Every year on the eve of a terrible and tragic date for our people - June 22, again and again I ask myself how could this happen? As a country preparing for war and having perhaps the strongest army at that time, it suffered a crushing defeat, 4 million Red Army soldiers surrendered and were taken prisoner, and the people were on the verge of extermination. Who is to blame for this? Stalin? It is perfectly acceptable, but is he the only one? Maybe someone else is involved in this, maybe someone's wrong actions are hiding another White spot stories about World War II? Let's try to figure it out. One year before the war 1940 Summer. World War II has been raging for almost a year. Hitler and Germany led by him reach hitherto unseen heights. France is defeated, and with this victory, almost all of continental Europe is at the feet of the Nazis. The Wehrmacht begins to prepare for war with England. On July 16, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 16 on the preparation of an operation to land troops in the UK, codenamed "Sea Lion". Not a word about the war with the USSR. Hitler does not need a war with the Soviet Union. Hitler is not suicidal. And he read the great strategists of Germany's past: Clausewitz and Bismarck. They bequeathed to the Germans that they would never fight with Russia. The war with Russia is suicide: this is a vast territory that cannot be occupied by any armies, these are impenetrable swamps and forests, a cruel winter with wild frosts. And this is an army of many millions; plus Stalin's industrialization gives this army the latest tanks, aircraft and artillery. This is a nation that has never recognized foreign invaders, its own - yes, foreign ones - no. To decide on a war with Russia, you must either have a huge strong, professional army with a militarized economy subordinate to it, or be a suicide with a guarantee of failure. As for the first, it's not a secret for a long time. total troops of Germany and the USSR. These figures are even given in the history books. Before the attack on the USSR, Hitler had about 3,500 tanks, about 4,000 aircraft, 190 divisions, and this number includes all divisions (both motorized, and tank, and infantry). And what about the other side? Comparing the German Wehrmacht and the USSR before the war, in all reference books, textbooks and books, I always observed one detail, perhaps unnoticed by other researchers. Bringing the German forces, the researchers give all the troops concentrated near the border with the USSR. This is the overwhelming number of the entire Wehrmacht, in addition, Germany has only occupying forces in the occupied countries of Europe. When referring to the Soviet forces, only the ZapVO, KOVO and PribVO (western, Kiev and Baltic military districts) are given. But this is not the entire Soviet army. But it still turns out that Germany is many times inferior in number even to these districts. And if you compare the Wehrmacht with the entire Red Army? Only a madman could attack such a colossus as the USSR. Or someone who had no choice but a doomed attack. This is exactly what happened on June 22, 1941. Who, and with what unjustified actions, forced Hitler to take this step, which eventually ruined him and the Third Reich? Unjustified appetites of the aggressor The USSR, acting as a real aggressor, seized foreign territories and occupied independent states. There is nothing strange in this, any aggressors of both the past and the present have acted and are acting in this way. In 1940, the Baltic countries were subjected to aggression: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina - two primordially historical regions of Romania. What changes, what happens after these captures on political map world? First. The borders of the Reich and the USSR are in contact, that is, now "only a spark is needed for fire." And this spark is struck by one of our military figures - Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Second. The oil fields of Romania are within easy reach - 180 kilometers. This is a direct threat to the Reich. Without oil, the Wehrmacht war machine will stop. Third. With the occupation of the Baltic states, there was a direct threat to the most important supply artery of the Reich - the transport of iron ore from Luleå (Sweden) across the Baltic Sea. And without iron ore, Germany, of course, would not have been able to fight successfully either - this is the most important resource. The aspect of "Romanian oil" is especially important. After the Stalin step and the execution of this step, G.K. Zhukov, among other things, the USSR had the following problems: Romania, having become an ally of Hitler, spoiled relations with the USSR (and how else, when territory is taken from you?), The front with Germany increased by 800 kilometers, plus another foothold from Hitler to attack THE USSR. The worst thing is that Stalin scared Hitler. It was Zhukov's capture of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina that excited the Fuhrer and the German military command. There was a direct threat to the oil fields of Romania. From that moment on, a strike against the USSR began to be developed. June 22 Alternatives Although history does not like subjunctive mood, but still "what would happen if?" Germany is going to fight the British Empire and is preparing for the most difficult landing on foggy Albion. All this is known, but could Zhukov change something? It is quite possible that Stalin could listen to the voice of Georgy Konstantinovich and resolve military issues with him. In the summer of 1940, there were several alternatives. Let's consider them. First. With a strike on Bessarabia, do not stop, but go further and capture the whole of Romania. Hitler, who concentrated his army along the Atlantic coast, would not have been able to successfully prevent Zhukov. Ten divisions in Poland and Slovakia do not count. With the capture of the whole of Romania, the oil fields of Ploiesti are leaving the hands of Germany - and this puts the Reich in a dependent position. Synthetic fuel is not a solution: it is not enough, it Bad quality and very costly. Second. Zhukov could have advised Stalin to wait a bit until the Reich got bogged down in a war with England. After all, landing on Albion Island is a very risky and complicated business, and even if everything goes well, then even then Stalin and Zhukov will have a moment that is very favorable for an attack - the very moment when the German army is on this island - and for a successful operation it would take about 80-85% of the Wehrmacht. But what happened happened. The Red Army, having captured Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, stopped. Yes, you will say that Stalin did not set the task for Zhukov to crush Romania in the summer of 1940. But Zhukov could have tried, if he were a strategist, as our directors and writers portray him, to suggest to Stalin an almost win-win option. Didn't suggest. Afraid or did not understand the strategy of warfare. “As a result of the successful development of offensive operations on the Central, Southern and Southwestern Fronts, the Red Army occupied the cities of Brussels, Amsterdam, Bruges and others during the liberation campaign. In the direction of Vienna, Salzburg, Strasbourg, enemy troops were surrounded and surrendered in quantity ... ”The words of military reports from the front could sound like this or almost like that when the Red Army would subjugate Europe. But do we need it?***** EDITORIAL COMMENT What is the reason for the defeats of the Red Army in initial period wars? In Soviet times, they usually looked for an explanation in the suddenness of the attack, in Germany's superiority in military force (which actually did not exist), in the incompleteness of the country's transition to a military footing (which also did not exist). A glimpse of the "partial loss of command and control", which is a delusion, since in this case it is necessary to talk about the partial preservation of command and control. Well-known Russian historians Yu.T. Temirov and A.S. Donets in the book "War" (M., "EKSMO", 2005). They call the main reason for the defeats of 1941 the completely mediocre command and control of the troops by the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, as well as the general inability of the command staff of the Red Army to fight. The mediocrity of Zhukov and the commanders of the Red Army was caused by the authoritarianism of the System itself, which deprived the commanders of the initiative and forced them to follow the stupid orders of the communists, and repressions in the army in the pre-war period, and the extremely weak and poor-quality training of command personnel. The authors of the book compare the terms for training specialists and commanders in the German army and in Soviet army: the Germans, on average, spent 5-10 times more time on this training, and in some cases 30 times more. But the decisive role in the defeat of the Red Army was played precisely by Zhukov’s mediocrity as a commander, he fought “not with skill, but with numbers”, made completely ridiculous tactical decisions, ruined thousands of tanks and millions of soldiers. As a result, Zhukov was punished and dismissed, Stalin was going to shoot him for his mistakes, but he was hardly dissuaded (Zhukov himself hid this in his memoirs, explaining the removal from the post of the Chief of the General Staff by the fact that he allegedly quarreled with Stalin - this is another lie of the narcissist "commander"). But even today, Russian historians cannot tell the whole truth about the war. The glaring fact is that the 3.5 millionth German army surrendered in just six months of the war 4 million Soviet soldiers , and about a million more were repressed during this period for their unwillingness to fight (in total, there were 5.5 million people in the Red Army on June 21, 1941). The most important reason for the defeats is the unwillingness of the army to fight for Stalin, for the hateful power of the commissars. It has never happened before in history that entire units of the Red Army surrendered to the enemy, tying up their commissars. Moreover, out of 4 million surrendered soldiers and officers, about 1.5 million began to fight on the side of the enemy (including the millionth Russian Liberation People's Army of General Vlasov). There may be ten or a hundred traitors. But not half a million! These are no longer traitors, this is the Civil War. The people, tired of the bloody communist junta, were waiting for liberation. But the tragedy was that Hitler was not a "liberator" at all, he was a conqueror. And when the people understood this, the whole course of the war immediately changed. Therefore, after all, the main reason for the defeats of the beginning of the war was the pre-war Bolshevik yoke, which did not allow people to understand at all the meaning of protecting such an ugly and rotten state as the USSR from the enemy. It is curious that today at all events in connection with the events of 1941 (on the "Stalin Line", etc.), the idea is given that "they died, but did not give up." The historians of “Soviet hardening” say the same thing in their articles. But what about the fact that during the 6 months of the war, out of 5.5 million personnel army, 4 million surrendered to the Germans, about a million more were repressed for unwillingness to fight (600 more than a thousand for the month of October in Beria's certificate, of which about 30 thousand were shot in October), and only about 500 thousand soldiers and officers died or were wounded in hostilities from the pre-war composition of the Red Army? Naked statistics show that they just SURRENDED, and did not die - EVERYONE SURDERED: about 80% of the pre-war composition of the Red Army surrendered to the Germans! Let the Red Army surrender for political reasons, and many historians call this an “Act of the Civil War”, and not a betrayal. But there was the crappy power of the USSR - and there was its own people: things are different. The Red Army actually betrayed its people, which it was supposed to protect, who fed and clothed it, who trained it, who gave it the best military equipment in the world - while living from hand to mouth . It seems absurd even the very fact that 4 million Soviet prisoners of war were in the rear of the advancing 3.5 million enemy army: they could well disperse the frail guards and seize power in the rear of the Germans, thereby carrying out the ENVIRONMENT operation of the entire advancing German army. Instead, for weeks they marched in an endless column to the West in front of the windows of the Belarusians - dreaming of an early victory for Hitler and a new life without the Bolsheviks. That is, not so much in German captivity as in captivity of their own illusions. This is precisely the tragedy, and it is hushed up in every possible way even today, because the behavior of 4 million surrendered Red Army soldiers must somehow be explained - but it is difficult to explain. It is much easier to call them "heroes", although Stalin considered them traitors (80% of his army!). And it’s even easier to continue to lie odiously about the fact that “they died, but did not give up.” And the truth is that in the Land of Slaves, which was Stalin's USSR, the army can only consist of slaves. And such an Army of slaves cannot fight, even having the best equipment in the world, because they do not understand the purpose of this: a slave will never be a patriot of his slavery. As a result, Hitler simply took advantage of this situation. Including a huge gift awaited him: he started the war with 3.5 thousand antediluvian tanks, and in the first weeks of the war, the surrendered units of the Red Army handed him another 6.5 thousand of the latest tanks, among which a significant part were KV and T-34. They became the striking force of the Wehrmacht in the attack on Smolensk, Moscow and Leningrad, having acquired the indices "KV (r)" and "T-34 (r)". Another paradox of the initial stage of the war is that all conquered Europe gave Hitler only 3.5 thousand tanks to attack the USSR, and the surrendered Red Army added another 6.5 thousand to him, bringing the number of tanks in Hitler's army in July 1941 to 10 thousand! And this is hushed up (the number of tanks the Germans had in July-October 1941 is concealed), although without this fact it is difficult to understand how an army with 27 thousand tanks, including the invincible KV and T-34, can be defeated with 3.5 thousand tanks ... Sergei GRIGORIEV, Vitebsk "Secret Research"
Part 1.
Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, I.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany - the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially fixed. And the name - "Great Patriotic" war appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
Until now, the question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at its beginning and the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad is being discussed. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not fulfill what he was obliged to do, because he took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of the war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation, the townsfolk were alarmed by rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world”, which was constantly repeated in the newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, moreover, on his own territory, encroaching on our borders.
The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev by the decisions of the XX Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who was “afraid” of Hitler, and at the same time “trusted” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on alert before June 22, thanks to which, as a result, the soldiers of the Red Army met the war sleeping in their barracks »;
- “The main thing, of course, that dominated him, over all his activities, which also responded to us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces ”(From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military History Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the magazine Ogonyok No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities .....” (G.K. Zhukov “Memoirs and Reflections”. M. Olma -Press.2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and significance of the General Staff .... he was little interested in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to fully report to I. Stalin on the state of the country's defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy ..». (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).
Until now, in different interpretations, it sounds that the “main culprit”, of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot”, “everyone was afraid of him” and “nothing happened without his will”, “did not allow the troops to be brought into combat readiness in advance", and "forced" the generals to leave soldiers in the "sleeping" barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I am gone, more than one tub of dirt will be poured on my head, a pile of rubbish will be put on my grave. But I am sure that the wind of history will dispel all this!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, recorded in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this testimony, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall upon him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me."
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed in his time, is typical, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to digress from everything personal and follow only the truth, it is not permissible to try to put all the blame for the surprise attack Nazi Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless lamentations of our military leaders about the "surprise" one can see an attempt to absolve themselves of all responsibility for mistakes in the combat training of troops, in their command and control in the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all units - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep the troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and to explain the non-fulfillment of it with references to I.V. Stalin is not to the face of the soldiers.
Stalin, by the way, just like them, gave a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.
The paradox is that those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, what the former People's Commissar of the USSR aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister should also be responsible for something ... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I will definitely bear responsibility for this. And then everything is on Stalin ... ".
The great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov were the same.
Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from the post of Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and appointed him to the 2nd Belorussian.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Pole to take Berlin, and G.K. became the Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov almost all of his officers of the Front Headquarters, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky have always been distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
Troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. Ye Golovanov was proud that he had the honor to serve the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but he did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military figures and historians speak about the same.
Here is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia”, Moscow, 2003:
“... there was no surprise attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s wording was invented at one time in order to shift the blame for the defeat at the beginning of the war onto Stalin and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period ... ".
According to the long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army P. Ivashutin, “Neither strategically nor tactically, the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was not sudden” (VIZH 1990 No. 5).
The Red Army in the prewar years was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of mobilization and training.
Hitler declared universal military service from March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only from September 1, 1939.
As you can see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to wear and how to equip the conscripts, and only then, if the calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as much as, according to the calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
September 2, 1939 Council Decree people's commissars No. 1355-279ss was approved by the "Plan for the reorganization of the ground forces for 1939 - 1940", developed by the head since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.
In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army - only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.
It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and re-equip it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.
I. V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that she would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than mid-1942-43. That is why he sought to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.
I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to play for time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and was afraid of Hitler.
Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish war, in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, an entry appeared that recorded the following words of Stalin personally heard by her during an audience in the Kremlin:
“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for a rebuff, for a war with Hitler.
As to whether Stalin "trusted" Hitler, his speech at a meeting of the Politburo on November 18, 1940, when summing up the results of Molotov's visit to Berlin, very well testifies:
“... As we know, immediately after the departure of our delegation from Berlin, Hitler loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we well know the price of these statements! For us, even before meeting with Hitler, it was clear that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests Soviet Union dictated by the security requirements of our country ....
We considered the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to probe the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his stubborn refusal to reckon with the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to stop the de facto occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about not infringing on the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler leads double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, at the same time he tries to buy time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the question of the further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations ....
It was at this time that we managed to prevent the attack of fascist Germany. And in this case, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role ...
But, of course, this is only a temporary respite, the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but not completely eliminated.
But having concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot regard the Soviet-German pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
State security issues are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been moved to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops put on alert in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear.
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops on the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).
On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:
“... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink for the war, for the offensive in the war, for our victory in this war .... "
Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshal S.K. Timoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which the newspapers of the whole world are trumpeting about.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the troops of the districts:
“The war creeps up imperceptibly and will begin with a surprise attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. Molotov in the mid-1970s recalled the beginning of the war:
“We knew that war was not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war .... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months .... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal footing. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, by the hour of the attack, no one could be ready, even the Lord God!
We were waiting for the attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would say: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!
The TASS report of June 14, 1941 was sent to give the Germans no reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort.... It turned out that on June 22, Hitler became the aggressor in front of the whole world. And we have allies .... Already in 1939 he was determined to unleash a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or a few months. Of course, we knew that we had to be ready for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It is very difficult ... "(F. Chuev. "One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov."
Much is said and written about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.
As one of the leaders of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials (why, it will be shown below-sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was instructed to bring it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability for Germany of a long war with Russia, emphasizing that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.
So, for example, I. Stalin ordered to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
In early April 1941, he was allowed to tour the new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attache in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate potential aggressors in this way.”
Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on Stalin's instructions, specifically provided the Harbin residency of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to "intercept and decipher" a certain "circular from Moscow," which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union was preparing to defend its interests." (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).
The most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR was obtained by foreign intelligence through its agents ("the magnificent five" - Philby, Cairncross, MacLean and their comrades) in London.
Intelligence got the most classified information about the talks that British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax had with Hitler in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed to Hitler's demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany's expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of the highest representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data were obtained on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion ("Sect's testament") that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the fighting dragged on for a period of time. more than two months, and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.
The conclusion, as we see, was fully justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German direction of intelligence, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to initiate the conclusion of the 1939 non-aggression pact.
In 1935, information was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.
But the objective, full-fledged characterization of Germany's intentions towards the USSR, the specific goals, the timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained not yet clarified.
The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler's proposals to delimit the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We should also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not bypass intelligence either. Our residency in Germany and other countries was severely weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov declared that he "cleaned 14,000 Chekists"
On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to start aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to start hostilities no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - very happy for himself and then appointed June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.
On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed directive No. 21 - Plan "Barbarossa".
“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was pointed out that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa".
In January 1941, Sam Edison Woods, the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, obtained it through his connections in the German government and military circles.
US President Roosevelt ordered to familiarize with the materials of S. Woods Soviet ambassador in Washington by K. Umansky, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Samner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, moreover, with an indication of the source.
The information of the Americans was very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information of the NKGB intelligence department and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it. (Sudoplatov P.A. "Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941". M., 2001).
But the date - June 22, is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.
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First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa
The long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh), General of the Army Ivashutin, said:
"The texts of almost all documents and radiograms relating to the military preparations of Germany and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense and Chief of the General Staff."
Therefore, the statement of G.K. looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we allegedly knew the Barbarossa plan ... Let me state with all responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data ”(G.K. Zhukov“ Memories and Reflections ”M. APN 1975. p. vol. 1, p. 259.).
It is permissible to ask, what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (since February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - "Variants of military operations of the German army against the USSR", compiled on the basis of all intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country's leadership.
This document outlined the options for the possible directions of attacks by the German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the "Barbarossa plan" and the direction of the main attacks of the German troops.
So G.K. Zhukov answered a question posed to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(Moreover, it is characteristic that in his most "truthful book about the war" G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).
When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov assured that he knew nothing on the eve of the war about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. Zhukov copies of these German documents, which were signed by Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the March 20, 1941 report and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing to attack the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 Head of the General Staff Directorate F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Timoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, the head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, received a report “On the plans for a German attack on the USSR”, which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and gave the number of concentrated German divisions;
- May 15, 1941, the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On the distribution of the armed forces of Germany in theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on the military preparations of Romania. Until June 22, a number of messages were submitted.
As mentioned above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the potential capabilities of the enemy.
What capabilities of a potential adversary could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity for a detailed report to I. Stalin - also a complete lie in "the most truthful book about the war."
For example, only in June 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office.
This is evidenced by entries in the journal of visits to I. Stalin's office.
("At a reception at Stalin's. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)" Moscow. New Chronograph, 2008. Records of reception secretaries on duty I.V. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day, to the nearest minute, the time spent in Stalin's Kremlin office of all his visitors was recorded).
In the same period, Stalin's office was repeatedly visited, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, General of the Army Meretskov, Lieutenant Generals of Aviation Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.
On January 31, 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement the Barbarossa plan.
The directive determined "Day B" - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Halder “On setting the date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"one. Day "D" of the operation "Barbarossa" is proposed to be considered June 22, 1941.
2. In case of postponement of this period, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main strike will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned, and that you can proceed to the open execution of the order.
b) Alton's signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will already be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aircraft, then ground troops launch an offensive on their own.
Unfortunately, our external, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht's bet on blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.
Foreign intelligence reports about German military preparations came from various residencies: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.
Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin residency "Corsican" (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. He began to cooperate with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 he was arrested and executed) transmitted information that "at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. There were similar reports from other sources.
In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin residency that on December 18, Hitler, speaking about the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, spoke out sharply against “injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice".
“In those pre-war years, there was an order to report to the leadership of the country each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without its analytical evaluation. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.
The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose certain measures were being taken, whether a political decision had been made on the attack, etc.
Generalizing materials were not prepared, with a deep analysis of all the information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country's leadership.” ("Hitler's secrets on Stalin's table" ed. Mosgorarkhiv 1995).
In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “filled up” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory, and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level public policy, in the development of which the highest ranks of the Third Reich were taken.
At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, signed by Keitel, document No. 44142/41 “Guiding instructions of the Supreme High Command for masking the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, which provided for hiding from the enemy preparations for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed at the first stage, “until April, to maintain the uncertainty of information about their intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.
On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 "Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union."
This document provided:
“... from May 22, with the introduction of the maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all the efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue with particular energy the preparations for an attack on England ...
Among the formations stationed in the East, a rumor must circulate about a rear cover against Russia and a "distracting concentration of forces in the East", and the troops stationed in the English Channel must believe in real preparations for an invasion of England ...
Spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England ... ".
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted over 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to Crete by air. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .
Our Berlin residency was set up by the agent provocateur "Lyceum student" (O. Berlinks. 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940.).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, during interrogation in May 1947 testified that in August 1940 Amayak Kobulov (a resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was substituted by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceum student”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials.).
The results of the meeting of the Lyceum student with Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from the "Lyceum student" about the low probability of Germany's war with the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of Soviet troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of the “Lyceum student”. Foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that a quick determination of the true face of the "Lyceum student" left no difficulty.
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin, Kobulov, provided the “Lyceum student” with relevant information during meetings.
In German disinformation actions, information began to appear that German preparations near our borders were aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept economic and territorial demands, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin supposedly intends to put forward.
Information was spread that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, she would not be able to defeat England.
All this misinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin residency, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence service also received them through its agents in these countries.
Thus, it turned out to be a multiple overlap of the information obtained, which, as it were, confirmed their “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in the supply of raw materials.
On May 5, the same "Corsican" gives information that the concentration of German troops is a "war of nerves" in order for the USSR to accept Germany's conditions: the USSR must give guarantees for entering the war on the side of the "Axis" powers.
Similar information comes from the British residency.
On May 8, 1941, in a message from the "Sergeant" (Harro Schulze-Boysen), it was said that the attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum, demanding to increase exports to Germany.
And all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting its generalized analysis and conclusions on the table to Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions ..
Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation with intelligence materials, but by no means with all materials.
Here is what V.M. Molotov:
“When I was the Presovnarkom, it took me half a day every day to read intelligence reports. What was not there, no matter what terms were called! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The task of the scout is not to be late, to have time to report ... ".
Many researchers, speaking of I. Stalin’s “distrust” of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People’s Commissar for State Security V. N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the “Foreman” (Schulze-Boysen) and "The Corsican" (Arvid Harnak):
"Tov. Merkulov. Can send your source from the headquarters of the German. aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a source, but a misinformer. I.St.” 
In fact, those who spoke about Stalin's distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only on the basis of I. Stalin's resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates for a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported only through military intelligence, Stalin apparently developed.
Hitler, for example, issued an offensive order during the war on the Western Front, and canceled it on the planned day of the offensive. On the offensive on the Western Front, Hitler issued an order 27 times and canceled it 26 times.
If we read the very message of the "Foreman", then the irritation and resolution of I. Stalin will become clear.
Here is the text of the Master's message:
"one. All military measures for the preparation of an armed uprising against the SSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any meaning.
3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops ... ".
(Following the text is the report of the "Corsican" on economic and industrial issues in Germany).
.
"Foreman" (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. He studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. He was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Imperial Ministry of Aviation, Schulze-Boysen established a relationship with Dr. Arvid Harnack (The Corsican) before the start of World War II. Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed on August 31, 1942. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.
But his report of June 17 looks rather frivolous just because it confuses the date of the TASS report (not June 14, but June 6), and the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories "producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops.
So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that I. Stalin's resolution applies only to the "Foreman" - an agent working in the headquarters of the German aviation, but not to the "Corsican".
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why the intelligence service trusted Starshina, Stalin said: "Go check everything and report back to me."
A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by the military attaché, Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1638 sheets of telegraph reports were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR.
The telegram of Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, was widely known:
In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
June 6, 2001 "Red Star" published materials round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.
The same fake and "resolution" L. Beria dated June 21, 1941:
"Many workers are sowing panic ... The secret collaborators of Yastreb, Carmen, Almaz, Verny should be wiped into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany."
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.
Indeed, since February 3, 1941, Beria did not have foreign intelligence under his control, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence became completely subordinate to Merkulov.
And here are some actual reports by R. Sorge (Ramsay):
- “May 2:“ I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR ... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler either in May or after the war with England.
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German uprising against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure the war will start."
- June 1: “The expectation of the start of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left - on May 6 to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.
- June 20 "The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable."
Only according to military intelligence reports on the date of the start of the war with Germany, since 1940, more than 10 have come.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin next spring;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will perform in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack is scheduled for 3 - 4 am on June 22.
As you can see, the latest information from a source in the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Directorate - "HVTs" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who, early in the morning of June 21. "KhVTs" himself called for an urgent meeting of his curator Colonel of the Republic of Uzbekistan K.B.Leontva.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again met with an agent of the HVC.
Information "KhVTs" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov.
Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into hostilities, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.
How extensive was the agent network of Soviet intelligence is also evidenced by the fact that the agents of our military intelligence were such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk.
The illegal intelligence officer, acting under the pseudonym "Merlin", she is also Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, the volume, and especially the level and quality of the information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that communication between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow, three radio operators in Berlin and its environs supported at once.
Hitler conferred on Olga Chekhova the title of State Artist of the Third Reich, specially established for her, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he defiantly showed her signs of the highest attention, invariably seated her in rows with him. (A.B. Martirosyan “The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason.”)
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OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.
Marika Rekk belonged to the undercover group of the Soviet military intelligence, which bore the code name "Krona". Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Yan Chernyak.
The group was founded in the mid 1920s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but none of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important officers of the Wehrmacht, major industrialists of the Reich.
Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers by captured German
film "The Girl of My Dreams"
But G.K. Nevertheless, Zhukov did not miss the opportunity to cheat our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Directorate of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:
“Our undercover intelligence, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Nazi high command. Our undercover intelligence was unable to refute Hitler's false version of his unwillingness to fight the Soviet Union.
Hitler, on the other hand, continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay J. Stalin in it.
So on May 15, 1941, the non-scheduled Yu-52 aircraft (the Junkers-52 aircraft was used by Hitler as personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynka field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very "serious troubles."
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to J. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion forces far from the eyes and aviation of the enemy, as well as in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops, about 88 divisions, accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, which may have given rise to the rumors circulating now about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you on the honor of the head of state that this is not the case.
For my part, I am also sympathetic to the fact that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all exclude the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, under conditions of such a concentration of troops, can take on very large proportions, when it will be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be very frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and frustrate my plans.
It's only about one month. Around June 15 - 20, I plan to start a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I most convincingly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may take place on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, needless to say, try not to give them any reason.
If a provocation by one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report the incident through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, it seems to me, we have clearly agreed with you. I thank you for meeting me halfway in a matter known to you, and I ask you to excuse me for the way I chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941".
(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself "calls" the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)
But I. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler's intentions and confidence in him.
The question of whether he believed or did not believe - simply should not exist, he never believed.
And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler's "sincerity" and continued to take measures to "bring operational groupings of troops into combat readiness in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear," which he spoke about in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo, so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:
On May 14, 1941, directives of the General Staff No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 (for the Western, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) were sent on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline for submitting plans indicated in them by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, neither the General Staff nor the People's Commissar of Defense had time to approve these plans.
This is the direct fault of the commanders of the districts, as well as the General Staff, which did not demand the submission of plans by the specified date.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers answered with their lives with the beginning of the war;
- “... In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kiev special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border was outlined, the allocation of the necessary forces for this purpose and the forms of their use .. ”(Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”. M., 1974);
From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally call up about 300 thousand people;
On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the admission to the cadres of the reserve command staff, called up for mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who was detained in the army after the end of this war until a special order;
On May 24, 1941, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo, I. Stalin openly warned all the top Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subjected to a surprise attack by Germany;
During May-June 1941. as a result of "hidden mobilization" about a million "accomplices" from the inner districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions up to the regular strength of wartime (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and resupplying of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This covert mobilization could not be carried out without I. Stalin's instructions, but it was carried out covertly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II announced mobilization in the Russian Empire, which was regarded as a declaration of war;
On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859 / ss / s was sent to the ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the troops of the district, all deep rifle divisions ... withdraw to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual putting troops on high combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent on the immediate bringing into proper condition and full combat readiness of the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO, primarily strengthening their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report on the execution by June 15, 1941. But the report on the implementation of this directive has not been received.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg”. M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question was, where was the General Staff and its chief, who were supposed to demand its execution, or were I. Stalin to control these issues for them?;
On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent to put into effect Cover Plans for all western districts;
On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a directive of the General Staff was issued on the advancement of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”).
In three districts out of four, this directive was carried out, except for the Western OVO (commander of the district, General of the Army D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kiev OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sc (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sc (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sc (141.80.139 sd); 55 sc (169,130,189 sd); 49 sc (190.197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (sk), having 14 rifle divisions (sd), which is about 200 thousand people "
In total, 28 divisions were advanced closer to the state border;
In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko already in June 1941 recommended that the district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to bring troops closer to the deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was put into practice by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
... The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kiev OVO-Kirponos), without agreement with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if, without their knowledge, the commanders of the districts are taking such measures when a war with Germany is on the verge?
As a result, some corps and divisions of the covering forces during the attack of fascist Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order followed from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the strike force of the troops, was practically absent in combat formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover the units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command rendered this "invaluable service" to the invading German troops.
Here is what the German General Blumentritt, the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd tank group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest region against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - the commander of the army, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all our artillery opened fire ... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not answer ... A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were being crossed, pontoon bridges were being built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy ... There was no doubt that they had caught the Russians by surprise ... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed to the east on level ground ”(“ Fatal Decisions ” Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this it must be added that the bridges in the Brest region were not blown up, along which the German tanks moved. Even Guderian was surprised by this;
On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire airfield network of the Air Force in a 500-km strip from the border with the completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;
On June 19, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has been done so far to mask airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft, in the “complete absence of their masking”, are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military installations...”.
What was the result of this carelessness of the command of the districts, especially the Western OVO, showed on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 were lost on the ground, as well as big number military equipment.
Who is to blame? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, which failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of its orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, having learned about these losses, on the same day, June 22, shot himself.
Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was ... He believed that at any moment, on a combat alert, they could give a reliable rebuff to the enemy ... Knowing exactly the number of aircraft deployed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And he was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.
Naturally, I. Stalin's idea of the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly heard in his office;
On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. South, Northwest, North.
By this time, the command posts of the fronts were already equipped, because. As early as June 13, a decision was made to separate the command and control structures in the military districts and to transform the departments of the military districts into front-line departments.
The command post of the Western Front (Front Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was deployed in the area of the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war).
In the city of Ternopil, there was a front-line command post of the South-Western Front (Front Commander Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos died on 09/20/1941).
Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, "the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it turned out to be in reality ...".
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the impending war from Merkulov’s foreign intelligence residencies from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the RU General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also reconnaissance of the border troops, subordinated to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by constant monitoring of the border guards, a large number of informers of the border regions who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these are residents of the border regions, train drivers , switchmen, greasers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot but be reliable. This information, summarized and put together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B dated April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko are given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sends note No. 1798 / B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, the reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868 / B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from the intelligence of the border troops were presented.
But this is what Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding a separate 212th long-range bomber regiment subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk in Minsk to be presented to the Commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.
During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:
“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I'll check again, but I think it's just a provocation ... "
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Not in the spirit of the Boss. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...”. Apparently, by this "bastard" he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to repeat that Stalin allegedly did not believe "Pavlov's warnings" about the concentration of German troops ....
The situation heated up every day.
On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS report, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about "the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany."
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It became apparently clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany's military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.
June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no "withdrawal" and "transfer" of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter of May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, "toward England" did not happen.
On the contrary, an intensified accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.
On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the USSR Naval Attaché, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that the German attack on the USSR would take place on June 22 at 3.30 am. (Captain 1st rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on June 21 in the evening he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).
And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with the "inspection" of German units near our border.
Here is what he writes in his book - “I am a fighter” - Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov. Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting against it ... and ready to overflow over it.
We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information -sad39 would soon land) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok
After landing, the commander of the Air Force of the district, General Kopets, took me after the report to the commander of the district.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either ....
The attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR began at 4 am on June 22, 1941, when German military aviation launched the first strikes on a number of Soviet cities and strategic military and infrastructure facilities. Having attacked the USSR, Germany unilaterally broke the non-aggression pact between the countries, concluded two years earlier for a period of 10 years.
Background and preparation of the attack
In mid-1939, the USSR changed the course of its foreign policy: the collapse of the idea of "collective security" and the impasse in negotiations with Great Britain and France forced Moscow to move closer to Nazi Germany. On August 23, the head of the German Foreign Ministry, I. von Ribbentrop, arrived in Moscow. On the same day, the parties signed a non-aggression pact for a period of ten years, and in addition to it, a secret protocol, which stipulated the delimitation of the spheres of interests of both states in Eastern Europe. Eight days after the signing of the treaty, Germany attacked Poland - the Second World War began.
The rapid victories of German troops in Europe caused concern in Moscow. The first deterioration in Soviet-German relations occurred in August-September 1940, and was caused by the provision of foreign policy guarantees by Germany to Romania after it was forced to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR (this was stipulated in a secret protocol). In September, Germany sent its troops to Finland. By this time, the German command had been developing a plan for more than a month. lightning war(“blitzkrieg”) against the Soviet Union.
In the spring of 1941, relations between Moscow and Berlin deteriorated sharply again: less than a day had passed since the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty, as German troops invaded Yugoslavia. The USSR did not react to this, as well as to the attack on Greece. After the defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia German troops began to concentrate near the borders of the USSR. Since the spring of 1941, Moscow received information from various sources about the threat of attack from Germany. So, at the end of March, a letter to Stalin with a warning that the Germans were transferring tank divisions from Romania to southern Poland was sent by British Prime Minister W. Churchill. Germany's intention to attack the USSR was reported by a number of Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats - Schulze-Boysen and Harnack from Germany, R. Sorge from Japan. However, some of their colleagues reported the opposite, so Moscow was in no hurry to draw conclusions. According to G.K. Zhukov, Stalin was sure that Hitler would not fight on two fronts and would not start a war with the USSR until the end of the war in the West. His point of view was shared by the head of the intelligence department, General F. I. Golikov: on March 20, 1941, he presented Stalin with a report in which he concluded that all the information about the inevitability of the imminent start of the Soviet-German war “should be regarded as disinformation coming from the British and even maybe German intelligence.
With the threat of conflict growing, Stalin assumed the formal leadership of the government: on May 6, 1941, he assumed the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. The day before, he spoke in the Kremlin at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies, in particular, saying that it was time for the country to move "from defense to offensive." On May 15, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko and the newly appointed Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov presented to Stalin “Considerations on the strategic deployment plan armed forces Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies. It was assumed that the Red Army would strike at the enemy at the moment when the enemy armies were in the deployment stage. According to Zhukov, Stalin did not want to hear about a preventive strike against German troops. Fearing a provocation that could give Germany a pretext for an attack, Stalin forbade opening fire on German reconnaissance aircraft, which had been increasingly crossing the Soviet border since the spring of 1941. He was convinced that, by observing the utmost caution, the USSR would avoid war, or at least delay it until a more favorable moment.
On June 14, 1941, by order of the Soviet government, TASS published a statement stating that rumors about Germany's intention to break the non-aggression pact and start a war against the USSR were groundless, and the transfer of German troops from the Balkans to eastern Germany was probably connected with other motives. . On June 17, 1941, Stalin was informed that the Soviet intelligence officer Schulze-Boysen, an employee of the German aviation headquarters, said: “All German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR are completely over, and a strike can be expected at any time.” The Soviet leader imposed a resolution in which he called Schulze-Boysen a disinformer and advised him to be sent to hell.
On the evening of June 21, 1941, a message was received in Moscow: a sergeant major of the German army, a staunch communist, crossed the Soviet-Romanian border at the risk of his life and said that the offensive would begin in the morning. The information was urgently conveyed to Stalin, and he gathered the military and members of the Politburo. People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, according to the latter, asked Stalin to accept a directive to put the troops on alert, but he doubted, suggesting that the Germans could have planted a defector officer on purpose in order to provoke a conflict. Instead of the directive proposed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, the head of state ordered another, short directive, indicating that the attack could begin with a provocation by the German units. On June 22, at 0:30, this order was transmitted to the military districts. At three o'clock in the morning, all those gathered at Stalin's dispersed.
Start of hostilities
Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, German aviation destroyed a significant part of the Soviet aviation in the western districts with a sudden attack on airfields. The bombing of Kiev, Riga, Smolensk, Murmansk, Sevastopol and many other cities began. In a declaration read on the radio that day, Hitler stated that Moscow allegedly "treacherously violated" the friendship treaty with Germany, as it concentrated troops against it and violated German borders. Therefore, the Führer said, he decided to "come out against the Judeo-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and their assistants, as well as the Jews from the Moscow Bolshevik center" in the name of the "cause of peace" and "the security of Europe."
The offensive was carried out according to a previously developed plan "Barbarossa". As in previous military campaigns, the Germans expected to use the tactics of "blitzkrieg" ("blitzkrieg"): the defeat of the USSR was supposed to take only eight to ten weeks and be completed even before Germany ended the war with Great Britain. Planning to end the war before winter, the German command did not even bother to prepare winter uniforms. German armies in three groups were to advance on Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, having previously surrounded and destroyed enemy troops in the western part of the USSR. The army groups were led by experienced military leaders: Field Marshal von Leeb commanded the North Army Group, Field Marshal von Bock commanded the Center Army Group, and Field Marshal von Rundstedt commanded the South Army Group. Each army group was given its own air fleet and tank army, the Center group had two of them. The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa was to be the achievement of the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. The work of industrial enterprises located to the east of this line - in the Urals, in Kazakhstan and Siberia - the Germans expected to paralyze with the help of air strikes.
Giving instructions to the High Command of the Armed Forces, Hitler emphasized that the war with the USSR should become a "conflict of two worldviews." He demanded a "war of annihilation": "carriers of the state political idea and political leaders" were ordered not to be taken prisoner and shot on the spot, which was contrary to international law. Anyone who resisted was ordered to be shot.
By the time the war began, 190 divisions of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the Soviet borders, of which 153 were German. They contained more than 90% armored forces German army. The total number of armed forces of Germany and its allies intended to attack the USSR was 5.5 million people. They had more than 47,000 guns and mortars, 4,300 tanks and assault guns, and about 6,000 combat aircraft at their disposal. They were opposed by the forces of five Soviet border military districts (with the outbreak of the war, they were deployed in five fronts). In total, there were over 4.8 million people in the Red Army, who had 76.5 thousand guns and mortars, 22.6 thousand tanks, and approximately 20 thousand aircraft. However, only 2.9 million fighters, 32.9 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and more than 9 thousand aircraft were in the border districts of the above.
After 4 o'clock in the morning, Stalin was awakened by a phone call from Zhukov - he said that the war with Germany had begun. At 4:30 a.m., Tymoshenko and Zhukov again met with the head of state. In the meantime, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov, at the direction of Stalin, went to a meeting with the German ambassador W. von der Schulenburg. Until the return of Molotov, Stalin refused to order counterattacks on enemy units. The conversation between Molotov and Schulenburg began at 5:30. On behalf of the German government, the ambassador read out a note as follows: “In view of the further intolerable threat that has arisen for the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and training of all the armed forces of the Red Army, the German government considers itself forced to take military countermeasures.” The head of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs tried in vain to challenge what the ambassador had said and to convince him of the innocence of the USSR. Already at 5:45, Molotov was in Stalin's office together with L.P. Beria, L.Z. Mekhlis, as well as Timoshenko and Zhukov. Stalin agreed to give a directive on the destruction of the enemy, but emphasized that the Soviet units should not violate the German border anywhere. At 7:15 a.m., the corresponding directive was sent to the troops.
Stalin's entourage believed that it was he who should speak on the radio with an appeal to the population, but he refused, and Molotov did it instead. In his address, the head of the NKID announced the start of the war, noted that the German aggression was the cause, and expressed confidence in the victory of the USSR. At the end of his speech, he uttered the famous words: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!" In order to prevent possible doubts and rumors about the silence of Stalin himself, Molotov added several references to him to the original text of the appeal.
On the evening of June 22, British Prime Minister W. Churchill spoke on the radio. He said that in the current situation, his anti-communist views recede into the background, and the West should provide "Russia and the Russian people" with all the help it can. On June 24, F. Roosevelt, President of the United States, made a similar statement in support of the USSR.
Retreat of the Red Army
In total, only on the first day of the war, the USSR lost at least 1200 aircraft (according to German data - more than 1.5 thousand). Many nodes and lines of communication were rendered unusable - because of this, the General Staff lost contact with the troops. Due to the inability to fulfill the requirements of the center, the commander of the aviation of the Western Front, I. I. Kopets, shot himself. On June 22, at 9:15 pm, the General Staff sent a new directive to the troops with an order to immediately launch a counteroffensive, “regardless of the border”, encircle and destroy the main enemy forces within two days, and capture the areas of the cities of Suwalki and Lublin by the end of June 24. But the Soviet units failed not only to go on the offensive, but also to create a continuous defensive front. The Germans had a tactical advantage on all fronts. Despite the enormous efforts and sacrifices and the colossal enthusiasm of the fighters, the Soviet troops failed to stop the enemy's offensive. Already on June 28, the Germans entered Minsk. Due to the loss of communications and panic on the fronts, the army became almost uncontrollable.
Stalin was in a state of shock for the first 10 days of the war. He often intervened in the course of events, several times called Timoshenko and Zhukov to the Kremlin. On June 28, after the surrender of Minsk, the head of state went to his dacha and for three days - from June 28 to 30 - he stayed there without a break, not answering calls and not inviting anyone to his place. Only on the third day, the closest associates came to him themselves and persuaded him to return to work. On July 1, Stalin arrived in the Kremlin and on the same day stood at the head of the newly formed State Defense Committee (GKO) - an emergency governing body that received full power in the state. In addition to Stalin, the GKO included V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria. Later, the composition of the committee changed several times. Ten days later, Stalin also headed the Headquarters of the Supreme Command.
To rectify the situation, Stalin ordered to send marshals B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik to the Western Front, but the first fell ill, and the second himself was surrounded and with difficulty got out, disguised as a peasant. Stalin decided to shift the responsibility for failures on the fronts to the military command on the ground. The commander of the Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, and several other military leaders were arrested and sent to a military tribunal. They were accused of an "anti-Soviet conspiracy", of purposefully "opening the front to Germany", and then of cowardice and alarmism, after which they were shot. In 1956 they were all rehabilitated.
By the beginning of July 1941, the armies of Germany and its allies occupied most of the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Belarus, approached Smolensk and Kiev. The Army Group Center advanced the deepest into Soviet territory. The German command and Hitler believed that the main enemy forces had been defeated, and the end of the war was near. Now Hitler was wondering how to quickly complete the defeat of the USSR: continue to advance on Moscow or encircle Soviet troops in Ukraine or Leningrad.
Version of Hitler's "preemptive strike"
In the early 1990s, V. B. Rezun, a former Soviet intelligence officer who fled to the West, published several books under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov, in which he claimed that Moscow planned to be the first to hit Germany, and Hitler, having started the war, only prevented the attack of the Soviet troops. Later, Rezun was supported by some Russian historians. However, an analysis of all available sources shows that if Stalin was going to strike first, then in more favorable situation. As of the end of June-beginning of July 1941, he sought to delay the war with Germany and was not ready for an offensive.
SO WHAT TIME 06/22/41
THE GERMANS ATTACKED THE USSR?
(part 3)
(sometimes discharge bold in the text - zhistory)
After posting information about this topic in some forums, an interesting discussion of the problem under consideration arose on them. In particular, many opinions were expressed at VIF-RJ. This included the following message:
From: Correct VI forum, 17.03 15:35
In response to: Re: So what time did the Germans attack on 06/22/41? - Zakoretsky
Everything has already been discussed in this thread: http://vif2ne.ru:2003/nvk/forum/archive/1135/1135829.htm
K. Zakoretsky. If you decide to post part 3 "What time did the Germans attack" on Z-History using materials from the VIF2NE forum, then please make a corresponding link.
First, I do. Secondly, I would like to note that I did not create messages on this topic on the VIF2NE forum. And I was pleased to learn that VIF2NE was also carried away by the problem of time. However, after reading most of the opinions there, I do not agree with what is there" ALREADY EVERYTHING discussed". Such a categorical statement arose due to the fact that one of the participants provided a link to a German site, which contains a list of periods when summer time was introduced in Germany:
Clocks were advanced one hour with respect to CET: (Periods where 1 hour was added)
| 1916-04-30 | 23:00:00 CET | to | 1916-10-01 | 1:00:00 CET |
| 1917-04-16 | 2:00:00 CET | to | 1917-09-17 | 03:00:00 CET |
| 1918-04-15 | 2:00:00 CET | to | 1918-09-16 | 03:00:00 CET |
1919 to 1939: No DST (There was no summer time).
| 1940-04-01 | 2:00:00 CET | to | 1942-11-02 | 03:00:00 CET |
| 1943-03-29 | 2:00:00 CET | to | 1943-10-04 | 03:00:00 CET |
| 1944-04-03 | 2:00:00 CET | to | 1944-10-02 | 03:00:00 CET |
Abbreviations:
UT: Universal Time ("Greenwich-Time")
DST: Daylight Saving Time
CET= UT + 1 h: Central European Time
CEST= UT + 2 h: Central European Summer Time
CEMT = UT + 3 h: Central European Midsummer Time
And this is the explanation:
Madame and Monsieur
>From 2:00 04/01/1940 to 3:00 02/11/1942
That is, 2 am on April 1, 1940 became 3 am (GMT+1 became GMT+2),
On November 2, 1942, everything returned to its place again (GMT + 2 => GMT + 1).
The difference with Moscow during this period was 1 ("maternity leave") hour (GMT + 3),
and during "Uranus" - already 2 hours.
>Thus. during the Battle of Kursk and Operation Typhoon, Berlin time differed from Moscow time by 1 hour. And on June 22, 1941, the difference was also 1 hour. The Germans write that they started the war at 3 o'clock, and according to Soviet data, this happened at 4 o'clock.
If I correctly understood all your data, and if our "maternity leave" time then stood unshakably "like a rock", then it should be so.
Happiness is when you have everything at home (not mine), Andrei.
So, is everything settled?
Was it daylight saving time in Germany in June 1941?
And because the difference with Moscow was 1 hour?
And everything fits? And the topic can be closed?
Perhaps ... But it looks somehow strange that in the winters of 1940-1941 and 1941-1942 the Germans lived according to summer time! And secondly, there is one more remark: it is known that the Germans on the morning of June 22, 1941 started the war at 3-00 "FROM DAWN"! But this event can be checked. And if it turns out that on the western border of the USSR, according to German summer time, sunrise began at about 3-00, and according to Soviet decree time, respectively, around 4-00, then everything really converges and the topic can be closed. You can check this, for example, using the same astronomical shareware program SKYGLOBE 3.6.
Here the green horizontal line is the horizon.
Letter " N" is the direction to the north.
Letters " NE"Northeast.
Letter " E" - East (" East"- 90 degrees from the north direction).
Yellow Circle of the Sun (" SUN") coincides with the direction to the northeast (" NE").
To the left below the horizon is the star "Castor", to the right and above are the positions of the planets of Jupiter ( JUP), Uranus ( URA), Saturn ( SAT), moons ( MO), as well as some stars, for example, Aldebaran.
Although, of course, they were no longer really visible, since they were overshadowed by the light of the Sun rising from behind the horizon.
But what is this time (3-43)?
Belt GMT+1? Or summer for this belt GMT + 1 + 1?
In order to understand, it would first be useful to familiarize yourself with the general theory of sunrise on June 22 within any time zone at different latitudes. The fact is that the Earth is round and has been rotating at almost the same speed for many thousands of years. And the meanings of these movements are not secret. For example, you can make calculations for the Greenwich meridian (0 degrees of longitude), starting from the equator. The results can be summarized in the following table:
Sunrise on June 22 according to the latitudes of the northern hemisphere of the Earth (values + - a few minutes)
Latitude |
Western border |
middle |
Eastern border |
| 00-00 (Equator) | 5:55 |
||
| 10-00 | |||
| 20-00 | |||
| 30-00 | |||
| 40-00 | |||
| 50-00 | 4:15 |
||
| 55-00 | 3:47 |
||
| 60-00 | 2:32 |
||
| 62-00 | |||
| 66-33 (Arctic Circle) |
0:00 |
0:00 |
0:00 |
| 70-00 | polar day |
polar day |
polar day |
What time are the values? In the waist or summer?
This can be checked against known data for known coordinates.
For example, in Kiev ( 50 deg. 25 min. north latitude, 30 deg. 32 min. east longitude) June 22, 2006 the Sun should rise in 4-46
summer time (or 3-46
, respectively, standard time).
But how to link its coordinates with the created table?
In terms of latitude, this is simple - we take a line for latitude 50-00.
And it remains to be determined what Kiev is closer to - to the borders of the belt or to its middle (for GMT + 2).
This can be done according to the rule:
The Greenwich meridian is the middle of the zero time zone (GMT). After 7 deg. 30 minutes. to the east is its eastern border. Further, after 15 degrees, the boundaries of other belts are located. Well, the middle between the two borders is the middle of the time zone.
So: 0 deg. + 7.5 (Eastern GMT) + 15 (GMT+1) + 7.5 (half GMT+2) = 30 degrees.
Those. meridian 30
degrees east longitude is the middle of the 2nd time zone.
Those. Kiev is practically located on it.
And we find in the table the value of sunrise for the middle of the belt in the line for 50-00: 3-45
, which practically converged with the time indicated in the tear-off calendar (plus 1 hour for the summer).
CONCLUSION: in the created table, the time of sunrise for different latitudes is indicated WARNING.
And you can see that the time of sunrise at the borders of any time zone differs from the middle by 30 minutes, which agrees with the theory: through each time zone, the time should change by 1 hour (and from the middle - by half an hour, i.e. by 30 minutes).
And another conclusion: the closer to the Equator, the later the Sun rises, and the closer to the North Pole, the earlier. And starting from a certain latitude (66 degrees 33 minutes - "Arctic Circle"), the Sun does not set beyond the horizon at all in summer.
TSB, 3rd ed., Volume 20:
POLAR CIRCLE, the earth's parallel, 66 ° 33 "from the equator" (the angle of inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of the ecliptic). P. k. On the day of the summer solstice (June 21 or 22) to the N. from N. P. k. The sun does not set, and on the day of the winter solstice (December 21 or 22) it does not rise. -ryh the Sun does not fall below the horizon or rise above it, it increases as it approaches the pole, where day and night last for half a year (polar day and polar night).A similar phenomenon is observed in the southern hemisphere of the Earth. Light refraction complicates this somewhat a phenomenon that increases the duration of the polar day at the expense of the night and increases the number of days with the sun that does not set.
We return to Berlin: its latitude is 52 degrees. 32 min. Longitude - 13 degrees. 25 min.
In longitude, this is approximately the middle of the time zone:
0 deg. + 7.5 (east GMT) + 7.5 (half GMT+1) = 15 degrees.
We find in the table rows of 50 and 55 degrees. and in the cells in the middle of the belt we read: 3-45 and 3-17.
Those. in Berlin, the time of sunrise according to standard time can be estimated as 3-35 (but this is 2 degrees east). The program shows the time - 3-43. error - 8 minutes (quite acceptable). The main thing is that one hour is shown - 3
.
So, in Berlin, standard time on June 22, the sun rises at 3-43,
and if they introduced summer time, then at 4-43.
And on the eastern border of this time zone (near Brest), it should rise 30 minutes earlier
(i.e. at 3-10).
It remains to find out in what latitudes the Germans advanced on 06/22/41.
As the map shows, they advanced in the geographic zone from 49 degrees. up to 55 deg. northern latitude:
(Hereinafter, information from the "ATLAS OF THE WORLD", Moscow, "State Geodesy of the USSR", 1991)
More information from Athalas, from the map of time zones on page 14:
Mid GMT: Paris, London.
Mid GMT+1: Berlin, Rome.
Eastern border GMT+1: Western border of the USSR.
Western border GMT+2: Western border of the USSR.
Mid GMT+2: Leningrad, Kiev, Ankara, Cairo.
Eastern border of GMT+2: Moscow, Murmansk.
Mid GMT+3: Volgograd, Tbilisi.
Thus, in the German offensive zone on June 22, 1941, the Sun should have risen Berlin standard time at 2-47 - 3-20 . (Or in 3-47 - 4-20 according to summer, if any).
Those. roundly, dawn on the border of the USSR with Germany on June 22, 1941, according to the German clock, should have either 3 hours (zone time) or in 4 (according to summer, if there was one).
Accordingly, from the Soviet side, the clock had to show or 4 waist or 5 according to summer ("maternity").
DAY TIME standard time plus one hour; unlike summer time, this excess is constant throughout the year. Introduced by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 16, 1930 with the aim of more rational use of the daylight hours (cancelled in February 1991). In Russia, standard time was again adopted in October 1991. Thus, the time of a given time zone in Russia differs from universal time by the time zone number (in hours) plus one hour (in summer, an additional hour).
Here comes the problem:
If the Germans attacked at 3-00 in the summer, then this is 2-00 in the waist. And there is still 1 hour left before dawn in the Brest region. Those. the Germans would have to use searchlights, car headlights, flashlights, lighting bombs, mines, rocket launchers, tracer bullets. But in this case, in all memoirs, all this light-pandemonium should clearly be.
But she is not. For everyone writes that the war has begun " WITH DAWN".
But according to geo-astronomical data, dawn on June 22 at 2-00
on the eastern border of the belts in standard time (or at 3-00 in summer time) occurs only in latitudes of at least 60-00
degrees north latitude ( Leningrad, Helsinki, Oslo, Magadan, Stockholm a little to the south - 59 degrees).
And at 2-00 in the middle of the time zone, the Sun rises even further north - at 62-00 degrees [this is just the latitude of the upper reaches (from where it flows) of the Kolyma, and the capitals of Karelia (Petrozavodsk) and Komi (Syktyvkar) a little to the south].
Well, almost all of Great Britain to the south is not only 62-00, but also 60-00.
AND SKYGLOBE 3.6 persistently shows...
Or maybe this whole program is lying?
Can it be checked?
For example, it is known that on March 22 the day is equal to the night. Those. sunrise in the middle of any time zone should begin at 6-00 standard time (summer time is not yet used at this time!) Or at 7-00 maternity time, if it was used (as it is now in Russia or as in 1941 in the USSR). And, accordingly, on the western border - in 6-30 waist or in 7-30 by summer.
For control in SKYGLOBE 3.6 we take the coordinates of Moscow for 06/22/41 and shift them to Brest, setting the position of the Sun on the horizon. We get 7-28 :
CONVERSING!
Similarly, according to Berlin time for Brest (Berlin is in the middle of GMT + 1, and in Brest the sunrise should be 30 minutes earlier, i.e. somewhere around 5-30):
CONVERSING!
Well, in Berlin itself, the sunrise should be around 6-00:
CONVERSING!
Yes, that means SKYGLOBE 3.6 not lying?
We open the tear-off calendar for Kiev for March 22 (also the middle of the time zone and should be around 6-00). Reading: "Sunrise - 5:57"
CONVERSING!
We open the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, "MEMORY AND REFLECTIONS", 7th edition, 1986, volume 2, p. 8-9:
=====
On the morning of June 22, N.F. Vatutin and I were at the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko in his office in the People's Commissariat of Defense.
3 hours 07Minutes later, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, called me on HF and said: "The fleet's VNOS system reports the approach of a large number of unknown aircraft from the sea, the fleet is in full combat readiness. I ask for instructions."I asked the admiral:
- Your choice?
- There is only one solution: to meet the aircraft with fleet air defense fire.
After talking with S.K. Timoshenko, I answered Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky:
“Go ahead and report to your commissar.
The People's Commissar ordered me to call I.V. Stalin. I'm calling. Nobody answers the phone. I call continuously. Finally, I hear the sleepy voice of the guard general on duty.
– Who is speaking?
- Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Please urgently connect me with Comrade Stalin.
- What? Now?! - the head of security was amazed. Comrade Stalin is sleeping.
- Wake up immediately: the Germans are bombing our cities!
Please clarify: at what time the German planes in 3-30 - 3-40
bombed Soviet cities?
Presumably, according to the Moscow maternity?
But then in Berlin it was 2-30 - 2-40
!
But German planes had to fly another 30-60 minutes to reach Soviet cities in the 200-300 km zone from the western border, i.e. they were supposed to cross the border at 1-30 - 2-00 summer Berlin time?
Or at 0-30 - 1-00 in the waist?
But it is known that German planes flew over the western Soviet border around 3:00 am (most likely, after all, standard time or [say] summer time - in any case, not at 2:00 am!).
Options: either at 3-30 Moscow time the Soviet cities on June 22, 1941 were bombed by someone else (not the Germans), or Zhukov is lying. And all this text of Zhukovsky's memoirs, along with his alleged call to Stalin, is a LIE!
Moreover, it doesn’t matter - the Germans attacked in summer time or in the waist!
BOLD LIE!
(Or, I repeat, we will have to assume that there were bombings, but not by German aircraft - judging by a number of data, this hypothesis cannot be ruled out, however ...)
You can argue about the veracity of Zhukovsky's story about the period after 4-00 (presumably in Moscow).
Here the Germans attacked at 4-00 Moscow time (and at 3-00 Berlin SUMMER time) and EVERYTHING CONVERSES! ...
Sorry... Something doesn't add up... What about lighting with searchlights, headlights, lighting bombs, tracer bullets? Where is the description of this light-pandemonium? Indeed, in Moscow, dawn in Brest begins at 5-04!
Or at 3-03 BST Berlin time:
(Respectively, at 4-03 SUMMER Berlin).
So who's lying? German site about daylight saving time?
Or all German memoirs and other books in which the time of the attack is indicated everywhere as 3-00 - 3-30 with dawn? For example, a quote from http://airforce.ru/history/.../chapter3.htm
What happened on June 22, 1941? Let us turn to the events of this day and begin with the picture that is painted for us German sources .
June 22, 1941. 3.20 am. A little more - and the rising sun will dry the dew ... on the wings of fighters of the 23rd Air Force Division, lined up at the airport near Rivne ... Suddenly, the dull roar of engines broke the silence. ... three planes slipped out from the west, crossed the border of the airfield on a strafing flight and rushed to the long lines of fighters. In a second ... a shower of two-kilogram fragmentation bombs poured out of their belly ... A thick cloud of oily smoke swirled and grew over the airfield.
Three Heinkel-111s of the 53rd Bombardment Squadron... turned around and passed over the airfield once more, pouring machine-gun fire over the flaming wreckage. Then, having completed their task, they went west, while the stunned pilots jumped out of their beds. ..." (Military pilots, pp. 58-59).
Sorry, at 3-30 to dry the dew near Rivne on June 22 The sun can only German standard time! And nothing else! No summer time! By daylight saving time, this means 2-30 UTC. And according to the belt at 2-30 on June 22, the Sun can dry the dew only near Leningrad or Helsinki ...
Oh-oh! What a mess though!
By the way, if the Germans attacked at 3-00 summer time, can this be compared with someone else who attacked the USSR with them? (And when did they attack?)
For example, when did the Romanians start the war? Got data?
There is one site CORNER OF THE SKY"(Aviation Encyclopedia), where the article by A. Gulyas is posted -
The first days of the war (June 22, 1941)
And it provides information about combat work Soviet pilots 06/22/41 in the zone of the Odessa military district. In particular:
======================
Events unfolded in a completely different way in the zone of the Odessa Military District. The enemy attacked 11 airfields; but almost everywhere he received a decisive rebuff and suffered losses. Major Rudakov's 67th IAP achieved the greatest success. ..... At 4 in the morning The regiment was put on alert. Soon towards airfield Bulgaria
a scout appeared. L-t Yermak took off from the interception and shot him down in two bursts. Some time later, 9 (according to other sources - 10) bombers appeared over the airfield. A group of Lieutenant A. Moklyak rose to meet them on I-16 fighters. ....
Having suffered two failures in a row and making sure that Bulgaria - tough nut to crack, the German command launched a massive raid, which involved about 50 bombers and 30 fighters. The bombers came in waves at intervals of 2-3 minutes. Each nine was covered by six Bf-109s. The entire regiment entered the battle with them - fifty I-16s. Divided into groups, our pilots attacked the bombers and their cover at the same time. The enemy formation was immediately broken. 5 bombers and 2 fighters were shot down. In this fight, Alexander Moklyak showed himself brilliantly. With well-aimed fire, he shot down two He-111s (according to other sources - S.M.81), and the third rammed and died in the process. All this happened between 5 and 6 am. So at the end of the second hour of the war A. Moklyak became the leader among Soviet pilots in terms of the number of victories. ....
Failure befell the enemy and during a raid on Grosulovo airfield. At 5 o'clock 10 minutes three nine Ju-88s under the cover of nine Bf-109s tried to bombard the SB and Pe-2 parking lots. The first group of attackers missed, and the second was prevented by Afanasy Karmanov. In the Grosulovo area, he happened to be driving the MiG-3 from the field camp to main airport in Chisinau. Captain A. Karmanov was not embarrassed by the multiple superiority of the enemy. He immediately shot down one "Junkers" and scattered the rest. However, all nine cover fighters immediately fell on him. ... To survive with the aircraft is a skill. .... A. Karmanov's plane resembled a sieve, but landed at its airfield, but one of the Messerschmitts was burning down in the vicinity of Grosulovo. V 4th IAP other pilots also distinguished themselves. A.I. Pokryshkin writes that over Grigoriopol, Tiraspol and Chisinau the pilots of the regiment shot down about 20 enemy aircraft.
55th IAP under the command of Mr. V.P. Ivanov was based in Balti. In April, as at many airfields on the western border, they began to build a concrete runway there, and three squadrons of the regiment flew over to Lighthouses. One of the experienced pilots was Art. L-t A.I. Pokryshkin. The war caught his link at the airport in Grigoriopol. He returned to Mayaki after the first enemy raids. Based in Balti The 1st squadron of Mr. F. Atrashkevich turned out to be understaffed - in addition to the Pokryshkin link, there was no Figichev link, which was patrolling at the very border near Ungheni. F.Atrashkevich was also summoned there. In Chisinau the commander of the third link K. Seliverstov was at the headquarters. The remaining 5 ordinary pilots, led by flight commander Mironov and squadron adjutant Ovchinnikov, did everything to repel a raid by a large group of bombers under the cover of Messerschmitts (more than 20 He-111 and 18 Bf-109). But the forces were unequal, and it was not possible to prevent the raid. 2 people died at the airport fuel depot burned down three MiGs damaged. .... F.Atrashkevich especially distinguished himself by shooting down the "Messerschmitt" of the group commander - a major with an Iron Cross. Only the lack of accurate information about the location of the headquarters of the 27th fighter squadron (JG-27) does not allow us to state with full confidence that the downed major was the commander of JG-27 Wolfgang Schelmann ...
Along with the above 4th IAP over Chisinau pilots fought 69th IAP, where the deputy The commander of the regiment was one of the most famous Soviet aces in Spain, Lev Shestakov. The regiment was part of the 21st SAD and based near Odessa. On the first day of the war, he suffered no losses, and Major L. Shestakov and Mr. Astashkin shot down 3 aircraft: 2 Ju-88s were destroyed over Chisinau, and Astashkin shot down a Do-215 on the outskirts of the airfield, scoring his second victory.
Moses Stepanovich Tokarev started the war in the 131st IAP. June 22, patrolling at the head of nine I-16 near Tiraspol, he met a group of 20 Ju-88s, covered by 12 Bf-109s. ....
The combat account of the pilots of the Black Sea Fleet was opened by ml. Lt. M.S. Maksimov. Early in the morning of June 22, the 96th squadron, consisting of 16 I-153 and I-16 under the command of A.I. Korobitsyn on the outskirts of Ishmael met 12 Romanian bombers
. Our pilots shot down 5 planes. In addition to M.S. Maksimov, personal victories were won by Senior Lt. A.P. Borisov, Dr. A.I. Korobitsyn. Two planes were shot down by B.V. Maslov and A.A. Malinovsky.
==============
It turns out that SIMULTANEOUSLY (and why delay?) hostilities also began in the south of the Soviet western border, which at that time passed between the USSR and ROMANIA! And it turns out that along with the German planes, the Romanian planes also began to cross the Soviet garrison. More precisely, not only SIMULTANEOUSLY with the German ones in the PribOVO, ZapOVO and KievOVO zones, but German planes also took off from Romanian airfields in the direction of Moldova. AND TOGETHER with them, Romanian planes went into battle. This is evidenced by the remark that a plane was shot down over the Soviet airfield in Bulgaria. S.M.81- Whose production is this? German? Which troops were armed with such aircraft? Romanian? And when describing the battles over Ishmael, this article directly refers to Romanian airplanes.
So, one must assume, SIMULTANEOUSLY with the Germans, Romanian planes also flew into battle.
At what time, you might ask?
It turns out you can...
By the way, if the Germans attacked in 3-00 supposedly summer time, then it must be assumed that in Romania, located in the same time zone, summer time should also show the same 3-00
. Is it logical?
But if the Germans attacked at 3-00 waist, then if summer time was used in Romania, then the Romanians should have started at 4-00. And if they didn’t use it, then like the Germans at 3-00.
All this can be clarified on another site: Kharina V.V. "World War II Aviators", and on it in the article by M. Zhirokhov with the participation of A. Stratulat (Moldova) - Romanian squadrons in the sky of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, June 22, 1941
In the introduction, the authors note that " the actions of the Romanian Air Force during the Second World War represent a little-studied piece of the history of air warfare"and they wanted in this article" analyze the actions of the Romanian aviation on the first day of the war". As for the start time, the information there is as follows:
========
On the night of June 21-22, 1941, in all Romanian aviation formations at the front, the commanders gathered the pilots and read out to them the message of the State Undersecretary of Aviation, Gheorghe Zhienescu. At the end of this message, the following was said: "Young flyers! Buchums are trumpeting and their echo is heard in the forests, the sky rumbles in the song of engines, to arms, to the helm, forward with God!" At dawn on June 22
For the Romanian Royal Air Force, the Second World War began.
The main strike force of Romania was the Combat Air Group, under the command of Squadron General Constantin Chelereanu, a large aviation formation that included 2 bomber fleets (11 bomber squadrons - He-111, S.M.-79, Loos, Potez 63, Bloch 210, IAR-37), .....
The Red Army concentrated significant air force forces in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In Bessarabia, at the Bolgrad airfield, there were 67 IAPs, and at the airfields Bulgarica-Ialoveni there were 68 and 82 air regiments. In Chisinau there was 20 SAD, which included 55 IAP (Balti airfield), 45 BAP (Tiraspol airfield) and 2 parachute regiments. In Bukovina, at the airfields near the city of Chernivtsi, there were 87, 187 and 149 IAPs. Also in this area were 86 BAP, 224 PBB and 4 parachute regiments. In total, the Red Army had at its disposal in Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Transnistria 840 bombers and 960 fighters. This can add 240 reconnaissance aircraft and approximately 2,500 paratroopers.
"Ardyalul" at 4.00
The General Staff of the Combat Air Group received from General Ramiro Enescu, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, a message with the following content: " fighting our aviation on the Eastern Front, developed jointly with the German command, will begin at dawn on June 22 1941 Directive no. 34. The operation must be organized in such a way that so that all bombers and scouts at the same time, with the call sign "Ardyalul", crossed the border at 4 o'clock in the morning. Fighter aircraft will be on alert at dawn to provide air cover. I wish you success and it is also necessary to contact the IVth Army regarding the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, which should be carried out, taking into account the border crossing of the Air Combat Group and according to the plan and instructions of the German Army Air Command. I expect an operational report tomorrow, more precisely this morning, after the completion of the first task." General Constantin Chelereanu immediately replied: "The combat air group is ready and able to carry out directive No. 34".
First wave
Airfield Ziliste-Buzau, 0 hours 5 minutes.
“A terrible roar broke the silence of the night, and the walls of the hangars shook so that it seemed they were about to collapse,” recalled Lieutenant Mircea Nicolau. All 200 German bombers He-111 4th German Fleet and 27th Flotilla under the command of General Boelcke took off and headed east. There was an indescribable noise, a fantastic performance that cannot be forgotten. After the German planes took off, at 12.30[those. at 0-30 - zhistory], and we began to prepare ... "
3 hours 50 minutes.
The 5th bomber group, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Paul Landmann, from 17 He-111H3 aircraft of the 78th, 79th and 80th squadrons took off to bombard airfields in the area of Chisinau and Tiraspol, the station and the railway siding. Each aircraft carried 4 250 kg and 16 50 kg bombs. Accompanied by 27 He-112 and Bf-109E fighters of the 5th and 7th Fighter Groups, at 4 o'clock in the morning the Romanian He-111H3 bombers crossed the Prut. The aircraft, tail number 21, with a crew of Lieutenant Mircea Nicolau - crew commander, junior lieutenant Ion Pedureanu and lieutenant Sorin Tulia - gunner (since he was appointed on duty, he could not fly, but volunteered), was the first Romanian aircraft , who dropped bombs on the Tiraspol airfield, where the planes of the 45th BAP were based. “Tiraspol appeared in the distance,” recalled Lieutenant Sorin Tulya. Airfield facilities, warehouses and hangars were visible. We dropped half of the bombs, avoiding hits in the strip, which we planned to use soon. We headed towards Chisinau and, from a height of 500 meters, struck at the railway siding, on which there were trains with ammunition and troops. The blast wave was so powerful that the plane was thrown up. At 5.20 we landed ". Bombs dropped by Romanian aircraft destroyed 12 Soviet aircraft on the ground.
Pogoanele Buzau airfield.
At 2.45 the engines of the S.M.-79 bombers are launched 1st bomber group. The first plane to take off is No. 5 of the 71st Squadron (call sign Mihai), which is controlled by the group commander himself, Lieutenant Commander Komsha Liviu. Due to soft ground, plane no. 13, but the crew was not injured. After a twenty minute delay, planes take off No. 72 Squadron (callsign Romeo). Due to the sudden shutdown of the left engine, aircraft no. 12 forced to return. The frustrated chief adjutant pilot Ioan Kirya could not restrain himself and began to cry. The remaining 9 bombers crossed the Prut at 4.03 , heading for enemy airfields in Bolgrad and Bulgarica. Above the target, they were attacked by Soviet I-16s and a heated battle ensued over the airfield. The crew of Captain Constantin Stoenescu shot down 2 I-16 fighters in this battle ....
Of the four aircraft of the 72nd Squadron (Romeo) that took off, only three bombed the airfield in Bulgarica: at 4.45 , when the planes were heading towards Bolgrad, the formation was attacked by several I-16s. ....
The bombers of the 1st bomber group landed between 0505 and 0530. Of the 9 aircraft participating in this raid, 2 were lost, as well as 10 flight personnel.
Fighter actions
Ramnicu Sarat airfield, 3 hours 35 minutes.
Non-112 fighters of the 51st squadron under the command of the squadron captain Virgil Trandafirescu take off to attack the Izmail Karaklia airfield. Above the target, the leader ordered by radio to attack the airfield from south to north, where you could see the formation of Soviet aircraft . Some I-16s began to fly across the airfield, but were attacked by the trailing pair of Non-112s. Second Lieutenant Teodor Moscu, diving on the I-16s taking off, shot down one Soviet fighter and announced two more shot down in the ensuing air battle. His aircraft was seriously damaged and Moscu was forced to withdraw from the battle. He landed at Rimniku Sarat at 4.50 . Led by Moscu, adjutant Pavel Konstantin, confirmed two and one probable victory of his leader ....
18 IAR-80 aircraft of the 8th Fighter Group took off at 3.45 to cover the S.M.-79 bombers of the 72nd squadron. ....
To cover the He-111 group, sent to bomb the airfield near Chisinau, a Bf-109E link was allocated, led by Captain Alexandru Manoliu, commander of the 57th squadron. ....
Second wave
At 10.50, 12 Potez 63 aircraft of the 2nd bomber group, escorted by 12 He-112s, attacked the airfield in Bolgrad, railway and an airfield to the south and, respectively, southeast of Bulgarik. As a result, at least 200 meters of the railway were destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb. The Romanian group met fierce opposition from Soviet anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft ...
===========
Thus, the Romanian planes crossed the border with the USSR at about 4:00 am, and at that time the Sun was already illuminating targets on the ground, since some Romanian planes were landing back already at 4:45 am, having completed the task visually without illumination by searchlights visible Soviet aircraft (and not the former in the dark). Question: what time of sunrise in the region of the Soviet border along the Prut (say, in its northern part) can the program show SKYGLOBE 3.6? Theoretically - approximately 4-00 (Romanian summer time):
or 5-00 Moscow maternity leave:
CONVERSING!
Another question: where did the German He-111 bombers fly, taking off at 0-30 from the airfield Ziliste-Buzau? It can be assumed that to Sevastopol. Then the next question is: when could they have reached it?
performance characteristics Heinkel-111:
Takeoff weight - 14000 kg
Max speed - 400
km/h
Ceiling - 8400 m
Flight range - 2800 km
With a cruising speed of 370 km / h, the Germans could fly to Sevastopol in an hour and a half. Those. by 2-00 Romanian summer time or by 3-00 Moscow maternity time - GOOD! Conclusion: Zhukov, when describing the morning of June 22, 1941, used MOSCOW DECREE TIME! No objections?
Then whose planes bombed Soviet cities at 2:30 Berlin summer time or at 1:30 Berlin standard time? They haven't crossed the border yet! After 30 minutes (or after 1-30) they were only supposed to fly up to the Soviet western border! Who is lying? Whose planes did Zhukov tell Stalin about when he woke him up at 3:45 am Moscow standard time? Or is this whole conversation an invention of the marshal?
And the question remains according to the following words of Zhukov:
. . . . . . .
At 04:10, the Western and Baltic special districts reported the start of hostilities by German troops in the land areas of the districts.
At 4:30 am Timoshenko and I arrived at the Kremlin. All the summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. Me and the people's commissar were invited to the office.
JV Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding a pipe stuffed with tobacco in his hands. He said:
“We need to urgently call the German embassy...
If the Germans attacked in the dark at 3-10 am summer time (and 4-10 am Moscow time) in the light of searchlights, headlights, flashlights, highlighting with light bombs, shells, tracer bullets and launching rocket launchers (did they have night vision devices? ), then we can agree that at 4-30 Moscow time in Moscow a meeting could theoretically begin in Stalin's office (after all, 4-30 is later than 4-10 or 4-20 - not earlier, after all!).
But if you try to time it...
If Zhukov's call to Stalin at 3-45 is a lie, then they could not wake him up until 4-20. Where was Stalin at that time? In the country? How long does it take him to get to the Kremlin? (Wake up the driver, start the car, go to the highway, drive, go up to the office ...) In 10 minutes? INCREDIBLE! It will take 10 minutes just to wake up the driver and start the car...
Thus, even if the Germans started at 4:10 am Moscow time, Zhukov's meeting with Stalin at 4:30 am in the Kremlin is a lie. And all the more a lie, because judging by the Journal of visitors to Stalin's office, this meeting began in... 5-45.("Robin", Volume 2, p. 300):
And by this time, the German ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, had already read out a statement from the German government (ibid., p. 432):
In view of the further intolerable threat created to the German eastern frontier as a result of the massive concentration and training of all armed forces of the Red Army, the German Government considers itself compelled to immediately take military countermeasures.
The corresponding note will be handed over to Dekanozov at the same time in Berlin.
WUA RF. F.06. Op.Z. P. 1. D.5. Ll. 12-15. \433\
===========
Next CONCLUSIONS:
1) The description of events given in Zhukov's memoirs on the morning of June 22, 1941 to the phrase; " At 7:15 a.m. on June 22, Directive N: 2 People's Commissars for Defense was handed over to the districts" - LIE!
2) The Germans attacked at dawn at 3-00 Berlin summer time (or 4-00 Moscow maternity time).
3) The question (in 2006) remains: What time did the watches of Soviet soldiers on the western border of the USSR show if it was 4-00 at the SAME TIME? (And why?)
(in 2016 - it was shown at 4-00)
On June 22, in the early morning, having carefully prepared aviation and artillery forces, German troops crossed the borders of the Soviet Union. After 2 hours, V.M. Molotov had already hosted the German Ambassador W. Schulenberg. This visit took place at exactly 05:30, as evidenced by entries in the visitor's book. The German ambassador provided an official statement containing information about the sabotage actions of the USSR against Germany. The documents also spoke of the political manipulations of the Soviet Union directed against Germany. The essence of this statement was that Germany is taking military action to counter the threat and protect its territory.
Molotov officially declared the beginning of the war. And this fact raises many questions. First, the announcement was made much later. The speech on the radio was heard by the population of the country only at 12:15. More than 9 hours have passed since the start of hostilities, during which the Germans bombed our territory with might and main. WITH German side the appeal was recorded at 6:30 (Berlin time). It was also a mystery that Molotov, and not Stalin, reported the outbreak of hostilities. Modern historians put forward more than one version. Some argue that the head of the USSR was on vacation at that time. According to the version of foreign historians Brackman and Payne, during this period, Stalin was resting in Sochi. There is also an assumption that he was on the spot and simply refused, shifting all responsibility to Molotov. Such a statement is based on entries in the visitor's log - on this day, Stalin hosted a reception and even received the British ambassador.
There are also disagreements regarding the authorship of the text, which was compiled for an official speech. According to G. N. Peskova, who worked on restoring the chronology of events, the text of the message was handwritten by Molotov. But from the style of presentation and corrections made later in this text, they came to the conclusion that the content of the text was edited by Stalin. Subsequently, Molotov spoke on the radio mentioning that he was acting on behalf of Joseph Vissarionovich. Later, when comparing the content of the written text and the spoken speech, historians found some differences, which mainly related to the extent of the territories that were attacked. There were other discrepancies, but they were not of great strategic importance. In any case, the fact that the war began earlier than indicated in official sources time, the researchers documented.
