The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to the plans of the Wehrmacht, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.
USSR
To slow down and complicate the advance of the enemy, the Soviet Army planted approximately 1,500 mines for every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same Wehrmacht Tigers.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact numbers.
The Battle of Kursk, according to historians, was a turning point in. More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. There has never been such a thing in world history, and probably never will be again.
Actions Soviet fronts marshals Georgy and led on the Kursk Bulge. The number of the Soviet army amounted to more than 1 million people. The soldiers were supported by more than 19,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 aircraft provided air support to Soviet infantrymen. The Germans countered the USSR on the Kursk Bulge with 900,000 soldiers, 10,000 guns and more than 2,000 aircraft.
The German plan was as follows. They were going to capture the Kursk ledge with a lightning strike and launch a full-scale offensive. Soviet intelligence did not eat its bread in vain, and reported the German plans to the Soviet command. Having learned the exact time of the offensive and the purpose of the main attack, our leaders ordered to strengthen the defenses in these places.
The Germans launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On the Germans gathered in front of the front line, a heavy fire of Soviet artillery fell, causing them great damage. The offensive of the enemy stalled, and went with a delay of a couple of hours. During the day of fighting, the enemy advanced only 5 kilometers, and in 6 days of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, 12 km. This state of affairs hardly suited the German command.
During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest in history occurred near the village of Prokhorovka. tank battle. 800 tanks from each side met in battle. It was an impressive and terrible sight. On the battlefield were the best tank models of the Second World War. Soviet T-34 clashed with the German Tiger. St. John's wort was also tested in that battle. 57 mm cannon that pierced the armor of the "Tiger".
Another innovation was the use of anti-tank bombs, the weight of which was small, and the damage caused took the tank out of combat. The German offensive bogged down, the tired enemy began to retreat to their previous positions.
Soon our counteroffensive began. Soviet soldiers took the fortifications and, with the support of aviation, made a breakthrough in the German defense. The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted about 50 days. During this time, the Russian army destroyed 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, 1.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns, 15 thousand tanks. The casualties of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Bulge amounted to 500 thousand people.
victory in Battle of Kursk showed Germany the strength of the Red Army. The specter of defeat in the war hung over the Wehrmacht. More than 100 thousand participants in the battles on the Kursk Bulge were awarded orders and medals. The chronology of the Battle of Kursk is measured by the following time frames: July 5 - August 23, 1943.
The Battle of Kursk was planned by the Nazi invaders led by Hitler in response to the Battle of Stalingrad. where they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but a fascist sapper who was accidentally captured surrendered his own. He announced that on the night of July 5, 1943, the Nazis would begin Operation Citadel. The Soviet army decides to start the battle first.
The main idea of the "Citadel" was to launch a surprise attack on Russia using the most powerful equipment and self-propelled guns. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the general staff of the Soviet army developed a plan aimed at liberating Russian troops and battle defense.
Own interesting name in the form of a battle on the Kursk Bulge, the battle received due to the external similarity of the front line with a huge arc.
Change the course of the Great Patriotic War and to decide the fate of Russian cities, such as Orel and Belgorod, was entrusted to the armies "Center", "South" and the task force "Kempf". Detachments of the Central Front were put on the defense of Orel, and the Voronezh Front - on the defense of Belgorod.
Date of the Battle of Kursk: July 1943.
July 12, 1943 was marked by the greatest tank battle on the field near the Prokhorovka station. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack to defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and the defeat of 400 tanks. Further, in the Orel region, the battle was continued by the Bryansk, Central and Western Front, switching to the operation "Kutuzov". In three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Nazi group was liquidated by the Central Front. Subsequently, they indulged in air pursuit and thus were driven back 150 km. west. The Russian cities of Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov breathed freely.
After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative in its own hands and continued to advance to the West, while freeing Russian cities.
Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 printed works on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov, Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth region.
The article is based on the material of the program "The Price of Victory" of the radio station "Echo of Moscow". The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full here.
After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which the Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - the Germans launched a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high cost to us.
After German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, in the south the well-known Kursk ledge was formed. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from the Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 -I and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March, mud had set in, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.
Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance was maintained, balance, without sharp, as they say, movements on both sides.
The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself
Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership faced important task- to consolidate their bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a rather victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.
No, it's not small though. If Operation Citadel were successful, which the German command naturally expected, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.
Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they go there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (there were the Azov and Black Seas in the lower part).
But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany could not make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on the development of Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.
The fact is that from the Kursk ledge it was convenient to deliver flank strikes to our troops, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the task formation process and the preparation process took a long time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation because of the understaffing of both manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the Citadel was set for June 10 (the first date was for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.
Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine grouping was not involved, because, like any new technology, both those and other tanks suffered from “childhood illnesses”. As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers quite often caught fire in their carburetors, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in the fighting during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more deplorable.
It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main task. The blow of the 9th Army of the Model was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining the troops of the Model, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.
The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (reconnaissance reports, photography) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first arrived at Bogodukhov, at the command post of the 4th Panzer Army near Goth. What for? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was still an attempt to develop the operation "Panther" (as a continuation in case of success of the "Citadel"). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 tank mechanized corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.
If all this colossus moves on the Army Group "South", then, as they say, it will not show enough. That's it for this it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11 Goth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was precisely at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.
It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when an assessment of the state of the German troops is carried out, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.
In the area of the Kursk ledge, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles available to them on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, with a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.
For the battles near Prokhorovka, the SS corps, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were planned. These three corps were supposed to crush the mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why in the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. Expand elsewhere significant amount tanks was simply impossible. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that our defense forces did not calculate.
A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that they already had a seam situation in Africa. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British established complete control over mediterranean sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, everything was not thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies...
The planning of the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately at the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the holding of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the Belgorod region; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he stated the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of the Headquarters, was removed from this post).
So, in early April, a note lay on Stalin's desk, which set out the basic principles for conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and a defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the area of the Kursk ledge assumed a high probability of such a transition.
Despite local successes, the Nazi operation "Citadel" failed
Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines by the Red Army was not carried out. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And it's not just trenches dug in full height and fortified with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the first time made during the war powerful system minefields; and each, in fact, the settlement in this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.
Neither the German nor our side have ever erected such a strong and saturated defensive line with engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The first three lanes were the most fortified: the main army lane, the second army lane and the third rear army lane - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groupings could not break through them for two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.
The fact is that in May fairly accurate data were received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would inflict the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting on South. Vatutin was forced to repulse the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that were directly involved in the attack on the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.
But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery attack is carried out, almost all Germans are killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?
There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a soldier of the reconnaissance battalion from the 168th Infantry Division went over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy prepared for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery raid, and, secondly, to strike the aircraft of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.
As for the artillery attack, it was partially successful in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: the telephone communication lines were mostly disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.
Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to force the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and previously built several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineer intelligence, by the way, worked very well), and artillery strikes were carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd tank corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.
Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike force and the auxiliary along divergent lines began. This forced the enemy to enlist additional forces to cover his flanks from the point of impact. Such a tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and perfectly implemented.
Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky - famous people, but the latter gained a reputation, or something, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, because he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it can be said with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main grouping, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and management went, of course, very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander.
Everyone remembers that great victory Rotmistrov's tankers won on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, on cutting edge, there was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did it happen? The fact is that the defense was built as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans, most likely, would strike along the Oboyan highway. And then they were supposed to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.
On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took on the main blow. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was divided into several parts, three divisions were dispersed, we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and stamina of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held up to the 9th day inclusive.
Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N. F. Vatutin accepts the report of one of the unit commanders, 1943
It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh Front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the call of the local population, which came out of the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the replenishment that arrived from the Central Asian republics.
As for the command staff, its shortage in the spring of 1942 was made up by officers from the academies, from the rear units, and so on. And after the battles near Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical level, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that can be done was done.
The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage, no doubt. No matter how we evaluate the battle on the Chernozem region now, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, german army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was given the task of exhausting the enemy forces and driving out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base of the 10th tank brigade. There, the Germans blew up part of the Panthers, up to forty units, we captured part. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.
History is always written by the victors, exaggerating their own importance and sometimes belittling the dignity of the enemy. Much has been written and said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk for all mankind. This great epic battle was another bitter lesson that claimed the lives of many people. And it will be a great blasphemy for future generations not to draw the right conclusions from those past events.
By the spring of 1943, the formed Kursk ledge not only interfered with normal railway communication between the German army groups "Center" and "South". Associated with him was an ambitious plan to encircle 8 Soviet armies. Until now, the Nazis have not carried out anything like this even in a more favorable period for them. According to some historians, the obviously unrealistic plan was, rather, an act of desperation. Allegedly, Hitler was most afraid of the landing of the allies in Italy, therefore, with such measures, his army tried to protect itself in the East, having finished with the Soviets.
This point of view does not stand up to scrutiny. The significance of the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk lies in the fact that it was in these military theaters that crushing blows were dealt to the well-coordinated military machine of the Wehrmacht. The long-awaited initiative was in the hands of Soviet troops. After these great historical events, the wounded fascist beast was dangerous and snapped, but even he himself knew that he was dying.
One of the key aspects in the meaning of the battle is the determination with which soviet soldiers were ready to demonstrate to the enemy that two terrible years had not been in vain for them. This does not mean that the Red Army at one fine moment was reborn, having solved all its old problems. There were still enough of them. This was primarily due to the low qualification of military personnel. Personnel shortage was irreplaceable. To survive, we had to come up with new approaches to solving problems.
One such example is the organization of anti-tank strongholds (PTOP). Previously, anti-tank guns were lined up in one line, but experience has shown that it is more efficient to concentrate them in original, well-fortified islands. Each PTOP gun had several positions for firing in all directions. Each of these strongholds was located at a distance of 600-800 meters from each other. If enemy tanks tried to wedge in and pass between such "islands", they would inevitably fall under cross artillery fire. And on the side, tank armor is weaker.
How this would work in a real combat situation had to be clarified during the Battle of Kursk. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of artillery and aviation, to which the Soviet command paid close attention, due to the emergence of a new factor, on which Hitler placed great hopes. We are talking about the emergence of new tanks.
In the spring of 1943, Marshal of Artillery Voronov, reporting to Stalin on the state of affairs, noted that the Soviet troops did not have guns capable of effectively fighting the new enemy tanks. It was necessary to urgently take measures to eliminate the backlog in this area, and in as soon as possible. By order of the State Defense Committee, the production of 57-mm anti-tank guns was resumed. Also carried out feverish modernization of existing armor-piercing shells.
However, all these measures were ineffective due to lack of time and necessary materials. A new PTAB bomb entered service with aviation. Weighing only 1.5 kg, she was able to hit 100 mm upper armor. Such "gifts for the Fritz" were loaded into a container of 48 pieces. The Il-2 attack aircraft could take on board 4 such containers.
Finally, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed in especially important areas. They were carefully camouflaged, with orders not to fire on enemy aircraft under any circumstances.
From the measures described above, it is clear what importance the Soviet soldiers attached to the Battle of Kursk. At the most difficult moment, determination to win and natural ingenuity came to the rescue. But this was not enough, and the price, as always, was a huge loss of life.
A lot of conflicting information and various myths created for propaganda purposes do not allow us to put an end to this issue. History has long brought to the judgment of posterity the results and significance of the Battle of Kursk. But all the new details that are revealed make us once again marvel at the courage of the soldiers who won in this hell.
The grouping of the "genius of defense" Model launched an offensive in the north of the Kursk salient. natural conditions limited room for maneuver. the only possible place the appearance of the Germans was a section of the front 90 km wide. This advantage was competently disposed of by the Red Army under the command of Konev. The railway station "Ponyri" became a "fire bag" into which advanced units of the fascist troops fell.
Soviet gunners used the tactics of "flirting guns". When enemy tanks appeared, they began to hit with direct fire, thereby riveting the fire on themselves. Germans on at full speed rushed to destroy them, and came under fire from other camouflaged Soviet anti-tank guns. The side armor of tanks is not as massive as the front. At a distance of 200-300 meters, Soviet guns could completely destroy armored vehicles. At the end of the 5th day, Model's attack in the north of the ledge bogged down.
The southern direction, under the command of one of the best commanders of the twentieth century, Heinrich von Manstein, had a better chance of success. There was no room for maneuver here. To this must be added a high level of training and professionalism. 2 out of 3 lines of Soviet troops were broken through. From the operational report for July 10, 1943, it followed that the retreating Soviet units were pursued closely by German troops. For this reason, there was no way to block the road leading from Teterevino to Ivanovsky settlement with anti-tank mines.
To cool the ardor of the presumptuous Manstein, in urgently the reserves of the Steppe Front were involved. But by this time, only a miracle did not allow the Germans to break through the 3rd line of defense near Prokhorovka. They were greatly hampered by the threat from the flank. Being cautious, they waited for the SS "Dead Head" fighters to cross to the other side and destroy the gunners.
At this moment, Rotmistrov's tanks, about which the German aircraft warned in a timely manner, approached Prokhorovka, assessed the future battlefield. They were to attack narrow corridor between the river Psel and the railroad tracks. The task was complicated impassable ravine, and in order to go around it, it was necessary to line up at the back of each other's heads. This made them easy targets.
Going to certain death, they stopped the German breakthrough at the cost of incredible efforts and colossal sacrifices. Prokhorovka and its importance in the Battle of Kursk are regarded as the culmination of this general battle, after which large-scale attacks of this magnitude were not undertaken by the Germans.
The result of the operation "Kutuzov", which began with an offensive in the rear of the Model group, was the liberation of Belgorod and Orel. This joyful news was marked by the roar of guns in Moscow, saluting in honor of the winners. And already on August 22, 1943, Manstein, violating Hitler's hysterical order to keep Kharkov, left the city. Thus, he completed a series of battles for the recalcitrant Kursk salient.
If we talk briefly about the significance of the Battle of Kursk, then we can recall the words of the German commander Guderian. In his memoirs, he said that with the failure of Operation Citadel on the Eastern Front, calm days disappeared. And one cannot but agree with him on this.
