couriers from Abwehr came to Max, delivering a walkie-talkie, encryption pads and money. After the couriers were captured by the NKVD, they were recruited, and now "information" to the Germans went through several channels.

December 18, 1942 "Max" and one of the radio operators were awarded the German Order - "Iron Cross" with swords for bravery. The radio play continued. German intelligence couriers increasingly arrived not only in Moscow, but also in other cities where the "Throne" allegedly had its strongholds: in Gorky, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk. In total, more than fifty agents were captured during the operational game.

But the main merit of the participants in the operation "Monastery" is the transfer of a large amount of the most important disinformation. According to the legend for the Germans, "Max" worked as a junior communications officer in the General Staff of the Red Army. Demyanov's reports concerned mainly the rail transportation of military units, military equipment, which made it possible for the Germans to calculate the actions planned in advance by our army. But the leaders of the operation "Monastery" proceeded from the fact that the monitoring of the railways is carried out by real German agents. Therefore, wooden "tanks", "guns" and other "equipment" were sent along the routes indicated by "Max" under tarpaulin covers.

To confirm Demyanov's reports about acts of sabotage committed by "his people", the press published notes about sabotage in railway transport.

The information reported by "Max" was divided into information obtained by his "sources" and by himself. Of course, while "his" information was poorer, given his low position.

The radio game continued until the end of 1944, after which it was decided to stop it and start a new operation - Berezino.

"Reliable source" weekly reported to the Germans data on the deployment of the main parts of the Soviet army south of Moscow. According to legend, he had access to information in the General Staff. The intelligence officer reported on the active transfer of Soviet troops and armored vehicles to the Kursk-Orel region, but they are not maneuverable enough, so their use is difficult. The transfer really went on, but in the reports of "Max" its dimensions were increased many times over. As the head of the NKVD intelligence service, Sudoplatov, later said: “Max’s disinformation, as it became known from the memoirs of the head of German intelligence (BND) Gehlen, contributed to the fact that the Germans repeatedly postponed the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, and this was in the hands of the Soviet Army ... »

defensive lines

The main idea of ​​the plan of the USSR command to repel the German strike on the Kursk ledge was a system of defense in depth with a large number of engineering structures and obstacles.

Defense preparation.

The depth of tactical defense was 15-20 kilometers. Particular importance in the preparation of the defense was attached to the equipment of trenches of a full profile, interconnected by communication lines. They served as shelters from artillery and mortar fire, as well as from air strikes, and provided covert maneuver along the front. In some areas of defense, the trenches were in four lines, with a distance of 250 meters between them. Shelters were also equipped there: cracks, niches, long-term firing points, dugouts under the timber frame.

As a rule, the first line of trenches was engaged in submachine gunners, tank destroyers, anti-tank gun crews. The main firing structures were anti-fragmentation nests for shooters, and for machine guns - bunkers (wood-and-earth firing points - a wooden frame two by two meters, almost completely buried in the ground, and covered with several logs on top).

The troops worked day and night, and the main difficulty was that, in order to disguise themselves on the front line, the fighters dug only at night.

General I.M. Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army on the Voronezh Front, recalled:

« So, we started building our defensive lines. The trenches and communication passages were deep - a meter and seventy centimeters, they dug, built dugouts and shelters, prepared positions for fire weapons. There was a lot of work. The army occupied 64 kilometers along the front, and an offensive could be expected along the entire front: swamps and forests, the so-called passive areas, inconvenient for an offensive, were not here ... "

Thus, on the alleged directions of the main enemy attacks, each front had six lines of defense with a separation depth of up to 110 km on the Central Front and up to 85 km on the Voronezh Front.

To repel the attacks of German tanks and motorized infantry, a widely developed system of engineering barriers was used: anti-tank ditches, scarps (an anti-tank obstacle, which is an artificially cut edge of a slope or river bank at a large angle), three rows of barbed wire, blockages of trees, minefields. In places where a breakthrough of German tanks was possible, the density of mines reached 1,500 pieces per kilometer of the front. In addition, for the implementation of the operational laying of mines directly in front of the advancing tanks (in those years called "impudent mining"), special mobile barrage detachments (PZO) were organized. The cover was provided by a platoon of anti-tank rifles on trucks off-road or captured armored personnel carriers.

It is interesting: in addition to regular mines, in the defense on the Kursk Bulge, fire explosives were widely used, which were a box with incendiary bottles, in the center of which a saber, a grenade or an anti-personnel mine was placed. Unlike conventional minefields, they hit the enemy not only with a blast wave and fragments, but also with a flame resulting from the explosion. A minefield with fire explosives, with good camouflage, cannot be cleared. From such land mines, several barrier fields were created, which proved to be very effective both against infantry and against light and medium tanks.

The volume of work carried out by the engineering services of the fronts was colossal. Only in the location of the Central Front in April-June, up to 5,000 km of trenches and communications were dug, more than 300 km of wire obstacles were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 mines and land mines, over 60 km of gouges, up to 80 km of anti-tank ditches.

The crew of the 45-mm gun is ready to open fire.

Considering that the Germans were going to use heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, powerful anti-tank mines were required, but the Red Army did not have enough of them. For example, when hitting a Soviet mine YaM-5, the German T-2 was completely destroyed, and the T-6 "Tiger" lost one or two tracks from the caterpillar. If the Wehrmacht had a well-established repair system, damaged vehicles were quickly put into operation. Knowing this, in some areas, Soviet sappers used the simultaneous installation of two mines (one above the other) in one hole against enemy tanks "Tiger", "Panther" and assault guns "Ferdinand".

The basis of the Soviet anti-tank defense was anti-tank strongholds (PTOP). These were well-camouflaged firing positions for 6-10 anti-tank guns with a caliber of 45 and 76 mm, with a wide sector of fire. From the fire of the German motorized infantry, the PTOOP covered a platoon of submachine gunners.

It is worth noting that all firing positions were prepared only by battery crews. As the commander of the anti-tank gun, a participant in the Battle of Kursk, M.P. Badigin:

“The most difficult thing in war is work, sometimes physically exhausting work, before you have to fight, go on the attack ... It is sometimes even easier than this work. According to calculations, in order to dig in a 45-mm cannon, it is necessary to take out about thirty cubic meters of earth, and a 76-mm one - already fifty-six cubic meters. If according to peaceful calculations, this is two days of work. And without calculation - it was necessary to be in time by the morning ... They dug as much as dozens of people, maybe they won’t have to dig up the earth in a lifetime ... Let’s say this: we took up a firing position, the commander, for example, decided to change one kilometer to the right. We must dig again, throw away fifty-six cubic meters of earth. I didn’t have time to dig - they say: five kilometers to the left. Digging again ... The soldier just runs out of breath mentally and physically, runs out of breath, can't. But nevertheless, the tasks are worth it, this is war. Not dug in - this is death. So, they found the strength in themselves and dug ... First, as a rule, ditches are dug for shelter, and then only - a platform for a gun. One has only to dig two bayonets, you can already lie down, hide in the ground - it’s no longer dangerous here. And there was such a rule - it was not instituted by anyone, but we firmly followed it: you will definitely dig a ditch in the place, if there is such a place, where there is a trace of mines or a shell that has exploded. Because we ourselves, gunners, know that a projectile hits the same place twice extremely rarely ... "

Leading edge masking

Along with the creation of a strong defense, the Soviet command was faced with the task of masking the front line. German intelligence did not sit still and conducted a large-scale collection of information in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. All means were used: round-the-clock surveillance of the front line, reconnaissance groups parachuted into the rear of the Russian units, and the Germans systematically captured prisoners. But aerial reconnaissance turned out to be the most effective - German reconnaissance aircraft regularly photographed the front line of the Soviet defense. And comparing the photographs with the previous ones, taken two or three weeks ago, one could see how the area was changing, where the Russians were setting up artillery batteries, and where the infantry had dug in.

German reconnaissance aircraft crosses the neutral zone.

On May 28, 1943, a German reconnaissance aircraft Focke-Wulf 189 ("frame" - the Russian pilots called this aircraft) was shot down over the territory of the first echelon of defense of the Soviet troops. The captured pilot with documents and a map was immediately taken to the front headquarters. And when the commander of the Voronezh Front superimposed the captured map on the divisional defense scheme, it turned out to be very similar - in some places the combat positions, especially artillery and tanks, were as if copied from the Soviet map.

A plan was immediately developed for the regrouping of Soviet troops. A truly titanic work lay ahead: re-equipping hundreds of strongholds, digging up tons of earth - and all this in the shortest possible time. Changes of firing positions were carried out only at night. A decision was also made: to put mock-ups of guns at the former positions of the artillery, to put mock-ups of plywood in the places of the former concentration of tanks. During the flights of German reconnaissance, anti-aircraft fire was simulated over decoys. The Second Air Army had to create false airfields at the site of the previous deployment. Part of the combat aircraft remained with mock-ups, which were periodically moved around the runway to simulate. When a Luftwaffe scout approached, a pair of fighters rose from the airfield, the task of which was only to scare away the German spy.

The bulk (up to 90%) of the tanks were concentrated on the probable directions of the main attacks of German tanks. The front commanders adhered to the principle of the massive use of tank troops in the decisive sectors of the front.

Soldier training

The March-June period preceding the Battle of Kursk was used to thoroughly prepare the troops for combat operations. The commanders and headquarters of rifle, tank and artillery formations and units conducted joint exercises on the ground, during which options for delivering counterattacks and counterattacks were worked out. Special attention in the course of combat training, emphasis was placed on the ability to organize the repulsion of large tank attacks, the preparation and conduct of counterattacks and counterattacks, and the implementation of a wide maneuver of forces and means in order to create superiority over the enemy. Combat training went on in each category of servicemen in their own specific areas. For example, units of anti-tank rifles (PTR) practiced practical interaction with tank units. Much attention was paid to the development of infantry combat methods with new German tanks. This became especially true after the Wehrmacht, along with the German propaganda about the “wonder weapon of the Third Reich”, used heavy T-6 Tiger tanks during the winter battles near Kharkov, which had a strong moral impression on the exhausted Russian troops.

As the infantryman G.S. Genkin, who fell under the terrible blow of Manstein's tanks, rushing to help the encircled Paulus group near Stalingrad in December 1942:

« And then tanks came at us... Dozens of tanks... We somehow managed to cut off the German infantry, and then the carnage began. German tanks crushed us.

What kind of shooting at the viewing slots here ?! And then the German infantry joined in the extermination of our battalion. Battalion PTR-sheep managed to fire several shots at the tanks and were crushed by caterpillars. We couldn't even step back. Tanks from all sides! Their caterpillars were red with blood. Those of our people who tried to get up and run were immediately killed by bursts from tank machine guns ... Naked, flat as a table steppe. It was a terrible fight, believe me... Bloody porridge... I lay among the crushed human bodies and waited for their fate to befall me too».

Impressions of a 56-ton armored vehicle spewing fire and lead only strengthened German propaganda, so it was extremely important to prove to a soldier who was preparing for defensive battles that even an infantryman could fight a "tiger".

"Tigers" on the march.

The military publishing house issued special instructions and posters, which clearly showed the vulnerabilities of enemy armored vehicles, gave advice on how to more effectively use each of the anti-tank weapons available to the infantry (grenades, Molotov cocktails, anti-tank rifles, etc.). In order to "eliminate the elements of tank fear", the entire personnel of rifle and motorized rifle units were tested with tanks at special tankodromes. And for the running-in of infantry and anti-tank artillery regiments in the rear of the defense, a special training ground was built, where in June there were systematic firing and exercises. For these purposes, tank crews of neighboring units were involved.

In the training of tank units, the emphasis was primarily on training driver-mechanics in the practical driving of combat vehicles, primarily in real combat conditions, as well as firing on the move and with short stops.

Considerable importance was attached to the study of techniques and methods of camouflage, the preservation of equipment and people from German air strikes. At the beginning of May 1943, information was received from Soviet intelligence about the appearance of a new attack aircraft based on the Ju-87 (Junkers 87, also known as Laptezhnik) from the German aviation. The Germans tested the Model G in an experimental squadron located in the Crimea.

This "German response to the Il-2" was a modernized Junkers 87 dive bomber. It was equipped with two 37 mm cannons that could penetrate armor up to 40 mm. But, as it turned out later, the Germans abandoned the mass production of this attack aircraft due to design flaws, and 174 copies were produced before the end of the war. The new attack aircraft had such a low speed that it barely overtook the old Hs 126 reconnaissance aircraft, contemptuously referred to in the Red Army as a “crutch”. The new Ju-87 also earned a lot of nicknames: "Cannon bird" (Kanonenvogel) or "Thing with long sticks" (Stuka mil den Langen Stangen).

Attack of the German infantry under the cover of self-propelled guns.

By July 5, the defense on the Kursk ledge, which has a length of 550 kilometers, was occupied by the troops of the Central (commander - General of the Army Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander - General of the Army Vatutin) fronts. They included 1,336,000 people, over 19,000 guns and mortars, over 3,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (including over 900 T-60 and T-70 light tanks), 2,900 aircraft (including 728 long-range and light aircraft). bombers Po-2). To the east of Kursk, the Steppe Military District, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was concentrated, renamed on July 9 into the “Steppe Front” (commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev), which had 573,000 people, 8,000 guns and mortars, about 1,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations , up to 400 combat aircraft.

Operation "Citadel" and the Kursk defensive operation July 5-23, 1943

On the afternoon of July 4, a strong air strike and artillery fire were dealt to the combat guards and forward detachments of the army of General Chistyakov. As the German Field Marshal Manstein wrote in his memoirs, this attack was aimed at capturing "the observation posts necessary to lead the offensive." In addition, the Germans sought to reconnoiter in detail before the start of the offensive and, if possible, destroy the system of Russian minefields and bring their troops as close as possible to the front line of defense of the Soviet army. The Wehrmacht attack was repulsed in two hours. At the headquarters of the Soviet command, no one doubted that the Germans were conducting "reconnaissance in force."

On July 5, at four o'clock in the afternoon, German artillery preparation began - tons of shells hit the Soviet defense line. From the memoirs of Wehrmacht soldiers and officers participating in Operation Citadel:

ACS Stug is firing.

« ... silence reigned between Belgorod, Tomarovskaya and Faustov. The Russians were waiting. And on the other side of the neutral zone, the Germans were waiting. The sound of aircraft was heard. People raised their heads, Captain Laik, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Regiment of the "Grossdeutschland" division, looked at the sky, and then at his watch. “Minute by minute,” he said ... And at that moment, a squadron of Stuka bombers roared over the trenches towards the enemy. Fighters flew high above them. The Stukas banked and dived with a howl. On the other side, on the slopes of Gertsovka and Butovo, fountains of earth and smoke rose. It was there that the observation posts of the Soviet artillery were located ... The next squadron flew over our positions, and after it another and another. At 15:00 the last bomb exploded. Then the artillery came in. Roaring, howling hell... Ten minutes later, under the cover of artillery fire, the platoons were running through the passages in the minefields, assault guns were moving on their heels.

Detachments of sappers fled between them, ready to remove any unexpected obstacle ... Soon, however, the garrisons of the still surviving Russian strongholds recovered from surprise and opened fire from all types of weapons that they had .... And Soviet artillery intervened in the matter, setting a deadly barrier. Volley after volley hit the attack area. The swept German assault guns began to run into Soviet mines. There was a roar of anti-tank rifles and a howl of mortars. Red fighters, uttering piercing cries, flew like a hawk on the slopes and already got the German assault squads with machine guns and cannons ...»

South of Orel and north of Belgorod, fierce battles began. The main blow was inflicted on the village of Olkhovatka, and the auxiliary ones - on Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Soviet troops met the Germans with dense fire from howitzers and anti-tank guns. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, and only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

central front

On the Central Front, the enemy dealt the main blow to the center of the 13th Army, commanded by General Pukhov. Having concentrated up to five hundred tanks here, the Germans hoped to break the defense of the Soviet troops with a powerful armored ram, supported by aviation and artillery. The enemy delivered an auxiliary blow to Gnilets.

Commander's T-4.

Soviet armor-piercers.

The Russians met the blows of the advancing enemy with exceptional stamina. All anti-tank weapons, and above all tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, in cooperation with rifle units, sappers and units of other branches of the military, inflicted great damage on the Germans. The actions of the ground troops were supported by the formations of the 16th Air Army of General Rudenko. The German command continuously increased its strike, throwing new tank and infantry units into battle, trying at any cost to break the defenses of the 13th Army. By the end of the day, the Germans in the main, Olkhovatsk, direction wedged into the Soviet defense for eight kilometers and reached the second defensive strip.

The commander of the Central Front, General Rokossovsky, decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack against the Nazi grouping with the forces of the 2nd Panzer Army. The counterattack began early in the morning on July 6, the 16th Panzer Corps under the command of General Grigoriev struck at Butyrki and pushed the enemy back two kilometers to the north. But the German command brought fresh tank units to this area. A battle broke out between 100 Soviet and 200 German tanks. Tankers, showing exceptional courage and stamina, held the captured positions for a long time. However, using their numerical superiority, the Germans repulsed the counterattacks of the formations of the 16th Panzer Corps, and then went on the offensive with two tank divisions of the 41st Tank Corps and two infantry divisions, supported by aviation.

Attack T-34

The Germans often used captured T-34s.

The 19th Panzer Corps, commanded by General Vasiliev, concentrated in the starting area on the morning of July 6th. Significant time was spent on organizing interaction with rifle divisions and clearing the passages, so the formations of the 19th Panzer Corps struck in the direction of Podolyan only at 17:00, that is, when the brigades of the 16th Panzer Corps were already forced to retreat to their original position. Met by heavy fire from enemy artillery, tanks and aircraft, the 19th Panzer Corps suffered losses and retreated to its original position. The counterattack of the 2nd Panzer Army did not reach its goal, but played a large and important role in the defensive operation of the Central Front. The active and decisive actions of the Soviet troops halted the German offensive in front of the second line of defense.

On July 7, the enemy concentrated his main efforts on three directions: Ponyri, Olkhovatka, and Teploe. Replenished with reserve tanks, the battered divisions of the Nazis sought to break through the defenses of the Red Army troops.

After strong artillery preparation and with the support of 150 aircraft, the Germans attacked Ponyri. 150 Wehrmacht tanks took part in the attack. Fierce fighting broke out, lasting until the very night. Hitler's tanks, together with infantry, supported by heavy artillery fire and massive air strikes, attacked eight times, but each time their attack was repulsed.

Rare shot - captured T-60.

The main forces of the German strike force went on the offensive in the directions of Olkhovatka and Teploe. Up to 300 German tanks broke into these areas, but here they were met with heavy fire from tanks and anti-tank artillery. In the very first minutes of the battle, several dozen German tanks were set on fire. The fire of the Soviet troops forced the enemy to retreat. On July 7, the Germans advanced only three kilometers into the defenses. On July 8, the Nazis brought up reserves and again struck in the same directions.

Particularly stubborn and heavy fighting unfolded in the Ponyri area. 80 tanks, supported by motorized infantry, attacked this settlement several times. However, the Russians pushed the Germans back to their original position. On the Olkhovat direction, the Germans launched 13 powerful attacks that day, but all of them were repulsed by strong infantry, artillery and tank fire, supported by air strikes. In the area of ​​the Ponyri station on the morning of July 10, about 300 German tanks attacked Soviet positions. German tanks moved in echelons of 50-60 vehicles, and the Russian defenses were subjected to continuous bombardment in groups of 40-60 aircraft.

Nevertheless, the defense held out, destroying 60 Wehrmacht tanks. For six days, the Germans, at the cost of huge losses in manpower and military equipment, wedged into the defense of the Soviet troops. In the Olkhovatsk direction - 12 kilometers, and in auxiliary directions only 1-3 kilometers. During this time, the German forces were exhausted, and they were forced to go on the defensive without reaching the goal.

Voronezh Front

Russian infantry attack.

Infantry digs in positions.

Bloody battles unfolded in these July days on the Voronezh front. The Germans delivered the main blow in the general direction to Kursk, it was here that the bulk of the Wehrmacht tanks were concentrated. On the first day, the Germans brought into the battle up to 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, supported by a large number of artillery and aircraft. At the cost of huge losses in manpower and equipment, the Wehrmacht troops managed to break through the main line of defense of the 6th Guards Army in some areas. The commander of the Voronezh Front, General Vatutin, decided to counterattack the Wehrmacht tank units, exhausted by battles. At night, Soviet tanks made a march and on the morning of July 6 took up defensive positions near Shepelevo.

During the day, 160 German tanks entered Shepelevo in four columns and tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the move. But here they met with powerful fire from rifle units, tank and artillery formations.

From July 9 to 14, after fierce fighting, the Germans managed to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of about 35 kilometers. After unsuccessful attempts to break through to Kursk along the highway to Oboyan, the Germans decided to do it to the east, through Prokhorovka. The Russian command decided to counterattack the Nazi tank units.

Prokhorovka

Wehrmacht tanks near Prokhorovka.

The counterattack during the Battle of Kursk on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka was characterized by official Soviet historians as the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War, which was won by the Soviet troops. It is alleged that it clearly showed the complete superiority of Soviet tanks and military art over German weapons and the skill of the commanders of the German army. Here is the interpretation of this battle in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:

« On July 12, 1943, in the area west and south of Prokhorovka, during the Battle of Kursk, the largest battle in the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 took place. oncoming tank battle between the advancing Nazi tank grouping (2nd SS Panzer Corps and 3rd Panzer Corps, about 700 tanks and assault guns in total) and the counterattacking 5th Guards Tank Army and three tank and mechanized brigades (about 800 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, self-propelled guns). In fierce battles that lasted all day, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. killed and was forced to go on the defensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy went on the defensive, and on July 16 he began to withdraw his forces. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 19 and the Steppe Front, went on to pursue and threw back the Nazi troops to the starting line».

There is an alternative version of modern historians, according to which no more than 311 German tanks and self-propelled guns (SPGs) fought near Prokhorovka on July 12 against 597 Soviet tanks and SPGs. I will not go into details, quote from documents, orders, reports - this will require much more space than the format of the article allows.

Self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", blown up by a Soviet mine.

Wrecked Panthers.

Since everyone studied “official history” at school, I will introduce you to an alternative version: in an expanded form, the Battle of Prokhorov (as an episode of the Battle of Kursk during the operation “Citadel” by the German troops) lasted from July 10 to July 13, 1943. It was on July 10, having met stubborn resistance in their movement to Oboyan, that the Germans changed the direction of the main attack on the Prokhorovka railway station. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was advancing here as part of the SS motorized divisions (called tank divisions in Russia, although they officially became such in October 1943) “Dead Head”, “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” and “Reich” (“SS-Division “Totenkopf ”, “Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler” and “SS-Das Reich”), which broke through two lines of long-term fortifications of the Soviet troops, the main and the second, in five days, and went out on the sixth day to the third, rear, line ten kilometers southwest railway station Prokhorovka. At four in the morning on July 12, 1943, the "Dead Head" division began to advance on the bridgehead near the Psel River, and "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich" took up defense at the Prokhorovka station.

Exactly at eight in the morning on July 12, 1943, Soviet artillery preparation began, which lasted fifteen minutes; by noon approached the positions of the German Leibstandarte division, which took up defense near the Prokhorovka station (there were 56 tanks: 4 Tigers T-6, 47 T-4, 5 T-3, 10 Stug assault guns and 20 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns) and , having met with strong resistance, went on the defensive. At 10:30, the 29th Tank Corps (122 T-34s, 70 T-70 light tanks and 20 self-propelled guns) also approached the German positions located near the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it was stopped by the Germans. Having the ability to conduct effective fire to kill from a distance of two kilometers, German tankers shot attacking Soviet tanks, as if at a training ground, from camouflaged positions. At 11:00 "October" was taken by a motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Corps, but after a German counterattack, the brigade retreated. At 16:00, the last attack was made by the forces of the remaining 15 T-34s - hiding behind a forest plantation and the smoke of burning Soviet tanks, they managed to slip through the strongholds of the German Leibstandarte assault guns - heights 242.5 and 241.6 - and break into the state farm.

Komsomolets went deepest into the enemy defenses - five kilometers. But the Germans blocked the state farm and inflicted a powerful artillery and air strike on it. Ultimately, the units that broke through were almost completely destroyed.

"Ferdinand", abandoned by the crew.

Set on fire T-34.

At ten in the morning, the 2nd Tank Corps (35 T-34s, 4 Churchills, 46 T-70 light tanks) and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps (84 T-34s, 3 Churchills, 52 light tanks T -70). Their target was the German division "Reich" located south of the Prokhorovka station (1 "Tiger", 8 captured Soviet tanks T-34, 18 T-4, 34 T-3, 27 assault self-propelled guns and about 70 field and anti-tank artillery guns). By noon, the advance of Russian tanks was stopped by German artillery and tanks. At 15:00, the "Reich" division launched a counteroffensive, pushing back the Soviet units, and advanced two kilometers in a five-kilometer-wide sector, suffering relatively light losses.

At noon, the Dead Head division launched an offensive (94 tanks, 10 Tigers, 30 T-4s, 54 T-3s, 21 assault self-propelled guns) and, having crushed the defenses of the 6th Guards Army, captured the Polezhaev farm. In the middle of the day, Totenkopf units broke through to the high western bank of the Psel River, from which the battle formations of the Soviet 18th Panzer Corps were easily shot through with flanking fire. But the Germans were unable to force the river, although they forced the 110th and 181st tank brigades of this corps to finally withdraw from the battle.

From the memoirs of V.P. Bryukhov, commander of the T-34 tank of the 2nd tank corps:

« In the Battle of Prokhorovka, our corps was at first in the second echelon, providing for the entry of other corps, and then went forward. There was no more than a hundred meters between the tanks - you could only fidget, no maneuver. This was not a war - beating tanks. They crawled and fired. Everything was on fire. An indescribable stench hung over the battlefield. Everything was covered with smoke, dust, fire, so it seemed that twilight had come. Aviation bombed everyone. Tanks were on fire, vehicles were on fire, communications were down. All wiring was wound on the tracks. Radio communication is blocked. What is a connection? I'm working on the transfer, suddenly they kill me - the wave is clogged. It is necessary to switch to a spare wave, and when will anyone guess? At eight in the morning we went on the attack and immediately clashed with the Germans. About an hour later my tank was knocked out. A shell flew in from somewhere and hit the side, repulsed the sloth and the first roller. The tank stopped and turned around. We immediately jumped out - and let's crawl into the funnel. It's not up to repair. This is Prokhorovka! There, if the tank stopped, jump out. If you haven't been killed now, the next tank will come up and finish you off. Shot at point blank range. I switched to another tank. He, too, was soon burned. The shell hit the engine compartment. The tank caught fire and we all jumped out. They climbed into the funnel and sat, firing back. Well, while I was fighting in the tank, I didn’t play the fool either - with the first shell I covered the 75-mm cannon, which the crew rolled out to the firing line, and burned the T-3 tank. The battle lasted until about seven o'clock in the evening, we had heavy losses. In a brigade of sixty-five tanks, about twenty-five remained, but on the first day I got the impression that the losses on both sides were the same ... On the evening of the 12th, an order was received to go on the defensive, and for another three days we fought off counterattacks ...»

The results of the battle on July 12, 1943 near the Prokhorovka station

Counterattack.

The Soviet offensive was stopped, after stubborn fighting in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Germans remained in their previous positions. In the northern sector, the Totenkopf division advanced five kilometers, wedged into the Russian defenses. In the southern sector, the SS division "Reich" advanced two kilometers.

Attacking the enemy southwest of Prokhorovka station, the Soviet tank troops, squeezed in a six-kilometer-wide strip and being shot at by gunfire, could not realize the advantage in the mobility of their tanks and suffered catastrophic losses: 329 tanks and self-propelled guns (according to other sources, 343). Almost all the Soviet tanks knocked out in the battles on July 12, suitable for refurbishment, remained on the territory occupied by the enemy, and were captured and destroyed by him. Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka region not only failed to recapture territory from the enemy, but also lost part of their own.

The Germans lost about 120 combat vehicles, but most of the German tanks and self-propelled assault guns were restored in mobile military repair units, which, located not far from the front line, with their own forces and means usually commissioned up to 90% of the wrecked armored vehicles.

It is interesting: Soviet reports reported dozens of Tigers and Ferdinands knocked out by the Red Army. The number of T-6s destroyed in Soviet reports for the Battle of Prokhorov is several times higher than the number of Tigers participating in it. Tanks T-4G / H and T-3L / M with hinged armor screens were often confused by Soviet tankmen and gunners with the T-6, and self-propelled guns of the StuG type with the Ferdinands.

German self-propelled guns. Stug with side screens.

The failure of the Citadel

On July 12, at five in the morning, the Oryol offensive operation "Kutuzov" began. The purpose of the operation was to defeat the German army grouping "Center" and eliminate the Oryol ledge with strikes from the Western and Bryansk fronts. As a result, the German command was forced to stop the attack on the Kursk salient and go on the defensive. By the evening of July 13, units of the Red Army had broken through the German defenses to a depth of twenty-five kilometers. On July 15, the divisions of the Central Front joined the advancing units of the two fronts. On July 17, after the start of the Soviet attack on the Orlovsky bridgehead, the Germans finally abandoned the hope of resuming the Citadel.

Counterattack near Orel.

T-34 in the Oryol operation.

On July 26, the Germans were forced to leave the Orlovsky bridgehead and begin a retreat to positions east of Bryansk. On July 29, Volkhov was liberated, on August 5, Orel, by August 18, Soviet troops approached the defensive lines near Bryansk. This ended the Oryol-Kursk operation, but the counteroffensive on the Kursk Bulge developed into a general offensive of the Red Army along the entire front.

On July 19, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the Germans back to the starting line, from which the Wehrmacht attacked the Kursk Citadel on July 5. On August 5, Belgorod was liberated. By August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The troops of the Steppe Front came close to the outer defensive contour of Kharkov. Having unsuccessfully tried to counterattack, the Germans finally went on the defensive. On August 23, after stubborn fighting, the troops of the Steppe Front completely cleared Kharkov of the Nazis.

Results

The results of the Battle of Kursk were rather disappointing for the Soviet Union in terms of loss ratio. Between July 5 and August 23, 1943, Soviet losses reached approximately 1,677,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick; while approximately 360,000 belong to the Wehrmacht.

These figures became available to the public only in 1993, after the declassification of documents from the archives of the USSR Armed Forces. Prior to this, Soviet historians underestimated the losses of the Red Army, while German ones exaggerated.

Soviet irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns during the Battle of Kursk amounted to 6064 vehicles. This figure is confirmed by data on the irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the Soviet tank armies during certain operations of this battle. These losses are four times higher than the German ones, even if we take the traditional Soviet estimate (most likely overestimated) of 1,500 enemy tanks and assault guns destroyed.

The fifth mission for the Red Army begins with an order to take up defense. Fortified areas, minefields, several echelons of defense, a large number of tanks and self-propelled guns - everything looks like it was on a hot July day in 1943.

Five waves of attacks by German "armored wedges", strong opposition from howitzer artillery, a flurry of fire and elements of a three-dimensional landscape that are being erased from the face of the earth convey the scale and atmosphere of a global battle.

Codename: Panzers

Developer: Stormregion

Publisher: Akella

Genre: strategy

Excellent graphics, bright special effects - and a complete lack of realism. So you can characterize this RTS. The medium tank of the Wehrmacht T-3 withstands the hit of a rocket fired by the Katyusha and continues to fire - where has this been seen? The battle on the Kursk Bulge will begin in the fourth mission, in the company of the USSR, where the player is asked to cover the Russian defenses with volleys of rocket artillery.

Great Battles: Kursk Bulge (Supplement to Blitzkrieg 2)

Developers: Nival/N-Game

Publisher: Akella

Genre: strategy

In my opinion, this time the developers frankly cheated. Where did the German self-propelled guns Hetzer come from in July 1943 on the battlefield near Kursk? And where did the Russian T-34-85 come from? Their release was established only in 1944.

Also, the disadvantages include the complete absence of the atmosphere of a global battle. Artificial intelligence, to put it mildly, is lame: a tank can easily substitute the side during an artillery duel, and the enemy’s “panther” will not notice the execution in the stern from the Russian self-propelled guns, since it is “busy” with the destruction of infantry in the trenches.

Call of Duty: United Offensive

Developer: Gray Matter Studios

Publisher: Activision

Genre: first person shooter

The developers of the action movies could not get past the battle on the Kursk salient. Call of Duty: United Offensive has a "Kursk" mission.

In it, the player is given the opportunity to attack the Germans on the T-34 tank. Despite the big name, this is a rather boring mission. It is surprising that the German infantry had the Panzerfaust 30 - it entered service with the Wehrmacht only in September 1943, when the Battle of Kursk ended.

Also, this historical episode was covered in such games as IL-2: Sturmovik, Battlefield 1942, Panzer Campaigns.