Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.
The researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, laying the responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they "did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of the German troops."
Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by the Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.
“The People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.
The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff expected that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the Nazis, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.
However, an analysis of the strategy of waging war in Europe by German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily associated with powerful strikes. armored forces, supported by aviation, which quickly cut through the enemy defenses.
The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defense capability of the invaded country.
The miscalculation of the command of the USSR led to the fact that German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft and actually secured air supremacy for itself. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. The German command achieved its goal: the control of the Red Army troops was violated for some time.
As many researchers note, the nature of the location of the Soviet troops was very convenient for striking at German territory, but detrimental to a defensive operation. The deployment that took shape at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the plan of the General Staff to deliver preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the Fundamentals of Deployment, such a deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.
At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with deployed rears, but were divided into three echelons out of operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy the Soviet troops in parts.
The situation was especially alarming on the "Bialystok ledge", which went for many kilometers towards the enemy. This arrangement of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. Fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.
On June 22, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin's directive was issued, which stated: "troops to attack enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border."
Such an order testified to a misunderstanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when the German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts as well. Few could object to him. Despite the unpreparedness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire length of the front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.
Moreover, the troops were ordered to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction, could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov region, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the capabilities of the enemy and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a "boiler". About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers as a result of this operation was captured.
The General Staff believed that in the conditions of the impending war, the material and technical means needed to be pulled closer to the troops. 340 out of 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in the border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. Only in the area of the Brest Fortress, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the frontline zone, but in training camps.
The course of hostilities showed the recklessness of such a decision. It was no longer possible to withdraw military equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricants in a short time. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was a large accumulation of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the forward units of the army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km., Then the front-line and long-range aviation units were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.
In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into a gap in the Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, the Headquarters placed the main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the personnel of the Red Army, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center.
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: to meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then go on the counteroffensive with all available forces. The main task - to keep Moscow at any cost - was completed, however, most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the "cauldrons" near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two "cauldrons" were 7 field directorates of the armies out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but most of the reserves were concentrated not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the southern direction.
The main reasons why the Red Army failed in 1941 How the Red Army defended the Brest Fortress in 1941
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany, treacherously violating the non-aggression pact, suddenly, without declaring war, dealt a powerful blow to the Soviet Union. This day entered the history of our country as a tragic date, became the day of the beginning of the incredibly difficult war of the Soviet people against fascism, rightly called the Great Patriotic War.
The military-political leadership of Germany, having concentrated the main armed forces against the USSR, planned to defeat the Soviet Armed Forces and achieve victory within 4-5 months by delivering crushing blows on a wide front and in great depth.
Before the attack on the USSR, the armed forces of Germany numbered 8.5 million people. The ground forces had 179 infantry and cavalry divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions and brigades, a total of 5.2 million people. Of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66.5% of all available), 33 motorized and tank (94.3%) divisions and 2 brigades were deployed against the Soviet Union. In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies - Finland, Hungary and Romania - were put on alert near the borders of the USSR. In total, in this grouping of troops of Germany and its allies, there were 5.5 million people, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4.3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft.
By the beginning of the German aggression, the Red Army had 303 divisions, including 198 rifle divisions, 13 cavalry divisions, 31 motorized divisions, and 61 tank divisions. Mechanized and tank divisions were part of 29 mechanized corps. There were up to 4,826,907 servicemen in the Red Army and Navy. In addition, 74,940 people were kept in the formations of other departments that were on allowance in the People's Commissariat of Defense, including 64,900 military personnel.
The troops of the five western border districts and the forces of three fleets (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets) had 2,900,000 servicemen. The ground grouping had 170 divisions (103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 mechanized, 7 cavalry) and two brigades. They were armed with 32.9 thousand guns and mortars (without 50 mm), 14.2 thousand tanks, 9.2 thousand combat aircraft, which is much more than half of the entire combat and numerical strength of the Red Army and the Naval fleet.
The attack of fascist Germany found the Soviet Armed Forces in the period of strategic deployment, when its measures were begun, but none of them were completed by the beginning of the war. The Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts, deployed on the basis of the Baltic, Western and Kiev military districts, found themselves in the most difficult situation. The troops of these fronts took upon themselves the blows of the main groupings of the enemy's wars.
In the first months of the war, the Red Army suffered heavy defeats and heavy losses. By the end of the first day of the German attack, enemy tank groups in many sectors of the front had penetrated deep into Soviet territory from 25 to 35, and in some places up to 50 km. By July 10, enemy troops advanced in decisive directions from 380 to 600 km. The Red Army suffered heavy losses. The enemy managed to defeat 28 Soviet divisions and more than 72 divisions suffered losses in personnel and military equipment of 50% or more. “The total losses of the Red Army,” writes G.A. Kumanev, “only in divisions, excluding reinforcement and combat support units, during this time amounted to about 850 thousand people, up to 6 thousand tanks, at least 6.5 thousand guns of caliber 76 mm and above, more than 3 thousand anti-tank guns, about 12 thousand mortars, as well as about 3.5 thousand aircraft.
What is the reason for these heavy defeats of the Red Army. In our opinion, there is a whole complex of objective and subjective factors that determined the difficult course of hostilities for the Red Army in the initial period of the war. "V historical literature, published in the country and abroad, - writes G.A. Kumanev, - there are many works containing the answer to this question. Usually they refer to the huge military and economic potential of the fascist Reich, which in June 1941 relied on the resources of Europe that it had enslaved. Readers' attention is also drawn to the fact that the fascist German army had two years of war experience, was well trained and equipped with the latest technology. The failures of the Red Army are also explained by the pre-war repressions against military personnel, the erroneous assessment of Stalin and his inner circle of the military-strategic situation, the incorrect determination of the direction of the main attack of the aggressor, our insufficient preparedness for war in economic terms, the too short peacetime framework that did not allow us to fulfill all outlined plans, etc.”
Among these and other factors that led to extremely difficult consequences for the Soviet troops, the main one, we believe, was that the German army in June 1941 was stronger, more combat-ready, better armed than the Red Army. She gained combat experience in modern warfare. The German army was the best army at that time in Europe. Suffice it to recall that it took the Wehrmacht only about a month for France to be brought to its knees. At the same time, German troops lost only 29 thousand killed. The entire campaign in Poland took only 14 days for the Wehrmacht.
As a result of the occupation of European countries, the Wehrmacht received a large amount of military equipment and supplies. In France alone, 3,000 aircraft and over 3,500 tanks were captured. In total, military equipment for 150 divisions was taken from the occupied countries. After campaigning in Western Europe and Poland in Germany, a number of measures were taken to improve the quality of weapons. The troops were left with samples of weapons and equipment that showed the best efficiency in combat operations. At the same time, a number of manufactured types and models of weapons were modernized, and all the equipment available to the troops was repaired and its resource was brought to the required level.
It should be noted that assessing the capabilities of the German army before the attack on the USSR, many researchers pay attention to the high level of its command staff, which in the second half of the 30s received the practice of command and control of troops, organizing their support in combat conditions. On the training of non-commissioned officers, former Wehrmacht General K. Tippelskirch wrote that the German army "had ... such non-commissioned officers as no other army in the world had - numerous, exceptionally well trained and trained."
In addition, the grouping of enemy forces concentrated near the border of the USSR surpassed the Soviet troops of the Western military districts in terms of the number of personnel by 1.9 times, in heavy and medium tanks - by 1.5 times, in combat aircraft of new types - 3.2 times. times. Despite the large number of aircraft and tanks available in the Red Army, the overall superiority (taking into account all the above indicators) was in favor of Germany by 1.2 times.
The size of the Red Army, as already noted, from 1939 to 1941 increased two and a half times and amounted to more than five million people. As a result, the Red Army mostly consisted of newly drafted youth aged 18-21. Almost half of the Red Army soldiers of the first year of service were recruits in 1941. A significant part of those called up from the reserve during the winter and spring of 1941 did not have time to complete a full course in combat training.
On May 17, 1941, a directive was issued, signed by Zhdanov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, criticizing the shortcomings identified during inspections of Red Army units and formations in early 1941. It was noted that the training, especially of battalions and divisions, is poor in almost all military districts. The middle and junior command staff of many units and formations also received low marks. All military districts inspected for firearms training received a poor rating.
Not all was well with the tank troops. In 1941, a decision was made to create 9 mechanized corps, in March 1941 another 20. A paradoxical situation arose: with almost 19 thousand tanks in the Red Army, only one corps out of 29 mechanized corps could be fully equipped with them. There were few new tanks. Even in the western districts, on June 22, 1941, out of 12,782 tanks, there were 1,301 new tanks (469 KV tanks and 832 T-34s). Of the old tanks in the armed forces of the USSR on June 15, 1941, 29% needed major repairs, on average - 44%, serviceable was no more than 27%.
There were serious problems with the combat training of tankers. The training of the personnel of tank units left much to be desired. Many drivers had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving tanks. Secrecy forced to master the machine in the dark.
The head of the armored department Ya.N. Fedorenko, speaking at the December meeting of 1940 of the top command staff of the Red Army, said that over the past year the tankers were able to work out only shooting from a place, and did not start shooting at all as part of a platoon and company. “Fire training,” he noted, “remained unfinished this year... In tactical training, issues of interaction remained unfinished this year...” , what they did not manage to do in 1940, could not be completed in the next.
It was necessary to replace obsolete aircraft with new ones, since most of the Soviet aircraft were inferior to the German ones in many respects. technical specifications. Of the 6,379 combat aircraft at the disposal of the five border districts, only 1,540 were new designs. Plus, there is a shortage and low qualification of the flight crew, since these new types of aircraft accounted for only 208 crews. Even in the Western Special Military District, with all 1909 combat aircraft, there were 1343 combat crews and 1086 combat vehicles. On 242 new aircraft they were able to perform combat missions 64 crews, and in difficult weather conditions - 4.
In the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense dated May 17, 1941(underlined - ed.) the following was noted, in particular: “... the low performance in the combat training of the aviation units of the Red Army was accompanied by an extremely large number of disasters and accidents ... The operation of the new material unit by the flight crew was poorly mastered ... The flight personnel for combat use - bombing, aerial shooting, high-altitude and cross-country flights - were trained completely unsatisfactorily ... The average flight time per pilot for the entire winter period was in the VVVS KOVO (Kiev Special Military District. - ed.) six hours, and in the OVO (Odessa Military District. - ed.) - two hours and fifteen minutes ... "
The order of the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force dated the same date indicated that as a result of an inspection of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District, whose troops were stationed in Belarus, in the direction where the German command planned to deliver the main blow, low fire training of pilots was revealed, even on the ground they fired machine guns unsatisfactorily. In July 1941, due to the lack of fuel in the Western Special Military District, flights were stopped in a number of aviation regiments. The Chief Military Council, at its meeting on May 5, 1941, recognized the combat training of the Red Army Air Force as unsatisfactory.
It is worth emphasizing that in the summer of 1939 the Luftwaffe troops numbered 8,000 pilots of a higher rank, who had the right to day and night driving of any type of military aircraft. 25% of pilots mastered the skill of blind piloting. There is no doubt that during the two years of the war they significantly improved their skills and gained valuable combat experience.
This, one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, was aggravated by a number of mistakes, miscalculations, and wrong decisions in preparing the army and the country for fascist aggression.
We note, first of all, the problems of surprise. In determining its role in the defeat of the Red Army, as it seems to the author, an extreme is allowed that does not correspond to reality. Until now, there is an assertion that Stalin, the country's intelligence agencies knew about the German attack, and therefore any supposed suddenness of it is excluded. However, the documents show that, despite the reports of intelligence agencies, reports of diplomats about the imminent danger, Stalin was afraid to give Germany a reason to attack. Only on the night of June 22, when the signals about the impending attack became extremely alarming, did Stalin allow People's Commissar for Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. However, this measure was too late.
The formations, formations and units of the Red Army of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts (the former Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts) were to fully implement operational deployment, occupy initial position to repel enemy attacks. However, this was not done. Of the 75 rifle divisions of these fronts, more than a third was on the move, making marches to a new location or to concentration areas, 20 divisions required resupplying from 25 to 50%.
These and other facts allow us to conclude that there was no strategic surprise, the country, the people, the army knew that sooner or later aggression from Germany was possible. However, there was a clear operational-tactical surprise in the beginning of hostilities, which had an extremely negative impact on the course of the war.
On June 22, 1941, General F. Halder wrote in his diary: “... All the armies, except for the 11th, went on the offensive according to the plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy ... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the facts that the units were taken by surprise at the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units were suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do ... We can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the future course of events ... "
In discussions about the events of the first days of the war, a special place is occupied by the discussion of the impact of repressions in relation to the command cadres of the Red Army in the prewar years. With a certain degree of conditionality, three points of view expressed in the course of consideration of this problem can be distinguished.
The essence of the first lies in the assertion that it was as a result of repression that the army was beheaded and could not withstand the blow of the German Wehrmacht. Supporters of this point of view refer to the fact that from 1937 until the start of the Great Patriotic War, 40 thousand commanders of all levels were repressed, which, in their opinion, left the army without command personnel.
The second point of view is almost the opposite. Its essence: supporters of the first version exaggerate the damage done Stalinist repressions. In total, 36,898 commanders of various ranks were dismissed and repressed. This is less than 7% of the entire command staff of the Red Army. In addition, some of the repressed commanders, about 15 thousand, were rehabilitated before the war or at the beginning of the war. Consequently, they believe, repression did not have such a detrimental effect attributed to them on the course of hostilities.
And the third point of view, which is close to us, comes from the fact that the training of command personnel did not keep pace with the rapid numerical growth of the army, despite the wide network of higher and secondary military educational institutions deployed in the country, the opening of military faculties in civilian universities, and the creation of numerous junior courses. lieutenants. By 1941, the ground forces alone lacked 66,900 commanding officers (more than all those dismissed and repressed). The shortfall in the flight and technical staff of the Air Force reached 32.3%. It was simply impossible to eliminate such a situation in a short time. In addition, more than 75% of military personnel had no experience in command and control in combat conditions. Their rapid promotion without acquiring the necessary experience adversely affected the quality of military personnel. More than 55% of command personnel before the start of the Great Patriotic War were in their positions for less than half a year, and only a quarter of them can be considered experienced, since they held positions for more than one year.
At the same time, these researchers believe that repressions against the command staff and various kinds of purges had a negative impact on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. All commanders of the military districts, 90% of their deputies, heads of military branches and services were replaced. 80% of the leadership of the corps and divisional units, 91% of the regimental commanders and their deputies. That is, the trained link of commanders suffered, which was extremely difficult to restore in a short time. The repressions to a large extent caused the insufficient quality level of the commanding staff. At a meeting of the leadership of the Red Army in December 1940, V.N. Kurdyumov said: “The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that out of 225 regiment commanders involved in the collection, only 25 people turned out to have graduated from a military school, the remaining two hundred people are people who graduated from junior lieutenant courses and came from the reserve. In general, by the beginning of the war, only 7% of the commanders had a higher education, up to 37% did not complete the full course of study even in secondary military educational institutions.
The psychological consequences of the repressions were quite tangible, which gave rise to the uncertainty of the commanding staff, the fear of making responsible decisions on their own.
The course of the battles of the first days of the war was in a certain way affected by the erroneous view of the outbreak of war by fascist Germany. “A sudden transition to the offensive on such a scale, moreover, at once by all the forces that were available and deployed in advance in the most important strategic directions,” wrote G.K. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov and the leadership of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day in powerful compact groupings on all strategic directions in order to inflict crushing cutting blows.
“It should be emphasized,” write the authors of the book “The Great Patriotic War without the stamp of secrecy,” that Germany has already used a similar method of unleashing a war when attacking the countries of Western Europe and Poland. There was time to analyze it, take it into account in the training of our troops and military personnel. Unfortunately, this has not been fully done. And part of the military personnel of the Red Army turned out to be unprepared for command and control in a difficult situation. This is one of the reasons for the heavy losses of the Red Army in the first months of the war.
Among other versions of the tragic events of the beginning of the war, there is one openly mocking from the position of blind hatred for the Russian people, Russians, participants in the war. It is difficult not to regard it as a slander on the defenders of the Fatherland. Supporters of this version (I. Bunich, M. Solonin and others) argue that at the beginning of the war in the Red Army there was a "spontaneous, uncontrolled uprising, the army did not want to fight in defense of the Stalinist regime." On a thousand-kilometer front, "... millions of officers and soldiers gave a substantive lesson to the criminal regime, starting to go over to the side of the enemy" (Bunich).
How is this monstrous slander against Soviet soldiers "proved"? The basis for this malice for them was a large number of fighters and commanders who were captured in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. According to official data for July-December 1941, the Red Army and Navy lost 802,191 people killed and 2,335,482 missing and captured. One cannot but agree that a large number of Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. But let's pay attention to what this ratio was in other campaigns carried out by the Wehrmacht in Europe during the Second World War. The Polish army, for example, in battles with the Wehrmacht lost 66.3 thousand killed, and 420 thousand were missing and captured. That is, for every killed Polish soldier, there were 6.3 captured. The defeated French army lost 84 thousand soldiers and officers, and 1,547,000 prisoners, that is, 18 prisoners for one killed.
A.I. Burlakov quite rightly raises the question: whose army fought more courageously: the French, in which 18 were captured for one killed, or the Soviet, which lost 2.9 prisoners per one killed? And he emphasizes the obviousness of the answer - the Soviet soldiers defended their socialist Fatherland more courageously than the soldiers of the French army defended their Motherland, which was considered a model of democracy.
But the main refutation of the version of M. Solonin, I. Bunich and others like them lies in the reality itself, in the real facts of the Red Army's military operations against the German troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. From the very first days of the war, the fighters and commanders of the Red Army selflessly fought the enemy in exceptionally difficult conditions, and put up stubborn resistance to him. In support of this, we can cite evidence of the resilience of the border outposts, the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, Mogilev, the fierce defensive battle of Smolensk, the defense of the Luga line in July-August 1941, the heroic defense of Odessa.
The troops of Nazi Germany and its allies had never met such fierce resistance anywhere before and did not suffer such heavy losses in manpower and military equipment.
This is evidenced by former generals of the Wehrmacht, German researchers of the Second World War, based on archival documents, reports of the commanders of formations and units of the German army.
On June 24, 1941, General Halder made an entry in his diary: “The stubbornness of the Russian formations in battle should be noted. There were cases when the garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender. A little later, on June 29, he writes: “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last bullet ... The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West we could afford certain liberties. Now this is unacceptable."
General Blumentritt, who served as a lieutenant for two years on the Eastern Front during the First World War, told the English historian Liddell Hart: “Already the battles of June 1941 showed us what the new Soviet Army is like. We lost up to fifty percent of our personnel in battles. Red Army 1941-1945. was a much stronger opponent than royal army because she selflessly fought for the idea.
Here are the statements of the authors of Germany. “Despite the unsatisfactory armament and supply,” writes P. Gostoni in his book “The Red Army,” the Red Army fought for its Motherland, as a rule, stubbornly and fiercely. There was no case for entire sections of the front to stop resisting, outbreaks of panic almost always managed to be extinguished. I.Dek called one of the chapters of his book "The Road Through a Thousand Deaths" "Only dead Russians do not shoot." He writes about the "extreme resistance of the Soviet troops in the Smolensk region", "a city in front of which all the conquerors on their way to Moscow were forced to stop."
It is probably not superfluous to recall W. Churchill's statement. In his memoirs, listing the factors that allowed the Soviet Union to survive in the first months of the war, he called the resilience of the Russian people. He writes: “President Roosevelt was considered a very brave man when he announced in September 1941 that the Russians would hold the front and that Moscow would not be taken. The remarkable courage and patriotism of the Russian people confirmed the correctness of this opinion. Note that these statements refer to facts and events that took place long before the introduction of penal battalions and barrage detachments.
The population rose to fight the aggressors, regardless of class, social position in society, nationality and religion. National spiritual values came to the fore. The war showed the patriotism of the people, who exalted the duty of serving the Fatherland above their own needs, suffering, and losses. Thus, the highest and enduring value of the Fatherland was affirmed.
Despite the heavy defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, the aggressor failed to achieve the implementation of the "Barbarossa plan", the deadlines for the "blitzkrieg" were frustrated. Thanks to the ever-increasing resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy suffered heavy losses, he was unable to capture a number of the most important strategic centers of the Soviet Union, provided for by the plan, and in the battle for Moscow, the plan " lightning war' was finally buried.
Mikhail Ivanovich Frolov , Veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Vice-President of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, Professor
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28.
S. Shvetsov
:
Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:11
PS. In that photo - Brodsky. His well-known accusation of parasitism and the exile that followed is, in general, a well-known fact, but one can not know. No reputation impact.
27.
S. Shvetsov
:
Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:10
You and I were talking about Khrushchev houses, which began to be built - I remind you - from the year 59. What does "after the war" have to do with it?
How to fight the Germans? As in the 43rd, for example. And further. Why were the Germans able in the 41st, but we were not, although there was no less military experience? What kind of lessons could be drawn from the Polish and French campaigns that could not be learned at Halchingol and Finnish? Moreover, we had a brilliant leader, and they had a possessed one, right?
26.
Alejandro
:
Answer to 25., S. Shvetsov:
2012-06-26 at 23:16
"Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side." I hope, Shvetsov, this time you will lay out all your cards and tell us HOW you had to fight against the Germans. For the new tactics of which, it turned out, no one was ready at all. Neither the French, nor the proud Poles. But Shvetsov knows HOW. I kept waiting for you to tell me HOW it was necessary to immediately provide everyone with elite housing after the war, but I didn’t wait. Well, I hope you're a better military strategist than a builder.
25.
S. Shvetsov
:
Answer to 23., Ivan:
2012-06-26 at 21:42
Germany by that time had perfected this organization throughout Europe
And which particular Europe offered more resistance to the Germans than the Japanese (Halkhingol) and the Finns of the Red Army? Or have you already lowered that historical version into the closet, according to which Europe unanimously fell under Hitler, and then fell upon the USSR with the whole European world?
24.
:
Myth No. 37. Stalin planned to surrender Moscow to the Nazis and escape from the capital in October 1941.
2012-06-26 at 20:14
“One of the most insidious anti-Stalinist myths. Unlike other myths, it was launched into circulation gradually, without direct accusations of Stalin. Start
Khrushchev laid the myth. Very often he was personally exploited by Zhukov, but only in the form of either very transparent allusions to the supposedly "homemade truth of history" or in private conversations. Often used in our time.
In reality, everything was different. Zhukov offered to surrender Moscow directly! Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, in a conversation with the writer F. Chuev (02/01/1975, see Chuev’s book “Soldiers of the Empire”) said: “Zhukov wrote that on October 6, 1941, Stalin asked him if we would defend Moscow, and Zhukov answered firmly: "Let's stop!" But it happened that he sent General Sokolovsky to Vasilevsky (Alexander Mikhailovich should remember this) so that he at the General Staff would receive a communications center for the Western Front. Vasilevsky, bewildered, called Stalin about this, and he gave a scolding to Zhukov. Zhukov offered to surrender Moscow, and so it would have been if not for Stalin.
- But this must be documented, - I said (ie F. Chuev. - A. M.).
- How can you confirm? Golovanov answered. - Most of the documents showing the true role of Stalin in the war were burned under Khrushchev. So three volumes of my correspondence with Stalin were destroyed. Vasilevsky will die, Golovanov will die, Shtemenko will die, and no one will know the true truth. But this fact does not in the least belittle the role of Zhukov, but shows how many doubts there were, and with what efforts Soviet people victory was achieved near Moscow. But it is also impossible to compare Zhukov with Kutuzov in this matter, because the surrender of Moscow in 1941 meant much more to us than in 1812, when it was not the capital. Zhukov might not have known what Stalin knew and what became known to all of us much later: with the fall of Moscow, Japan opposed us in the East, and at that time we would have to fight on two fronts at once.
Golovanov's story is confirmed by the speech to the readers of Army General SM. Shtemenko. Here is an excerpt from the transcript: “During the period of the threatening situation, Zhukov's command post was closer to the line of defense. Zhukov turned to Stalin with a request for permission to transfer his command post away from the line of defense, to the Belorussky railway station. Stalin replied that if Zhukov moved to the Belorussky railway station, he would take his place.
The former commander of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Defense Zone, Colonel General Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev, recalled in 1975 that in response to Zhukov’s request, Stalin replied as follows: “If you move back to the Belorussky railway station, then I will take your place in Perkhushkovo.”
In the first part of the Golovanov story quoted above, published by F. Chuev under the title "Shovels" in the book "Unlisted Marshal" (M., 1995), the following is said: "In October 1941, on one of the most intense days of the Moscow defense, in The Headquarters discussed the use of the 81st Aviation Division, commanded by Golovanov. Suddenly the phone rang. Stalin, without hurrying, approached the apparatus. When talking, he never put the receiver to his ear, but kept it at a distance - the volume was such that a person nearby could hear everything. Corps Commissar Stepanov, a member of the Military Council of the Air Force, called. He reported that he was in Perkhushkovo, a little west of Moscow, at the headquarters of the Western Front.
- How are you? Stalin asked.
- The command is concerned that the headquarters of the front is very close to leading edge defense. It is necessary to bring it to the east, beyond Moscow, approximately to the Arzamas region (and this, by the way, is already the Gorky region. - A. M.). And organize a command post on the eastern outskirts of Moscow.
There was a rather long silence.
- Comrade Stepanov, ask at the headquarters, do they have shovels? - without raising his voice, said Stalin.
- Now. - And again silence. - And what kind of shovels, Comrade Stalin?
- No matter what.
- Now ... There are shovels, Comrade Stalin.
- Tell your comrades, let them take shovels and dig their own graves. The front headquarters will remain in Perkhushkovo, and I will remain in Moscow. Goodbye.
He said all this calmly, without raising his voice, without a trace of irritation, and slowly hung up. He didn’t even ask who exactly raises such questions, although it was clear that without the knowledge of the front commander Zhukov, Stepanov would not call Stalin.
In the memoirs of one of Stalin's leading guards, Lieutenant General V. Rumyantsev, the ending of the same episode looks like this: “Comrade Stepanov, give each of your comrades a shovel in their hands, let them dig a mass grave for themselves. You will stay in Perkhushkovo, and I will stay in Moscow. There will be no retreat. Only forward. Such was Stalin's reaction.
Firstly, it is obvious that Zhukov made such attempts at least twice - through some corps commissar who had nothing to do with such issues, the second time - through General Sokolovsky. What is called, not washing, so skating with the front line, although he gave others, and in the most rude forms, orders to stand to the death ... Secondly, in both cases, Zhukov, in fact, turned the heads of others, although he was obliged to personally report on this Supreme Commander. Thirdly, the question of the defense of Moscow was then extremely acute, and only exceptional adherence to principles, awareness of one’s special responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, personal courage, as well as purely strategic considerations, which together guided Stalin at that moment, prevented the panic flight of the commander of the Western front and the actual collapse of the front.
According to Stalin's personal driver, A. Krivchenko, it was in those days that Stalin said: "I am staying in Moscow, with the Russian people!" Moreover. In the same days, Stalin clearly said that if the Germans entered Moscow, it would be only through his corpse!
The late publicist Felix Chuev was also a good poet. He wrote a poignant poem related precisely to these events:
Already the ambassadors live in the rear deep,
Already in Moscow, people's commissars can not be seen,
And armored armies of von Bock
They continue to attack Khimki.
They decide at the headquarters of the Western Front -
Set up headquarters east of Moscow,
And the sun is a wound of the Russian people
Burning in the autumn blue...
Already in Moscow responsible persons
They don't understand only one thing:
When will Sam leave the capital -
But how do you ask yourself?
Yes, how can I ask? The question is extremely important
Something you can't put off until later:
- When to send your guard regiment
To Kuibyshev? The composition of the regiment is already ready.
The glass trembled in the roar of the air,
Sparkling in the Alexander Garden...
He said calmly: - If necessary,
I will lead this regiment on the attack.
As for the fact that Stalin allegedly planned to escape from Moscow in October 1941, the myth about this was launched by Goebbels. Why is clear. But that's why Soviet writers repeated this nonsense (M. Padzhev in the book "Through the whole war" and after him P. Proskurin in the novel "Your Name"), the question, of course, is interesting. Because they lied from three boxes. Why did Stalin come to the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky cul-de-sac, where a special train was standing, and in heavy thoughts walked along the platform for two hours, thinking whether he should go to Kuibyshev or stay in Moscow? Soviet writers fantasized great. But what is it really?
But in reality it was the following. According to Stalin's bodyguards (A. Rybin, P. Lozgachev, A. Belekhov, P. Shitokh, V. Krutashev, S. Kashevarov, V. Tukov, and others), the special train was in fact prepared in advance. There is nothing supernatural in this. The security measures of the head of state must be comprehensive and taken in advance. However, Stalin did not come there, he did not see this train and did not walk along the platform, especially since it was not there. Moreover. Accidentally noticing that the commandant of the dacha in Semenovsky - S. Solovov - was transporting things from the dacha somewhere, Stalin gave him a scolding and said: "There will be no evacuation, we will remain here until the victory."
In addition, a special Douglas passenger plane and a flight of fighters were prepared for Stalin as well. The planes were under special protection of the NKVD at the Frunze airfield. However, Stalin never came there either.”
(Martirosyan A. B. Stalin and the Great Patriotic War. M., 2007. S. 361-365).
23.
Ivan
:
15. Andrew: The same old chewing gum...
2012-06-26 at 17:57
//dear professor and veteran cannot (or does not want to) get rid of that sea of endless LIES..//
Father Ilya rightly drew attention to the rudeness of your comment in relation to the veteran, which (comment) you habitually call "spiritual". Of course, mentioning repression is a guarantee of "spirituality", and the phrase "there is a spiritual answer to this question in circulation" betrays your "spirituality" with your head.
I will pay attention to the incompetence worthy of Father Nikolai Savchenko, mechanically adding up the number of abortions with the amount of profit. The mechanical comparison of the number of tanks is INCORRECT at all. On the battlefields, not crowds of tanks lined up in squares are fighting, but organizational structures scattered in space (motorized infantry, artillery, and much more). Organizational structures, This is clear? Germany by that time had perfected this organization throughout Europe. We didn't even have time to arm ourselves properly. Two wars and three revolutions half a century before and an attack by the most powerful army in the world, to which France, for example, surrendered a month.
And why did older people have "less fear of reprisals"? Obviously the opposite is true. The young always underestimate the danger, the older ones always have more fear and caution. And those young people who died in the first battles were replaced by the same young ones who had reached military age (there my grandfather went to the front in 42).
Bottom line - your post is just a meaningless set of sentences, the main purpose of which is to insult the veteran to whom you should bow at the feet.
p.s. And why should someone (especially a priest) refute your figures, have you proved them? It is with you - unsubstantiated accusations, and not with Father Ilya.
22.
Andrey
:
Swearing is not proof
2012-06-26 at 14:56
Dear father Ilya! Unlike your post, which accused a number of participants in the discussion of rudeness, nothing of the kind was contained in my speech. An unsubstantiated accusation does not paint anyone, especially a priest, and yet not a single one of the figures I have cited has been refuted by you. Sorry.
21.
Clerk
:
18. Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:19
SW. Antony.
I know perfectly well what secular science does.
You already said it.
The existence of God is a matter of Faith, first of all, but not of speculative knowledge.
As for the game of "wise thoughts", according to the ESSENCE of the war with Hitler, this was a war with the army of the Antichrist, whether you like it or not, at least W. Churchill stated in his speech in 1940.
And so far, not a single person has been found who has taken Churchill's words into question.
You are the first, apart from the truth of those who are simply silent about this speech, because you are perfectly aware that Churchill said not just the truth, but the Truth.
Absolute.
20.
Clerk
:
17. Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:01
SW. Antony.
Absolutely fair.
Science is doing its job - it describes historical events-facts that took place, so let it describe itself, since no one has charged secular historical science with the duty to "invent hypotheses", including on the subject of the essence of war, without saying already on the subject of whether there is a God or not.
Yes, science suffers from this, if we are talking about science, of course ...
It has been that way since the time of Newton.
... like the "equal responsibility" of Stalin and Hitler for unleashing the Second World War.
If you have anything to say, in essence, the Patriotic War, including, I’m ready to listen.
It's one thing to describe an object, it's another thing to unfairly point to its ESSENCE.
The last thing is the matter of Theology, but not secular historical science.
A very simple thought.
So, the ESSENCE of the past War is that it was a War with the army of the Antichrist, where in relation to Hitler there are weighty, irrefutable, THEOLOGICAL, i.e. SCIENTIFIC, evidence and not just evidence, but ABSOLUTE TRUTH.
And here a conflict arises - for someone who is trying to distort the essence of the war or does it at all - puts an equal sign between Stalin and Hitler, this rubbish, sorry, "hypothesis", about the "equal honesty" of Stalin and Giler, will have to be confirmed scientifically, i.e. theologically , and this, alas, cannot be done, even by substituting and manipulating concepts.
To those who, on principle, if I understood you correctly, Antony, hold the conviction that God is by Himself, and earthly affairs by themselves, I recommend W. Churchill's speech, dated 1940, where Churchill directly points to the anti-Christian nature of Nazism and the war unleashed by them, Nazism.
18.
Anthony
:
Answer to 14., Bondarev Igor:
2012-06-25 at 18:02
So, the theory of evolution justifies sin (consequences and provision of struggle) as a way of survival
The theory of evolution is not even a hypothesis, but a false, anti-scientific myth, composed by interested parties on the basis of scientific facts in order to deny God
"Evolutionism does not explain the observed fact of the unity of the laws of the world, and does not even explain why it is cognizable at all.
Evolutionism directly contradicts the second law of thermodynamics. (Isaac Asimov defines it this way without the help of mathematical formulas: “In another way, the second law can be formulated as follows: “The universe is constantly becoming more and more disordered!” Considering the second law from this point of view, we see that it is said about us. We have to work hard to put the room in order, but in the mess she comes by herself, and much faster and easier. Even if we don't go there, it will become dirty and dusty. How difficult it is to keep the house in order, even our own bodies; how quickly things fall apart. Even if you don’t do anything at all, everything will fall into decay, break down, wear out by itself - that’s what the second law means”). If the theory of evolution is correct, then neither are our daily observations and the calculations of engineers. Moreover, evolutionists need to sue the Russian Academy of Sciences for not considering projects of perpetual motion machines with 100% efficiency.
All constructions of evolutionism are completely unbelievable from a mathematical point of view. So the random occurrence of our set of world constants is 1 in 103,000; the accidental appearance of a simple bacterium - 1 chance in 1,040,000; random change in the desired direction of 5 proteins - 1 chance in 10275, etc.
Evolutionism does not have a predictive ability, does not allow itself to be refuted by an experimental method, and therefore, even with a stretch, cannot be attributed to the field of science.
Darwinism (as a special case of evolutionism) is based on a logical fallacy called tautology. The statement: “survival of the fittest” does not carry any information.
Evolutionists' arguments make extensive use of the vicious circle principle. (Rock is dated by fossils. The latter are dated by evolutionary theory, which in turn confirms their age by reference to the geological stratum in which they are found).
Evolutionism cannot explain a number of facts related to its “field” of explaining the origin of species (the bombardier beetle, echolocation in bats, the birth of a whale under water, the sundew, etc.), and therefore cannot be considered a scientific theory.
about Daniil Syoyev
17.
Anthony
:
Answer to 9., Pisar:
2012-06-25 at 17:33
Uv.Antony. Here are your words. "Physics does not deny God." Physics-denies. Isaac Newton-no.
16.
Priest Ilya Motyka
:
2012-06-25 at 01:34
I thought the matter would be limited to the old guard Shakhmatov, Slava Tambov and Fr. Nikolay Savchenko. No. New eagles appeared: Artemy and Andrey. Absolutely stupidly and unceremoniously insulting the respected Mikhail Frolov. Comrades, unfortunate historians, what new documents have you introduced into circulation. to draw such phenomenal conclusions. Or you just misread liberal propaganda. The Soviet agiprop was more talented and not particularly slanderous.
15.
Andrey
:
Same old chewing gum...
2012-06-24 at 22:44
It is painful and embarrassing to read on the pages of the respected same old chewing gum, which Soviet agitprop treated us for half a century - perhaps the respected professor and veteran cannot (or does not want) to get rid of that sea of endless LIES, which most of all offends the memory of the heroes of 1941, without feats of which, undoubtedly, there would not have been even 1945 .... Over the past 20 years, many worthy and competent authors have answered the question about the tragedy of 1941 and now it is no longer possible to hide the fact that the Red Army units deployed in the border districts, not only quantitatively, but often and qualitatively surpassed the enemy - only the T-34 and KV tanks, which the Germans did not have at all until 1943, we had about 1500, the number of new aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft) was in the hundreds, not to mention the thousands of automatic rifles, which the Germans did not have at all then ... There is a spiritual answer to this question in circulation, which can be briefly reduced to the fact that personnel the army, which was largely atheistic (youth and commanders who underwent purges), in its mass died heroically by the beginning of the battle of Moscow, and the army that was formed from older people under the leadership of commanders broke the back of the best army of the then world, who had less fear of reprisals, and responsibility (at least moral) to their subordinates - much more than before the war - it was to SUCH an army that the Lord granted the Great Victory!
14.
Bondarev Igor
:
Reply to 8., Anthony:
2012-06-24 at 11:50
More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise, we won’t understand anything. I’ll explain in simpler words. If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the history of your relationship with God, he will put you out the door, because he doesn’t need it from you. If you come to the confessor and tell your story career development, he will also be in a state of bewilderment. Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks. History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God, Isaac Newton was of the same opinion. Specific physiologists, physicists, historians can be atheists or believers ... But if the historian starts to argue who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of Novgorodians with Suzdalians - St. Andrey Bogolyubsky, or Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.
Science correctly describes the world, but evaluates it incorrectly, since it proceeds from what it has proved in the description of the world.
That is, science is based on itself.
Thus, the theory of evolution justifies sin (the consequences and ensuring the struggle) as a way of survival. Instead of saying that the struggle for survival is not entelechy of life a consequence for its violation (when Adam violated the installations (entelechy) of Life).
In the same way, History contains the same “struggle” for survival. But how should one look at it? Either with the Spirit, or contrary to it. But, the Holy Spirit is one and the same, and man is in the image and likeness of God. God, man, spirit - "elements"
history is not subject to cancellation. And in ancient times and today, these elements are unchanged. But, changes in history are made by the spirit of struggle against the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit is infinite, therefore the History is finite, and in its end sums up the assessment of the beginning of the creation of man and the drama of his fall.
The meaning of History may well comprehend the consciousness of one person. Hence the morality of History.
13.
Alexander Vaskin, Russian priest, officer of the Soviet Army
:
Appeal of Mr. Sergius (Stragorodsky)
2012-06-23 at 17:28
"June 22, 1941
Moscow city
To the pastors and flock of Christ's Orthodox Church.
In recent years, we, the inhabitants of Russia, have consoled ourselves with the hope that the military fire that has engulfed almost the entire world will not touch our country. But fascism, which recognizes only naked force as law and is accustomed to mocking the high demands of honor and morality, turned out to be true to itself this time as well. Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating their native land. The times of Batu, German knights, Charles of Sweden, Napoleon are repeated. The pitiful descendants of the enemies of Orthodox Christianity want once again to try to bring our people to their knees before untruth, to force them to sacrifice the good and integrity of their homeland, the blood covenants of love for their fatherland by sheer violence.
But this is not the first time the Russian people have had to endure such trials. WITH God's help and this time he will scatter the fascist enemy force into dust. Our ancestors did not lose heart even in a worse situation, because they remembered not about personal dangers and benefits, but about their sacred duty to their homeland and faith, and emerged victorious. Let's not shame them glorious name and we are Orthodox, kindred to them both in flesh and in faith. The fatherland is defended by weapons and common folk feat, a common readiness to serve the fatherland in a difficult hour of trial with everything that everyone can. This is the case for workers, peasants, scientists, women and men, young men and old people. Everyone can and must contribute his share of labor, care and art to the common feat.
Let us remember the holy leaders of the Russian people, for example, Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, who sacrificed their souls for the people and their homeland. And not only the leaders did it. Let us recall the innumerable thousands of ordinary Orthodox warriors, whose unknown names the Russian people immortalized in their glorious legend about the heroes Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich, who utterly defeated the Nightingale the Robber.
Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with him, she carried trials, and consoled herself with his successes. She will not leave her people even now. She blesses with a heavenly blessing and the forthcoming nationwide feat.
If anyone, then it is we who need to remember the commandment of Christ: "No one has more sowing love, but who will lay down his life for his friends." Not only the one who will be killed on the battlefield for his people and its good believes his soul, but also anyone who sacrifices himself, his health or profit for the sake of the motherland. We, the pastors of the Church, at a time when the fatherland calls everyone to a feat, it would be unworthy to only silently look at what is happening around us, not to encourage the faint-hearted, not to console the afflicted, not to remind the hesitant about the duty and the will of God. And if, moreover, the pastor’s silence, his indifference to what his flock is experiencing, is also explained by crafty considerations about possible benefits on the other side of the border, then this will be a direct betrayal of the homeland and his pastoral duty, since the Church needs a shepherd who truly carries out his service “for the sake of Jesus , and not for the sake of kusa bread, ”as St. Demetrius of Rostov put it. Let us put our souls together with our flock. Countless thousands of our Orthodox warriors walked the path of selflessness, laying down their lives for their homeland and faith at all times when enemies invaded our homeland. They died without thinking about glory, they thought only that their homeland needed a sacrifice on their part, and humbly sacrificed everything and their very lives.
The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our homeland.
The Lord will give us victory.
Patriarchal Locum Tenens
humble Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna"
(Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents / Comp. O. Yu. Vasilyeva et al. M., 2009. S. 38-40).
12.
Clerk
:
"Either the 21st century will return to God, or the 21st century will not exist at all"
2012-06-23 at 13:43
The question of the Essence of the Historical Process is, first of all, a question of the philosophy of history.
What is the engine of history, what drives history as a dynamic process.
This is how human thought answers this question.
"Ideas rule the world" (Hegel).
"Ideas then become a material force when they take possession of the masses." (K. Marx).
I hope no one will deny that this is so.
However, neither Hegel nor Marx could say anything about the Essence of these "ideas" that rule "this world", moreover, it took nineteen centuries to reach this thought and the twentieth to be convinced in their own skin that that's exactly the way it is.
So, as many as nineteen centuries to think of it and the twentieth to state the fact.
But here is what St. Apostle Paul wrote, two thousand years ago, both in form and in essence, of these most unfortunate ideas that rule this world ...
"Our struggle is not against flesh and blood (against people), but against principalities, against authorities, against the world rulers of the darkness of this age (demons), against spirits (thoughts that this public throws up about their own exclusivity, genius, destined to dominate the World etc. rubbish) malice (false teachings - "ideologies") under heaven ("air" - the sphere of abstract, non-essential ideas - banal demagogy on the subject of universal freedom of equality and brotherhood).
Eph. 6:12.
So, it took a man two whole millennia to reach with his mind what little children who listen to the Words of the Apostle know.
So why do I need this Human Science, which is developing at such a snail's pace, and on blood, and even posing as God knows what wisdom, when the Lord gives me everything and at once, just to accept, not in the sense of containing, but as the Absolute Truth and more did not doubt that.
Do not doubt God, but yourself.
Starting to study history at school, at the university, in the archive, dealing with any specific problem.
In other words, history, as Science, and not only history, can FURTHER develop and must, exclusively as Divine-human creativity, then bear unfalse and worthy fruits.
Knowledge of the Truth is salvation.
Here and now, in this age and in the future.
To the extent due and necessary, for every person and according to the age in which a person happened to be born.
11.
Clerk
:
8. Antony.
2012-06-23 at 12:59
"If the historian begins to argue who was the Antichrist in the battle in 1170 between Novgorodians and Suzdalians, St. Andrei Bogolyubsky or Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign ...".
SW. Antony.
The essence of the Historical Process comes down to the relationship of Man with God.
With God, but not with the "antichrist".
The coming of the Antichrist is their relationship, the result.
The case of the Free Will of Man.
A very simple thought.
And the assessment, according to the essence of the event, is not given by a human historian.
Lord.
Head of the Orthodox Church, through the mouth of Her Primate.
And the score is always the same.
Moral or not.
According to Conscience, people acted or not.
Fratricidal war is always immoral.
If a historian goes into this kind of "reasoning", then, in fact, this is an attempt to speak out in essence, however, in your case, an unsuccessful attempt - "from the wind of your head."
From reason.
This is no longer a historian-"thinker", but a "manufacturer of thought" (St. Patriarch Pimen) - a charlatan.
This is the same "mysticism and priesthood".
This is no longer a historian, but a "pathfinder", equal to the current one, busy searching for "seals of the Antichrist" in markets and supermarkets.
Wider-in history...
Such, for example, was Merezhkovsky.
What is the purpose?
This is a matter of judgment, not judgment.
... Thus, he puts in the place of God, making the enemy of the human race equal to God, recognizing, in fact, the enemy of the human race is capable.
The ability to create.
This is what blasphemy is.
As for the inadmissibility of the substitution of mathematics (history) for the Psalter and the Psalter-mathematics (history) and the need for both, for a person, as a Personality and for science, as a result of this Personality of work, these are not my words.
Mikhail Lomonosov, founder of Russian Science.
On what Russian Science stood and will stand.
On the Stone of Faith.
As an objectively existing reality.
And now and forever and forever and ever.
Amen.
Do not doubt.
10.
Sergiy Agapov
:
"... And, denying the Lord who redeemed them, they will bring swift destruction upon themselves."
2012-06-23 at 12:09
In general, when you read about all these shortcomings, miscalculations, mistakes of our command, one gets the impression that in the military leadership of that time there were only former furniture makers or half-educated seminarians. Therefore, I agree with the main idea of the respected Pisar:
Strategic.
Deadly blindness.
Both in this age and in the future.
The only thing I would like to add to the comments of a respected colleague is that after saying "A", he did not finish the following. It is not enough to see in the causes of the war and in the causes of its bitter failures an underestimation of the diabolical cunning and ingenuity of the forces of Antichrist, it must be admitted that this terrible tragedy was given to us by the Lord. Here, of course, in my opinion, the assessment of these events given by Igor Bondarev is more correct: “It is characteristic that under the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, represented by Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) is a huge mass of idols and idols…”. We must admit that demonism was rampant on our side too. Otherwise, how can you explain the punishment of the Lord sent to our country? Even until recently. A generation is already growing up in our country, which, perhaps, does not even suspect that quite recently their fathers and mothers had to dismantle the toilet bowls in the altars, from where the priests now take out bowls with the Holy Gifts for them. Let's get rid of "deadly blindness" together and tell our children the whole truth. And here again I agree with the respected Pisar: "This rule knows no exceptions."
9.
Clerk
:
8. Antony.
2012-06-23 at 11:24
SW. Antony.
Here are your words.
"Physics does not deny God."
Physics-denies.
Isaac Newton no.
Science, as a field of human knowledge, denies.
Man, as a Person, no.
Don't confuse one with the other, they are two different things.
Science denies the Existence of God in Fact.
METHODOLOGICALLY.
It's a matter of worldview.
How science looks at the world and how the One Who created it, the World, science, including.
Who is the reason for everything.
The emergence of science, including.
Your reasoning is superfluous confirmation of this.
The real picture of the World, as it really is, is only partially accessible to science or distorted.
It's not about EXPLAINING the history of the relationship between HUMANITY and God, as you think.
This is not required - every time and on every occasion to expound the Scriptures.
If a person, when applying for a job, begins to expound the Scripture-the history of the relationship of Mankind with God, instead of his own, or starts to figure out who was the Antichrist in the time of A. Bogolyubsky, this person is definitely crazy.
It's one thing - your own ideas about what a person's relationship with God is, in their Essence - another, what it really is.
And what to do with it.
What is the "history of man's relationship with God" in relation to a resume and a job application?
In what way does it manifest itself?
In relation to your neighbor.
In the business with which a person is busy and with the people with whom, together, he does one thing.
No one will ever indicate this in its entirety in a resume, but this is what always and first of all needs to be clarified.
The relationship between man and God is primarily a moral category.
This is a question of whether a person has a Conscience, or lack thereof.
What is Conscience?
It is the Voice of God in the Heart of Man.
The conscience of people is One for All-Christ.
If the employer argues following your logic, not showing interest in WHAT IS THE PERSON whom he hires, he risks hiring a scoundrel or that very "holy simplicity that is worse than theft."
In both cases, he will hire people who do not have a Heart, which means there is no mind.
One "mind".
Not crazy, no, crazy.
Graduates, the employer, in any case -
Badly.
uv.Anthony.
Spiritual side-Moral side of any act is the subject of the presence of Conscience in a person, or lack thereof.
It is true both for the individual and for the whole society.
You should not mix the categories of Rational and Moral, all the more so replace one with the other, otherwise you can fall into oblivion, into mysticism, into madness, or simply do stupid things or at best case-write.
Rational, in relation to hiring, is the degree of mastery of the craft.
Accounting, for example.
The moral is a matter of purpose.
Why, the accountant submits a petition for employment.
What for?
This question is always asked and I have seen few people who are able to clearly and concisely formulate the answer to this question, so as not to cause mistrust or confusion.
Why do you want to work in our company?
A rationally thinking person, strictly following the logic of rationalism, must say what he thinks, well, for example ...
"Drink tea from the belly and steal your tablecloth ...".
The answer to this question - "What is the PURPOSE" will depend on whether a person will be accepted for a position or not.
And above all, no matter what anyone says, first of all he will be interested in the Moral Purpose or Not?
Bastards, brawlers, rogues and swindlers, no one needs them anywhere, even if they are "seven spans in the forehead."
Not even professional bank robbers.
Yes, this never happens.
A man without conscience is always professionally falls short, everyone will be convinced, one has only to dig, it means unreliable.
While everything is going more or less stably, you can still put up with the level of his preparation, but as soon as an emergency situation arises, he will let you down.
Do not doubt.
8.
Anthony
:
Reply to 7., Scribe:
2012-06-23 at 05:32
More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise, we will not understand anything
7.
Clerk
:
3. Antony.
2012-06-23 at 01:33
SW. Antony.
You see, history is not astrology and does not suffer from providentialism.
In addition, history, as a science, has never set itself the goal of testing the Ways of God.
We are talking about what history as a science understands by the essence of the historical process.
Anything, except for what actually exists, since it denies the Existence of God as an Objective Reality.
This is what it means to be methodologically atheistic, although at the same time a historian, personally, can be a believer.
It is bad both for history and for the historian, since there is no completeness of perception of the historical process, which is possible for a person.
Thus, objective conditions are created for the transformation of history into myth.
Usually destructive.
It is true both for the individual and for the whole society.
P.S.
History, in its ESSENCE, comes down to the history of Man's relationship with God.
Particularly Russian.
Which does not at all eliminate the need to know Russian history well, replacing it with the knowledge of the Psalter, rather the opposite.
More precisely, both are necessary.
Otherwise, we won't understand anything.
In History, and in the Psalms too.
In the XIII century, the Agarians did not attack Russia.
The Mongols were pagans.
6.
Ivan
:
Thanks to the author for the article!
2012-06-23 at 00:20
Thanks a lot Dear Mikhail Ivanovich! Everything is written to the point and the way it SHOULD be written about the war, the way those who KNOW write. In such a short journalistic article there are 40 (!) References to sources and what! We have scientific treatises and they write lighter.
Health and long life to you!
5.
Bondarev Igor
:
Addition.
2012-06-23 at 00:01
It is characteristic that under the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, represented by Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) had a huge mass of idols and idols in which orthodox spirit society.
That is, the Western idea under the conditions of the Antichrist is fascism. And in Russia - pagan idols, all sorts of ideological cults, but firmly united in a false spirit.
That is, the West deviated into the idea of matter, and Russia into pride. Germany - into the materialization of empiricism, and Russia into a stronghold of the spirit (but false), into deception.
The war changed everything.
4.
Bondarev Igor
:
Cause.
2012-06-22 at 23:44
June 22, 1941 - All Saints' Day.
Indeed, opposite them is the Antichrist.
I agree with the respected Pisar, with one "but".
The Antichrist is not only Nazi Germany, but also the USSR itself. More precisely, the spirit from materialism in the world. Including the USA.
The Antichrist is the common spirit of mankind.
And June 22, 1941 - its apogee.
Liberation from this spirit is Victory 1945.
And we see the alignment of forces. The USSR was freed by the spirit of will, from below, mainly, because in this case command is an application to the troops, and governments to the people.
And, accordingly, the countries of the world. In the United States, the people did not fight. But, Germany received the most bitter lesson. She should act most nobly in the matter of the expected spiritual flowering of the mind in Russia.
3.
Anthony
:
Reply to 2., Pisar:
2012-06-22 at 23:27
Strategic. Deadly blindness. And in this century and in the future. This rule knows no exceptions. The trouble, historical science, is that being, METHODOLOGICALLY! atheistic ...
2.
Clerk
:
Re: Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War
2012-06-22 at 18:48
"Ignorance of God is the blindness of the soul."
Strategic.
Deadly blindness.
Both in this age and in the future.
This rule knows no exceptions.
The trouble with historical science is that being, METHODOLOGICALLY! atheistic, that is, being able to describe, and for the most part, reliably, the factual side of the matter, is not able to transform the "sum of facts" into knowledge.
In other words, it cannot reveal the essence of the war against Nazism, thereby providing the widest opportunities for all kinds of manipulations of facts.
Historical science, in general, by and large, has nothing to oppose to manipulators.
Except faith.
Faith in science and faith in it.
And this, as the practice of the last twenty years has shown, is not enough.
There is nothing to oppose lies, since there is no access to Truth - some guesses, partly true, partly not very.
Of course, neither the Soviet leadership nor the people were ready for the war that befell the Fatherland.
They were not ready precisely STRATEGICALLY.
And they couldn’t be ready, they were spiritually blind, that’s why they didn’t imagine WHO ATTACKED.
And attacked by none other than the "Antichrist".
Just imagine, I.V. Stalin collects, the Politburo and says ...
"Comrades, the Antichrist has attacked us.
What are we going to do, comrades?"
Anyone Orthodox person known, and not falsely, traits inherent in the Antichrist.
First of all, a tendency to pathological lies.
If anyone is interested, they can open Mein Kampf - there are several pages devoted to lies.
It's a whole anthem.
Anthem of Lies...
...and the First Epistle of the Holy Apostle Paul to the Corinthians.
Chapter 13
Anthem of Love.
In other words, a Russian person cannot even imagine that one can lie like that.
Perhaps there is one more thing that needs to be overlooked.
"At equal strength opponents, the spirit of the troops, correlates as three to one.
Napoleon.
So let's multiply 5,5 million, who have two years of invaluable modern combat experience behind them, by three.
We'll get 16.5 million.
So, the 4.5 million army, brought up in the spirit of proletarian friendship for the unfortunate oppressed German working class and not only the European working class in general, was attacked not by the "proletarians of all countries", only waiting, as it were, to fraternize, but by the hordes of the Antichrist, who does not know mercy.
Not for children, not for women, not for the elderly.
This is already after the war came with whom, and they began to write about the "lair of the beast" in the newspapers, etc.
Stalin, thank God, was, after all, a spiritually educated person.
Russian Orthodox Church, in On the very first day of the war, on the face of Her Primate, the future St. Patriarch Sergius, she gave an unfalse assessment of the essence of events and, I believe, conveyed this essence, in its entirety, to the leadership.
With whom we are dealing, without this, no Victory would be possible.
And thank God for everything.
1.
Anthony
:
Re: Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War
2012-06-22 at 10:16
During all 70 years that have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, public consciousness is looking for an answer to an outwardly very simple question: how did it happen that the Soviet leadership, having seemingly irrefutable evidence that Germany was preparing aggression against the USSR, did not fully believe in its possibility and was taken by surprise? What is the reason that Stalin, even having received on the night of June 22 from the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District the news that the German units were already occupying the initial areas for an offensive along the border line, told People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov: do not rush to conclusions, maybe everything will be settled peacefully.
One of the answers is that the leader became the victim of a large-scale disinformation operation carried out by the German special services.
From May 22, 1941, as part of final stage operational deployment of the Wehrmacht, the transfer of 47 divisions to the border with the USSR began, including 28 tank and motorized.
Summarized, all versions of the purpose for which such a mass of troops is concentrated near the Soviet border boiled down to two main ones:
- to prepare for the invasion of the British Isles, in order to protect them here, in the distance, from British air strikes;
- to ensure by force a favorable course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, which, according to hints from Berlin, were about to begin.
In agreement with Hitler, Goebbels published in the evening edition of the newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" dated June 12, 1941 an article "Crete as an example", in which he made a transparent allusion to the landing of the Wehrmacht soon on the British Isles. To give the impression that the Reich Minister of Propaganda committed grossest mistake and issued a secret plan, the issue of the newspaper was confiscated "by Hitler's personal order", and a rumor spread throughout Berlin about the inevitable resignation of the minister, who had fallen out of favor with the Fuhrer. Indeed, they did not let the retail newspaper through (so as not to misinform their own military and the population), but foreign embassies received a number.
“My article about Crete,” Goebbels wrote in his diary the next day, “is a real sensation at home and abroad… Our production was a great success… From the tapped telephone conversations of foreign journalists working in Berlin, we can conclude that they all fell for the bait "
Read more in the article on the website of the Foundation for Strategic Culture “I look forward to seeing you in July. Yours sincerely, Adolf Hitler
http://www.fondsk.ru...sh-adolf-gitler.html
Hundreds, thousands of books, articles were written about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, films were made, many "copies" were broken in various disputes. But still there is a question - how so? Why was the powerful Red Army, which, as it turned out in the last two decades, possessed a large number of tanks and aircraft, failed to hold out on its borders and allowed the enemy to break through to Leningrad, Moscow, and the Volga?
The anti-Stalinists have a simple answer: they say, the Stalinist regime is to blame for everything - it destroyed the best commanders, believed Hitler, did not believe intelligence, poorly prepared the army, etc. But archival documents and recent studies by Russian authors (for example, you can read the series “War and We ”) say the opposite: there was no exact intelligence data, there was a huge amount of conflicting information; the army, the economy, society were prepared for war for real (without concessions). The "purge" of the officer corps did not worsen the combat capability of the country's officer corps, but rather increased it, opportunists were repressed, drunkards were fired, and so on; real military leaders who had gone through combat school began to come to the fore - from a simple soldier to the commander of a division, corps. For example, you can read about this in Igor Pykhalov's book "The Great Slandered War".
In the field of diplomacy, the USSR also showed its best side, having won a number of victories on the diplomatic (foreign policy) front: the issue of the security of Leningrad was resolved, the borders were significantly pushed to the west, a number of their territories were returned, and they gained time for preparation. Militarily, the Red Army gained experience in fighting in Spain, on Khasan, Khalkin-Gol, in China, in Poland, in the war with Finland, despite all the cruelty of this, but without such a “school” one cannot learn to fight.
An interesting version was put forward by the writer Yuri Mukhin, he suggested that one of the main factors in the defeats of the initial period of the war was the so-called "problem of the military class." This is not only a disease of the Red Army, this problem originated in Russian Empire, passing by inheritance to the USSR, and then to the Russian Federation. Its essence is this: after the nobles got the opportunity not to serve, or to serve immediately from the position of an officer, the officer corps of the empire began to degenerate. Prior to this, the commanders began their service from the bottom (for example, Peter the Great forced the children of the aristocracy to serve from soldiers and sailors), so Suvorov, Kutuzov were the "fathers" to their soldiers. They thoroughly knew their psychology, ate with them, slept with them, stood in the same ranks, “did not bow to bullets”, they were an indisputable authority for the soldiers, they were loved, believed in them and were ready to perform any task. After the liquidation of this system, a mass of inexperienced people, often opportunists and careerists, became officers. For them, the army was a place of “warm”, high-status life, a place for making a career. This became one of the main reasons for the defeat in the Crimean War, when terrifying flaws were revealed behind the outward brilliance and window dressing, when real heroes (such as Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, hundreds of thousands of officers and soldiers) died in order to correct the mistakes of others and prevent empire catastrophe. This caused a protracted Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878, defeats in the Russian-Japanese 1904-1905, failures in the First world war. And it became the cause of catastrophic failures in the Great Patriotic War. Mukhin calls the main reasons - incompetence, cowardice, lack of will, unprofessionalism of the senior command staff. And even outright betrayal. So, according to Yuri Mukhin, the command of the Western Military District (front) - Pavlov and K., simply allowed the forces standing in the Central Strategic Direction to be destroyed. Opening the road to Smolensk and Moscow.
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the border guards were not ready to strike, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were on alert, the Kiev military district withstood the blow and even counterattacked, and a catastrophe occurred in Belarus.
But apparently still main reason the catastrophes of the initial period are the power of the blow. None of the armies that existed at that time could stand it. To withstand such a blow, one had to be the Red Army of the 1944-1945 model. People, including a significant part of the commanders, did not have the psychological readiness to die, but not to retreat. Part (everyone knows the heroic example of the Brest Fortress, and there are many such examples) withstood and fought to their last breath. And the majority, especially where there were no passionaries (in Russian, furious, full of vitality), capable of leading and inspiring to a mortal battle, retreated and surrendered. Everything is clear even from the columns taken prisoner - if there are no people who will lead the attack on the few escorts, the rest will simply go to the slaughter.
This confirms the complete superiority of the Wehrmacht in the main directions of impact - a 3-x-5-fold superiority in manpower and technology.
It is also very important that Wehrmacht soldiers were already a warring army, and not peaceful (like most of the Red Army), they have already "tasted blood" in Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Greece. They had the psychological readiness to kill, were absolutely sure they were right– it is very important in battle, to be absolutely confident in your strength. They are the highest race, and against them "subhuman orcs", the program worked.
But soon the situation changed, their tribal memory awakened in the Russians, they again became Warriors. The Russian people, Russia cannot be defeated on their territory, in open battle, the Russian Spirit has awakened, and all the false programs of the Nazis could not withstand his blows.
Sources:
The Great Slandered War - 2. Under the general editorship. A. Dyukov. M., 2008.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Ten Myths of World War II. M. 2006.
Lebedintsev A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Fathers are commanders. M., 2004.
Mukhin Yu. If not for the generals! Problems of the military class. - M., 2006.
Mukhin Yu.I. Crusade to the East - M., 2004.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M, 2006.
Human factor. Under total ed. Yu. I. Mukhina. M., 2003.
Synopsis on the history of Russia
June 22, 1941. Nazi Germany and its allies launched a carefully prepared blow against the Soviet Union. The peaceful work of the Soviet people was interrupted. A new period has begun in the life of the Soviet state - the period of the Great Patriotic War.
Goals and nature of the Great Patriotic War.
Germany in this war pursued the following goals:
Class - the destruction of the USSR as a state, and communism as an ideology;
Imperialist - the achievement of world domination;
Economic - robbery of the national wealth of the USSR;
Racist, misanthropic - the destruction of most of the Soviet people and the transformation of the remaining into slaves.
The goals of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR were:
Defense of the Fatherland, freedom and independence of the Motherland;
Assistance to the peoples of the world in liberation from the fascist yoke;
The elimination of fascism and the creation of conditions that exclude the possibility of aggression from German soil in the future.
Its character followed naturally from the aims of the war. On the part of Germany, it was an unjust, predatory and criminal war. On the part of the USSR - liberation and fair.
Periodization of the Great Patriotic War.
June 1941 - November 1942 - the period of mobilization of all forces and means to repulse the enemy.
November 1942 - December 1943 - the period of a radical turning point in the war.
January 1944 - May 1945 - the period of the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe.
Causes of the defeats of the Red Army in the first period of the war:
Gross miscalculations of the country's leadership in assessing the real military situation;
Insufficient professional training a significant part of the command cadres of the Red Army;
Weakening of the country's defense capability and the combat capability of the Red Army by unjustified repressions against the leading cadres of the country's armed forces;
miscalculations of a military-strategic nature;
The advantage of Germany over the USSR in economic potential;
Significant superiority of Germany in the actual military. Her army was fully mobilized and deployed, equipped modern means wrestling, had two years of experience in combat operations. However, in Soviet army work on its technical equipment has not ended. The balance of power on the eve of the war.
Germany and its allies: 190 divisions (153 + 37) = 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 4500 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars and 192 ships of the main classes. Allies of Germany: Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Slovakia. USSR: 179 divisions = 3 million people, 8800 tanks, 8700 aircraft, 38 thousand guns and mortars. The fleets of the Soviet armed forces consisted of 182 ships of the main classes and 1400 combat aircraft.
And although the Soviet troops had superiority in tanks and aviation, they were still inferior to the enemy in terms of quality.
German offensive strategy.
In accordance with the strategy of "lightning" war, it was envisaged the invasion of powerful groupings of tank formations and aviation, in cooperation with ground forces, advancing in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, encircle and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops of the border districts, within 3-5 months reach the line Arkhangelsk - r. Volga - Astrakhan. To solve this problem, several army groups were created. Army Group "North" was advancing in the direction of the Baltic, Pskov and Leningrad. Commander - Field Marshal W. von Leeb. Army Group Center operated along the lines of Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow. Commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock. Army Group "South" strikes at Western Ukraine, captures Kiev, then advances on Kharkov, Donbass, Crimea. Commander - Field Marshal G. von Runstedt. The German army of Norway acted in the direction of Murmansk. V fighting two Romanian armies and a Hungarian army corps also joined.
mobilization activities.
A) Establishment of the supreme governing bodies of the country's defense.
June 23, 1941 - the Headquarters of the High Command was created, which on August 8 is transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It included People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov. General mobilization was declared in the country, and martial law was introduced throughout the European part.
June 30, 1941 - the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed, endowed with full state, military and party power. It included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, later Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Bulganin were introduced. Stalin became the chairman of the GKO. In addition, on July 19, he took the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, he accepted the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and the Navy.
B) A directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The letter prescribed the following order:
Ensuring the work of the rear for the front;
Organization of resistance in the occupied territory.
July 3, 1941 - Stalin's address to the people on the radio, where for the first time it was openly announced about deadly threat hanging over the country, and contained an appeal to all citizens of the country to save the Fatherland.
