Battle of Kursk |
|
Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine |
|
Red Army victory |
|
Commanders |
|
Georgy Zhukov |
Erich von Manstein |
Nikolai Vatutin |
Gunther Hans von Kluge |
Ivan Konev |
Walter Model |
Konstantin Rokossovsky |
Herman Goth |
Side forces |
|
By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve |
According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, According to him. data - 780 thousand people. 2758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft |
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317 361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71 611 Sanitary - 183 955 General in the Battle of the Kursk Salient: Irrevocable - 189 652 Sanitary - 406 743 In the Battle of Kursk in general ~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153,000 small arms 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5,245 guns and mortars 1,626 combat aircraft |
According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet less than 1696 aircraft |
Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, involved forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle "Operation Citadel".
After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war went over to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the western side (the so-called " Kursk Bulge"). During April-June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.
The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". According to the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Goth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of Soviet troops.
To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (18 of them tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total strength, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people. The command of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Panzer Army, the 24th Panzer Corps and Operational Group "Kempf" (commander - General German Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
To carry out the operation in the Kursk region, several elite SS Panzer divisions were advanced:
The troops received a number of new equipment:
At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly obsolete tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, the German Sd.Kfz.302 telewagons were used for the first time.
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.
The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:
Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources |
||||||||
Source |
Personnel (thousand) |
Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns |
Guns and (sometimes) mortars |
Aircraft |
||||
about 10000 |
2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and far) |
|||||||
Krivosheev 2001 |
||||||||
Glantz, House |
2696 or 2928 |
|||||||
Mueller Gill. |
2540 or 2758 |
|||||||
Zett, Frankson |
5128 +2688 "rate reserve" total over 8000 |
|||||||
From the beginning of 1943, the intercepts of secret communications from the Nazi High Command and Hitler's secret directives increasingly referred to Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed in general details by Stalin about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the Plan of Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command, which was endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, translated from German, fell on Stalin’s desk, who signed it only three days later. This data was obtained by a scout who worked under the name "Werther". The real name of this man is still unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luci agent operating in Switzerland, Rudolf Rössler. There is an alternative suggestion that Werther is the personal photographer of Adolf Hitler.
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:
Although the exact text of the "Citadel" lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command, and they knew the general details about the existence of such a plan at least for eight days before.
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
Operation Citadel - General Offensive German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Kursk by counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge, as well as the defeat of the Soviet operational and strategic reserves to the east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of Prokhorovka station). Main blow from southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Herman Goth, 48th TC and 2nd SS TC) with the support of the army group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).
At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (commander: O. von Knobelsdorf, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the strongest formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 Panzer divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Grossdeutschland", 10 tank brigade and 911 det. division of assault guns, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka-Butovo area in the direction of Cherkasskoe-Yakovlevo-Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area, 48 TC would connect with units of the 2nd SS TD (thus surrounding units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and 67 Guards Rifle Division), change units of the 2nd SS TD, after which it was supposed to use units of the SS division against the operational reserves of the Red Army in the area of Art. Prokhorovka, and 48 shopping mall was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.
To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to crack the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. should have reached the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, the courage and stamina they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were "significantly adjusted" - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of engineering training terrain by Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on enemy tanks accumulated in front of engineering obstacles, the competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the strip of 71 Guards Rifle Division, No. in the strip of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), the rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, and also 27 oiptabr of Colonel N. D. Chevola) with an anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd and 11th divisions with the involvement of forces of 245 rep (lieutenant colonel M. K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of military outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalion 199 guards, captain V. L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers' barracks southwest of . Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.
Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly practiced interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the division "Grossdeutschland" (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) in the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (especially great difficulties were caused by overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassky), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoye for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.
The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important success factor German tanks th units was a qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was crushed around midnight on July 5th. However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) were held for about a day in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5, 1943, in the area of Cherkassky, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner to pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5, 1943, one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops, is unfortunately one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the area of offensive 48 TC (near the village of Cherkasskoe) and 12-13 km in the area of 2 TC SS (in the Bykovka-Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Dead Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .
On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS TC (334 tanks) were determined: for the Dead Head TD (brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th rifle division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Lipovy Donets, for TD "Leibstandarte" (brigadeführer T. Vish, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and "Das Reich" (brigadeführer V. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and exit to the line of the bend of the river Psel - with. Teterevino.
At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by 154 and 156 guards sp. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify the command and control posts of the regiments of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and launch a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and command and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division repelled enemy attacks without communication with the higher command, since the work of communication officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.
The initial success of the attack of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the regiments of the divisions, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which was the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end a few hundred meters from the trenches.
By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments were knocked out of their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; the left-flank 158th Guards Rifle Regiment, having bent its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments was carried out mixed with tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in 156 Guards Rifle Regiment out of 1685 people on July 7, about 200 people remained in the ranks, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . The general leadership of the retreating battalions was practically absent, the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments went to the positions of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the suitable 5th Guards Rifle Division from the reserve. Stalingrad tank corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M.N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.M. Shchekal) fought hard battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich combat groups in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the gunners managed to save most of their heavy weapons. A fleeting but fierce battle flared up for the village of Luchki, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich the 464th guards artillery division and 460th guards managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6 guards msbr 5 guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).
At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After that, up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front, there were actually no units of the 6th Guards in front of the Das Reich combat group. armies capable of holding back its offensive: the main forces of the anti-tank artillery of the army (namely, 14, 27 and 28 oiptabr) were located to the west - on Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of 48 TC, which, according to the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main German strikes (which was not entirely true - the strikes of both German tank corps 4 TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the strike of the TD "Das Reich" artillery from the 6th Guards. And by this point, it just wasn't.
The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of the Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of Soviet artillery in its offensive area (the regiments of Major Kosachev's 28th Oiptabr were active), timely strikes of the 1st Guards. brigade (colonel V. M. Gorelov) and 49 brigade (lieutenant colonel A. F. Burda) from the 3 mechanized corps 1 TA M. E. Katukov, as well as the presence of a well-fortified village of Yakovlevo in its offensive zone, in street battles in which for some time bogged down the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment.
Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS TC had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of s. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd shopping mall of the SS, conditions were prepared for their replacement with units of the 48th shopping mall. The advanced units of the 2nd SS TC were ready to begin to fulfill one of the general goals of the Citadel operation - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of st. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Goth (commander of 4 TA) failed to fully fulfill the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of 48 TC (O. von Knobelsdorf), who faced the skillful defense of the Katukov army that entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to surround some regiments of the 67th and 52nd guards divisions of the 6th guards in the afternoon. And in the interfluve of the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having stumbled upon the rigid defense of the brigades of 3 microns (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions could not capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of parts 2 shopping mall SS. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment of the 3rd tank regiment (F. Westkhoven), which gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tankmen and artillerymen of the 22nd tank brigade (Colonel N. G. Vennichev), which was part of the 6th tank regiment (Major General A D. Hetman) 1 TA.
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte", and in particular "Das Reich", forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV Churchill) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk Major General A. G. Kravchenko tasked with withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and the application by these forces of a counterattack on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the division "Das Reich", and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up the anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th Guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 near the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).
After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the Das Reich tank regiment, using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
The offensive of the “Dead Head” TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th rifle division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd guards carried out in the afternoon on its sector. Tatsinsky tank corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some parts of the Das Reich TD. However, to inflict losses on the Tatsinsky Corps even approximately commensurate with the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the Stk, even despite the fact that during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. TTK for July 6 amounted to: 17 tanks burned out and 11 lined, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.
Thus, during July 6, formations of 4 TA managed to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank, inflicted significant losses on the troops of 6 Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed a section not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug up 1 TA brigades, using his experience in defensive battles near Orel in 1941.
However, all the successes of the 2nd SS TC, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of the Kempf AG, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG "Kempf" still could not provide the right flank of the 4th TA, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. TTK supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. Also significant to the further course of events was the loss of the Germans in armored vehicles. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 mk, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered incapacitated (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in 10 tank brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, less ambitious tasks were set for the 4th TA corps than on July 6 - expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the flanks of the army.
The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorf, on the evening of July 6 summed up the results of the day's battle:
Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet one, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored attack. Due to the loss of combat capability and the failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, the overall operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of the Soviet defense in the area of the breakthrough of the German 4th TA was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. And I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of 1 TA M. E. Katukov. The main frame of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Panzer Army.
On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) in the history of the oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area.
According to data from Soviet sources, from the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 "Tigers") and self-propelled guns.
On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike was launched, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.
Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and high. 252.2 resembled the surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three SAP batteries, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves against the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering enormous losses in the process.
From the memoirs of a participant in the battle, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:
During the battle, a lot of tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of order. A high level of casualties among command personnel in the 32nd brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), commander of a tank platoon (61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). Very high losses were suffered by the command link and in the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade, many commanders of companies and platoons were killed and seriously injured. His commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, failed (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).
Grigory Penezhko, a participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st brigade, later Hero of the Soviet Union, recalled the condition of a person in those terrible conditions:
... Heavy pictures remained in my memory ... There was such a roar that the membranes pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron ... From point-blank shots, turrets turned, twisted guns, armor burst, tanks exploded. From shots into gas tanks, the tanks instantly flared up. Hatches opened, and tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burnt, hanging from his armour. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time, we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cockpit of the tank. One thought, one desire - while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols, grabbed them hand-to-hand. I remember the captain, who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a wrecked German "tiger" and hit the hatch with his machine gun in order to "smoke out" the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the commander of the tank company Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out the enemy "Tiger", but he himself was shot down. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And went to fight again |
By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle German troops could not move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers over July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.
According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irrevocably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 tanks Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.
At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.
According to the memoirs of Major General of the Wehrmacht F. W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - up to 240 vehicles in total, including including four "tigers". It was not supposed to meet a serious enemy, according to the German command, TA Rotmistrova was drawn into the battle against the “Dead Head” division (in fact, one corps) and a counter attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks was a complete surprise.
However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but pursued the goal of going into the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Dead Head” division was taken.
The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire.
The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 5-23 July 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers of the German command are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.
According to Soviet data, only in the Kursk defensive operation from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not affect the Battle of Kursk in any way, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, so "the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy."
On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies in the area of the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were destroyed in the Oryol operation.
On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were not successful.
On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:
According to Guderian,
The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and captured, 1500 tanks and over 3700 aircraft.
However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10-day reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:
Total total losses of enemy troops that took part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43.: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.
According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130,429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.
In addition, according to German documents, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943.
On the other hand, true Soviet military reports about German losses even the Soviet commanders did not consider during the war years. So, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to the lower headquarters:
From Kursk and Orel
The war brought us
to the most enemy gates,
Such things, brother.
Someday we'll remember this
And you won't believe yourself
And now we need one victory, One for all, we will not stand up for the price!
(lyrics from the movie "Belorussky Station")
To at The Russian Battle, according to historians, was a turning point inGreat Patriotic War . More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. There has never been such a thing in world history, and probably never will be again. Actions Soviet fronts marshals Georgy Konstantinovich led the Kursk Bulge Zhukov and Vasilevsky.
Zhukov G.K. 
Vasilevsky A.M.
If the Battle of Stalingrad made Berlin plunge into mourning tones for the first time, then Battle of Kursk finally announced to the world that now the German soldier will only retreat. Not a single piece of native land will be given to the enemy! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree in one opinion - Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it, the outcome of the Second World War.
From a speech on the radio by the Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill : “I readily admit that most of the Allied military operations in the West in 1943 could not have been carried out in the form and at the time they were carried out, were it not forheroic, magnificent deeds and victories of the Russian army , who defends her native land under vile, unprovoked attack with unparalleled energy, skill and devotion, protects at a terrible price - the price of Russian blood.
No government in the history of mankind would have been able to survive such severe and cruel wounds that Hitler inflicted on Russia ...Russia not only survived and recovered from these terrible wounds, but also inflicted mortal damage on the German military machine. No other power in the world could do this.”
Historical parallels
The Kursk confrontation took place on 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again gained strength. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander by the Teutonic knights on Lake Peipsi on 04/05/1242. Of course, the weapons of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks. If you pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, a brief summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of the front.- Read more at
The Battle of Kursk is the beginning.
“... On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, we, as part of the 125th special communications battalion, were transferred to the city of Orel. By that time, there was nothing left of the city, I remember only two surviving buildings - the church and the station. On the outskirts, some sheds have been preserved in some places. Piles of broken bricks, not a single tree in the whole huge city, constant shelling and bombing. At the temple there was a priest and several female choristers who remained with him. In the evening, our entire battalion, together with the commanders, gathered in the temple, the priest began to serve a prayer service. We knew we were going to attack the next day. Remembering their relatives, many wept. Scary…
There were three of us, radio operator girls. The rest of the men: signalmen, reel operators. Our task is to establish the most important thing - communication, without communication the end. I can’t say how many of us survived, we were scattered all over the front at night, but I think that it was not much. Our losses were very large. The Lord has saved me…” Osharina Ekaterina Mikhailovna (mother Sofia))
Here it all began! The morning of July 5, 1943, the silence over the steppes is living out its last moments, someone is praying, someone is writing last lines letters to a loved one, someone just enjoys another moment of life. A few hours before the German offensive, a wall of lead and fire collapsed on the positions of the Wehrmacht.Operation Citadelgot the first hole. Artillery strikes were carried out along the entire front line, on German positions. The essence of this warning strike was not even so much in dealing damage to the enemy, but in psychology. Psychologically broken German troops went on the attack. The original plan was no longer working. For a day of stubborn fighting, the Germans were able to advance 5-6 kilometers! And these are unsurpassed tactics and strategists, whose shod boots trampled European soil! Five kilometers! Every meter, every centimeter of Soviet land was given to the aggressor with incredible losses, with inhuman labor.
(Volynkin Alexander Stepanovich)
The main blow of the German troops fell in the direction - Maloarkhangelsk - Olkhovatka - Gnilets. The German command sought to get to Kursk along the shortest path. However, it was not possible to break the 13th Soviet army. The Germans threw into battle up to 500 tanks, including new development, heavy tank "Tiger". It did not work out to disorient the Soviet troops with a wide front of the offensive. The retreat was well organized, the lessons of the first months of the war were taken into account, besides, the German command could not offer something new in offensive operations. And it was no longer necessary to count on the high morale of the Nazis. Soviet soldiers defended their country, and warriors - heroes were simply invincible. How can one not remember the Prussian king Frederick II, who was the first to say that a Russian soldier can be killed, but impossible to defeat! Maybe if the Germans had listened to their great ancestor, there would not have been this catastrophe called the World War.
Only lasted six days Operation "Citadel", for six days the German units tried to move forward, and all these six days the stamina and courage of a simple Soviet soldier thwarted all the plans of the enemy.
July, 12 Kursk Bulge found a new, full-fledged owner. Troops of two Soviet fronts, Bryansk and Western, launched an offensive operation against German positions. This date can be taken as the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. From that day until the very end of the war, German weapons no longer knew the joy of victory. Now the Soviet army was waging an offensive war, a war of liberation. During the offensive, the cities were liberated: Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov. German attempts to counterattack had no success. It was no longer the strength of the weapon that determined the outcome of the war, but its spirituality, its purpose. The Soviet heroes liberated their land, and nothing could stop this force, it seemed that the land itself helps the soldiers go on and on, freeing city after city, village after village.
Neither before nor after has the world known such a battle. More than 1,500 tanks from both sides throughout the day on July 12, 1943, fought the hardest battles on a narrow heel of land near the village of Prokhorovka. Initially, inferior to the Germans in the quality of tanks and in quantity, the Soviet tankers covered their names with endless glory! People burned in tanks, were blown up by mines, the armor could not withstand the hit of German shells, but the battle continued. At that moment, nothing else existed, neither tomorrow nor yesterday! The dedication of the Soviet soldier, who once again surprised the world, did not allow the Germans to either win the battle itself or strategically improve their positions.
“... We suffered on the Kursk Bulge. Our 518th Fighter Regiment was defeated. The pilots died, and those who survived were sent to reform. So we ended up in aircraft workshops, began to repair aircraft. We repaired them both in the field, and during the bombing, and during the shelling. And so on until we were mobilized ... "( Kustova Agrippina Ivanovna)
“... Our artillery guards anti-tank fighter battalion under the command of Captain Leshchin has been on formation and combat exercises since April 1943 near Belgrade, Kursk region, to master new military equipment - anti-tank guns of 76 caliber.
I took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge as the head of the division radio, which provided communication between the command and the batteries. The division command ordered me and other artillerymen to withdraw the remaining damaged equipment from the battlefield at night, as well as the wounded and killed soldiers. For this feat, all the survivors were awarded high government awards, the dead were awarded posthumously.
I remember well that on the night of July 20-21, 1943, on a combat alert, we quickly set out on the road to the settlement of Ponyri and began to take up firing positions in order to delay the Nazi tank column. The density of anti-tank weapons was the highest - 94 guns and mortars. The Soviet command, having accurately determined the directions of German attacks, managed to concentrate a large amount of anti-tank artillery on them. At 0400, a rocket signal was given, and artillery preparation began, which lasted about 30 minutes. German tanks T-4 "Panther", T-6 "Tiger", self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" and other artillery mortar guns in the amount of more than 60 barrels rushed to our combat positions. An unequal battle ensued, our division also took part in it, which destroyed 13 fascist tanks, but all 12 guns were crushed under the tracks of German tanks.
Of my brother-soldiers, I remember the guard lieutenant Aleksey Azarov the most - he knocked out 9 enemy tanks, for which he was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The commander of the second battery, Guard Lieutenant Kardybaylo knocked out 4 enemy tanks and was awarded the Order of Lenin.
The Battle of Kursk was won. In the very convenient location for the offensive, the German army was waiting for a trap that was capable of crushing the armored fist of the fascist divisions. There was no doubt about the victory, even before the start of the defensive operation, the Soviet military leaders were planning a further offensive ... "
(Sokolov Anatoly Mikhailovich)
From the beginning of 1943, in the intercepts of secret messages of the High Command of the Nazi army and secret directives of A. Hitler was increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of A. Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed in general details. V. Stalin about German plans. On April 12, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the Plan of Operation Citadel” translated from German of the German High Command, translated from German, was placed on Stalin’s table, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later.
There are several versions regarding the sources of information.
The command of the Central Fleet inspects the wrecked German equipment. Front commander in the centerK. K. Rokossovsky and commander 16th VA S. I. Rudenko. July 1943.
V. I. Kazakov, the commander of the artillery of the Central Front, speaking about the preparation, noted that she:
was an integral and, in essence, the dominant part of the general counter-training, which pursued the goal of disrupting the enemy's offensive.
In the zone of the Central Fleet (13A), the main efforts were focused on suppressing the enemy artillery grouping and observation posts (OPs), including artillery ones. This group of objects accounted for more than 80% of the planned targets. This choice was explained by the presence in the army of powerful means of combating enemy artillery, more reliable data on the position of his artillery group, the relatively small width of the expected strike zone (30-40 km), as well as the high density of combat formations of divisions of the first echelon of the troops of the Central Fleet, which led to their greater sensitivity (vulnerability) to artillery strikes. By inflicting a powerful fire strike on German artillery positions and NP, it was possible to significantly weaken and disorganize the enemy’s artillery preparation and ensure the survivability of the troops of the first echelon of the army to repel the attack of attacking tanks and infantry.
In the VF zone (6th Guards A and 7th Guards A), the main efforts were aimed at suppressing infantry and tanks in the areas of their probable location, which accounted for about 80% of all targets hit. This was due to a wider zone of a probable enemy strike (up to 100 km), greater sensitivity of the defense of the first echelon troops to tank strikes, and fewer means of combating enemy artillery in the armies of the VF. It was also not excluded that on the night of July 5, part of the enemy artillery would change their firing positions when the combat outposts of the 71st and 67th Guards departed. sd. Thus, the gunners of the VF, first of all, sought to inflict damage on tanks and infantry, that is, the main attack force of the Germans, and suppress only the most active enemy batteries (reliably explored).
On August 17, 1943, the armies of the Steppe Front (SF) approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. 53 A Managarova I. M. acted vigorously, and especially her 89 guards. sd colonel M. P. Seryugin and 305 sd colonel A. F. Vasiliev. Marshal G. K. Zhukov wrote in his book “Memoirs and Reflections”:
"... The most fierce battle unfolded over the height of 201.7 in the Polevoy area, which was captured by the consolidated company of the 299th Infantry Division, consisting of 16 people under the command of Senior Lieutenant V.P. Petrishchev.
When only seven people remained alive, the commander, turning to the fighters, said: - Comrades, we will stand on a height as the Panfilovites stood at Dubosekov. We will die, but we will not retreat!
And they didn't back down. The heroic fighters held the height until the division's units approached. For courage and heroism, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, senior lieutenant V.P. Petrishchev, junior lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, senior sergeant G.P. Polikanov and sergeant V.E. Breusov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The rest were awarded orders.
- Zhukov GK. Memories and reflections.
The course of the battle.Defense
The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew near, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From reconnaissance reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to produce artillery on the night of July 5 countertraining. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min . After the roar of the cannonade died down, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of the previously carried out artillery countertraining in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later planned time . Only some time later, the German troops were able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.
The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses of the Soviet troops and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack against the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German advance here was delayed and finally thwarted on July 10 . In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.
“... Our unit was located in the deserted village of Novolipitsy, 10-12 km from the forward positions, and engaged in active combat training and the construction of defensive lines. The proximity of the front was felt: artillery rumbled in the west, flares flared up at night. Air battles were often fought over us, downed planes fell. Soon, our division, like our neighboring formations, staffed mainly by cadets of military schools, turned into a well-trained "guards" combat unit.
When the Nazi offensive began on July 5 in the direction of Kursk, we were transferred closer to the front line to reserve positions in order to be ready to repel the onslaught of the enemy. But we didn't have to defend ourselves. On the night of July 11, we replaced units that had thinned out and needed rest on one of the bridgeheads on the western bank of the Zushi near the village of Vyazhi. On the morning of July 12, after a powerful artillery preparation, an offensive began on the city of Orel (in the place of this breakthrough, near the village of Vyazhi, 8 km from Novosil, a monument was erected after the war).
The memory has preserved many episodes of heavy fighting that unfolded on the ground and in the air ...
On command, we quickly jump out of the trenches and shout “Hurrah!” attack enemy positions. The first losses from enemy bullets and minefields. Here we are already in well-equipped enemy trenches, operating with machine guns and grenades. The first killed German is a red-haired guy, with a machine gun in one hand and a skein telephone wire to another... Having quickly overcome several lines of trenches, we liberate the first village. There was some kind of enemy headquarters, ammunition depots ... In field kitchens another warm breakfast for the German soldiers. Following the infantry, which had done its job, the tanks went into the gap, which, firing on the move, famously rush past us forward.
In the days that followed, the fighting was almost non-stop; our troops, despite the counterattacks of the enemy, stubbornly advanced towards the goal. Before our eyes even now are the fields of tank battles, where sometimes at night it was light from dozens of flaming vehicles. Unforgettable are the battles of our fighter pilots - there were few of them, but they bravely attacked the Junkers' wedges, which were trying to bomb our troops. I remember the deafening crack of exploding shells and mines, fires, mutilated earth, the corpses of people and animals, the persistent smell of gunpowder and burning, constant nervous tension, from which a short sleep did not save.
In battle, the fate of a person, his life depend on many accidents. In those days of fierce battles for Orel, it was pure chance that saved me several times.
During one of the marches, our marching column was subjected to intense artillery fire. On command, we rushed into a shelter, a roadside ditch, lay down, and suddenly, two or three meters from me, a shell pierced into the ground, but did not explode, but only showered me with earth. Another case: on a hot day, already on the outskirts of Orel, our battery provides active support to the advancing infantry. All mines are used up. People are very tired, terribly thirsty. About three hundred meters from us, a well crane sticks out. The foreman orders me and another fighter to collect pots and go for water. Before we had time to crawl even 100 meters, a flurry of fire fell on our positions - mines of heavy six-barreled German mortars burst. The aim of the enemy was accurate! After the raid, many of my comrades were killed, many were wounded or shell-shocked, some of the mortars failed. It looks like this "outfit for water" saved my life.
A few days later, having suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, our unit was withdrawn from the combat area and settled in the forest, east of the city of Karachev, for rest and reorganization. Here, many soldiers and officers received government awards for participating in the hostilities near Orel and the liberation of the city. I was awarded the medal "For Courage".
The defeat of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge and the appreciation of this feat of arms made us very happy, but we could not and cannot forget our comrades-in-arms, who are no longer with us. Let us always remember the soldiers who gave their lives in the nationwide Patriotic War fighting for the freedom and independence of our Fatherland!..” (Sluka Alexander Evgenievich)
The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tigr" and "Panther". Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns of tanks dug into the ground opened effective fire on the German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of the German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: all the spaces between the positions were heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were good shot through artillery. While the German tankers were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.
“... The heat melted very strong, dryness. There is nowhere to hide from the heat. And during the battles, the earth stood on end. Tanks are moving, artillery is showering with heavy fire, and Junkers and Messerschmitts are attacking from the sky. Until now, I can not forget the terrible dust that stood in the air and seemed to penetrate into all the cells of the body. Yes, plus, besides, smoke, soot, soot. On the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis threw new, more powerful and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns - "tigers" and "Ferdinands" against our army. The shells of our guns ricocheted off the armor of these vehicles. I had to use more powerful artillery guns and cannons. We already had new 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns, improved artillery pieces.
I must say that even before the battle, during tactical exercises, we were told about these new Nazi machines and showed their weaknesses, vulnerabilities. And in battle I had to practice. The attacks were so powerful and strong that our guns became hot and had to be cooled with wet rags.
It used to be impossible to stick your head out of hiding. But, despite the constant attacks, incessant battles, we found strength, endurance, patience and repulsed the enemy. Only the price was very expensive. How soldier died - no one can count. Very few survived.And every survivor is worthy of a reward ... "
(Tishkov Vasily Ivanovich)
Only during the first day of fighting, the Model grouping, operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5-6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between shock units 20, 2 and 9- thGermantankdivisionsWithcompoundsSoviet 2- thtankand 13- tharmies. OutcomethisbattlesbecameextremelyunexpectedforGermancommand. Having lostbefore 50 thousand. humanandnear 400 tanks, northernpercussiongroupingwasforcedstay. advancingforwardTotalon the 10 – 15 km, Modelineventuallylostpercussionpowertheirtankpartsandlostcapabilitiescontinueoffensive. Temtimeon thesouthernwingKurskledgedevelopmentsdevelopedonotherwisescenario. To 8 JulydrumsdivisionsGermanmotorizedconnections« GreatGermany» , « Reich» , « deadhead» , life standard« AdolfHitler» , severaltankdivisions 4- thtankarmiesGothaandgroups« Kempf» managedwedgeinSovietdefensebefore 20 andmorekm. OffensiveoriginallywentindirectioninhabiteditemOboyan, butthen, due tostrongoppositionSoviet 1- thtankarmies, 6- thguardsarmiesandothersassociationson thethissite, commandinggrouparmies« South» backgroundMansteinacceptedsolutionhiteast– indirectionProkhorovka. ExactlyatthisinhabiteditemandstartedmostbigtankbattleSecondworldwars, inwhichWithbothpartiesacceptedparticipationbeforeTHOUSANDSTWO HundredTANKSandself-propelledguns.
BattleunderProkhorovka– conceptinmanycollective. Fateopposingpartiesdecidednotperonedayandnoton theonefield. TheatrecombatactionforSovietandGermantankconnectionsrepresentedterrainareamore 100 sq.. km. Andtopicsnotlessexactlythis isbattleinmanydeterminedthe wholesubsequentmovenotonlyKurskbattles, butandallsummercampaignson theEasternfront.
“... The policeman drove us, 10 teenagers, with shovels and took us to the Big Oak. When they arrived at the place, they saw a terrible picture: between the burned-out hut and the barn, the executed were lying. Many of their faces and clothes were burned. They were doused with gasoline before being burned. To the side lay two female corpses. They hugged their children to their chests. One of them hugged the child, wrapping the little one with the hollow of her fur coat ... "(Arbuzov Pavel Ivanovich)
Of all the victories of 1943, it was decisive in providing a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, which ended in the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine and the crushing of the enemy defenses on the Dnieper at the end of 1943. The fascist German command was forced to abandon the offensive strategy and go over to the defensive on the entire front. He had to transfer troops and aircraft from the Mediterranean theater of operations to the Eastern Front, which facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily and Italy. The Battle of Kursk was a triumph of Soviet military art.
In the 50-day Battle of Kursk, up to 30 enemy divisions were defeated, including 7 tank divisions. Total losses Nazi German troops more than 500 thousand people were killed, seriously wounded and missing. The Soviet Air Force finally won air supremacy. The active actions of the partisans on the eve and during the Battle of Kursk contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Kursk. Striking at the rear of the enemy, they fettered up to 100 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy. The partisans carried out 1460 raids on the railway line, disabled over 1000 locomotives and defeated over 400 military trains.
Memoirs of participants of the Kursk Bulge
Ryzhikov Grigory Afanasevich:
“We thought we would win anyway!”
Grigory Afanasyevich was born in the Ivanovo region, at the age of 18 he was drafted into the Red Army in 1942. Among 25 thousand recruits, he was sent to Kostroma to the 22nd training brigade to study "military science". With the rank of junior sergeant, he went to the front in the ranks of the 17th Motorized Rifle Guards Red Banner Brigade.
“They brought us to the front,” Grigory Afanasyevich recalls, “they unloaded us. The railway, apparently, was far from the front line, so we walked for a day, we were fed only once with hot food. We walked day and night, we did not know that we were going to Kursk. They knew that they were going to the war, to the front, but they didn’t know where exactly. We saw that a lot of equipment was coming: cars, motorcycles, tanks. The German fought very well. It would seem that he has a hopeless situation, but still he does not give up! In one place, the Germans took a fancy to the house, they even had beds with cucumbers and tobacco, apparently, they were going to stay there for a long time. But we did not intend to give them our native land and fought hot battles all day long. The Nazis stubbornly resisted, but we moved forward: sometimes we won’t move in a whole day, and sometimes we’ll win back half a kilometer. When they went on the attack, they shouted: “Hurrah! For the Motherland! For Stalin!" It helped us raise our morale.”
Near Kursk, Grigory Afanasyevich was the commander of the machine-gun squad, once he had to settle down with a machine gun in the rye. In July it is even, high, and so it reminds of a peaceful life, home comfort and hot bread with a golden crust ... But wonderful memories were crossed out by the war with a terrible death of people, burning tanks, blazing villages. So they had to trample the rye with soldiers' boots, drive over it with heavy wheels of cars and ruthlessly cut off its ears, wound around a machine gun. On July 27, Grigory Afanasyevich was wounded in his right hand, and was sent to the hospital. After recovery, he fought near Yelnya, then in Belarus, was wounded twice more.
I received the news of the victory already in Czechoslovakia. Our soldiers triumphed, sang to the accordion, and entire columns of captured Germans walked past.
Junior Sergeant Ryzhikov was demobilized already from Romania in the autumn of 1945. He returned to his native village, worked on a collective farm, and started a family. Then he went to the construction of the Gorkovskaya hydroelectric power station, from where he had already come to build the Votkinsk hydroelectric power station.
Now Grigory Afanasyevich already has 4 grandsons and a great-granddaughter. He likes to work in the garden, if his health allows, he is keenly interested in what is happening in the country and the world, he is worried that “ours are not very lucky” at the Olympics. Grigory Afanasyevich modestly assesses his role in the war, says that he served "like everyone else", but thanks to people like him, our country won a great victory so that the next generations could live in a free and peaceful country.
Telenev Yuri Vasilievich:
All his pre-war life, Yuri Vasilyevich lived in the Urals. In the summer of 1942, at the age of 18, he was drafted into the army. In the spring of 1943, having completed an accelerated course at the 2nd Leningrad Military Infantry School, evacuatedthen to the city of Glazov, junior lieutenant Yuri Telenev was appointed commander of a platoon of anti-tank guns and sent to the Kursk salient.“Then we didn’t think about awards”
“On the sector of the front where the battle was to take place, the Germans were on high ground, and we were on low ground, in plain sight. They tried to bomb us - the strongest artillery raid lasted approx.For about an hour, there was a terrible roar around, no voices were heard, so they had to shout. But we did not give up and responded in kind: shells exploded on the side of the Germans, tanks burned, everythingshrouded in smoke. Then our shock army went on the attack, we were in the trenches, they stepped over us, then we followed them. The crossing over the Oka began, only
infantry. The Germans began to shoot at the crossing, but since they were overwhelmed and paralyzed by our resistance, they fired randomly, aimlessly. Crossing the river, we joined the fightingThey liberated the settlements where the Nazis still remained "
Yuri Vasilievich proudly says that after Battle of Stalingrad mood Soviet soldiers was only for victory, no one doubted that we would still defeat the Germans, and the victory in the Battle of Kursk was another proof of this.
On the Kursk Bulge, Junior Lieutenant Telenev shot down an enemy Henkel-113 aircraft, popularly called a “crutch”, with an anti-tank rifle, for which he was awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War after the victory. “In the war, we didn’t even think about awards, and there was no such fashion,” recalls Yuri Vasilyevich. In general, he considers himself a lucky man, because he was wounded near Kursk. If wounded, but not killed - already a great happiness for the infantry. After the battles, there were no entire regiments left - a company or a platoon.“Young people were,” says Yuri Vasilyevich, “reckless,at the age of 19 they were not afraid of anything, accustomed to danger. Yes, you can’t protect yourself from a bullet if it’s yours. ” . After being wounded, he was sent to the Kirov hospital, and when he recovered, he again went to the front, and until the end of 1944 he fought on the 2nd Belorussian Front.
Before the new year 1945, Lieutenant Telenev was demobilized due to a severe wound to his hand. Therefore, I met the victory already in the rear, in Omsk. There he worked as a military instructor at a school and studied at a music school. A few years later, with his wife and children, he moved to Votkinsk, and later to the very young Tchaikovsky, where he taught at a music school and was an instrument tuner.
Volodin Semyon Fedorovich
The events of those days will be remembered for a long time when the fate of the war was decided on the Kursk Bulge, when the company of Lieutenant Volodin held a small piece of land between a birch hill and the stadium of the village of Solomki. Of what the young commander had to endure on the first day of the Battle of Kursk, the retreat was most memorable: and not the very moment when the company, which had beaten off six tank attacks, left the trench, but for other night road. He walked at the head of his "company" - twenty surviving soldiers, remembering all the details ...
For about an hour, the "Junkers" continuously bombed the village, as soon as one party flew away, another appeared in the sky, and everything was repeated all over again - the deafening roar of exploding bombs, the whistle of fragments and thick, suffocating dust. The fighters were chasing the fighters, and the roar of their engines, like a groan, layered above the ground, when the German artillery began to hit and at the edge of the forest, in front of the buckwheat field, a black tank rhombus appeared again.
Ahead was a heavy and smoky military dawn: in an hour the battalion would take up defensive positions on the high-rises, and in another hour everything would start all over again: an air raid, artillery cannonade, rapidly creeping boxes of tanks; everything will be repeated - the whole battle, but with great bitterness, with an irresistible thirst for victory.
Already in seven days they were to see other crossings, other crowds along the banks of Russian rivers - clusters of broken German cars, the corpses of German soldiers, and he, Lieutenant Volodin, would say that this was a just retribution that the Nazis deserved.
Volynkin Alexander Stepanovich
In August 1942, a 17-year-old boy was called up for service in the Red Army. He was sent to study at the Omsk Infantry School, but Sasha could not finish it. He signed up as a volunteer, and received a baptism of fire near Vyazma, Smolensk region. The smart guy was immediately noticed. Yes, how not to notice a young fighter who has a true eye and a firm hand. So Alexander Stepanovich became a sniper.
"- It is impossible to remember the battle on the Kursk Bulge without shuddering - horror! The sky is covered with smoke, houses, fields, tanks, combat positions were burning. The thunder of cannonade from both sides. And in such a heavy fire," the veteran recalled, "fate protected me. I remember this case: we, three snipers, chose positions on the slope of a ravine, began to dig trenches, and suddenly - a flurry of fire. We quickly fell into one half-dug trench. The owner of the trench was below, I fell on him, and my neighbor fell on me. And then - a line from a heavy machine gun at our shelter ... The owner of the trench - immediately to death, the soldier who was above me was wounded, but I remained unharmed. One can see fate ... "
For the battle on the Kursk Bulge, Alexander Stepanovich has a medal"For Courage" is an award most revered among front-line soldiers.
Osharina Ekaterina Mikhailovna (mother Sofia)
“... On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, we, as part of the 125th special communications battalion, were transferred to the city of Orel. By that time, there was nothing left of the city, I remember only two surviving buildings - the church and the station. On the outskirts, some sheds have been preserved in some places. piles broken brick, not a single tree in the whole huge city, constant shelling and bombing. At the temple there was a priest and several female choristers who remained with him. In the evening, our entire battalion, together with the commanders, gathered in the temple, the priest began to serve a prayer service. We knew we were going to attack the next day. Remembering their relatives, many wept. Scary…
There were three of us, radio operator girls. The rest of the men: signalmen, reel operators. Our task is to establish the most important thing - communication, without communication the end. I can’t say how many of us survived, we were scattered all over the front at night, but I think that it was not much. Our losses were very large. The Lord saved me…”
Smetanin Alexander
“... For me, this battle began with a retreat. We retreated for several days. And before the decisive battle, breakfast was brought to our crew. For some reason, I remembered it well - four crackers and two unripe watermelons each, they were still white. We couldn't have been better then. At dawn, huge black clouds of smoke appeared on the horizon from the German side. We stood motionless. Nobody knew anything - neither the company commander, nor the platoon commander. We just stood there. I am a machine gunner and saw the world through a hole two and a half centimeters. All I saw was dust and smoke. And then the tank commander commands: "Sour cream, fire." I started shooting. By whom, where, I don't know. At about 11 am we were commanded "forward". We rushed forward, firing as we went. Then there was a stop, the shells were brought to us. And forward again. Rumble, shooting, smoke - that's all my memories. I would be lying if I said that everything was clear to me then - the scale and significance of the battle. Well, the next day, July 13, a shell hit us on the starboard side. I got 22 splinters in the leg. This is what my Battle of Kursk was like ... "
Oh Russia! A country with a difficult fate.
I have you, Russia, like a heart, one.
I'll tell a friend, I'll tell an enemy
Without you, like without a heart, I can't live!
(Yulia Drunina)
July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of the war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the Nazi command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.
Hitler’s operational order began with the words: “I decided, as soon as weather conditions allow, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success.” Everything was gathered by the Nazis into a powerful fist. Swift tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers" super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", according to the plan of the Nazis, were to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, turn the tide of events.
The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The most important decision was to be made by the Military Council of the front, and it was taken. On July 5, 1943, at two and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until August 23.
As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into the defeat of the Nazi groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise on the forces of the Soviet Army, encirclement and destruction of them. The triumph of the "Citadel" plan was to ensure the implementation of the further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.
The actions of the Army Grouping "Center" and the Operational Group "Kempf" of the armies "South", speaking from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulse of the strike from the side of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.
The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field under the Prokhorovka railway station experienced the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in terms of scale. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.
One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and nearly 10,000 casualties. Hitler's groupings were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovka field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting the implementation of Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From July 16 to July 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk Triangle and began to pursue it with the support of the air forces. Together, the Nazi formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.
Since March 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) has been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center, to crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense, and then go on the counteroffensive. Possessing a strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis organized the mass production of new medium and heavy tanks, increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to the total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses incurred in personnel.
The fascist German command decided to carry out a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and once again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of the operation was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge with powerful counter strikes from the Orel and Belgorod regions to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat the Soviet troops in the Donbass. For the implementation of the operation near Kursk, called "Citadel", the enemy concentrated huge forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, including. 16 tank, Army Group "Center" (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group "South" (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft were part of the enemy strike groups. An important place in the enemy's plan was assigned to the use of new military equipment - the Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).
The offensive of the Nazi troops against the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, was countered by the Soviet command with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge into the defense of the Soviet troops for 10-12 km. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.
On July 12, the Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place near the Prokhorovka railway station (up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by strikes from the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for deploying a general strategic offensive.
Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to wear out and bleed the enemy strike groups with a deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was assigned to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's offensive from the side of Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, the task was to repel the enemy’s offensive from Belgorod. The Steppe Military District was deployed in the rear of the Kursk ledge (since July 9 - the Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of the Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Operational Group "Kempf" of the Army Group "South" (commander - Field Marshal E. Manstein).
The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most probable direction of action for the main enemy forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary ones. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the expected enemy strike made it possible to create high densities in the zone of the 13th Army (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of the front.
The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy offensive could be in the directions of Belgorod, Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. In contrast to the Central Front, the armies of the first echelon received wide lines of defense. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the density of anti-tank artillery amounted to 15.6 guns per 1 km of the front, and taking into account the means located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of the front.
On the basis of our reconnaissance data and the testimonies of the prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of that day on the Voronezh and central fronts, artillery counter-preparation planned in the fronts and armies was carried out. As a result, she managed to delay the enemy's offensive for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.
On the morning of July 5, the Oryol grouping of the enemy, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, inflicting the main blow on Olkhovatka, and auxiliary ones on Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional stamina. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.
In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, advanced several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrier detachments to the main strip, and the front commander - howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive tank counterattacks in cooperation with infantry units and artillery halted the advance of the enemy. On this day, fierce battles unfolded in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting operations of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions, his attacks were not successful.
Having determined the direction of the main efforts of the enemy, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A. G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After delivering a counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Army and the 19th Panzer Corps went over to the defensive behind the second lane, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.
On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; the main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th guards, the 69th army and the 1st tank army.
Having not achieved success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy on the morning of July 7 launched an attack on Ponyri, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day, she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then, with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade, launched a counterattack and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10 against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.
Having exhausted its reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.
German soldiers in front of the Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943
Against the troops of the Voronezh Front, the enemy launched a general offensive also on the morning of July 5, inflicting the main blow with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army on Oboyan, and the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting took on a particularly fierce character in the Oboyan direction. The commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I. M. Chistyakov, in the first half of the day put forward part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade to the front line of defense. By the end of the day, the troops of this army had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main strip of our defense was broken through only in separate sections. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to force the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and capture a small bridgehead.
In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he advanced to the second line of defense the 1st Tank Army of General M. E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army. In addition, the army was reinforced by front-line artillery.
On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. On the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met with powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only by the end of the day did he manage to wedge into the second lane of our defense.
In the Korochan direction that day, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main line of defense, but his further advance was stopped.
Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the line of attack, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943
On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, by bringing fresh reserves into battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks rushed to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd tank corps, advanced from the reserves of the Stavka to the Prokhorovka area, as well as the active actions of the 2nd and 17th air armies. On the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack inflicted on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy's 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, greatly facilitated the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.
From July 9 to 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. To help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, the front command promptly put forward part of its artillery. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were aimed, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. By the joint efforts of the ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.
SS Panzer Division "Dead Head" (Totenkopf), Kursk, 1943.
In the offensive of the enemy, a crisis was clearly ripe. Therefore, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, chairman of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and General N. F. Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army, General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the aim of finally defeating the enemy grouping that had penetrated. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.
On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events unfolded in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod-Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, task force "Kempf ") and counterattacking Soviet troops (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Aviation support of the enemy's strike force was carried out by the aviation of the "South" army group. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were made). During the day of the battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having not reached the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (moved up to a maximum of 35 km on the southern face of the Kursk salient) went on the defensive.
July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The Hitlerite command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18 and the Steppe Fronts, proceeded to pursue the enemy, and by the end of July 23, they had mainly reached the line, which they occupied by the beginning of the defensive battle.
Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989
The Orlovsky ledge was defended by the troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They numbered 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two lanes with a total depth of 12-15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communications and a large number of armored firing points. In the operational depth, a number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.
The Oryol grouping of the enemy was instructed by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to defeat the troops of the left wing Western front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of the operation was to cut the enemy grouping into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Orel.
The Western Front (commanded by General V. D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow by the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroy them; part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, to surround and destroy the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy; deliver an auxiliary strike with the troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.
The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow by the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil region to Orel, and the auxiliary one - by the forces of the 61st army to Bolkhov.
The Central Front had the task of eliminating the enemy grouping that had penetrated north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing a strike on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts, to complete the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol ledge.
The preparation of the operation in the fronts was carried out taking into account the fact that for the first time they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses and develop tactical success at a high pace. To do this, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the battle formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies as part of one or two tank corps, the offensive was planned to be carried out day and night.
For example, with a total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone of 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and means was achieved on a 14-kilometer breakthrough sector, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average density of artillery in the area of the army breakthrough reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. Whereas the offensive lines of divisions in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. New in comparison with the counter-offensive at Stalingrad was the fact that the combat formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was built, as a rule, in two, and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the strength of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.
Characteristic in the use of artillery was the creation in the armies of artillery groups of destruction and long-range action, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The schedule of artillery preparation in some armies began to provide for a period of sighting and destruction.
There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, regiments of self-propelled artillery were included in the tank groups of direct infantry support (NPP), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. At the same time, in some armies, NPP tanks were attached not only to rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps formed mobile army groups, and tank armies were to be used for the first time as mobile front groups.
The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th air armies (commanded by Generals M. M. Gromov, N. F. Naumenko, S. I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and as well as long-range aviation.
The following tasks were assigned to aviation: to cover the troops of the shock groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; to suppress the centers of resistance at the forefront and in the nearest depth and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; with the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; to ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in the operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.
The counteroffensive was preceded by a lot of preparatory work. In all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large stocks of material and technical equipment were created. A day before the offensive in the fronts, reconnaissance in combat was carried out by advanced battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.
On the morning of July 12, after a powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By the middle of the day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments, separate tank brigades, broke through the enemy’s main line of defense and crossed the Fomin River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy tactical zone, in the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Panzer Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of the rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with the tank units, bypassing the strong strongholds of the enemy, with the active support of artillery and aviation, by the middle of July 13, completed the breakthrough of the second line of his defense.
After the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and the 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the forward detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.
In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and advanced here the 25th Tank Corps transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled the enemy's counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping from the southwest.
In order to develop the operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command reinforced the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army on the move was brought into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.
In order to finally defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Stavka reserve (commander General V. M. Badanov).
Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Panzer Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days, she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through the intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. By its actions, the 4th Panzer Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of the city of Bolkhov.
On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps), in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation, were transferred to the Bryansk Front.
The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.
The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st guards tank corps brought into battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, by the end of July 13, had completed the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they met fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.
In order to speed up the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commander General P.S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th air armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the line of Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo and, repelling strong enemy counterattacks, broke through his defenses on the Oleshnya River by the end of the day. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the enemy's Mtsensk grouping. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army struck at the Stanovoi Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day, she was handed over to the Central Front.
The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts forced the enemy to withdraw part of the forces of the Oryol grouping from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the counteroffensive of the troops of the right wing of the Central Front. By July 18, they restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.
By the end of July, the troops of three fronts engulfed the enemy's Oryol grouping from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, in an effort to avert the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. The Soviet troops began to pursue. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and liberated it by the morning of August 5. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.
Having mastered Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18, they reached the line Zhizdra, Litizh. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)
3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)
The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 bypass around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.
The idea of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command was to cut the opposing enemy grouping into two parts with powerful blows from the troops of the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and the steppe fronts, subsequently deeply cover it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.
The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, auxiliary, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.
The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow by the troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th army from the area northwest of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, the auxiliary - by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area southeast of Belgorod to western direction.
By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.
From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was provided, respectively, by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S. A. Krasovsky and S. K. Goryunov. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.
The command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, in order to achieve success in breaking through the enemy's defenses, resolutely massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. So, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.
There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in the armies, but also in the corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were supposed to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in military art.
Tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to act in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodulov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev, and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation, go to the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.
Artillery and engineering support for the introduction of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.
For aviation support of each tank army, one assault and one fighter aviation division was allocated.
In preparing the operation, it was instructive to misinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing areas of false concentration of troops, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.
The peculiarity was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.
Hiding behind the wrecked enemy tanks, the fighters are moving forward, the Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943
On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the troops of the fronts, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first position of the enemy. With the introduction of the second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To build up the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they overcame the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12-26 km deep, thereby separating the enemy's Tomarovsk and Belgorod centers of resistance.
Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy's resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and defeated the nearest operational reserves, the main strike force of the Voronezh Front, on the morning of the second day of the operation, proceeded to pursue the enemy.
On August 4, the troops of the 1st Panzer Army from the Tomarovka region began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th tank and 3rd mechanized corps, having reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by the middle of the day on August 6. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Panzer Corps liberated Bogodukhov.
The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing enemy resistance centers from the west, attacked Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.
By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy's strong defense center Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov grouping. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing the offensive in a southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift blow on the move, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy's escape route to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary grouping of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.
The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy on August 4, by the end of the next day took Belgorod by storm, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the front of the breakthrough of our troops reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of up to 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.
Kislov Photos
The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the line of Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I. A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tankers, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repulsing the fierce attacks of the Nazis, who were trying to capture them alive. In two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army had reached the line of the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began to regroup in the Bogodukhov area.
Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front by this time approached the outer defensive contour of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.
The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov grouping, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Dead Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Panzer Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. A tank battle ensued. In the course of it, the enemy pushed the formations of the 1st Panzer Army by 3-4 km, but could not break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards Armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. She conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted the combined arms and tank armies in repelling the counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy's counterattack from the south to Bogodukhov.
Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943
However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka region with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this grouping of the enemy, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st tank army from the Bogodukhov region, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. By the end of August 19, these forces, by strikes on the enemy's flanks, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrskaya group of Germans and completely defeated it.
At the same time, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched an assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.
Soviet soldiers inspect the German heavy tank "Panther" knocked out on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943
Photo - A. Morkovkin
The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km to the south and south-west, came close to the enemy's Donbass grouping. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed in the city and region (according to incomplete data) about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war, about 160 thousand people were deported to Germany, destroyed 1600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.
Thus, the Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and took an advantageous position to go on a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass.
4. Main conclusions.
The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended for us with an outstanding victory. Irreparable losses were inflicted on the enemy, all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov regions were thwarted.
The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment for our troops to go over to the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German strike groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was determined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts advancing in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This made it impossible for the fascist German command to carry out regroupings of troops in areas dangerous to it.
The success of the counter-offensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which had previously been created in the Kursk direction and were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.
For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through a well-prepared, in-depth enemy defense and the subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.
Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by forward battalions.
In the course of the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repulsing counterattacks by large enemy tank groupings. It was carried out with the close cooperation of all branches of the armed forces and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and crush his advancing troops, the fronts and armies part of the forces went over to a tough defense while delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy's counterstrike grouping. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and means of reinforcement, the tactical density of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2-3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.
What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from one-echelon to deep-echelon battle formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.
In the counter-offensive near Kursk, methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks increased compared to the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front. However, when breaking through a strong defense in depth of the enemy, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps have become the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of uniform composition have become the echelon of developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a pre-prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant losses of tanks, to the weakening of tank formations and formations, but in the specific conditions of the situation it justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the offensive of tanks and infantry.
There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars increased significantly in the direction of the main attack; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of attack support was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.
The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of Gott: the 2nd such SS corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of Soviet troops. And, based on the losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (From the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th tank army, General Fangor)
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.
On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. From the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps participated in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle from the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops could not move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical mistakes of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers over July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.
According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles on July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.
The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 143,950 people on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they considered the losses of their front at 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is in the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th armies of the enemy in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.
Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were not successful.
However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even despite the fact that the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500,000 look somewhat exaggerated.
On the other hand, even the Soviet commanders during the war did not consider the Soviet military reports about German losses to be true. Thus, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to the lower headquarters: “Looking through the daily results of the day on the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly overestimated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”
