The code name for the plan of the offensive operation of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don fronts during the Great Patriotic War, during which the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht was surrounded.
The situation at the beginning of the operation
By the time the operation began, it had already been four months. Repeated attempts by the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - Colonel General) to take Stalingrad by storm were unsuccessful. The 62nd and 64th armies held a strong defense on the outskirts of the city. Thrust resistance Soviet troops, the stretching of the rear and the approach of winter led to the fact that the German army was in a difficult position. The command of the Wehrmacht intended to hold the occupied lines until the onset of spring, and then carry out a decisive offensive.
Operation plan and preparation for it
The first discussions of the plan for an offensive operation near Stalingrad took place at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in early September 1942. During them, it was decided that the offensive should solve two main tasks - to surround and isolate the German group operating in the city area from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, and then defeat it.
The plan for the operation, which received the code name "Uranus", was distinguished by its breadth and boldness of design. The troops of three fronts were involved in it - Stalingrad (commander - colonel general), Southwestern (commander - lieutenant general, from December 1942 colonel general) and (commander - lieutenant general, from January 1943 colonel general ). The total offensive area was 400 square meters. The northern group of troops had to overcome the German defenses and fight 120-140 kilometers, and the southern group - 100 kilometers, after which both groups were supposed to meet, completing the encirclement of the Paulus army. When developing the operation, it was taken into account that the German troops, in an attempt to take Stalingrad, had used up all their reserves - by mid-November, he had only six reserve divisions scattered over large area front. The German command tried to strengthen them, but it was too late.
To prepare for the offensive, the fronts were strengthened. The Southwestern Front included two tank divisions, a cavalry corps, a number of artillery and tank units and formations; in the Stalingrad - mechanized and cavalry corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades; the Donskoy included three rifle divisions. All these forces were deployed as soon as possible - from October 1 to November 18, 1942. In total, at the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops involved in it numbered about 1 million 135 thousand soldiers and commanders, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.9 thousand aircraft. Thus, a decisive superiority over the enemy was created in this sector of the front: in personnel by 2-2.5 times, and in artillery and tanks - by 4-5 times.
The general leadership of the operation from the Headquarters was carried out by the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General (from January 1943 - General of the Army). Preparation for it was carried out with the participation of General of the Army and Colonel-General of Artillery N. N. Voronov.
The Soviet command widely used methods of misinforming the enemy about the place and time of the strike. Thanks to the high-quality camouflage of troop movements, the enemy did not know until the very last moment what kind of forces the Soviet troops had on the Stalingrad sector of the front. The construction of false objects was widely used - only 17 bridges were built across the Don, 12 of which were false. All these measures led to the fact that the Wehrmacht command did not expect a counter-offensive near Stalingrad, thinking that an offensive operation would be undertaken on the Rzhev salient or in the Caucasus.
The course of hostilities
The operation began on November 19, 1942. On this day, the South-Western and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. Due to bad weather conditions, the command had to abandon air support, and rely only on artillery. At 7:30, 3,500 guns and mortars began shelling enemy positions simultaneously in several areas. German troops, not expecting a strike, suffered big losses. The first to go on the attack were the 14th (commander - Guards Major General A. S. Gryaznov) and the 47th (commander - Guards Colonel, from December 1942 Guards Major General F. A. Ostashenko) Guards, 119th ( commander - colonel, since January 1943, Major General M. M. Danilov) and the 124th (commander - Major General A. I. Belov) rifle divisions. The enemy offered stubborn resistance - in the first four hours of the offensive, the Soviet units advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The 1st (commander - Major General of Tank Troops M. E. Katukov) and 26th (commander - Major General of Tank Troops A. G. Rodin) tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough, which completed the work of breaking through the defense - enemy troops , most of which in this area were Romanian units, were partly pushed back, partly surrendered. By the middle of the day, the defense was finally broken through and developed next steps behind enemy lines. In an effort to push back the Soviet troops and restore the situation, the German command brought operational reserves into action - four divisions. However, they only managed to delay the advance of the Red Army units. The 63rd (commander - Colonel N. D. Kozin), 76th (commander - Colonel N. T. Tavartkiladze), 96th (commander - Major General I. M. Shepetov), 293 -I (commander - Major General F. D. Lagutin) rifle divisions, 4th Panzer (commander - Major General of Tank Troops A. G. Kravchenko) and 3rd Guards Cavalry (commander - Major General I. A . Pliev) Corps. The mobile formations of the Southwestern Front were rapidly moving south, into the operational depth, destroying the enemy's reserves, headquarters and retreating formations. The Romanian troops suffered especially heavy losses here - two of their corps were completely defeated, another one was surrounded.
On the Don Front, the 65th Army (commander - lieutenant general) dealt the main blow. By the end of the first day of the operation, she advanced 4-5 kilometers, failing to break through the defenses. However, the stubborn resistance of the enemy in this area could not save the situation - the gap formed as a result of a breakthrough on the left flank of Paulus's army was growing rapidly. On November 20, 1942, units of the 26th Tank Corps were strategically stormed important node highways Perelazovskoe. On the same day, the troops were put into action Stalingrad Front. The 57th (commander - major general) and 64th (commander - lieutenant general) armies simultaneously, after artillery preparation, attacked enemy positions from two flanks. The enemy defense was broken through in several sectors: the 57th Army by the forces of the 169th (commander - Colonel I. I. Melnikov) and the 422nd (commander - Colonel I. K. Morozov) rifle divisions, and the 64th - by the forces of 36 1st Guards (commander - Major General M. I. Denisenko), 38th (commander - Colonel A. D. Korotkov) and 204th (commander - Colonel, since December 1942, Major General A. V. Skvortsov ) rifle divisions. The 13th tank (commander - Colonel T.I. Tanaschishin), 4th mechanized (commander - Major General V.T. Volsky) and 4th cavalry (commander - Lieutenant General T.T. . Shapkin) corps, which launched an offensive to the north-west and south-west. Unlike the attack in the north, the southern one was unexpected for the German command. Already on the second day of the operation, the enemy was forced to put into action all his remaining reserves. These measures could only delay the advance of the Red Army.
The command of the 6th Army and the Wehrmacht did not assess the scale of the threat to their Stalingrad group in time. Only on the evening of November 20, 1942, did it become obvious to Paulus that the Soviet units were carrying out a major operation. Realizing that the threat of complete encirclement loomed over him, he transferred part of his reserves, but many of them did not manage to break through. Seeing this, Paulus suggested that the command break through to the southwest, leaving the Stalingrad lines, but Hitler did not go for it. The offensive of the Soviet troops led to the fact that the command post of the 6th army was under the threat of a blow, and Paulus transferred it deeper to the rear, to the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. In the ranks of the German units, and especially among their allies - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians - panic began to grow.
On November 23, 1942, the 26th Tank Corps liberated the city of Kalach. On the same day, near the Soviet farm, its units met with the 4th mechanized corps, which marked the connection of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts and the closing of the encirclement. It contained about 330 thousand enemy soldiers and officers (22 divisions, 160 separate and auxiliary units). The next day, the defeat of the Romanian units in the area of the village of Raspopinskaya was completed - about 30 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered. V as soon as possible an encirclement front was created, protected both from the inside and from the outside - it was obvious that the enemy would soon try to break through it. On November 24, 1942, Paulus suggested that Hitler leave Stalingrad and break through to the southwest to join the main forces, but he again answered with a categorical refusal.
Over the following week, the Stalingrad and Don Fronts completed the encirclement by pushing back parts of the 6th Army and thereby reducing the front to 80 kilometers from west to east and to 40 kilometers from north to south. Having condensed his battle formations, Paulus managed to organize an effective defense, including using those fortified lines on which the Soviet troops held the defense during the summer-autumn of 1942. This significantly delayed the Soviet troops and delayed the defeat of the Stalingrad group.
The German command tried to organize a breakthrough with the forces of the Goth shock army group (commander - G. Goth), which was part of the Don Army Group (commander -) and numbered 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions. Manstein intended to implement it in the area of the city of Kotelnikovo. On December 12, 1942, the troops involved went on the offensive and pushed back the Soviet troops. However, on December 15, 1942, beyond the Aksai River, as a result of stubborn resistance from the Soviet troops, this offensive was stopped. The enemy had 40 kilometers to the front line with inside rings. On December 16, 1942, units of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive and during the subsequent three days broke through his defenses. The Gotha group, which also included one Italian army, suffered heavy losses, its front completely crumbled. As a result of the counterattack, the outer line of the encirclement was pushed back from the inner one by 200-250 kilometers, which finally deprived the 6th Army of hope for its breakthrough in the near future.
By January 1943, the position of the Stalingrad group had finally deteriorated. On January 8, the Soviet command gave Paulus an ultimatum to surrender, but Hitler categorically forbade surrender. Then the Soviet troops launched an offensive operation to finally defeat the 6th Army (code name - Operation "Ring"), as a result of which Stalingrad was liberated, and the enemy soldiers and officers still alive by that time, led by Paulus himself, surrendered in captivity.
Operation results
As a result of Operation Uranus, German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Croatian units suffered a severe defeat. Their irretrievable losses amounted to more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers. During the fighting, more than 155 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were killed, more than 300 thousand people were injured. This operation demonstrated to the whole world the operational and tactical skills of the Red Army command and had a huge political effect - in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the occupied territories, the victory on the Volga caused a general upsurge. In Germany, the defeat of the Stalingrad group was met with three days of mourning. In Italy, Hungary and Romania, which have lost a significant part of their armed forces, the defeat became one of the reasons for the internal political crisis, which subsequently resulted in the overthrow of the leaders of these states and their withdrawal from the alliance with Hitler.
By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the South-Western Front was created as part of the 5th Tank, 21st and 1st Guards Armies, deployed at the turn of the river. Don at the front Upper Mamon - Kletskaya. The newly created front is reinforced by cavalry, rifle and tank troops, as well as artillery of the RGK (Reserve of the High Command) and special forces from the Stavka reserve to carry out offensive operations in cooperation with the armies of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. The main idea of "Uranus" is the encirclement and defeat of the German-Romanian troops operating in the Don bend and in the Stalingrad direction. The immediate task of the South-Western Front is to defeat the 4th Romanian Army, reach the rear of the German group near Stalingrad and encircle them with a view to their subsequent destruction. All preparations for the operation took place in the strictest secrecy.
The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad is rightfully considered one of the most outstanding achievements of the military art of the 20th century. Until now, among historians, disputes have not subsided about how the counteroffensive plan was developed and who was its author.
A more or less inaccessible picture of the development of this decision is recreated by Georgy Zhukov in his memoirs. However, today the question arises - how reliable is it? Zhukov directly writes that the main provisions of this plan were considered by Joseph Stalin, Alexander Vasilevsky and him during their meeting in the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on September 12 and 13, 1942. The meeting was absolutely secret and further agreement on the details of the plan took place over the next two months. The content and details of this plan were known only to three. This is how the myth of the "mystery of the three" was born, which was then widely popularized in historical and journalistic literature.
In the second half of the 1990s, the journals of Stalin's visits were declassified, in which all his meetings and conversations with officials. On September 12 and 13, 1942, Stalin's meetings with Zhukov and Vasilevsky do not appear in these journals. The prominent British historian Geoffrey Roberts draws attention to this circumstance, who believes that Stalin could not meet with Zhukov between August 31 and September 26, 1942, and Vasilevsky saw Stalin, but not between September 9 and 21, since they were busy in other places and were absent from Moscow for most of September.
Regarding the authors of the counteroffensive plan near Stalingrad in the domestic historical literature this problem was approached in a biased, subjective and exclusively politicized manner. For the first time post-war years the authorship of this plan was attributed to only one person - Joseph Stalin. During Khrushchev's subjectivism and voluntarism, Khrushchev was made the initiator of this plan and its author, along with the commander of the fronts and commanders in the Stalingrad region. Finally, from the moment Zhukov's memoirs were published, Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Stalin became the creators of the plan for the Stalingrad counteroffensive.
How was the plan for the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad actually developed? New documents and studies allow us to look at this problem from a slightly different perspective. As historical documents and facts testify, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the State Defense Committee and Stalin personally began planning counter-offensive operations on the southeastern flank of the Soviet-German front, in the area of Stalingrad, already in the early summer of 1942, immediately after the defeat of the Soviet troops in Crimea and near Kharkov. The choice of the time for the development of the plan was by no means accidental, but based on a fundamental analysis of the current geopolitical situation, it was built taking into account the hostilities on the Soviet-German front and was based on a detailed study of extensive information received through the channels of Soviet intelligence agencies.
It was in the summer of 1942 that the Nazi military-political leadership was approaching the zenith of the implementation of its geopolitical plans. They were based on calculations to seize the oil wealth of North Africa, Asia Minor and Southeast and of Eastern Europe. Back in the spring of 1941, the Orient plan was prepared in Germany. His plan was to ensure that, in the event of the defeat of the USSR, to go through the Caucasus to Iran, and then to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Thus, the British troops in this region were deprived of maneuver and their actions could be paralyzed. Despite the fact that it was not possible to break the USSR in 1941, Hitler tried to speed up the implementation of the Orient plan. The fact is that already by the beginning of 1942, Germany began to experience enormous difficulties with oil products, she was really threatened by an oil crisis. Hitler's statement: "If I do not get Caucasian oil, I will be forced to end this war!" — was largely true.
Hitler began the summer campaign of 1942 not with an attack on Moscow, but with the advance of Rommel's troops in North Africa and Paulus in the southeast of the European part of the USSR. As a result, it was supposed to take the Caucasus in pincers. All forces were thrown at it. Hitler demanded 3 Alpine divisions from Mussolini. The Abwehr prepared an operation of reconnaissance and sabotage nature "Shamil" in order to raise an anti-Soviet revolt of the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus. The command of the Brandenburg-800 formation launched two unsuccessful landing operations in order to capture oil locations. In the event of the successful implementation of the plans "Orient" and "Blau", not only the rich hydrocarbon deposits of the Middle East and Western Asia were in the hands of Germany, but the scale of fascist aggression expanded: Turkey and Japan could be drawn into the war against the USSR. Above all, the Blau plan set itself the task of cutting the lower reaches of the Volga in the region of Stalingrad in order to finally cut off the European center of the USSR from Baku oil and the Caspian Sea. The Nazi command intended to defeat the Red Army in the steppe spaces between the Azov and Caspian Seas and in the foothills of the North Caucasus, securing a military advantage in this area. Their adventurous plans, the military-political leadership Nazi Germany associated with input advance in fighting fresh forces and new reserves of the Red Army.
The Soviet leadership revealed the plans of the German command in time and took urgent measures to disrupt them. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command and Stalin personally definitely outstripped Hitler's desire to seize Caucasian oil at all costs. Moreover, Joseph Stalin described Hitler's actions during this period as follows: “He is a fatalist. Hitler will not leave Stalingrad. Yes, it can turn to the Caucasus, but it will still hold part of the troops near Stalingrad, because the city is named after me.
So, at the beginning of the summer of 1942, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin instructed the General Staff to outline the main provisions of a large-scale offensive in the Stalingrad region. On the instructions of Stalin, the idea of the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed by Colonel Potapov, a senior officer of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. A great contribution to the development of this plan was made by Lieutenant General Nikolai Vatutin and the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Alexander Vasilevsky.
Joseph Stalin supervised all work on the counteroffensive plan, examined in detail and competently all the key issues of its components. Thus, in particular, the necessary measures were taken to expedited delivery reserves to the troops participating in the counteroffensive. To this end, within a few months, the construction of new and the expansion of existing railway lines and sections was launched. All this made it possible to significantly increase the volume of military transportation from north to south and speed up preparations for offensive operations. It should be noted that the construction and commissioning of these lines was carried out largely covertly for reconnaissance and the enemy Air Force and came as a complete surprise to him.
A big innovation in terms of the counter-offensive operation was the massive use of artillery. Stalin personally developed the theoretical issues and practice of the artillery offensive. This became the main form of using artillery in all offensive strategic operations. During the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded the maximum concentration of artillery in the sector of the front breakthrough. On November 19, 1942, the offensive of the troops of the Don and South-Western Fronts began with powerful artillery preparation. Since then, November 19 has been celebrated as Artilleryman's Day.
As a result of intense, full of creative searches, work, a comprehensively substantiated plan for the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad was formed. On November 13, he was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and personally by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin. The plan was codenamed "Uranus". Final goal This plan was to encircle and defeat the Nazi troops in the Stalingrad region by forces of the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts.
There is a version of the origin of the code name for Operation Uranus. Shortly before the start of the Stalingrad offensive operation, at Stalin's dacha in Kuntsevo, the head of state met with two prominent scientists - V.I. Vernadsky and A.F. Ioffe. At this meeting, the question of the possibility of creating Soviet atomic weapons was discussed. One of the leaders of Soviet intelligence, General P.A. Sudoplatov recalls: “Stalin was so mesmerized by the powerful destructive potential atomic bomb, that at the end of October 1942 he proposed to give a code name to the counteroffensive plan near Stalingrad - Operation Uranus.
Only a few sheets of 1942 remained on the calendar. The world was on the eve of a great turning point in the most destructive and bloody war in the history of human civilization in the twentieth century, a turning point that led to peace, freedom and social progress.
Considering the process of developing and adopting a plan for the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, an outstanding domestic military historian, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, General of the Army Mahmud Gareev, comes to the conclusion: “Historically, in the end, the idea, the idea belongs to the one who accepted it and took responsibility for its implementation, namely, to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin.
Viktor Popov, professor, candidate of historical sciences
Start: November 19 End: February 2 Result: capture of the encircled Axis group
Sides:
| Forces | |
|---|---|
| to the beginning of the operation 187 thousand Human Total 1.14 million Human . | to the beginning of the operation 270 thousand Human Total > 1 million Human. |
| Losses | |
| 1 million 143 thousand people (irretrievable and sanitary losses), 524 thousand units. shooter weapons 4341 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2777 aircraft, 15.7 thousand guns and mortars | 1.5 million total |
Stalingrad offensive operation- strategic operation of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. The goal is to defeat the enemy grouping operating in the Stalingrad direction (the main forces of Army Group B) and create conditions for the defeat of the entire southern wing of the Nazi troops. . Code name - "Uranus".
It was carried out by the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts (since January 1, 1943 it was renamed the Southern Front) from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The development of the operation was carried out by the General Staff and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The main contribution to the preparation of the offensive was made by Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky.
Operation "Uranus" has undergone major changes compared to the original plan, which envisaged the encirclement and liquidation of 80-90 thousand enemy groups. The encircled group, numbering about 300 thousand people or more, suspended the offensive of the troops of the Don Front, in connection with which the Soviet command was required to develop and introduce an additional operation, the Ring, into Operation Uranus, as well as take measures to neutralize enemy actions on the outer front of the encirclement in December 1942.
The encirclement of the enemy grouping occurred from November 19 to November 23 as a result of the infliction of flank counterattacks by the Soviet troops: by the South-Western Front, with the active support of the right wing of the Don Front from the Serafimovich area from the bridgehead on the Don on November 19 and the Stalingrad Front from the Sarpinsky Lakes region on November 20 in the general direction to Kalach-Soviet. During the 5-day encirclement, the 3rd Romanian army and the 48th German tank corps were defeated; significant losses were suffered by the 4th German Panzer Army and the 4th Romanian Army; The 6th field army lost 73 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, including 39 thousand prisoners. As a result of the offensive, one of the largest groupings in the history of wars was surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the 6th and 4th tank armies with a total strength of up to 330,000 people.
Until the end of November, Soviet troops created an external encirclement front and halved the area occupied by the encircled enemy. The further advance was halted by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who condensed the battle formations by reducing the front and organized defense in the positions prepared by the Soviet troops in the summer of 1942.
On December 12, 1942, in order to release the encircled grouping from the Kotelnikovsky area, the Goth army group launched an offensive. Using a large numerical superiority in front of the 51st Army, in particular, in front of the 4th Mechanized Corps, which took the main blow, by December 19, with heavy fighting, it advanced 40 km to the line of the Aksai River and was 80 km from the Stalingrad cauldron . However, by December 19, at the turn of the Myshkova River, the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army were already deployed, sent by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to defeat the Goth group. This meant the failure of the deblocking strike. Until December 23, the Goth group, without encountering strong resistance from the deliberately retreating troops of the 4th mechanized corps, advanced to the line of the Myshkova River, 35-40 km from the encircled troops. On August 24, the 2nd Guards Army, in cooperation with the 51st Army, launched a counteroffensive. By December 31, the Goth group was completely defeated and thrown back 200-250 km.
From December 16 to December 31, the troops of the South-Western Front during the operation "Small Saturn" defeated the 8th Italian army and the "Hollidt" task force on the Middle Don, which were preparing to begin the deblockade of the encircled group along with the "Got" group
From January 10 to February 2, 1943, the troops of the Don Front carried out Operation Koltso to cut and destroy the encircled group. As a result of this operation, the northern and southern enemy groups separated from each other surrendered on January 28 and February 2, 1943, respectively. 91,545 enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, including 24 generals led by Field Marshal F. Paulus. Another 16,800 were taken prisoner before the start of Operation Ring. Total taken prisoner in the Stalingrad offensive operation German soldiers and officers - 232,000. In addition, up to 30,000 Romanian (from the 3rd Romanian Army) and about 60,000 Italian (from the 8th Italian Army) soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.
Operation "Uranus" ended with a crushing defeat of the Nazi troops, whose total losses for the first time in the Great Patriotic war significantly exceeded the losses of the Red Army, and the irretrievable losses exceeded the irretrievable losses of the Red Army by more than 2 times. The defeat of the Nazi troops, carried out by the Soviet troops, without a significant superiority in forces, was a triumph of Soviet military art and marked a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.
Operation "Uranus" created the prerequisites for the successful conduct of the "Little Saturn" operations and the defeat of the Italian and German troops on the Middle Don with the aim of defeating the entire Army Group "B". During the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation from January 13 to 27, the 2nd Hungarian and the remnants of the 8th Italian army were defeated. More than 120 thousand people were destroyed and captured. Even further north, the remnants of the Hungarian troops and the main forces of the 2nd German army (9 divisions from the 3rd army corps) fell into the Voronezh-Kastornensky cauldron. From January 24 to February 2, they were defeated, more than 100 thousand German soldiers died and were captured. The rout and mass surrender began even before the group was completely surrounded. The remnants of several divisions (totaling about 20,000 men) made a breakthrough, but only a few thousand managed to get out of the encirclement by mid-February. Thus, the entire army group "B" was defeated.
counteroffensive of the troops of three Soviet fronts: Southwestern (gen. N.F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (gen. A.I. Eremenko) and Don (gen. K.K. Rokossovsky) to encircle and destroy the enemy group of troops in the interfluve of the Volga and Don in the autumn of 1942. In the spring of 1942, enemy troops broke through soviet front and in July they went to the Don. There was a threat to Stalingrad and North Caucasus. Stalingrad was the most important strategic point and a large industrial area. In addition, both for the Nazis and for Soviet citizens, Stalingrad was a city - a symbol. A. Hitler said more than once that Stalingrad is his destiny, and he must take it. In August 1942, the Nazi troops crossed the Don. Soldiers of the 62nd Army Gen. IN AND. Chuikov, 64th Army Gen. M.S. Shumilov, divisions under the command of generals A.I. Rodimtseva, L.I. Gurtiev heroically defended the city. The German command was forced to remove the 4th Panzer Army from the Caucasus direction and transfer it to Stalingrad. On August 23, 1942, German troops launched a new offensive with the aim of capturing Stalingrad with simultaneous attacks by the 6th and 4th armies in converging directions. On August 23, the Germans reached the Volga, and on September 13 they began the assault on Stalingrad. The most stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Germans to stop their attacks and go on the defensive. The German command decided not to take the offensive anymore in order to more thoroughly prepare "for the second Russian winter", accumulate strength and in the spring of 1943 again go on the offensive. In operational order No. 1 of the main command of the German fascist ground forces dated October 14, 1942, it was said: "The Russians themselves were seriously weakened during the last battles and will not be able to have the same large forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter." But it wasn't. By the autumn of 1942, the enemy no longer had absolute superiority on the Soviet-German front, the offensive capabilities of the German Wehrmacht were thoroughly undermined. In the first half of September 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff came up with a plan for an offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad region, codenamed "Uranus".
The operation plan was developed in detail with the involvement of the commanders of the military branches in this work, as well as taking into account the proposals of the front commanders of the Stalingrad direction. In the summer of 1942, in the region of the Middle Don, Stalingrad and to the south along the Sarpinsky Lakes, the main forces of Army Group "B" operated: the troops of the 8th Italian, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the 6th and 4th tank German armies . In this grouping there were more than a million people, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars. Army Group B was supported by the 4th Air Fleet and the 8th Air Corps. When choosing decisive strikes, it was taken into account that the main enemy grouping was in the Stalingrad area - the 6th and 4th German tank armies, and its flanks on the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad were covered mainly by Italian and Romanian troops, which had relatively low equipment and combat capability . main role the Southwestern Front was supposed to play in Operation Uranus. The troops of the South-Western Front attacked from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya. The Stalingrad Front was advancing from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The shock groupings of both fronts were supposed to connect in the area of Kalach - Sovetsky farm and thereby complete the encirclement of the main enemy forces (6th and 4th German armies) near Stalingrad. Further, individual troops of the Southwestern Front from the bridgeheads southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area were supposed to break through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army and go to the rear of the Stalingrad group in order to cut off all the ways to retreat. Thus, the Southwestern Front and the Stalingrad Front created an outer ring of encirclement of the enemy grouping. Don Front held auxiliary operations, and he created an inner encirclement of the enemy in a small bend of the Don. In the first half of November, in deep secrecy, large forces of Soviet troops were drawn up to Stalingrad, huge flows of military cargo were transferred. On the eve of the battle, the balance of power was approximately the same, with the exception of a slight superiority. Soviet side in tanks. On November 19, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the right wing of the Don Fronts went on the offensive, and on November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front. On November 23, the main forces of the 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army (330 thousand people) were surrounded. On November 16, the troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts, by advancing on Morozovsk and Kantemirovka, thwarted the German plans to unblock Stalingrad. Attempts to organize the supply of German troops by air failed. On January 26, the encircled grouping of enemy troops was divided by Soviet troops into two parts, after which mass surrender began. On January 31, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal F. von Paulus, surrendered. In total, 91 thousand people were captured. In Germany, a nationwide mourning was declared.
