In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis' dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.
Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.
(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)
It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable tank "Tiger", which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"
The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Victory of the Soviet Troops in the Battle of Kursk."
Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:
In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation code-named Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.
German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"
The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or the new tanks were not delivered, or the new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then
"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.
Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that he would lose this battle by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military specialists of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.
However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.
(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images) Having waited for the latest technology - the tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.
That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:
- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!
- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.
“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.
Rokossovsky was not mistaken.
On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.
Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.
Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.
Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some kind of information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.
- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.
"Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against the "Tigers" and "Panthers" The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.
Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.
Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and decrease the number of German ones.
None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.
Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).
Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle:
According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.
In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:
“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.
The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.
The Russians drove, if they ever got that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.
The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.
As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.
The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.
“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."
It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.
One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.
It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.
Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95 When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out their two offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.
On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.
On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation. "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943 in Moscow it was held to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. The painting "The Tale of a Real Man." Photo: Kommersant The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.
But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.
Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.
Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.
On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.
This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. August 24, 1943 Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.
After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for launching a general strategic offensive.
In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge" Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.
August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and longest retreats on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.
As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and stamina of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...
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All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments
Moscow City Branch
Military Historical Club
M.KOLOMIETS, M.Svirin
with the participation of O. BARONOV, D. NEDOGONOV
V Your attention is invited to an illustrated edition dedicated to the fighting on the Kursk Bulge. Compiling the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal of giving a comprehensive description of the course of hostilities in the summer of 1943. They used as primary sources mainly domestic documents of those years: combat logs, combat and loss reports provided by various military formations, and protocols of work commissions engaged in July-August 1943 in the study of new models of German military equipment. The publication deals mainly with the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored forces and does not consider the actions of aviation and infantry formations.
P after the end of the winter 1942-43. the offensive of the Red Army and the counterattack of the German operational group "Kempf" The Eastern Front in the area of \u200b\u200bthe cities of Orel-Kursk-Belgorod took on bizarre shapes. In the Orel region, the front line went into the location of the Soviet troops in an arc, and in the Kursk region, on the contrary, it formed a depression in a westerly direction. This characteristic configuration of the front prompted the German command to plan the spring-summer campaign of 1943, in which the stake was placed on the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kursk.
Unit of 150-mm self-propelled guns on the chassis of the French tractor "Lorrain" before the battles.
Oryol direction. June 1943
The plans of the German command
The conclusion about the possibility of destroying Soviet troops with small own losses followed from the experience of summer operations in 1941-42. and to a large extent was based on an underestimation of the capabilities of the Red Army. After successful battles near Kharkov, the German high command decided that the crisis on the Eastern Front had already passed and that success in the course of the summer offensive near Kursk was beyond doubt. On April 15, 1943, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6 on the preparation of the Kursk operation, called the "Citadel", and the study of the subsequent large-scale offensive to the east and southeast, which received the code name "Operation Panther".
Before coming. "Mapder III" and panzergrenadiers at the starting position. July, 1943
"Tigers" of the 505th battalion on the march.
It was originally planned to start offensive operations on May 10-15, but later this period was postponed to June, then to July due to the unavailability of Army Group South (some authors believe that this period was postponed due to the unavailability of the Panther tanks, however, according to Manstein's reports, on May 1, 1943, he had a shortage of personnel in his units, reaching 11-18%.
German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf G in ambush. District of Belgorod, June 1943
"Ferdinand" of the 653rd tank destroyer battalion before the battles.
The presence of tanks and assault guns in other units of the ground forces
The plans of the Soviet command
In the course of analyzing the situation that developed on the Central and Voronezh fronts in the spring of 1943, based on information transmitted by British intelligence, as well as short-term strategic games in the General Staff in April 1943, it was assumed that it was the floor of Kursk that the German command would try to take revenge for the Stalingrad "boiler".
During the discussion of plans to counter the German offensive, the staff of the General Staff and members of the Headquarters proposed two options for the summer campaign of 1943. One was to inflict a powerful preemptive strike on the German troops even before the start of the offensive, defeat them in deployment positions, and then go into a decisive offensive by the forces of five fronts in order to quickly reach the Dnieper.
The second provided for the meeting of the advancing German troops with a defense in depth prepared in advance, equipped with a large amount of artillery, in order to exhaust their forces in defensive battles and then go on the offensive with fresh forces from three fronts.
The most ardent supporters of the first version of the campaign were the commander of the Voronezh Front N. Vatutin and a member of the military council of the front N. Khrushchev, who asked for the strengthening of their front with one combined arms and one tank armies in order to go on the offensive by the end of May. Their plan was supported by the Stavka representative A. Vasilevsky.
The second option was supported by the command of the Central Front, who rightly believed that a preemptive strike would be accompanied by heavy losses of Soviet troops, and the reserves accumulated by the German troops could be used to prevent the development of our offensive and deliver powerful counterattacks during it.
The problem was resolved when the supporters of the second option were supported by G. Zhukov, who called the first scenario "a new version of the summer of 1942", when the German troops not only repulsed the premature Soviet offensive, but were able to encircle the bulk of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space for an attack on Stalingrad . I. Stalin, apparently convinced by such a clear argumentation, took the side of a defensive strategy.
203-mm B-4 howitzers of the breakthrough artillery corps in positions.
The presence of tank and artillery weapons in some armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts
Preparing for battle
Despite the numerical superiority of domestic tanks, they were qualitatively inferior to German combat vehicles. The newly formed tank armies turned out to be cumbersome and difficult to manage formations. A significant part of the Soviet tanks were light vehicles, and if we take into account the often extremely poor quality of crew training, it becomes clear how difficult the task awaited our tankers when they met with the Germans.
Somewhat better was the position in the artillery. The basis of the material part of the anti-tank regiments of the Central and Voronezh fronts was the 76-mm divisional guns F-22USV, ZIS-22-USV and ZIS-3. Two artillery regiments were armed with more powerful 76-mm guns mod. 1936 (F-22), transferred from the Far East, and one regiment - 107 mm M-60 guns. The total number of 76-mm guns in anti-tank artillery regiments was almost twice the number of 45-mm guns.
True, if in the initial period of the war the 76-mm divisional gun could be successfully used against any German tank at all ranges of actual fire, now the situation has become more complicated. The new heavy German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", modernized medium tanks and assault guns expected on the battlefields were practically invulnerable in the frontal part at a distance of over 400 m, and there was no time to develop new artillery systems.
Preparation of the firing point by the crew of the anti-tank gun of Sergeant Tursunkhodzhiev. The picture shows a 76.2 mm F-22 mod. 1936 one of the IPTAP reserve of the High Command. Oryol direction, July 1943
The task of increasing the armor penetration of domestic anti-tank artillery by the summer of 1943 was reduced mainly to the modernization of existing armor-piercing ammunition for 76-mm divisional and tank guns. So, in March 1943, a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile was mastered in mass production, penetrating armor up to 96-84 mm thick at a distance of 500-1000 m. However, the volume of production of sub-caliber shells in 1943 was extremely insignificant due to the lack of tungsten and molybdenum, which were mined in the Caucasus. The shells were issued to the commanders of the guns of anti-tank regiments
(IPTAP) to the account, and the loss of at least one projectile was punished quite severely - up to demolition. In addition to sub-caliber, in 1943, armor-piercing shells of a new type with localizers (BR-350B) were also introduced into the ammunition load of 76-mm guns, which increased the armor penetration of the gun at a distance of 500 m by 6-9 mm and had a more durable body.
Heavy tank KV-1s of the guards of Lieutenant Kostin of the heavy tank regiment of the breakthrough of the 5th Guards Tank Army before the battles. July, 1943
Specially for the summer campaign of 1943, in May, the People's Commissariat of Armaments (NKV) was issued a large overplanned order for armor-piercing (and semi-armor-piercing) shells for guns that were not previously considered anti-tank: 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 122-mm and 152-mm long-range cannons and cannon-howitzers. The NKV enterprises also received an additional order for Molotov cocktails KS and easel high-explosive flamethrowers FOG.
76-mm divisional gun mod. 1939/41 ZIS-22 (F-22 USV), one of the main Soviet anti-tank weapons in the summer of 1943
All available light artillery weapons (caliber from 37 to 76 mm) were aimed at fighting tanks. Heavy cannon-howitzer batteries, heavy mortars, and Katyusha rocket-propelled mortar units also learned to repel tank subframes. For them, temporary memos and instructions for firing at moving armored targets were specially issued. Anti-aircraft batteries armed with 85-mm cannons were transferred to the reserve of the fronts to cover especially important areas from tank attacks. It was forbidden to fire on aircraft with batteries allocated for anti-tank missile defense.
The rich trophies captured during the Battle of Stalingrad were also preparing to meet the former owners with fire. At least four artillery regiments received captured materiel: 75 mm PaK 40 guns (instead of 76 mm USV and ZIS-3) and 50 mm RaK 38 guns (instead of 45 mm guns). Two anti-tank artillery regiments, transferred to the fronts for reinforcement from the Stavka reserve, were armed with captured 88-mm FlaK 18 / FlaK 36 anti-aircraft guns.
But not only the material part occupied the minds of the national command. To no lesser extent, this also affected (for the first, and, apparently, the last time) questions of organization and thorough combat training of personnel.
First, the staff of the main anti-tank defense unit, the anti-tank artillery regiment (IPTAP), was finally approved, which consisted of five four-gun batteries. The larger unit - the brigade (IPTABr) - included three regiments and, accordingly, fifteen batteries. Such consolidation of anti-tank units made it possible to counteract large numbers of enemy tanks and at the same time maintain an artillery reserve for operational fire maneuver. In addition, the fronts also included anti-tank brigades of a combined arms type, which were armed with one light artillery regiment and up to two battalions of anti-tank rifles.
Secondly, in all artillery units, fighters were selected who had achieved success in the fight against new German tanks (not only the Tiger and Panther were new; many gunners until the summer of 1943 did not meet with new modifications of the PzKpfw IV and StuG assault guns 40), and were placed as commanders of guns and platoons in newly formed units. At the same time, the crews that were defeated in battles with German tanks, on the contrary, were withdrawn to rear units. For two months (May-June), a real hunt for "cannon snipers" was conducted among the artillery units of the fronts. These gunners were invited to the IPTAP and IPTABr, which, by order of the Headquarters, in May 1943 increased their pay and rations. For additional training of IPTAP gunners, in addition to practical ones, up to 16 combat armor-piercing shells were also allocated.
The forces of training units made models of the Tigers from captured medium tanks, welding additional armor plates on the frontal part of the hull and turret. Many gunners, practicing shooting at moving mock-ups (dummy models were towed on long cables behind artillery tractors or tanks), achieved the highest skill, managing to hit the gun barrel, commander's cupola or mechanic's viewing device from a 45-mm or 76-mm cannon. a tank driver moving at a speed of 10-15 km / h (this was the actual speed of the tank in battle). The crews of howitzers and large-caliber guns (122-152 mm) also underwent mandatory training in firing at moving targets.
Engineering support of defense lines
In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, the Steppe Front (front commander I. Konev) was defending, consisting of six combined arms, one tank army, as well as four tank and two mechanized corps. The defense of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge differed sharply from that in the battle of Moscow and Stalingrad. It was deliberate, prepared in advance and carried out in conditions of some superiority in forces over the German troops. When organizing the defense, the experience accumulated by Moscow and Stalingrad was taken into account, especially in terms of engineering and barrage measures.
In the armies of the first echelon of fronts, three defensive lines were created: the main army line of defense, a second line of defense 6-12 km from it, and a rear defensive line, located 20-30 km from the first. In certain especially critical areas, these belts were strengthened by intermediate lines of defense. In addition, the forces of the fronts also organized three additional front-line defensive lines.
Thus, on the alleged directions of the enemy's main attacks, each front had 6 lines of defense with a separation depth of up to 110 km on the Central Front and up to 85 km on the Voronezh Front.
The volume of work carried out by the engineering services of the fronts was colossal. Only in the location of the Central Front in April-June, up to 5,000 km of trenches and communications were dug, more than 300 km of wire obstacles were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 mines and land mines were installed, over 60 km of gouges, up to 80 km of anti-tank ditches.
To enlarge - click on the image
In addition, in order to carry out the operational laying of mines directly in front of the advancing tanks (in those years called “impudent mining”), special mobile barrage detachments (PZO) were organized as part of an engineering assault sapper company, reinforced by a platoon of anti-tank rifles and / or a machine-gun platoon on cargo off-road vehicles or captured armored personnel carriers.
The main line of defense was divided into battalion areas (up to 2.5 km along the front and up to 1 km in depth) and anti-tank strongholds, covered by a network of engineering barriers. Two or three battalion districts formed a regimental sector (up to 5 km along the front and up to 4 km in depth). Anti-tank strongholds (formed by artillery of rifle regiments and divisions) were located mainly in battalion defense areas. The advantage of the northern sector of defense was that all anti-tank strongholds located in the sector of rifle regiments, by order of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, were united into anti-tank areas, commandants of which were appointed commanders of rifle regiments. This facilitated the process of interaction between artillery and rifle units when repulsing enemy attacks. On the southern front, by order of the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, this was prohibited, and anti-tank strongholds often had no idea about the state of affairs in neighboring defense sectors, being, in essence, left to themselves.
By the beginning of the fighting, the troops occupied four defensive lines - entirely the first (main) line of defense and most of the second, and in the directions of a probable enemy strike, also the rear army line and the first front line.
To enlarge - click on the image
The Voronezh Front included, in addition to 35 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 83 reinforcement artillery regiments, i.e. also 118 artillery and mortar regiments, of which there were a total of 46 anti-tank regiments.
The anti-tank regiments were almost completely equipped with materiel and personnel (in terms of the number of guns - up to 93%, in terms of personnel - up to 92%). There was not enough means of traction and vehicles (especially on the Voronezh front). The number of motors per gun ranged from 1.5 to 2.9 (with the prescribed number - 3.5). Cars with a carrying capacity from 1.5 to 5 tons (GAZ, ZIS and American trucks) were most widely represented, and tractors of the STZ-5 (Nati) type (up to half of the prescribed number) and off-road cars of the Willys type "and GAZ-67 (up to 60% of the prescribed amount).
On the northern face, the troops of the 13th Army received the greatest means of artillery reinforcement as they were located in the most threatened direction. On the southern front, reinforcements were distributed between the 6th Guards and 7th Guards armies.
On both fronts, special artillery and anti-tank reserves were created. In addition to regular anti-tank guns, they also included battalions and companies of armor-piercers, as well as anti-aircraft guns of 76 and 85 mm caliber removed from air defense. In order to somehow compensate for the weakening of air defense, the Headquarters handed over to the command of the fronts additional units of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12.7-mm machine guns. Anti-aircraft guns, transferred to the category of anti-tank guns, were installed for the most part in pre-equipped positions near the tank-dangerous directions of the near rear of the front. It was forbidden to fire on aircraft from these batteries, and their ammunition load consisted of armor-piercing shells for more than 60%.
Sergeant Filippov's ZIS-22 gun crew is preparing to meet German tanks.
Heavy 203-mm B-4 howitzer of the breakthrough artillery corps in position under a camouflage net. Oryol direction, July 1943
A camouflaged Soviet medium tank in ambush on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri.
Defensive battles on the northern face
The air strike on both fronts failed due to its unsatisfactory preparation. By the time our bombers took off, all German planes were in the air, and the bombing strike fell mostly on empty or half-empty airfields.
At 05:30, the German infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army. The enemy exerted especially strong pressure on the right flank of the army - in the Maloarkhangelskoye area. Mobile barrage fire (PZO) stopped the infantry, and tanks and assault guns hit the minefields. The attack was repulsed. After 7 hours 30 minutes, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack and launched an offensive on the left flank of the 13th Army.
Until 10:30 a.m., the German troops could not get close to the positions of the Soviet infantry, and only after overcoming the minefields did they break into Podolyan. Units of our 15th and 81st divisions were partially surrounded, but successfully repulsed the attacks of the German motorized infantry. According to various reports, during July 5, the Germans lost from 48 to 62 tanks and assault guns in minefields and from Soviet artillery fire.
The artillery breakthrough corps of General N. Ignatov, a mortar brigade, two regiments of rocket-propelled mortars, two regiments of self-propelled artillery, two tank corps (16th and 19th), a rifle corps and three rifle divisions were involved in the counterattack. Infantry and tanks of the 16th. struck on the morning of July 6 on a front up to 34 km wide. Enemy artillery was silent, suppressed by the fire of the breakthrough artillery corps, but the tanks of the 107th tank brigade, having pushed the German troops in the direction of Butyrka by 1-2 km, came under sudden fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground. In a short time, the brigade lost 46 tanks, and the remaining 4 retreated to their infantry. The commander of the 16th, seeing this situation, ordered the 164th tank brigade, moving in a ledge after the 107th brigade, to stop the attack and retreat to its original position. The 19th, because, having spent too much time preparing a counterattack, was ready for it only in the afternoon and therefore did not go on the offensive. The counterattack did not achieve the main goal - the restoration of the former line of defense.
"Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion are moving towards the front line. July 1943
A column of French cars of one of the motorized units of the German troops. Orlovskoe example, July 1943
Command tank PzKpfw IV Ausf F in combat. Orlovskoye for example.
The radio relay station of the Army Group "Center" maintains contact with the headquarters of the 9th Army. July 1943
Fierce fighting took place here. The Germans quickly regrouped and delivered short powerful blows by tank groups, between attacks on the heads of the infantrymen of the 17th Guards. pages of the corps were bombed by German dive bombers. By 16 o'clock, the Soviet infantry retreated to their original positions, and the 19th, because. received an order to conduct a counterattack against the exposed flank of the German group. Having begun the strike at 1700 hours, our tank corps was met with dense fire from German anti-tank and self-propelled guns and suffered heavy losses. However, the German attack on Olkhovatka was stopped.
Artillerymen of the 13th Army are firing at enemy assault guns. July 1943
German tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division on the offensive. July 1943
To enlarge - click on the image
Armor-piercers change their firing position. July 1943
Tanks T-70 and T-34 of the 2nd Panzer Army move forward for a counterattack. July 1943
Tank reserves move to the front. The picture shows American medium tanks "General Lee", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. July 1943
German gunners reflect the attack of Soviet tanks. July 1943
Anti-tank self-propelled guns -Mapder III "covers the advance of German tanks.
Loss of materiel of the 2nd Panzer Army in defensive battles
Note: The general list of losses does not include the losses of attached units and subunits, including three tank regiments armed with Lend-Lease tanks.
Defense c. Ponyri
The station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by guided and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells were installed, converted into high-explosive bombs. The defense was strengthened by tanks buried in the ground and a large number of anti-tank artillery (13th IPTABr and 46th light artillery brigade).
Against the village "1st Ponyri" On July 6, the Germans threw up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns (including up to 40 "Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion) and infantry of the 86th and 292nd divisions. Having broken through the defenses of the 81st page of the division, the German troops captured the 1st Ponyri and quickly moved south to the second defense line in the area of the 2nd Ponyri and st. Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried three times to break into the station, but were repulsed. The counterattack carried out by the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps turned out to be inconsistent and did not reach the goal (repulse the "1st Ponyri"). However, the day for the regrouping of forces was won.
On July 7, the Germans could no longer advance on a wide front and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks (according to the classification that existed in the Red Army, German medium tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H were considered heavy), supported by heavy assault guns, advanced to the defense zone and opened fire on the positions of Soviet troops. At the same time, the "2nd Ponyri" were attacked from the air by German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tiger tanks began to approach the forward trenches, covering the medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry. Heavy assault guns with fire from a place on the discovered firing points supported the offensive. The dense PZO of large-caliber artillery and the "impudent mining", carried out by units of engineering assault brigades with the support of divisional guns, forced the German tanks five times to retreat to their original position.
However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of the "2 Ponyri". The reserve of the commander of the 307th division, brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the May 1 state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and the station were unsuccessful. July 7 was a critical day on the Northern Front, when the Germans had great tactical successes.
Heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" before the attack of Art. Ponyri. July 1943
In the afternoon, German troops again tried to break through bypassing Art. Ponyri - through the agricultural "May 1". However, here the attack was repulsed by the efforts of the 1180th IPTAP and the 768th LAP, supported by infantry and a battery of "portable jet guns". On the battlefield, the Germans left 11 burned-out and 5 wrecked medium tanks, as well as 4 wrecked assault guns and several armored vehicles. Moreover, according to the reports of the infantry command and artillery reconnaissance, 3 German combat vehicles fell to the share of "jet guns". The next two days will not bring anything new to the disposition of troops in the area of st. Ponyri. On July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group of 45 heavy tanks "Tiger" of the 505th heavy tank battalion (according to other sources - 40 "Tiger" tanks), the 654th battalion of heavy assault guns "Ferdinand", as well as the 216th division of 150 -mm assault tanks and a division of 75-mm and 105-mm assault guns. The command of the group (according to the testimony of the prisoners) was carried out by Major Kal (commander of the 505th battalion of heavy tanks). Directly behind the group were medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the agricultural "May 1st" to the village. Burnt. In these battles, the German troops used a new tactical formation, when the line of Ferdinand assault guns moved in the forefront of the strike group (rolls in two echelons), followed by the Tigers, covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But at the village Burnt, our artillerymen and infantrymen let the German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared artillery fire bag, formed by the 768th, 697th and 546th LAP and the 1180th IPTAP, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Having found themselves on the floor with powerful concentrated artillery fire from different directions, having also hit a powerful minefield (most of the field was mined by captured aerial bombs or land mines containing 10-50 kg of toll buried in the ground) and subjected to raids by Petlyakov dive bombers, German tanks stopped. Eighteen combat vehicles were hit. Some of the tanks left on the battlefield turned out to be serviceable, and six of them were evacuated at night by Soviet repairmen, after which they were transferred to the disposal of the 19th. to replenish the lost materiel.
The attack was repeated the next day. But even now the German troops failed to break through to Art. Ponyri. A large role in repelling the offensive was played by the PZO, supplied by a special-purpose artillery division (203-mm howitzers and 152-mm howitzers-cannons). By noon, the Germans withdrew, leaving seven more tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. On July 12-13, the Germans carried out an operation to evacuate their wrecked tanks from the battlefield. The evacuation was covered by the 654th division of assault guns "Ferdinand". The operation as a whole was a success, but the number of Ferdinands left on the battlefield with damaged mines and artillery fire increased to 17. .) pushed back the German troops that approached the outskirts of Ponyry. At the same time, the Germans did not have time to evacuate the damaged heavy Ferdinands, some of which were set on fire by their own crews, and some by our infantrymen, who used KS bottles against the crews of vehicles that offered resistance. Only one "Ferdinand" received a hole in the side in the area of \u200b\u200bthe brake drum, although it was fired upon by seven T-34 tanks from all directions. In total, after the fighting in the area of st. Ponyri - 21 Ferdinand assault guns remained with a damaged undercarriage, a significant part of which were set on fire by their crews or advancing infantrymen. Our tankers, who supported the infantry counterattack, suffered heavy losses not only from the fire of German assault guns, but also because, approaching the enemy, a company of T-70 tanks and several T-34s mistakenly fell into their own minefield. It was the last day when the German troops came close to the outskirts of Art. Ponyri.
German artillery is shelling the positions of the Soviet troops. July-August 1943.
Assault guns "Ferdinand", lined on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 1943
The battlefield after the counterattack of the owls. troops in the area of Ponyri - pos. Burnt. On this field, German assault guns "Ferdinand" and a company of Soviet T-34 / T-70 tanks were blown up by the action of Soviet land mines. July 9-13, 1943
German tank PzKpfw IV and armored personnel carrier SdKfz 251, lined up on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 15, 1943
Special Purpose Artillery Division Gen. Ignatiev when repelling the German offensive at st. Ponyri. July, 1943
"Ferdinand", lined with artillery near the village. Burnt. The gun mantlet was damaged, the starboard roller and drive wheel were broken.
Broken by a direct hit from a heavy shell, the Bryummber assault tank. Outskirts of st. Ponyri 15 July 1943
Tanks of the 3rd Regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division, knocked out on the outskirts of Art. Ponyri. July 12-15, 1943
The wrecked PzBefWg III Ausf H is a command vehicle with a dummy gun and a telescopic antenna.
A PzKpfw III Ausf N support tank armed with a short-barreled 75 mm gun.
Defensive battles of the 70th Army
Panzergrenadiers and anti-tank self-propelled guns "Mapder III" in battle near the village. Kashara.
German six-barrel rocket launchers "Nebelwerfer" in the reflection of the Soviet counterattack.
Sergeant Kruglov's 45-mm gun crew knocked out 3 German tanks in battle. July 1943
Medium tanks MZ at the starting position. Orlovskoye for example. July-August 1943
The armored ammunition transporter SdKfz 252 follows at the head of the assault gun column.
"Tiger", shot down by the calculation of Sergeant Lunin. Orlovskoye for example. July 1943
Soviet scouts who captured a serviceable PzKpfw III Ausf N and brought it to the location of their troops. July 1943.
Defensive battles on the southern front
To alleviate the position of the outposts and inflict losses on the German troops at their starting positions, at 22:30 on July 4, the artillery of the Voronezh Front conducted a 5-minute artillery attack on the identified positions of the German artillery. At 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5, the counter-preparation was carried out in full.
Defensive battles on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were distinguished by great bitterness and heavy losses on our part. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the nature of the terrain was more conducive to the use of tanks than on the northern face. Secondly, the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, who was watching the preparation of the defense, forbade the commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, to combine anti-tank strongholds into areas and give them to infantry regiments, believing that such a decision would complicate management. And, thirdly, German air supremacy lasted here almost two days longer than on the Central Front.
The first attack on the positions of the 6th Guards. army in the direction of Cherkasy began at 6 o'clock on July 5 with a powerful raid by dive bombers. Under the cover of a raid, a motorized infantry regiment went on the attack with the support of 70 tanks. However, he was stopped in the minefields, having been additionally fired upon by heavy artillery. An hour and a half later, the attack was repeated. Now the forces of the attackers have been doubled. In the forefront were German sappers, trying to make passages in the minefields. But the fire of the infantry and artillery of the 67th Infantry Division and this attack was repelled. Under the influence of heavy artillery fire, German tanks were forced to break formation even before they came into fire contact with our troops, and the “impudent mining” carried out by Soviet sappers greatly hampered the maneuver of combat vehicles. In total, the Germans lost 25 medium tanks and assault guns here from mines and heavy artillery fire.
German tanks, supported by assault guns, attack the Soviet defenses. July 1943. The silhouette of a bomber is visible in the air.
To enlarge - click on the image
Tank destroyer "Mapder III" follows the exploded medium tank MZ "Lee".
A column of one of the motorized units of the German troops follows the front. Oboyanskoye, for example, July 1943
Despite the emerging breakthrough of German tanks, by the end of the day on July 5, the artillerymen managed to restore a precarious balance, however, at the cost of heavy losses of personnel (up to 70%). The reason for this lay in the fact that the infantry units in a number of defense sectors retreated randomly, leaving artillery on direct fire without cover. During the day of continuous fighting in the Cherkasskoe-Korovino area, the enemy lost 13 tanks from IPTAP fire, including 3 heavy Tiger tanks. Our losses in a number of units totaled up to 50% of the personnel and up to 30% of the materiel.
The main direction of German attacks the next day was Oboyanskoye. On the morning of July 6, a large column of tanks moved along the road from the Cherkasskoye area. The guns of the 1837th IPTAP, hidden on the flank, opened a sudden fire from a short distance. At the same time, 12 tanks were hit, among which only one Panther remained on the battlefield. It is interesting to note that in these battles, Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of the so-called "flirtatious guns", allocated as bait to lure enemy tanks. "Flirting guns" opened fire on the columns from a long distance, forcing the advancing tanks to deploy in minefields and expose their sides to the batteries standing in ambush.
As a result of the fighting on July 6, the Germans managed to capture Alekseevka, Lukhanino, Olkhovka and Trirechnoye and reach the second defensive line. However, on the Belgorod - Oboyan highway, their advance was stopped.
Attacks of German tanks in the direction of Bol. Beacons also ended in nothing. Having met dense fire from the Soviet artillery here, the German tanks turned to the northeast, where, after a long battle with units of the 5th Guards since. they managed to capture Luchki. The 14th IPTABr, advanced from the reserve of the front and deployed at the line of Yakovlevo, Dubrava, played a large role in repelling the German strike, knocking out up to 50 German combat vehicles (the data was confirmed by the report of the trophy team).
The artillerymen of the SS unit support the attack of their infantry with fire. Prokhorovskoe eg.
Soviet T-70 tanks of the "Revolutionary Mongolia" column (112 brigade) move forward to attack.
Tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H of the Grossdeutchland (Grossdeutschland) division are fighting.
Field Marshal Manstein's headquarters radio operators at work. July 1943
German Panther tanks of the 10th tank brigade, PzKpfw IV Ausf G of the Grossdeutchland division and StuG 40 assault guns in the Oboyan direction. July 9-10, 1943
On July 9, the enemy continued to attack in the Oboyan direction. Tank and motorized infantry attacks were supported by aircraft. The strike groups managed to advance up to 6 km here, but then they ran into well-equipped anti-aircraft artillery positions adapted for anti-tank guns and tanks dug into the ground.
In the following days, the enemy stopped ramming our defenses with a direct blow and began to look for weak spots in it. Such a direction, according to the German command, was Prokhorovskoye, from where it was possible to go to Kursk by a roundabout way. To this end, in the Prokhorovka area, the Germans concentrated a grouping, which included the 3rd since, numbering up to 300 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The infantrymen of the division "Das Reich" help to pull out the stuck "Tiger".
Tankers of the 5th Guards. tank army prepare the tank for battle.
StuG 40 Ausf G assault gun shot down by Captain Vinogradov.
At 8:30 a.m., the main forces of the German troops, consisting of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf tank divisions, which included up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction Art. Prokhorovka in the strip of highway and railway. This grouping was supported by all available air forces.
Tanks of the 6th Panzer Division on the way to Prokhorovka.
Flamethrowers before the attack.
Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns SdKfz 6/2 firing at Soviet infantry. July 1943
The 29th Panzer Corps fought for Hill 252.5, where it was met by tanks of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler". Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuverable battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Tottenkopf division and, after dark, went on the defensive.
The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, at 14:30 suddenly collided with the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" moving towards it. Due to the fact that the 29th Panzer Corps was stuck in battles at a height of 252.5, the Germans inflicted on the 2nd Guards. the tank corps hit the exposed flank and forced it to withdraw to its original position.
Assault guns withdraw after the battle. Division unknown.
Command tank PzKpfw III Ausf To the SS division "Das Reich" follows the burning medium tanks "General Lee". Presumably, Prokhorovskoye, for example. July 12-13, 1943
Scouts of the 5th Guards. tank army on Ba-64 armored vehicles. Belgorod eg.
By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then it decided, by forcing the river. Psel, part of the forces to go north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the SS Totenkopf Panzer Division (96 tanks, a motorized infantry regiment, up to 200 motorcyclists, supported by two divisions of assault guns) were allocated ). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards. rifle division and by 13 o'clock had mastered the height of 226.6.
But on the northern slopes of the height, the Germans stumbled upon stubborn resistance from the 95th Guards. rifle division of Colonel Lyakhov. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve consisting of one IPTAP and two separate divisions of captured guns. Until 18:00, the division successfully defended itself against the advancing tanks. But at 20:00, after a powerful air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of personnel, the division, under the blows of approaching German motorized rifle units, withdrew beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves were already deployed here, and the German offensive was stopped.
The 5th Guards Army also failed to fulfill the assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units moved forward a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Panzer Army, 6th Guards. Army, 69th Army and 7th Guards. Army decisive success also did not happen.
Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-122 in the area of the Prokhorovsky bridgehead. July 14, 1943.
Repairmen evacuate a downed T-34 under enemy fire. The evacuation is carried out strictly according to the instructions, so that the frontal armor remains facing the enemy.
"Thirty-four" of the plant number 112 "Krasnoye Sormovo", somewhere near Oboyan. Most likely - 1st Panzer Army, July 1943.
T-34 tanks knocked out during the Soviet counter-offensive near Prokhorovka.
"Panther", lined with a gun ml. Sergeant Egorov at the Prokhorovsky bridgehead.
German T-34 of the Das Reich division, shot down by Sergeant Kurnosov's gun crew. Prokhorovskoe eg. July 14-15, 1943
The best armor-piercers of the 6th Guards. armies that knocked out 7 enemy tanks.
Fighting east of Belgorod
On July 5, the Germans deployed three infantry and three tank divisions in the Grafovka, Belgorod sector and, under air cover, began to cross the North. Donets. In the afternoon, their tank units went on the offensive in the Razumnoye, Krutoy Log sector in the eastern and northeastern directions. The anti-tank stronghold located in the Krutoy Log area repulsed two large tank attacks by the end of the day, knocking out 26 tanks (of which 7 were previously blown up by mines and land mines). On July 6, the Germans again advanced in a northeasterly direction. To reinforce the 7th Guards Army, the front command reassigned four rifle divisions to it. The 31st IPTABr and the 114th Guards IPTAP were transferred to her from the army reserve. To cover the junction between the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the 131st and 132nd separate battalions of anti-tank rifles were involved.
The most difficult situation developed in the Yastrebovo area, where the enemy concentrated up to 70 tanks and struck along the riverbed. Reasonable. The 1849th IPTAP, which approached here, did not have time to turn around before the approach of the German troops, and then the commander of the folder put forward a second battery for a sudden flank attack on moving tanks. Hiding behind the buildings, the battery approached the tank column at a distance of 200-500 m and, with a sudden flank fire, set fire to six and knocked out two tanks. Further, for an hour and a half, the battery repelled tank attacks, maneuvering between buildings, and withdrew only by order of the regiment commander, when the regiment was preparing for battle. Until the end of the day, the regiment repulsed four large tank attacks, knocking out 32 tanks and self-propelled guns. The loss of the regiment amounted to 20% of the personnel.
German motorized unit on the offensive in the Belgorod region.
On July 7, the Germans brought their artillery here, and after a powerful air raid and artillery preparation (from 9:00 to 12:00), their tanks launched an attack under the cover of a barrage. Now their attack was carried out in two directions - along the river. Reasonable (a group of more than 100 tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored combat vehicles) and a frontal attack from a height of 207.9 in the direction of Myasoedovo (up to 100 tanks). The infantry cover left Yastrebovo, and the artillery regiments were put in a difficult position, as the infiltrated enemy infantry began to bombard the positions of the batteries from the flank and rear. Since the flanks were exposed, the enemy managed to cover two batteries (3rd and 4th), and they had to retreat back by guns, defending themselves both from tanks and then from infantry. Nevertheless, the breakthrough on the left flank was localized by the 1853rd IPTAP, which was stationed in the second echelon. Soon units of the 94th Guards approached. page divisions, and the situation, rocked, was saved. But in the evening, the infantry, which did not have time to gain a foothold, hit the floor with a powerful air strike and, after processing by artillery, left Yastrebovo and Sevryukovo. The 1849th and 1853rd IPTAPs, which suffered heavy materiel losses in the morning, could not hold back the German tanks and infantry that rushed after our fleeing infantry, and retreated in battle, taking with them all the damaged guns.
Anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder-lll" follow the streets of Kharkov.
German anti-aircraft gunners cover the crossing across the Donets. July 1943
The last major offensive operation was carried out by German troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge on July 14-15, when they tried to encircle and destroy our units defending in the Teterevino, Druzhny, Shchelokovo triangle with counter attacks on Shakhovo from the Ozerovsky and Shchelokovo regions.
"Tiger" on the street of Belgorod. July 1943
"Tigers" in the battle for vil. Maksimovka. Belgorod eg.
Soviet scouts in an ambush at the padded self-propelled guns "Marder III".
The defensive battle lasted two weeks (from July 5 to July 18) and achieved its goal: to stop and bleed the German troops and save their own forces for the offensive.
According to reports and reports on the operation of artillery on the Kursk Bulge, during the period of defensive battles, 1861 enemy combat vehicles (including tanks, self-propelled guns, assault guns, heavy cannon BAs and cannon armored personnel carriers) were hit and destroyed by all types of ground artillery.
Repairmen are restoring a wrecked tank. Field repair team of Lieutenant Schukin. July 1943
Offensive operation in the Oryol direction
Geographically, the offensive of the Soviet troops was divided into the Oryol offensive operation (the left wing of the Western, as well as the Central and Bryansk fronts) and the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (the Voronezh and Steppe fronts). The Oryol offensive operation began on July 12, 1943 with a strike from the Western and Bryansk fronts, which were joined on July 15 by the Central. The main defensive zone of the Army Group "Center" on the Oryol ledge had a depth of about 5-7 km. It consisted of strongholds interconnected by a network of trenches and communications. Wire fences in 1-2 rows of wooden stakes were installed in front of the front edge, reinforced in critical directions with wire fences on metal racks or Bruno spirals. There were also anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. On the main directions, a large number of machine-gun armored caps were installed, from which it was possible to conduct a dense crossfire. All settlements were adapted for all-round defense, anti-tank obstacles were set up along the banks of the rivers. However, many engineering structures were not completed, since the Germans did not believe in the possibility of a wide offensive by Soviet troops on this sector of the front.
Soviet infantrymen are mastering the English armored personnel carrier "Universal". Orlovskoye for example. August 1943
The forces of the advancing fronts were opposed by the German 2nd Panzer Army, 55th, 53rd and 35th Army Corps. According to domestic intelligence, they had (including army reserves) up to 560 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the divisions of the first echelon, there were 230-240 tanks and self-propelled guns. The grouping operating against the Central Front included three tank divisions: the 18th, 9th and 2nd. located in the offensive zone of our 13th Army. There were no German tank units in the offensive zone of the 48th and 70th armies. On the side of the attackers there was an absolute superiority in manpower, artillery, tanks and aircraft. In the main directions, the superiority in infantry was up to 6 times, in artillery up to 5 ... 6 times, in tanks - up to 2.5 ... 3 times. German tank and anti-tank units had been significantly weakened in previous battles and therefore did not put up much resistance. The rapid transition of the Soviet troops from defense to a large-scale offensive did not give the German troops the opportunity to reorganize and complete the repair and restoration work. According to the reports of the advancing units of the 13th Army, all the captured German field repair shops were filled with damaged military equipment.
T-34s equipped with PT-3 minesweepers are moving towards the front. July-August 1943
German anti-tank gun PaK 40 firing at attacking Soviet tanks. Scissors for cutting barbed wire are fixed on the shield of the gun. August 1943
Tank destroyer and assault gun unit on vacation.
Soviet tank 22nd battalion. enters the burning village. Voronezh front.
German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf H, shot down by a Glagolev gun. Orlovskoe example, August 1943
The next day, the northwestern group was sent to destroy large strongholds in the villages of Staritsa and Ulyanovo. Using a smoke screen and demonstrating an attack with. Staritsa from the north, the advancing units secretly bypassed the settlements and launched a tank attack from the southeast and west. Despite the good provision of settlements, the enemy garrison was completely destroyed. In this battle, the units of the engineering assault search proved to be the best, which skillfully “smoked out” the German firing points in the houses with flamethrowers. At this time in Ulyanovo, the advancing troops with false attacks pulled the entire German garrison to the western outskirts, which made it possible to break into the village on tanks almost unhindered from the side of the village. Staritsa. During the liberation of this important stronghold, the losses on the part of the attackers were small (only ten people were killed).
With the elimination of these centers of resistance, our troops opened the way to the south and southeast. The troops advancing in these directions created a threat to the communications of the Germans between Orel and Bryansk. In two days of fighting, but according to the testimony of prisoners, the German 211th and 293rd infantry divisions were practically destroyed, and the 5th tank division, which suffered heavy losses, was withdrawn to the rear. The defense of the German troops was broken through on a front of 23 km and to a depth of 25 km. However, the German command competently operated with the available reserves, and by July 14, the offensive in this sector was suspended. The fighting took on a positional character.
The troops of the 3rd Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, advancing on Orel from the east, successfully crossed several water barriers and, bypassing pockets of resistance, tried to break through to Orel on the move. By the time of entering the battle on July 18. 3 Guards the tank army had T-34 tanks - 475, T-70 tanks - 224, guns and mortars - 492. They created a serious danger for the German troops to cut their grouping in half, and therefore anti-tank reserves were introduced against them on the evening of July 19.
Fighters and commanders of the engineer-sapper assault brigade, who distinguished themselves in the battles for Orel.
The pontoon park N-2-P is moving towards the front. Orlovskoye for example.
"Forward, to the Eagle!" Heavy 203-mm B-4 howitzers on the march.
On July 22, the forward units of the 61st Army broke into the Volkhov, improving the position of the troops of the Bryansk Front. At the same time, the troops of the 11th Guards. armies cut the Bolkhov-Orel highway, creating a threat of encirclement to the German Bolkhov group.
At this time, the 63rd Army and units of the 3rd Guards. tank army fought heavy battles with the 3rd tank division of the Germans, transferred from Novo-Sokolniki, and units of the 2nd tank and 36th mechanized divisions, transferred from under Ponyri. Particularly heavy fighting unfolded in the interfluve of Zush, Oleshnya, where the Germans had a well-prepared defensive line, which they tried to occupy with suitable forces. The troops of the 3rd Army on the move seized a bridgehead on the banks of the river. Oleshnya in the Alexandrov area, where the transfer of tanks of the 3rd Guards began. tank army. But south of Aleksandrovka, the offensive was unsuccessful. It was especially difficult to deal with German tanks and assault guns buried in the ground. Nevertheless, by July 19, our troops reached the river. Oleshnya along its entire length. On the night of July 19, along the German line of defense on the river. Oleshnya was dealt a powerful air raid, and in the morning artillery preparation began. At noon, Oleshnya was forced in several places, which created a threat of encirclement of the entire Mnensky group of Germans, and on July 20 they left the city almost without a fight.
On July 15, units of the Central Front also went on the offensive, taking advantage of the withdrawal of part of the German forces from Ponyri. But until July 18, the successes of the Central Front were rather modest. Only on the morning of July 19, the Central Front broke through the German defense line 3-4 km in the direction to the north-west, bypassing Orel. At 11 o'clock, tanks of the 2nd Panzer Army were introduced into the gap.
The crew of the SU-122 receives a combat mission. North of Orel, August 1943
SU-152 of Major Sankovsky, which destroyed 10 German tanks in the first battle. 13th Army, August 1943
To enlarge - click on the image
At the final stage of the struggle for the Orlovsky bridgehead, the battles unfolded for the city of Karachev, covering the approaches to Bryansk. The battles for Karachev began on August 12. An important role in the course of the offensive was played by the engineering units, which restored and cleared the roads destroyed by the German troops during the retreat. By the end of August 14, our troops had broken through the German defenses east and northeast of Karachev, and the next day captured the city. With the release of Karachev, the liquidation of the Oryol group was practically completed. By August 17-18, the advancing Soviet troops reached the Hagen line.
On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.
The headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment carried out, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better near the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by the German troops were expected. So, the 1st Panzer Army by the beginning of the counteroffensive had T-34 tanks - 412, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (549 in total). 5th Guards the tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.
Artillerymen of the fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursue the retreating enemy.
In a more difficult situation, parts of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Lacking such means of reinforcement as Voronezh, his offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st mechanized corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 km.
On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarovsky and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarovsk resistance center was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses, creating a threat of encirclement for the defending troops.
The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarovsky center of resistance allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front as part of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to enter the operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops on the southern front was much higher than the floor of Orlom. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front, he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks were allocated to the front for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced by two engineering brigades and four regiments of self-propelled artillery.
Grenadier after the battle. August 1943
On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9 also the 5th Guards. tank army. The main direction of the Steppe Front's offensive was now bypassing the Kharkov grouping of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Army received an order to cut the main railway and highway roads leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozova.
By the end of August 10, the 1st Panzer Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but further its advance to the south was stopped. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive grouping of German troops.
StuG 40 assault gun, knocked out by Golovnev's gun. Akhtyrka region.
Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.
Anti-tank gun RaK 40 on a trailer near the RSO tractor, left after shelling near Bogodukhov.
Tanks T-34 with infantry landing in the attack on Kharkov.
On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. armies made significant progress, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, the German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Panzer Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to withdraw to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the band of the 6th Guards. army, but all their efforts ended in nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the insufficient effectiveness of the Ilyushin attack aircraft was noted (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern face).
The crew is trying to level the overturned tank PzKpfw III Ausf M. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".
German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943
T-34 tanks knocked out in the Akhtyrka area.
Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.
Between August 13-17, Soviet troops started fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. Army on August 17, there were no more than 600 people. The 1st mechanized corps had only 44 tanks (less than the number of a tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of the prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov, there were 30 ... 40 people left.
German gunners fire from the IeFH 18 howitzer at the advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943
Studebakers with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.
A Churchill heavy tank of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment of the 5th Tank Army follows a wrecked eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank turret there is an inscription "For Radyanska Ukraine". Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.
Scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.
To enlarge - click on the image
On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery preparation and launched an offensive against the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repulsed the attacks of German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was put out of action, and the front was broken through. By 1300, the Germans had broken through to the headquarters of the division, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a southeasterly direction. To localize the strike, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear.
The long-range 152-mm Br-2 gun is preparing to open fire on the retreating German troops.
German gunners reflect the attack of the Soviet troops.
Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyrskaya grouping was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov grouping of German troops. It was only on August 21-25 that the Akhtyrskaya corps was destroyed and the city was liberated.
Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.
Tank T-34 on the outskirts of Kharkov.
"Panther", lined by the calculation of Guards. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.
Due to the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German grouping from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by the Soviet troops to break into the city ran into dense artillery and machine-gun fire from the units left in the rearguard. In order to prevent the German troops from withdrawing combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front ordered a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 am on August 23 they began the assault.
"Tame" "Panther" on the street of the liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943
Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations
Note: The first digit - tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34
Irretrievable losses amounted to T-34 tanks - up to 31%, for T-70 tanks - up to 43% of the total losses. The sign "~" marks very contradictory data obtained indirectly.
CONCLUSION
However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of the anti-tank defense of their opponents. For the German troops, the high density of Soviet artillery and the good engineering preparation of the defense line turned out to be unexpected. The Soviet command, on the other hand, did not expect the high maneuverability of the German anti-tank units, which quickly regrouped and met the counterattacking Soviet tanks with well-aimed ambush fire even in the conditions of their own offensive. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved the best results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at the positions of the Soviet troops from a long distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders, on the other hand, achieved better results, also using tanks "in a self-propelled way", firing from tanks dug into the ground.
Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, anti-tank and self-propelled artillery still remained the main enemy of armored combat vehicles. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of those shot down and destroyed.
Nevertheless, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defense.
In world history there are no analogues of the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 50 days and nights - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was a decisive turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The defenders of our Motherland managed to stop the enemy and deal him a deafening blow, from which he could not recover. After the victory in the Battle of Kursk, the advantage in the Great Patriotic War was already on the side of the Soviet army. But such a radical change cost our country dearly: military historians still cannot accurately assess the losses of people and equipment on the Kursk Bulge, concurring in only one assessment - the losses of both sides were colossal.
According to the plan of the German command, the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region were to be destroyed as a result of a series of massive attacks. The victory in the Battle of Kursk gave the Germans the opportunity to expand their offensive plan against our country and their strategic initiative. In short, victory in this battle meant victory in the war. In the Battle of Kursk, the Germans had high hopes for their new equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighters and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft. Our attack aircraft used the new PTAB-2.5-1.5 anti-tank bombs, which pierced the armor of the fascist Tigers and Panthers.
The Kursk Bulge was a ledge about 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west. This arc was formed during the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine. The battle on the Kursk Bulge is usually divided into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation, which lasted from July 5 to 23, Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23).
The German military operation to seize control of the strategically important Kursk Bulge was codenamed "Citadel". Avalanche-like attacks on Soviet positions began on the morning of July 5, 1943 with artillery fire and air strikes. The Nazis advanced on a broad front, attacking from heaven and earth. As soon as it began, the battle took on a grandiose scope and was of an extremely tense character. According to Soviet sources, the defenders of our Motherland were opposed by about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. In addition, aces of the 4th and 6th air fleets fought in the air from the German side. The command of the Soviet troops managed to collect more than 1.9 million people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. Our soldiers repelled the attacks of the enemy's strike groups, showing unprecedented stamina and courage.
On July 12, Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge went on the offensive. On this day, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 km north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The battle near Prokhorovka lasted all day, the Germans lost about 10 thousand people, over 360 tanks and were forced to retreat. On the same day, Operation Kutuzov began, during which the enemy’s defenses were broken through in the Bolkhovsky, Khotynets and Oryol directions. Our troops advanced inside the German positions, and the enemy command gave the order to retreat. By August 23, the enemy was driven back 150 kilometers to the west, the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.
Aviation played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk. Air strikes destroyed a significant amount of enemy equipment. The advantage of the USSR in the air, achieved in the course of fierce battles, became the key to the overall superiority of our troops. In the memoirs of the German military, admiration for the enemy and recognition of his strength are felt. The German General Forst wrote after the war: “Our offensive began, and a few hours later a large number of Russian aircraft appeared. Air battles broke out over our heads. During the entire war, none of us saw such a spectacle. A German fighter pilot from the Udet squadron, shot down on July 5 near Belgorod, recalls: “Russian pilots began to fight much harder. Looks like you have some old footage. I never thought that I would be shot down so soon…”
And about how fierce the battles were on the Kursk Bulge and about what superhuman efforts this victory was achieved, the memoirs of the battery commander of the 239th mortar regiment of the 17th artillery division M. I. Kobzev will best tell:
– The fierce battles on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in August 1943 especially stuck in my memory,” Kobzev wrote. - It was in the Akhtyrka area. My battery was ordered to cover the withdrawal of our troops with mortar fire, blocking the way for the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. The calculations of my battery had a hard time when the Tigers began to pour a hail of fragments on it. They disabled two mortars and almost half of the servants. The loader was killed by a direct hit of the projectile, the enemy bullet hit the gunner's head, the chin of the third number was torn off by a fragment. Miraculously, only one battery mortar remained intact, disguised in corn thickets, which, together with a reconnaissance officer and a radio operator, dragged 17 kilometers together for two days until we found our regiment that had retreated to the given positions.
On August 5, 1943, when the Soviet army clearly had an advantage in the Battle of Kursk in Moscow, for the first time in 2 years since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Subsequently, Muscovites often observed fireworks on the days of significant victories in the battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Vasily Klochkov
The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counteroffensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. .
To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the area, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping, according to Soviet sources, consisted of about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh Fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of the rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. From the side of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Task Force Kempf of the Army Group South).
The task of repelling the offensive from the side of Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.
On July 12, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the Soviet troops inflicting a counterattack. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day, by the evening the tank crews, together with the infantry, fought hand to hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.
On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the Oryol grouping of the enemy. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy's wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.
Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by the strikes of the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6,000 tanks.
Dates and events of the Great Patriotic War
The Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, on the day of All Saints who shone in the Russian land. The Barbarossa plan - a plan for a lightning war with the USSR - was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. Now it has been put into action. German troops - the strongest army in the world - advanced in three groups ("North", "Center", "South"), aimed at quickly capturing the Baltic states and then Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev in the south.
Kursk Bulge
In 1943, the Nazi command decided to conduct its general offensive in the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational position of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the Germans. Two large fronts could be surrounded here at once, as a result of which a large gap would have formed, allowing the enemy to carry out major operations in the south and northeast directions.
The Soviet command was preparing for this offensive. From mid-April, the General Staff began to develop a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive. And by the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command had completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk.
July 5, 1943 German troops began the offensive. The first attack was repulsed. However, then the Soviet troops had to withdraw. The fighting was very intense and the Germans failed to achieve significant success. The enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was eventually forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.
The struggle on the southern face of the Kursk ledge, in the zone of the Voronezh Front, was also exceptionally tense.
On July 12, 1943 (on the day of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul), the largest tank battle in military history near Prokhorovka took place. The battle unfolded on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, the former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the struggle was extremely fierce, “tanks jumped on each other, grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire. The battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour. As a result of the battle near Prokhorovka, none of the parties was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - go to the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the way to the enemy to Kursk was closed and the day of July 12, 1943 became the day of the collapse of the German offensive near Kursk.
On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction, and on July 15, the troops of the Central.
On August 5, 1943 (the day of the celebration of the Pochaev Icon of the Mother of God, as well as the icon of "Joy of All Who Sorrow"), Orel was released. On the same day Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended on August 18 with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north.
The events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk sector. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. On the night of July 19, the general withdrawal of the Nazi troops began on the southern face of the Kursk salient.
On August 23, 1943, the strongest battle of the Great Patriotic War ended with the liberation of Kharkov - the Battle of Kursk (it lasted 50 days). It ended with the defeat of the main grouping of German troops.
Smolensk offensive operation August 7 - October 2, 1943. In the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from 7 to 20 August. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Spas-Demenskaya operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front carried out the Yelnensko-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsky-Demidov operation.
On September 25, 1943, the troops of the Western Front liberated Smolensk, the most important strategic center of defense of the Nazi troops in the western direction.
As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke into the enemy's heavily fortified multi-lane and deeply echeloned defenses and advanced 200-225 km to the West.
