USSR: Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR; regions: Pskov, Smolensk, Kursk, Oryol, Leningrad, Belgorod. |
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Aggression of Nazi Germany |
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Tactical - the defeat of Soviet troops in border battles and the retreat into the interior of the country with relatively small losses of the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies. The strategic outcome is the failure of the blitzkrieg of the Third Reich. |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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Joseph Stalin |
Adolf Gitler |
Semyon Timoshenko |
Walther von Brauchitsch |
Georgy Zhukov |
Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb |
Fedor Kuznetsov |
Fedor von Bock |
Dmitry Pavlov |
Gerd von Rundstedt |
Mikhail Kirponos † |
Ion Antonescu |
Ivan Tyulenev |
Carl Gustav Mannerheim |
Giovanni Messe |
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Italo Gariboldi |
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Miklos Horthy |
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Josef Tiso |
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Side forces |
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2.74 million people + 619 thousand Reserve GK (VSE) |
4.05 million people |
Military casualties |
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2,630,067 killed and captured 1,145,000 wounded and sick |
Approximately 431,000 dead and dead 1,699,000 missing |
(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - a plan for the German invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and a military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.
The development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21. The lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers was envisaged, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with the subsequent exit to the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.
The estimated duration of the main hostilities, calculated for 2-3 months, is the so-called Blitzkrieg strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).
After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments also increased sharply in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government announced the inevitability of a war with the USSR in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry into the war of Great Britain and France, the German government decided to secure itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union sent troops and annexed former possessions from Poland Russian Empire: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.
In 1940, Germany captured Denmark and Norway (the Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, withdraw France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for an early end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its forces to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would give her a free hand to fight the United States.
However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to conclude peace or defeat her. The war continued, fighting took place at sea, in North Africa and the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany attempted to bring Spain and Vichy France into an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.
The Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions set by it were unacceptable for Germany, since they demanded that she refuse to interfere in Finland and closed her the possibility of moving to the Middle East through the Balkans.
However, despite these autumn events, based on Hitler's demands put forward by him in early June 1940, the OKH draws up draft plans for a campaign against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan, code-named "Plan Barbarossa", began. The decision to go to war with the USSR and overall plan future campaign was announced by Hitler shortly after the victory over France - July 31, 1940.
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England's Hope - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […] If Russia is defeated, England will lose her last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline - spring 1941. The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia. […] Beginning [of the military campaign] - May 1941. The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start already this year, but this is not suitable, since it is necessary to carry out the operation with one blow. The goal is to destroy the life force of Russia. The operation is divided into: 1st hit: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa. 2nd strike: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a bilateral strike - from the north and south; later - a private operation to seize the Baku region. |
The Axis are made aware of the Barbarossa plan.
The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is " defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign before the war against England is over". The concept was based on the idea " to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with quick and deep blows from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groupings of enemy troops". The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers, preventing them from retreating inland.
In development of the Barbarossa plan, on January 31, 1941, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces signed a directive on the concentration of troops.
On the eighth day, German troops were to reach the line of Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture the territory and reach the line: the Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikiye Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pyarnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was supposed to concentrate and regroup formations, rest the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.
Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: " The capture of this city means both politically and economic relations decisive success, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose the most important railway junction". The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw the last remaining forces to defend the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.
The line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan was indicated as the final one, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation so far.
The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the procedure for interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including the assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, the disinformation directive, the calculation of the time for preparing the operation, special instructions, etc.
In Directive No. 21 signed by Hitler, the date of May 15, 1941 was called as the earliest date for the attack on the USSR. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, June 22, 1941 was named the next date for the attack on the USSR. The final order was given on 17 June.
Soviet intelligence managed to get information that Hitler had made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word "Barbarossa". And the information received about the possible start of the war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war in England were unconditional disinformation, since Directive No. 21 indicated the approximate date for the completion of military preparations - May 15, 1941, and emphasized that the USSR should be defeated " more before that How will the war against England be ended?».
Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare the defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic staff game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.
The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, former boss General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Belostok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th army occupied the most disadvantageous location. Such an operational configuration of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement from the side of Grodno and Brest by striking under the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front troops in the Grodno-Suvalkovsky and Brest directions was not deep enough and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough here and the coverage of the Bialystok grouping. This erroneous disposition of troops, admitted in 1940, was not eliminated until the war itself ...»
Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, about the meaning and purpose of which discussions continue. In late May-early June 1941, troops were partially mobilized under the guise of reserve training camps, which made it possible to call up over 800 thousand people used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; from mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began to advance from the internal military districts to the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a covert regrouping of the formations of the western border districts themselves began: under the guise of reaching the camps, more than half of the divisions that made up the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From June 14 to June 19, the commands of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line departments to field command posts. Since mid-June, vacations for personnel have been canceled.
At the same time, the General Staff of the Red Army Army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the foreground. Only on the night of June 22 did the Soviet military districts receive a directive on the transition to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border were given to the commanders of the western districts from June 14 to 18.
In addition, most of the territories located on the western border were included in the USSR relatively recently. The Soviet army did not have powerful defensive lines on the border. The local population was rather hostile towards the Soviet authorities, and after the German invasion, many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.
Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.
In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.
By the beginning of the forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, came in third place after the USA and Germany in terms of the development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.
Early in the morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy declared war on the USSR (Italian troops began hostilities on July 20, 1941) and Romania, on June 23 - Slovakia, and on June 27 - Hungary. The German invasion took the Soviet forces by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; the Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1200 aircraft were disabled). German aircraft attacked naval bases: Kronstadt, Libava, Vindava, Sevastopol. Submarines were deployed on the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas, and minefields were laid. On land, after strong artillery preparation, the advanced units, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive. However, the Soviet command was unable to soberly assess the position of its troops. The Main Military Council on the evening of June 22 sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched on the enemy groupings that had broken through from the morning of June 23. As a result of the failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even more. The Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for the development of events, but giving the German aviation the opportunity to refuel.
On June 25, the Soviet command launched bombing attacks on Finnish territory. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and endangering Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. fighting soon turned into a positional war and had no effect on general position affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography, they are usually distinguished into separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.
At first, not one, but two tank groups acted against the Soviet North-Western Front:
An attempt by the command of the North-Western Front to launch a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the town of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 a decision was made to withdraw troops to the line of the Western Dvina.
But already on June 26, the German 4th tank group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (E. von Manstein's 56th motorized corps), on July 2 - at Jekabpils (G. Reinhard's 41st motorized corps). The infantry divisions followed the motorized corps. On June 27, units of the Red Army left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Group of the Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of the Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned to the southeast and entered the rear of the Soviet Western Front.
A difficult situation has developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (3rd Army in the Grodno region and 4th Army in the Brest region) suffered heavy losses. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23-25 ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, having overcome the resistance of the Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th Armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, in which the main forces of the Western Front found themselves.
On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; later, by decision of the military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the headquarters of the Western Front, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were first led by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June 30), then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Belostok-Minsk, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.
In early July, Wehrmacht motorized corps overcame the line of Soviet defense on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly ran into the troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the flared tank battle July 6-9 between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which Soviet side more than 1600 tanks participated, and from the German to 700 units, the German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units withdrew to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up starting positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.
The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful grouping of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. On June 23-25, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, together with aircraft, attacked Constanta. In an effort to stop the offensive of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with the forces of six mechanized corps (about 2500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody region, the Soviet troops were unable to defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lvov grouping (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front withdrew to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. In early July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to the counterattacks of the Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.
At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on July 2, the German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10, they reached the Dniester.
As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.
Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:
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« In general, it can already be said that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian land army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed ... Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The vast extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for many weeks to come. ... When we cross the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, it will be not so much about defeating the enemy’s armed forces, but about taking away the enemy’s industrial areas from the enemy and not giving him the opportunity, using the gigantic power of his industry and inexhaustible human resources, to create new armed strength. As soon as the war in the east passes from the phase of defeating the armed forces of the enemy into the phase of economic suppression of the enemy, the further tasks of the war against England will again come to the fore ...» |
On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advanced in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st motorized corps occupied Ostrov, on July 9 - Pskov.
On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Panzer Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) directions. However, the German 56th motorized corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, on July 19, the German command suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formations of the 18th and 16th armies approached. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the line of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.
On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area. The 8th Army was divided into two parts: the 11th Rifle Corps withdrew to Narva, and the 10th Rifle Corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.
On August 8, the offensive of Army Group North resumed on Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeisk, on August 10 - in the Luga region and in the Novgorod-Chudovsk direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19, the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.
On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, on August 20 - Chudovo. On August 23, battles began for Oranienbaum; the Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).
To reinforce Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth (39th and 57th motorized corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.
At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Luban, on August 30 went to the Neva and cut off the railway communication with the city, on September 8 they took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.
However, having decided to conduct Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps no later than September 15, 1941, which were called to participate in the last attack on Moscow.
On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, the Germans failed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops within the specified time frame. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further hostilities in the Leningrad direction, see Siege of Leningrad.)
On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in a northerly direction. Railroads were cut through which food was delivered to Leningrad through Lake Ladoga. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of a breakthrough of German troops to the rear and encirclement of the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the lines on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army launched a counterattack on the fascist troops that occupied Malaya Vishera. During the ensuing battles, the Malaya Vishera group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were driven back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.
On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group struck from the direction of Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, while three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk "cauldron" was over, the remnants of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were taken prisoner.
On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for Velikiye Luki for a whole month. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central sector of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.
Thus, taking into account two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and incessant attacks along the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the attack on Moscow. On July 30, she went on the defensive with her main forces and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat the Soviet troops in the Velikiye Luki region and capture Toropets on August 29.
On August 8-12, the advance of the 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Field Army began in a southerly direction. As a result of operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts in the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), launched on August 30 - September 1, was unsuccessful, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on September 10. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on 6 September.
In Moldova, an attempt by the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack by two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed back the Separate seaside army to Odessa. The defense of Odessa fettered the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.
Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Bila Tserkva direction. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were captured, including both commanders. But although the German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they failed to take Kyiv on the move.
Thus, the Army Group "South" was not able to independently solve the tasks assigned to it by the "Barbarossa" plan. From the beginning of August to the beginning of October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.
In pursuance of Hitler's order, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.
After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of the Army Group "Center" advanced on the connection with the 6th Army of the Army Group "South"; On September 9, both German armies joined in eastern Polissya. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was finally broken, both armies switched to mobile defense.
At the same time, the German 2nd Panzer Group, having repulsed the blow of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered the operational space. On September 9, V. Model's 3rd Panzer Division broke through to the south and captured Romny on September 10.
Meanwhile, on September 12, the 1st Panzer Group launched an offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead in a northerly direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups joined at Lokhvitsa. The main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front ended up in the giant Kiev "cauldron"; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. It turned out that the administration of the South-Western Front was defeated; the front commander, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos, died.
As a result, Left-bank Ukraine ended up in the hands of the enemy, the way to the Donbass was opened, and Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further military operations in the Donbas direction, see Donbas operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to the Crimea.
Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, the Crimea was important as a base for aviation. With the loss of the Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the possibility of raids on the oil fields of Romania, and the Germans would have been able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and concentrated on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.
On October 17, the Donbass was occupied (Taganrog fell). On October 25, Kharkov was captured. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - the forces of the Army Group "South" entrenched themselves at the turn of the Mius Front.
At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The following dates were indicated as the deadlines for achieving these goals: Moscow and Leningrad - August 25; the border of the Volga - the beginning of October; Baku and Batumi - early November.
On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Eastern Front of the Wehrmacht, it was said about the implementation of Operation Barbarossa in time:
However, Hitler was increasingly inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on August 4, he stated: First, Leningrad must be captured, for this the troops of the Gotha group are used. In the second place, the capture of the eastern part of Ukraine is carried out ... And only in the last turn will an offensive be undertaken to capture Moscow».
The next day, F. Halder clarified the opinion of the Fuhrer from A. Jodl: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Führer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine. We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.
On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive which stated: The most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets River and the blocking of Russian oil routes from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is the encirclement of Leningrad and the connection with the Finnish troops».
Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate attack on Moscow and turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help the Army Group South caused mixed assessments among the German command.
The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group G. Goth wrote in his memoirs: “ Against the continuation of the offensive against Moscow at that time there was one weighty argument of operational importance. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops stationed in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back to the south an enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper. An attempt to drop the Baltic grouping into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of Army Group Center, when advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being under attack, in the south this danger was already making itself felt ...»
The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group G. Guderian wrote: “ The battles for Kyiv undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, the question of whether this tactical success was also of major strategic importance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw period.».
Only on September 30 did the German troops, having pulled up their reserves, go on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, difficult weather conditions late autumn led to a halt in the offensive against Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further military operations in the Moscow direction, see the Battle of Moscow)
Final goal Operation Barbarossa was not achieved. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.
The main reasons can be attributed to the general underestimation of the Red Army. Even though before the war total and the composition of the Soviet troops was determined by the German command fairly correctly, the major miscalculations of the Abwehr should include an incorrect assessment of the Soviet armored forces.
Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, no more than 40 new divisions of the Red Army were expected to be encountered. In fact, the Soviet leadership only sent 324 divisions to the front in the summer (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence made a very significant mistake in this matter. Already during the staff games held by the German General Staff, it became clear that the available forces were not enough. The situation was especially difficult with reserves. In fact, the "Eastern Campaign" was to be won by one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of military operations, "which expands to the east like a funnel", German forces "will be insufficient if they fail to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians to the Kiev-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line."
Meanwhile, on the line of the rivers Dnieper-Western Dvina, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrated behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which the Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the advance of the enemy to the east.
In addition, due to the fact that the army groups struck in divergent directions on Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, it was difficult to maintain interaction between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central advancing group. These operations, although successful, resulted in the loss of time and resources of the motorized troops.
In addition, already in August, the question of the priority of goals arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict with each other, a crisis of command arose.
Army Group North failed to capture Leningrad.
Army Group "South" was unable to make a deep envelopment of its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) And destroy the main enemy troops on the right-bank Ukraine on schedule, and as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts were able to retreat to the Dnieper and gain a foothold .
Later, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center away from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.
In the autumn of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (the battle for Moscow).
The campaign of 1941 ended with the defeat of the German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under
Chapter 24
Early in the morning of June 22, the Führer's address to the people was broadcast over loudspeakers on the Berlin streets and special editions of newspapers were sold. Although the people were stunned by the attack on an ally, most Germans were relieved. Few people could understand the very fact of concluding an agreement with the Reds. Goebbels took up explanatory work. The propaganda chief immediately began to give directions to his subordinates: “Now that the Fuhrer has exposed the betrayal of the Bolshevik rulers, National Socialism and, consequently, the German people, the people are returning to the principles that inspired them - to the struggle against plutocracy and Bolshevism.” The Führer, he added, was confident that the Russian campaign would be over in four months. “But I tell you: it will be over in eight weeks,” Goebbels declared presumptuously.
He repeated this prediction at a reception at the Ministry of Propaganda. Turning to movie star Olga Chekhova, niece of the great Russian writer, he said, “We have an expert on Russia here. Do you think we will be in Moscow by Christmas?” Irritated by his impudence, the actress coldly replied: “You know, Russia is a boundless country. Even Napoleon was forced to leave.” From surprise, Goebbels was speechless. Ten minutes later, his adjutant approached the actress: “I think, madam, you are ready to leave. The car is waiting."
Stalin was at a loss. In a few hours, Soviet aviation lost 1200 aircraft, the defense was disorganized. Refusing to believe in the seriousness of the first reports coming from the combat area, Stalin ordered the Red Army not to enter German territory, and the aviation to limit its operations to the border strip. He was convinced that the Nazi attack was just an unfortunate mistake and that the war could be stopped by diplomatic means, and therefore left open radio communications with the German Foreign Ministry and asked Japan to mediate in resolving political and economic differences between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet ambassador to England had no such illusions. Maisky visited Foreign Minister Eden and directly asked whether the British government was going to relax its military efforts and, perhaps, heed Hitler's "peace offensive". Eden replied with a categorical "no". In the evening, Churchill confirmed this in an impassioned address to the country: “We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. We will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his clique." Churchill promised to provide all possible assistance to the USSR.
President Roosevelt condemned Stalin's dictatorial policies and his thirst for territorial acquisitions. But he feared Hitler and did not hesitate to endorse the State Department's statement that helping communism was in American security interests.
The Pope took a different position. Although he did not speak directly about the aggressive actions of Germany, he made it clear that he supported the struggle of Nazism against Bolshevism, describing it as "noble courage in defending the foundations of Christian culture." And a number of German bishops, as expected, openly supported the attack on the USSR. One of the ministers of the church called it the "European crusade", a mission similar to the exploits of the Teutonic Knights. He urged Catholics to fight for "a victory that will allow Europe to breathe freely again and open a new future for all countries."
Literally a day later, the interest of the Germans in the war began to fall. Citizens went about their daily business as if it were just another military campaign by Hitler. At 12.30 on June 23, the Fuhrer with his retinue left the capital. The train took him to the "Wolf's Lair", a new headquarters in the forest a few kilometers from Rastenburg in East Prussia. When, upon arrival at the place, everyone began to settle down in wooden houses and concrete bunkers, the Fuhrer's headquarters was dominated by confidence in a quick victory. However, Hitler was overcome by mixed feelings. “We just have to push the door, and the rotten building will collapse,” he said to Yodl. But he soon noticed the adjutant: “At the beginning of each campaign, you push the door into a dark room. No one knows what's waiting for you inside."
The first victories seemed to justify the most optimistic hopes. In two days, a huge number of prisoners of war were captured. Everywhere german tanks broke through the Soviet defenses. There seemed to be no organized enemy resistance. No details were given for the first week. But on Sunday, June 29, ten special messages, personally approved by Hitler, were read over the radio at one-hour intervals. Goebbels objected to excessive doses of information, but Hitler thought it was a brilliant idea. When Otto Dietrich reported the discontent of the people who were forced to sit at the radio all Sunday afternoon, Hitler replied that he knew the way of thinking and emotions of the masses better than all the intellectuals put together.
A column of captured Red Army soldiers. Minsk, 1941
The troops advanced rapidly. By June 29, almost half a million Red Army soldiers had surrendered. Halder wrote in his diary on 3 July: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won in fourteen days." The Fuhrer was sure that the Soviets were finished. “How lucky,” he enthused, “that we destroyed the Soviet tank power and aviation at the very beginning.” Many Western military experts shared this assessment, and the Pentagon argued when the Red Army would be finished off: in a month or sooner.
The advanced German units were followed by four "Einsatzgruppen" SS of three thousand people each. Their task was to ensure the security of the operational zone, in other words, repressions against the civilian population in order to suppress their resistance to the invaders. It was a special kind of police, subordinated directly to Reinhard Heydrich. "Troops special purpose"Not only active Bolsheviks, but also all Jews, as well as gypsies, "Asian subhumans" and "parasites" - insane and hopelessly ill were to be missed.
To carry out the massacres, Heydrich and Himmler personally selected officers, including a Protestant priest and doctor, an opera singer and a lawyer. It was hard to imagine that they were suitable for such work. But these people justified the hopes of their bosses and, despite remorse, became skillful executioners.
Most of the victims were Jews. They had no idea of Hitler's program of "racial cleansing": little was reported in the Soviet press about the anti-Semitic atrocities of the Germans. Therefore, many Jews became easy prey for the Einsatzgruppen.
The extermination of the Jews was carried out with cold calculation. The work of the SS units rarely met with resistance. “Oddly enough, the condemned allow themselves to be shot in peace,” one commander reported. “This applies to both Jews and non-Jews.”
Heydrich's most serious problem was the mental breakdown among the SS. Some of them received nervous shocks, hit hard drinking, suffered from gastrointestinal diseases. And there were those who performed their task with excessive zeal and sadistically beat the arrested, violating Himmler's order that the liquidation must be carried out in a "humane way."
Himmler himself had repeatedly witnessed the demoralizing effect of daily killings. During his summer trip to Minsk, he asked the commander of the Einsatzgruppe to shoot one hundred arrested people in his presence. When the squad of soldiers raised their rifles, the SS chief noticed one fair-haired young prisoner with blue eyes, who seemed to him a typical Aryan. Himmler asked if he was Jewish. Yes, a Jew, he replied. “And the parents are Jews?” Himmler continued to interrogate. "Yes," replied the condemned. “But, perhaps, one of the ancestors was not a Jew?” the chief executioner did not back down. Hearing a negative answer, he stamped his foot, “In that case, I can’t help you…”
Shots rang out. Himmler stared at the ground and shifted nervously from foot to foot. A second volley was heard. Looking up, he saw that the two women were still writhing on the ground. “Don't torture these women!” he shouted. “Finish them, quickly!” SS Obergruppenführer von Bach-Zelewski, commander of the "special forces" in Central Russia, accompanying Himmler, asked the chief to look at the firing squad. “They are already dead people. Who are we educating? Neurasthenics or cattle!”
Himmler ordered everyone to assemble and made a speech. Your work is disgusting, he said, but no one should feel remorse: the soldiers are obliged to obey any order without question. Before God and the Fuhrer, he alone is responsible. Everyone, of course, noticed that this bloody work was very unpleasant for him, it shocked him to the core. But he, too, obeys a higher law, doing his duty.
Rosenberg received an order from Hitler to develop a scheme for the administration of the eastern territories. The Reichsminister wanted to introduce limited self-government here. Since the Führer had previously agreed to the establishment of "weak socialist states" in the conquered lands of Russia, Rosenberg optimistically believed that Hitler approved in principle of his plan, which was to be discussed at a special meeting in the "Wolf's Lair" on July 16. “We must not inform the world of our intentions,” Hitler declared. - The main thing is that we ourselves know what we want. We will take all necessary measures, which we consider necessary - executions, resettlement, and the like. In principle, we must cut the giant pie according to our needs in order to dominate, secondly, govern, and thirdly, exploit. The Russians began to wage a guerrilla war behind the front line. Such actions give us the right to exterminate anyone who opposes us. Rosenberg's plans for "weak socialist states" collapsed like a house of cards.
What a tragedy, he thought, that Hitler was keeping misrepresentation about the Slavs, which he had formed in his youth in Vienna on the basis of incendiary pamphlets that portrayed the Slavs as a lazy, primitive, hopelessly second-rate race. Hitler's complete misunderstanding of the structure of the Soviet Union will also turn into a disaster. The Ukrainians and other peoples under the yoke of the Great Russians were potential allies of the "Third Reich" and could become a bulwark against Bolshevism if they were treated properly. But Bormann and Goering convinced the Führer that they were enemies that should be controlled only with the help of a whip.
In the early summer of 1941, Hitler fell ill. The stomach cramps returned. His body was undermined by an excessive dose of drugs: 120-150 anti-gas pills a week, as well as a dozen injections of the potent drug Ultraseptil. The Fuhrer then developed dysentery, a common illness in the swampy area where the Wolf's Lair was located. He suffered from diarrhea and nausea, he alternated between fever and sweat ... During a sharp argument with Ribbentrop at the end of July, Hitler suffered a heart attack. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, from the very beginning opposed to Barbarossa, could not restrain himself and began to loudly express his disapproval of the Fuhrer's Eastern policy. Hitler turned pale, made an attempt to object, but stopped in mid-sentence, clutched his heart and collapsed into a chair. Everyone was terrified. “So don’t talk to me anymore,” Hitler finally said.
Dr. Morel was so alarmed that he sent the Fuhrer's cardiogram to the director of the Heart Institute, Professor Karl Weber. He did not know that the Fuhrer himself was the patient. The diagnosis was disappointing: rapidly progressive coronary sclerosis, almost incurable heart disease. Probably Morel did not tell Hitler about this, on the contrary, he said that the Fuhrer's heart was in excellent condition.
Hitler fell ill in the midst of a conflict with his military leaders. He ordered to stop the advance on Moscow, taking away the most powerful armored formations from Army Group Center. One of them was sent to the north for the operation to capture Leningrad, the other to the south to facilitate the capture of Ukraine. In Hitler's opinion, these two districts were more important than Moscow. Leningrad, this large industrial center, was considered a symbol of the Bolshevik revolution. Ukraine was the breadbasket of the country, and Crimea was an unsinkable Soviet aircraft carrier for raids on the Ploiesti oil region in Romania. It could also be used as a springboard for a breakthrough to the Caucasus.
Hitler's illness made it possible for Brauchitsch and Halder to make adjustments to the Fuhrer's strategy. Only in mid-August, when Hitler felt better, did he fully realize what was going on behind his back: neither his directives nor Halder's plan were carried out, some kind of compromise was being carried out. To clarify the situation, on August 21, Hitler issued an unequivocal order: "The most important goal to be achieved by winter is not Moscow, but the Crimea." The attack on Moscow, in the opinion of the Fuhrer, cannot begin until Leningrad is isolated and the enemy's 5th army in the south is defeated. The order was followed a few hours later by a lengthy memorandum on how to wage war. It contained accusations against unnamed commanders that they were guided by "selfish desires" and "despotic inclinations." The army command was characterized as a bunch of empty heads, "ossified in outdated theories."
“A black day for the army!” Engel wrote in his diary. “Unbearable!” echoed Halder. - Unheard of! This is the limit! On August 22, he had a lengthy conversation with Brauchitsch about the Fuhrer's "unacceptable" interference in army affairs. The result of this conversation was a proposal to both of them to resign. But the depressed, sickly field marshal refused to follow the advice of the chief of the general staff. Moreover, he did everything to suppress the "rebellion" in his headquarters, assuring Halder that the Führer had personally promised that as soon as victory was secured in Ukraine, all forces would rush to Moscow. The 'revolt', if you can call it that, ended with a low grunt.
This crisis faded into the background when Mussolini's highly publicized departure to the front took place. The Duce intended to convince Hitler that it was necessary to increase the size of the Italian expeditionary force. The Roman dictator thus wanted to get his share of the glory in the destruction of communism. But he was in poor shape and could not argue with Hitler. The recent death of his son in a plane crash severely traumatized Mussolini.
Hitler met the Duce at a small station not far from his headquarters and for almost the whole day did not let him open his mouth. The Führer talked incessantly about the impending victory in the East, about the stupidity of France and the malicious machinations of the Jewish clique that surrounded Roosevelt. When at last the guest hinted that he wanted to send more troops to the Eastern Front, Hitler changed the subject of the conversation. His protracted monologue continued for several more days, and Mussolini was so fed up with tirades about the glory and exploits of Germany that he tried to turn the conversation to the victories of Ancient Rome ...
Later, near Uman in Ukraine, they inspected an Italian division, and when the Bersalieri in feathered helmets raced on motorcycles shouting “Duce!”, Mussolini beamed. But after dinner, Hitler left the guest and went to the military units. The Duce felt insulted and on the way back he decided to "repay" the unceremonious owner. He went into the cockpit and had a long conversation with Hitler's pilot Baur. He was touched by the attention of the distinguished guest and allowed him to sit at the helm of the aircraft. Hitler was shocked.
The results of the visit upset Mussolini. He was worried that the war in the East would be long and bloody. The Duce's depression turned to fury when he learned that Ribbentrop did not want to publish a joint communiqué about his visit. This time, Hitler gave in to Mussolini and put Ribbentrop in his place. Duce perked up. He summoned his ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, and gave him instructions on covering his trip to? front. “Do not forget to mention,” the conceited Duce emphasized, “that for a significant part of the way I myself piloted the Fuhrer’s four-engine plane!”
At the Wolf's Lair, Hitler revised his strategy, concluding that the time had come to launch an offensive against Moscow. Over a cup of tea, he told the secretaries and adjutants: “In a few weeks we will be in Moscow. There is no doubt about it. I will wipe this cursed city from the face of the earth and build an artificial lake in its place. The name "Moscow" will disappear forever." On September 5, he told Halder: "Start an offensive on the Central Front in eight to nine days." His remarks were recorded by Werner Koeppen, Rosenberg's liaison at the Fuhrer's headquarters. Since the beginning of July of this year, at the request of his boss, he has discreetly recorded Hitler's table conversations. Koeppen furtively made notes on table napkins, and in the evening, secluded, wrote down those parts of the conversation that he remembered well. The original and a copy of the recording were sent to Berlin by courier.
Koeppen did not know that there was another chronicler at the table. Shortly after his arrival at the Wolf's Lair, Bormann suggested to his adjutant Heinrich Heim that he discreetly write down everything the Fuhrer says. Heim took detailed notes on cards he held on his lap.
The records of Heim and Koeppen provide a rare insight into the mechanism of events that unfolded on the Eastern Front.
Hitler assured the listeners that the seizure of the Russian space would ensure Germany's world domination. “Then Europe will become an impregnable fortress. Such prospects will open that the majority of Western democrats will believe in the new order. At present, the most important thing is to win "living space". After that, everything will be a matter of organization.” The Slavs, he said, are born slaves who feel the need for a master, and the role of Germany in Russia will be the same as that of England in India. "Like England, we will run this empire with a handful of people."
He spoke at length about his plans to make the Ukraine the breadbasket of Europe and make the conquered peoples happy with scarves and glass beads, and then admitted that while everyone else dreamed of an international peace conference, he preferred to fight another ten years of war rather than lose fruits of victory.
The capture of Kyiv three days later caused rejoicing in the Wolf's Lair. This means, predicted Hitler, the imminent conquest of the whole Ukraine and justifies his insistence on delivering the main blow in a southerly direction. At dinner on September 21, the Fuhrer beamed, announcing the capture of 145,000 Red Army soldiers in the vicinity of Kyiv. The Soviet Union, Hitler argued, was on the brink of collapse.
During dinner on September 25, he spoke of how dangerous these "sub-humans from the east" were; Europe will not be calm until these Asians are pushed back beyond the Urals. "They are brutes, and neither Bolshevism nor tsarism have anything to do with it, they are brutes by nature." In the evening, Hitler continued to ornate at the table, extolling the virtues of war and comparing a soldier's first battle with a woman's first sexual experience, since both are an act of aggression. “In war, a young man becomes a man. If I myself had not been hardened by this experience, I would not have been able to take on such a grandiose mission as building an empire.
The table talk dealt almost exclusively with the war in the East. On the other front - in North Africa - there were no active operations. English attempts to repel Rommel failed, and by early autumn the desert was quiet. Neither side was ready to attack. Hitler's energy and the power of the Wehrmacht were focused on a general offensive against Moscow, but Field Marshal von Bock warned that the timing was bad. Why not survive the winter in fortified positions? Hitler responded with a kind of allegory: "Before I became chancellor, I thought that the General Staff was a dog that had to be held tight by the collar so that it would not attack anyone who noticed." But, the Fuhrer continued, this "dog" was far from ferocious. He was against rearmament, the occupation of the Rhineland, the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and even against the capture of Poland. “It is I who have to set this beast,” Hitler concluded.
He insisted on a massive offensive against Moscow, and Operation Typhoon began on the last day of September. Its goal was to destroy the Soviet forces on the central front with the help of tank pincers.
The Soviet high command was taken by surprise. During the first day, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group advanced 80 kilometers. Infantry rushed into the gap, crushing isolated pockets of resistance.
Hitler was so sure of victory that he took his special train to Berlin. The next day, he delivered a speech at the Sports Palace. Hitler began to list the losses of the enemy: two and a half million prisoners of war, 22,000 artillery pieces destroyed or captured, 18,000 tanks, about 15,000 aircraft. The numbers were impressive. German soldiers advanced a thousand kilometers, over 25 thousand kilometers destroyed railways in the occupied territory are again put into operation, and most of them have already been transferred to the German, narrower gauge. At the same time, the Fuhrer expressed concern. The war in the East, he stressed, is a war of ideologies, so all the best elements in Germany must rally and become a monolith. “Only then can we hope that Providence will be with us. Almighty God never helped the lazy. He does not help even a coward, ”concluded Hitler. He ended his speech with the words: "The enemy has already been defeated and will never rise." The hall burst into thunderous applause,
By evening, a message was transmitted that Guderian's tankers had taken Orel.
The next day, Hitler returned to the Wolf's Lair, and all the inhabitants of the Fuhrer's headquarters noticed that he was in a particularly good mood at dinner. The dinner conversation on October 6 focused on Czechoslovakia, where underground activity had intensified. And in this, according to the Fuhrer, the Jews were to blame: this is the source through which enemy propaganda spreads. Immediately, a decision was made to deport the Jews "far to the East."
On this day, Guderian took Bryansk and completed the encirclement of the Soviet armies defending it. Two days later, reports from the front reported that the Red Army could be "basically considered defeated." Inspired by the impending capture of Moscow, Hitler ordered that no German soldiers enter the capital. “The city,” he said, “will be destroyed and completely wiped off the face of the earth.”
On October 9, German newspapers reported a great victory - the encirclement of two Soviet fronts. The mood of the Germans rose sharply. The previously tense faces were now radiant. In restaurants and pubs people got up in Nazi salute when "Horst Wessel" and "Germany above all" sounded on the radio. Rumors spread in the capital that Moscow had fallen.
On the same day, Field Marshal von Reichenau, the first general to go over to the Nazis, issued an order for the 6th Army to step up measures against the partisans. It said that this was not an ordinary war, but a mortal struggle between German culture and the Jewish-Bolshevik system. "Therefore, the soldier must be fully aware of the need for cruel but just measures against Jewish subhumans." The same orders were issued by Rundstedt, Manstein and other military leaders.
Hitler's statement that the Red Army was defeated and victory secured was not just propaganda to raise the morale of the country. He believed what he said, unlike his more pragmatic propaganda chief. On October 14, Goebbels began his speech to the apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry with an optimistic statement: “Militarily, the war has already been won. All that remains to be done is predominantly political, both at home and abroad.” Then he began to contradict himself, warning that the German people must be ready to continue the war in the East for another ten years. Therefore, the task of the German press is to strengthen the resilience of the nation.
Meanwhile, reports indicated that the diplomatic corps had moved from Moscow to Kuibyshev. The evacuation from the capital of high-ranking party leaders and members of the secret services began.
In Berlin, in the corridors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Vilyelmstrasse, they said that Stalin had asked for peace through the Bulgarian Tsar Boris. Fritz Hesse asked Ribbentrop if this was true, and Ribbentrop told him in great confidence that Hitler had turned down the offer because he was sure of a close victory. Most of the military leaders shared his optimism. For example, Jodl had no doubt that the Soviets had used up their last reserves.
The demoralized Stalin finally began to come to his senses. Appearing in the Kremlin, he asked the chairman of the Moscow Council: "Will we defend Moscow?" And without waiting for an answer, he declared a state of siege. Violations of law and order were to be severely punished. All spies, saboteurs and provocateurs were to be shot on the spot. These cruel measures raised the morale of Muscovites.
The Soviet troops defending Moscow held firm, and the advance of the German tank wedges, which approached the capital at a distance of sixty kilometers, slowed down. Then the weather changed dramatically. The autumn rains began, and the powerful German T-4 tanks got stuck in the mud, while the more maneuverable Soviet T-34s were not afraid of off-road.
Hitler's most significant victories in the past two years have been won by massive tank attacks supported by aircraft. But now the powerful machinery skidded in a sea of mud, and poor visibility forced the Luftwaffe to remain on the ground. There was no more mobility or firepower, and the lightning war that Hitler had staked on bogged down. Most military leaders believed that the main reason for the failure was Hitler's refusal to launch an offensive a month earlier. If the Fuhrer had followed their advice, the generals argued, Moscow would have been taken and the Red Army would have been defeated.
At the end of October the rain turned to snow. The attack has stopped. The situation became so desperate that the architect Giesler was ordered to interrupt the work on the reconstruction of German cities. All workers, engineers, building materials and equipment were transferred to the East to lay roads, repair railways, build stations and locomotive depots.
Hitler seemed to remain confident that victory was imminent. On the eve of his departure to Munich to celebrate the anniversary of the "beer putsch", he enlivened the dinner with jokes and memories...
During these hours in Moscow, his personal enemy spoke at a solemn meeting on the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution in the spacious lobby of the Mayakovskaya metro station. Stalin admitted that the losses on the battlefield amounted to almost 1,700,000 people. But the Nazi claim that the Soviet regime is collapsing has no basis, he said. On the contrary, the Soviet rear is now stronger than ever... While the Germans are fighting with the support of numerous allies - Finns, Romanians, Italians and Hungarians, Russia faces a difficult task: not a single British or American soldier is yet able to help her. Stalin appealed to Russian national pride, mentioning in this connection the names of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Gorky and Chekhov, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Sechenov and Pavlov, Suvorov and Kutuzov. The German invaders want a war to exterminate the peoples of the Soviet Union. If they want a war of extermination, they will get it, Stalin concluded.
The next morning, November 7, Stalin delivered a speech to the troops in Red Square. Artillery cannonade was heard here, and patrols roared in the sky. Soviet fighters. “How can you doubt that such a people will overcome the German invaders,” Stalin addressed the troops. - Who has not threatened the long-suffering Russian land! Teutonic knights, Tatars, Poles, Napoleon... The same fate awaits the current enemy - he will be defeated. And let the images of our great ancestors inspire you for this: Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Minin and Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov.
On November 8, Hitler arrived in Munich. He spoke at a meeting of the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters, then gave a speech in the Levenbräukeller beer hall in which, among other things, President Roosevelt warned that if American ships began to fire on German ships, they would pay for it. Hitler uttered menacing words, but in fact he was alarmed. The Eastern Campaign came to a standstill.
The next day, Hitler reminded his entourage of the fate of Napoleon's army in Russia. But Field Marshal von Bock was optimistic. He urged to continue the offensive. The field marshal was supported by Brauchitsch and Halder.
When the Japanese ambassador to Germany, General Oshima, appeared in the Wolf's Lair, periodically paying visits to Hitler, he complained that winter had come much earlier than his meteorologist had predicted. Then the Fuhrer expressed doubt that Moscow could be taken this year.
The cold intensified. Hitler at one time forbade commissary services to store winter clothes; and the soldiers were dying. On November 21, Guderian called Halder and reported that his troops had "reached the limit of their endurance." He intends to visit von Bock and ask the field marshal to change the orders just issued, because "he does not see the possibility of their implementation." But the field marshal, under direct pressure from the Fuhrer, did not want to heed Guderian's requests for anything and ordered the attacks to be resumed. After a slight advance, the troops again ran out of steam. Arriving at the forward command post, von Bock ordered a new attack on 24 November. She was stopped by a snowstorm and fanatical Russian resistance.
Five days later, a crisis broke out in the south. Field Marshal von Rundstedt was forced to leave Rostov, captured only a week ago. Angry Hitler telegraphed Rundstedt to remain in his positions. The army group commander replied that his troops were unable to do so. If they don't retreat, they will be destroyed. The field marshal demanded that the order be canceled and warned that otherwise he would be forced to resign. The latter especially angered the Fuhrer, and he immediately informed the commander of the army group that he was granting his request. In place of Rundstedt, he appointed one of the oldest military leaders, Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau, and he himself flew to Mariupol to deal with the situation on the spot, Hitler called an old comrade, the commander of the SS division Sepp Dietrich and, to his disappointment, found out that he was completely I agree with Rundstedt in assessing the current situation.
Having given the order to Reichenau to hold on, he summoned Rundstedt. He was already packing his things, going home, and believed that the Fuhrer wanted to apologize to him. But Hitler had no intention of doing so. He began to scold the field marshal, saying that in the future he would not tolerate resignations. “I myself, for example, am not able to go to the Almighty and tell him:“ That’s enough, I’m tired of taking responsibility alone, ”Hitler said irritably.
The news of the surrender of Rostov caused a gloomy mood in Berlin. But the failure in the south was soon overshadowed by the emerging catastrophe on the Central Front. The general offensive against Moscow ran out of steam. Although one army intelligence unit reached the outskirts of Moscow in early December and even saw the towers of the Kremlin, it was quickly dispersed by tanks and militia units. Field Marshal von Bock, suffering from stomach pains, admitted to Brauchitsch by phone that the troops were physically exhausted. On December 3, von Bock called Halder and informed him that he intended to go on the defensive.
The next day, the thermometer dropped to minus 31 degrees. Tanks could only be started by warming up the engines. The cold disabled the telescopic sights. The soldiers did not have winter clothes, woolen socks. On December 5, the temperature dropped another five degrees. Guderian not only stopped the offensive, but also began to retreat to more convenient defensive positions.
On the same day, the commander of the Soviet Central Front, General Georgy Zhukov, launched a massive counteroffensive with forces of 100 divisions on a three-hundred-kilometer front. This combined attack of infantry, tanks and aircraft took the Germans by surprise, and Hitler not only lost Moscow, but was in danger of repeating the fate of Napoleon in the snowy expanses of Russia. The German high command was seized with horror and despair. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, sick and depressed, announced his desire to resign.
Hitler was close to despair. In the First World War, Russian infantrymen fought poorly, now they fought to the death. The dejected Fuhrer confessed to Jodl on December 6 that "victory can no longer be achieved."
For the past two years, Hitler has carefully avoided confrontation with the United States. Convinced that this country was in the grip of a "Jewish clique" that not only dominated Washington but also controlled the press, radio, and cinema, he exercised extreme restraint in the face of massive American aid to England. Although Hitler had a very low opinion of Americans as soldiers, he recognized the industrial power of the United States and sought to keep the overseas rival from direct participation in the war.
American military equipment was flowing into the British Isles in a continuous stream, but Hitler, trying to avoid incidents, forbade attacks on US warships and merchant ships. However, on June 23, 1941, President Roosevelt authorized the acting. Secretary of State Sumner Welles to make a statement that Hitler must be stopped at all costs, even if it means helping another totalitarian country. Roosevelt unfrozen Soviet assets of up to $40 million and then announced that the provisions of the Neutrality Act did not apply to the Soviet Union. The port of Vladivostok remained open to American ships. Two weeks later, on July 7, American troops arrived in Iceland to replace the English landing there, which had previously landed on this island.
Alarmed by these events, Hitler told the Japanese ambassador Oshima in mid-July that the current situation was changing his previous opinion that Japan should restrain England and strive for American neutrality. “The United States and England will always be our enemies,” he said. This understanding should be the basis of our foreign policy". "We must jointly destroy them," the Fuhrer added. As a bait, he suggested that Japan should help "credit the property" of the defeated Soviet Union and occupy its Far Eastern territories.
In Tokyo, these proposals were treated with restraint. The Japanese had already decided not to attack Russia from the east, but to move south into Indochina, which they soon captured without a fight. The latter provoked a negative reaction from the United States, which, in retaliation for this aggression, froze Japanese assets in America, thereby depriving Japan of its main source of oil. The Japanese leaders perceived this move as an attempt to disarm the empire and prevent Japan from taking its "rightful" place as the Asian leader.
A month later, Roosevelt met with Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland and signed the "Atlantic Charter" on the goals of England and the United States in the war. Its language not only left no doubt that Roosevelt was a staunch opponent of Hitler, but ironically disappointed Hitler's opponents in Germany, because the document did not draw a clear line between Nazis and anti-Nazis. The latter considered the charter an unofficial declaration of war against all Germans. They were especially offended by the point which spoke of the need for the disarmament of Germany after the war.
Hitler's hopes of avoiding the United States were dashed on the last day of October when the American destroyer Reuben James, escorting a convoy 600 miles west of Iceland, was sunk by a German torpedo, killing 101 Americans. In response, the United States expropriated the French liner Normandy, loaded 400 aircraft on it and sent it to Murmansk. A wave of anti-German speeches swept across America, and on November 7, the Lend-Lease Office was instructed to do everything to provide military and economic assistance to the Soviet Union. A billion dollars was allocated for this.
The next day, 8 November, Hitler delivered a belligerent speech in Munich in which he justified the sinking of the Reuben James and denounced Roosevelt's order "to fire on German ships as soon as they are seen", but at the same time emphasized that he himself ordered the German ships not to fire on American vessels except in self-defense. This speech was supposed to demonstrate to the whole world that the Fuhrer was striving to avoid war with the United States.
Nevertheless, Hitler's attitude towards the United States became tougher, and this was reflected in the behavior of Ribbentrop. On November 28, he invited General Oshima and expressed the wish that Japan would declare war on the United States and England. The Japanese ambassador expressed surprise at this proposal. Ribbentrop promised that if Japan started to fight America, Germany would support her.
This information was met by the Japanese General Staff with a sigh of relief. The Japanese fleet was already sailing for Pearl Harbor. On the last day of November, Oshima was instructed to immediately inform Hitler and Ribbentrop that the British and Americans planned to send military forces into East Asia, but this would be rebuffed, which could lead to war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries. On December 5, the German-Japanese Treaty was signed, according to which Germany promised to join Japan in the war against the United States.
In the Wolf's Lair, Otto Dietrich was the first to learn about the Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7. He hurried to Hitler's bunker, which at that moment was reading depressing reports from the Eastern Front. When Dietrich announced that he had important news, the Fuhrer looked at Dietrich with apprehension, believing that he had brought something far from joyful. But when Dietrich read out the message he had received, Hitler beamed, grabbed the paper from him and hurried to Keitel's bunker without his coat and cap. The Führer solemnly announced: “We cannot lose the war. Now we have a partner who has never been defeated in three thousand years.”
Desperate reports from the Eastern Front prompted Hitler to issue a new directive on 8 December. "Severe winter conditions, - it said, - and, as a result, difficulties in supplying troops are forcing us to immediately stop all major offensive operations and go on the defensive. After instructing Halder to draw up more specific instructions, he went to Berlin to personally deal with the problem of Pearl Harbor. Relief over the Japanese attack on the US naval base was replaced by concern. Pearl Harbor freed Stalin from fear of an attack from the east, and now he could send almost all the forces from Asia against Germany, transferring them to the west.
One of the first to visit the Fuhrer in Berlin was Ribbentrop, who announced that Ambassador Oshima was asking for an immediate declaration of war on America. Ribbentrop saw fit to warn that he did not consider Germany obligated to do so, since, under the Tripartite Pact, she should only help her ally in the event of a direct attack on Japan. But Hitler did not agree with this. “If we do not side with Japan,” he said, “the pact will be politically dead. But this is not the main reason. The main thing is that America is already firing at our ships. By doing so, it has already created a situation of war.”
There were also stronger arguments in favor of the decision to declare war on the United States: the aid received from Japan far exceeded the possible losses associated with America's entry into the war. From a propaganda point of view, the acquisition of such a strong ally as Japan should have markedly raised the spirit of the people after the failures in Russia. In addition, Hitler pursued ideological goals. Why not make 1941 the beginning of an all-out war against international Marxism (Russia) and international capital (America), the two hotbeds of international Jewry?
On December 11, Hitler spoke at a meeting of the Reichstag. “We always strike first,” he said. Roosevelt is as "crazy" as Woodrow Wilson. “First he provokes a war, then he falsifies the causes, then he puts on the mantle of Christian hypocrisy and slowly but surely leads mankind to war...” Having identified international Jewry with Bolshevik Russia and the Roosevelt regime, Hitler declared war on the United States. This decision of the Fuhrer was greeted with stormy rejoicing. The Chief of Operations listened to the speech with more anxiety than satisfaction. As soon as Jodl left the opera house, he called the Wolf's Lair to his deputy, General Warlimont. Upon learning that he listened to the Fuhrer's speech. Jodl ordered to predict possible US actions in the Far East and Europe and to prepare options for Germany's response.
But soon the situation on the Eastern Front became more complicated. The German retreat from Moscow threatened to turn into a stampede. The area to the west of the capital and the surroundings of Tula became a graveyard of enemy guns, vehicles and tanks. The confidence lost in the first months of the war returned to the Russians in victory. The Soviets publicly announced the failure of Hitler's attempt to encircle Moscow, and two days later the Politburo ordered the main government bodies to return to the capital.
Brauchitsch wanted to continue the withdrawal of troops, but Hitler, to the dismay of the generals, canceled his order: "Stand firm, not a step back!" The commander of the Central Front, Field Marshal von Bock, suffering from a stomach ailment, reported that he could no longer perform his duties. He was replaced by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge. The next day, December 19, Brauchitsch, who had just suffered a heart attack, plucked up the courage to argue with Hitler in private for two hours. He left him pale and shocked.
"I'm going home," he told Keitel. - He fired me. I can not do it anymore.
“And what will happen now?” Keitel asked.
I don't know, ask yourself.
A few hours later, Keitel was summoned to Hitler. The Führer read to him a short order from which it followed that he assumed command of the ground forces, inextricably linking the fate of Germany with his own. “The task of the commander-in-chief is to train the army in the National Socialist spirit, and I do not know a single general who can take on such a responsibility. For this reason, I took command of the army."
In fact, Hitler led the troops before, allowing the military to take the blame for all the failures. Now he became the official commander-in-chief and had to be personally responsible for everything that happened.
Under this name, a conference was held at Yad Vashem on June 20, 2011, timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the invasion of Nazi Germany into the territory of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The conference, held under the auspices of the Genesis Foundation and the Gurvich Family Foundation, was entirely devoted to the analysis of events on the territory of the former USSR during the Second World War.
At the beginning of the conference, Bella Guterman, Director of the International Institute for Shoah (Holocaust) Research, Avner Shalev, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Yad Vashem Memorial, Sana Britavskaya, Executive Director of the Genesis Foundation in Israel, addressed the participants with greetings.
Avner Shalev believes that research on this topic is particularly important. The topic of the USSR's participation in the war during the Cold War years was hushed up and ignored in the West, and the topic of the Holocaust was generally banned in the USSR. Sarah Britavskaya spoke about the trip to Ukraine by representatives of the Genesis Foundation. Everywhere in the shtetls they saw elements of Jewish life and the former life of the Jews, but they did not find the Jews themselves, Jewish life completely ceased in the shtetls. The topic of war on the territory of the USSR is important, it is closely connected with the Holocaust and needs further research.
A very informative paper, "The Second World War as an Ideological War" was presented by Professor Yehuda Bauer, Yad Vashem's Academic Advisor. The speaker set himself the task of finding an answer to the question: Why did the Second World War break out, who set the goal of kindling it and why? According to Bauer of the USSR, Stalin was not interested in the war; attempts were made by the USSR to negotiate with England and France. But these countries did not go for rapprochement with the USSR, believing that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union. The German people themselves also did not want war. After the death of several million Germans in the First World War, the presence of a huge number of war invalids, great economic difficulties, given the mood of the Germans, even Hitler spoke of peace. But the industrial capital of Germany did not exert any pressure on the Nazis in this matter. The armament of the army was in full swing, the industry worked for the war. The Sudeten crisis of 1938 did not lead to the support of the USSR from Britain and France. The German generals tried to overthrow Hitler and negotiate with the West, but these attempts came to nothing. These generals were not pacifists, they simply feared for the fate of Germany led by Hitler. The ideology of living space (Lebensraum) for the northern "Germanic" peoples was linked by Hitler and his entourage with the desire to capture Ukraine (grain, iron, coal) and the Caucasus (oil). But, Stalin, trying to avoid war, supplied Germany with everything necessary from food, raw materials and technology. Then why seize these lands if everything can be obtained without war. Now Germany has a much larger population than before the Second World War, but there is enough space for everyone, incl. the issue of living space was far-fetched. By 1938, unemployment was completely eliminated in Germany. The peasants had a job, wages grew. Those. the economy did not need war. From the documents of 1936 presented at the Nuremberg trials, it can be seen that the new Minister of Economics (appointed in October 1936), Goering, drew up a 4-year war preparation plan, which was supported by Hitler. This is reflected in Hitler's letter to Goering. They believed that after the French Revolution, the world would be drawn into a new conflict and world Jewry would strive for power. This, in turn, means the need for the complete annihilation of the Jews in Europe. Bolshevism, in their opinion, is a manifestation of Jewry. Hence - the capture of Ukraine, where, along with raw materials, Jews can also be destroyed. The conclusion suggests itself about the main reason for the Second World War - this is the ideology associated with the destruction of the Jews. As Hitler said, this is a war of ideologies. As a result of the war, 35 million people died in Europe alone, of which approximately 5.7 million were Jews. This ideology of war over anti-Semitism explains the Holocaust. The opinion that the war is predetermined by the internal struggle in Germany itself, Bauer considers erroneous. And although war is always predetermined by purely pragmatic reasons, but in the case of the outbreak of the Second World War, the main reason is ideology. Of course, a number of other reasons can be named, but the main thing here is the ideology of anti-Semitism.
Then several reports were presented to the attention of the listeners, united under the general title "The fight against Judeo-Bolshevism - from conventional to non-conventional war."
Speaker is Dr. Daniel Uzi. The topic of his report is "The Unknown War: An Analysis of the Eastern Company from a Political, Economic, Military and Ideological Point of View".
On that early morning of June 22, 1941, a new stage of the Holocaust and the extermination of the Jews of Europe began. This stage ended with the capture of the Reichstag and the death of Hitler. The beginning of this stage of the Second World War was the beginning of the end of Nazi Germany. Operation Barbarossa was the natural end of Nazi Germany. Many years passed, and again there was a debate about this war. Nazi Germany set two goals - to end Jewish Bolshevism and to destroy soviet state- to clear the territory of Euro-Bolshevism and create a living space for the "Germanic" peoples - Scandinavians, Flemings, Germans and partly French. This is a war - a crusade of the Western peoples against Bolshevism. Several major operations were planned. Only the northern front, with the aim of capturing Leningrad, included from the Germans several armies with a total number of half a million soldiers. For comparison, the total strength of the Israeli army is 450 thousand people. The main operation was the capture of the capital of the USSR - Moscow. One of the most important operations was the capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus. But, the USSR was a huge country, both in terms of territory and human and raw material resources. The Germans, in addition to capturing the territory, planned to destroy the Soviet army, fighting to destroy it. The balance of power was not in favor of Germany.
The USSR had superiority in tanks and aircraft. But we must also take into account the contribution of Germany's allies in the war. And we are talking about a coalition of a number of European countries, with fairly large armed forces. On the other hand, the armed forces of the USSR, located in the Far East, where they were ready to prevent an attack from Germany's ally Japan, are also usually not taken into account, although these troops played a huge role in defeating the Nazis later near Moscow. Germany wasted its military potential already in the first months of the war. At the same time, despite the huge losses in resources and people at the first stage of the war, a lot of forces and resources remained in the USSR. The losses of only the first day of the war amounted to about 2,000 Soviet aircraft. Significant difficulties with supplies for the army were experienced by the German forces - here and remoteness from supply bases, lack of fuel, bad roads, etc. Fatigue also affected, because the blitz krieg failed. As the war dragged on, disagreements arose in the German command. The dispute, in particular, concerned the protracted attempt to capture Moscow and the transfer of part of the forces from the Moscow direction to the south to capture Ukraine. At this time, there is a full-scale extermination of the Jews, but here the Germans, who are not ready for the harsh Russian winter, are captured by unprecedented frosts. Thanks to Sorge's intelligence, Japan's refusal to participate in the war on the territory of the USSR becomes clear. This leads to the transfer of fresh Siberian divisions to Moscow. The command of the Soviet troops, led by Zhukov, the greatest general of the Second World War, having accumulated strength, strikes at the fascist troops, which becomes the turning point of the entire Second World War. The Germans are beginning to realize that in this war they can be defeated. And this is not only a physical blow, but also a moral one. In addition, Japan strikes in December 1941 at Peel Harbar and is drawn into the war with the United States. So, December 1941 is the decisive month in the entire Second World War. Germany lacks the resources to support the economy. Hence the attempts to seize Ukraine and the rejection of further attempts to take Moscow. These are military operations of 1942 with attempts to enter the Caucasus to oil sources. In Germany itself, there was no transfer of all production to supply the front, and, as in peacetime, work was carried out in one shift. Meanwhile, the war is being fought on different fronts - from Murmansk to North Africa, the Germans are bombing London. At the same time, the USSR not only managed to move its industrial facilities deep into the rear - to the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia, and at the cost of enormous tension, inhuman difficulties and sacrifices, managed to establish and start supplying more and more military equipment and materials to the front. Stabilization of the war Soviet fronts in 1942 contributed to the extermination of the Jews. The defeat at Stalingrad and the destruction of the Romanian group of troops led to a change in the position of the Romanian leadership, which made it possible to save thousands of Romanian Jews.
Unfortunately, due to the Cold War, the decisive contribution of the USSR to the victory over Nazi Germany was ignored and forgotten. Also in the USSR, the topic of the Holocaust was ignored and emphasis was placed on propaganda of the superiority of the Soviet system regarding the war. The emerging thaw in the 70s of the 20th century led to attention in the West to the “unknown” war between the USSR and Nazi Germany, this topic then becomes very popular in the West.
In the report of Yitzhak Arad "Stages of "Operation Barbarossa" and their impact on the pace and goals of the actions of destruction." Arad remembers the first day of the war and Molotov's address to the Soviet people. He gives the contents of the orders of the Wehrmacht on the behavior of German soldiers in this war. This order of May 1941, which states that German soldiers are not subject to trial, no matter what offense they have committed. The second order speaks of the guilt of the Bolsheviks, and that the Jews and Bolsheviks must be brutally and vigorously suppressed. The third order deals with commissars and the need to execute them. There were no orders from Himmler to exterminate the Jews on the eve of the war. But, in July 1941, Himmler visited the Einsatzgruppen (extermination groups) and they received verbal instructions to exterminate the Jews. There was also an order to shoot Jewish men hiding in the swamps of Polesye, and to drive children and women into the swamps, where they would die. Until July, only Jewish men were killed, and from August women and children were also killed. Those remained alive where the seizure of territories by the Germans went as late as possible, and people managed to evacuate to a greater extent. The border regions of Belarus were captured in the first days of the war, and 5-6% of the Jews were saved. In Minsk, where the Germans arrived a week later, 20% of the population out of 70,000 Jews had already escaped. In Vitebsk, they even managed to evacuate factories.
Hitler sent part of his forces to Leningrad to cut off the Baltic Sea from the USSR. Part of the German forces carried out the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev. The direction of German troops to Moscow was held back at the beginning by a counterattack near Smolensk. a lack of work force led to a temporary suspension of operations to exterminate Jews. So, in Vilnius and Kaunas, Jews sewed warm clothes for German soldiers. Disputes arose between the German civil administration and the SS over the fate of the still living remnants of the Jewish population. The answer from Berlin was that economic considerations should not affect the extermination of the Jews, but this issue should be decided on the ground. As a result, about 40,000 Jews out of 250,000 Jews who previously lived in Vilnius, Kaunas, Siauliai remained to live. Some of the Jews were still alive in Minsk. About 20 thousand Jews survived as a result of the counterattack of the Soviet troops in Rostov-on-Don. But then the Germans re-captured this city. In the Moscow area, several towns were liberated and Jews were rescued there. The Jews of the Caucasus - the Tats were saved, because. the Germans could not immediately determine whether they were Jews, and then, as a result of a counterattack by the Soviet troops, they were saved. Their number was about 4000-5000.
In the summer of 1942, the Romanians promised Eichmann to send the Jews to the Belzhitsa concentration camp. But the Romanian authorities realized that the war was lost. As a result, 60-70 thousand Jews expelled from Bessarabia to Transnistria were saved. In March-April 1944, these areas were liberated.
In total, about 2.5 million Soviet Jews were destroyed, 100-110 thousand people survived in the occupied territories. Part of the Jews escaped in partisan detachments.
Leah Price and Shlomit Shulkhani then presented the Untold Stories website. Their presentations were united by the common theme "Places of massacres of Jews in the Soviet Union: presentation of an Internet research project."
In 1961, after the publication of Yevtushenko's poem "Babi Yar", a memorial was erected there. A monument was also erected to the exterminated Jews in the Ponara death camp. A lot of materials about places of mass death of Jews came to Yad Vashem in the 90s of the last century. Documents came from the archives of the NKVD, from the materials of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, from the archives of the Nuremberg trials, from German reports from the war, on the basis of testimonies, etc. Few documents were recorded in the USSR on the extermination of Jews, this topic was ignored. Documents on the same place of destruction are sometimes very contradictory.
As a result, the site presents all available materials in Russian and partly in English. It is also very interesting to get acquainted with the monuments to the dead - this is the language of the inscriptions, their content, alterations under pressure from the Soviet authorities. Here you can find the absence of an inscription that the dead are Jews, the subsequent alterations of Mogendavid into a five-pointed star, the absence of inscriptions in Hebrew.
After a break in the conference session, it was continued with the general theme “Conflicts and Identity in the First Months of the War: Germans, Belarusians, Poles and Jews”. In the opening speech of Arkady Zeltser, director of the Center for the Study of the History of Soviet Jews during the Shoah at Yad Vashem, he drew attention to the idea of Soviet patriotism, which was promoted before the war, excluding any national strife in the USSR, which was persecuted by the authorities at that time. Then Leonid Rein made a report on "The participation of the Wehrmacht in the actions of extermination in the "Eastern Territories" in the first months of the war." He began his speech with a story about the events in the town of Kodyma in October 1941. On October 1, a woman from local residents turned to the secret department of the German corps with a statement that she knew Yiddish and had heard Jews talking in this language about preparing an attack on the Germans. The German who listened to her did not doubt the authenticity of this message and passed this information on to the staff officer of the Sonderkommando, located 20 kilometers from Kodyma. An order was given to carry out an action against the Jews. The Sonderkommando, led by officer Prast, shot 100 Jewish men in the square of the town. The execution unit consisted of 2/3 of the Wehrmacht soldiers and 1/3 of the Einsatzgruppe. It was generally accepted that Wehrmacht soldiers did not participate in punitive operations. In fact, this does not correspond to historical reality. The Institute for Social Investigation in Hamburg organized the exhibition as evidence of the active participation of the Wehrmacht in the genocide of the Jewish people. This exhibition was the impetus for further research. The unkind treatment of Jews in the German army took place as early as the 19th century. It was then possible to take Jews to serve in the army only if they accepted Christianity. Eastern European Jewry was perceived in Germany through propaganda as a threat to the security and health of Germans, as well as a political threat. During the First World War, the German army was in the territories where Jews lived in Eastern Europe. Among the German soldiers then two tendencies were revealed in relation to the Jews - some of the soldiers began to treat these Jews better, and some worse. It was the latter part that perceived these Jews as a people lagging behind, as instigators of coups capable of sticking a knife in the back of the German people. After the Nazis came to power, the ideology of National Socialism penetrated deep into the consciousness of the masses. In 1935, according to the law on universal conscription, the German army was cleared of Jews. By 1939, Germany was openly declaring a war with world Jewry, it was called a plague that struck the peoples.
Introduction German troops to Poland became a kind of exam in racial theory for Wehrmacht soldiers. The Jews were presented as animals, for the murder of which there is no punishment. The army followed the installation that the Jews were the main carriers of the Bolshevik ideology, hostile to Germany. All these ideas found a practical way out already in the first days of the war on the territory of the USSR. In the Zhytomyr region, the town of Brusilovo, residents discovered the body of a German soldier. The investigation revealed that the killer had disappeared and that he was not a Jew. But, a number of Jews were arrested and shot. At the same time, it was asserted without evidence that the hostility of the Jews to the Germans was the reason for the murder of the soldier.
As they moved deeper into Soviet territory, organized local authorities authorities, and one of their first steps was to issue documents to the local population. Documents were not issued to Jews, which served as the basis for their further detention and executions. There were also pogroms by the local population. Parts of the Wehrmacht condemned the pogroms, but considered the revenge of the population for supporting the Jews of the NKVD during the years of Stalinist repressions. In the old fortress of Lutsk, 1,600 Jews were shot as a measure of revenge for the execution of Ukrainians by the Soviet authorities. In Liepaja already on July 4, 1941, the murders of the Jewish population began on the orders of the military commander of the city. Commanders and soldiers of the Wehrmacht took part in these killings. In Babi Yar, as a measure of revenge for the explosions in the center of Kyiv on the 20th of September 1941, executions of Jews were carried out with the participation of SS officers and the Sonderkommando. The Jews were accused of organizing the bombings. The Wehrmacht battalion under the command of Eberhard participated in the executions. In two days, 33,000 Jews were killed. Then the Wehrmacht engineers made explosions at the place of execution. The Wehrmacht was actively involved in many cases of extermination of the Jewish population.
The next report was presented in Russian, unlike all other reports delivered in Hebrew with simultaneous translation into Russian. This report by Yevgeny Rosenblat from Brest (Belarus) "Relations between Poles, Belarusians and Jews in the first months of the war" is presented here in audio recording.
The final report of the conference "Crushing Myths: Destroying Ideas about the Power of the Soviet Union and the Disappearance of Anti-Semitism in It" was read by Professor Mordechai Altschuler of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Professor Altshuler recalls a questionnaire for Soviet Jewish activists compiled about 40 years ago with many questions about the formation of the Zionist worldview in them. Possible answers were indicated - the emergence of Israel, the persecution of the Jews by the Stalinist regime, the six-day war, etc. Processing of the answers showed that 62% of the respondents pointed to the Holocaust. These answers prompted Altshuler to tackle this problem of the impact of the Holocaust on the consciousness of the Jews up to the present day. At the same time, the speaker distinguishes between Jews within the borders of the USSR before 1939 and after. Myths, as a system of views and worldviews, have undergone significant changes since the beginning of the war on the territory of the USSR. The beginning of the war became a critical point in relations between the state and society, a test of the veracity of the state ideology. According to these guidelines, people believed that the enemy who attacked the USSR would be destroyed in the shortest possible time, and the war would be waged outside the territory of the USSR. Faith in the might of the Soviet Army was unshakable. Molotov's speech
on the day the war began, also did not cause panic. Simultaneously with the bombing of Kyiv by the Germans, the radio reported that Soviet planes were bombing Berlin. Pre-war Soviet anti-fascist films praised the Red Army, the ideas of security and patriotism were reflected in many songs of that time. This belief was shared by the Jews of the USSR, and therefore many did not seek to evacuate while there was still such an opportunity. But the course of the war broke this belief. As early as October 1941, voices of dissatisfaction with the authorities were openly heard in Moscow. Many leaders fled to the rear of the country. During the two pre-war years, Stalin and the power structures of the USSR exported food and equipment to Germany, depriving their population of the most necessary. With the outbreak of the war, 600,000 people were released from the Gulag. It became clear to the population that the war was going on on Soviet territory and the army was defeated. Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941 only strengthened the understanding of the failure of the previous myths. The commotion was huge, long lines at the shops, food shortages, due to the capture of vast territories by the Germans, feelings of fear and fright arose.
There was a sharp turn in attitudes towards Jews among the local population. Anti-Semitism flourished in riotous colors. People said that the Germans would soon come, and we (Jews) would settle accounts. In the queues, one could hear talk about the need to exterminate the Jews. Before the war, Jews were convinced that anti-Semitism had been eradicated. The war showed that this was not the case. And, of course, the tragedy of the Holocaust is largely connected with the destruction of myths about a single Soviet people.
Such, in brief, is the content of this undoubtedly useful and interesting conference. For the first time at Yad Vashem, issues of the most important role of the USSR in the victory over fascist Germany were discussed so widely, linked to the theme of the Holocaust. Unfortunately, at this conference there was no discussion during the discussion, no questions from the audience. The conference had a one-sided character, although there were people in the hall who knew about this war not by hearsay, but from their own long-suffering life experience. There were war veterans, and former prisoners of the ghetto and concentration camps, home front workers and former refugees from that war on the territory of the USSR. There were also representatives of scientific circles and journalists dealing with these problems. I would like to hope that the format of the next two promised conferences at Yad Vashem on this topic will be different.
Also, unfortunately, for more than six months since the announcement of the competition of small grants for the development of projects in the field of Shoah (Holocaust) research in the territory of the former Soviet Union, conducted by the Genesis Foundation, the names of the winners and the grants allocated to them have not yet been announced. It would seem that at the indicated very representative conference, related to the same subject and the same Genesis Foundation, one could expect awards to the winners of the competition, but this was not done. From this, the value and significance of the competition has fallen significantly in the eyes of the public. It seems that such a long delay in time between the announcement of the competition and the awarding of grants for it is unacceptable.
These facts are clear evidence that Yad Vashem continues to ignore in its work the enormous intellectual potential that represents the intelligentsia that arrived from the former USSR and is able to greatly increase the effectiveness of this organization, undoubtedly important for Jews in the world. and for the global community.
09:35 04.02.2016
The Red Army in June 1941 surpassed the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of weapons available to the troops, despite the fact that Germany seized the weapons of all the countries of Europe it conquered, including the weapons of France, which had a huge number of tanks, guns and aircraft. In terms of the number of troops, the armed forces of only Germany surpassed Armed forces USSR by 1.6 times, namely: 8.5 million people in the Wehrmacht and a little over 5 million people in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army.
The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 by the writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book Russkaya Pravda, published in 2011.
In his author's materials, Maslovsky, according to him, exposes "the myths invented by Russia's ill-wishers about the events of the Great Patriotic War and shows the greatness of our Victory." The author notes that in his articles he is going to "show the unseemly role of the West in preparing Germany for war with the USSR." The Red Army in June 1941 surpassed the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of weapons available to the troops, despite the fact that Germany seized the weapons of all the countries of Europe it conquered, including the weapons of France, which had a huge number of tanks, guns and aircraft. In terms of the number of troops, the armed forces of Germany alone exceeded the Armed Forces of the USSR by 1.6 times, namely: 8.5 million people in the Wehrmacht and a little more than 5 million people in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. 
Such a balance of power took place despite the fact that, in preparation for repelling aggression, the USSR only in the period from 1937 to June 22, 1941 increased the strength of the Red Army from 1.433 million people to 5.1 million people. But when they talk about our defeats in 1941, they somehow casually mention the force that came against us at that terrible time. After all, this is not the strength of Germany, but of a huge “country” - Europe. It far exceeded our strength and capabilities in peacetime. It took 4 years of unlimited effort of all the forces of the entire Soviet people to defeat the enemy who attacked our country. At that time, the workers often slept in the shops, saving working time, and the soldiers and officers of the Red Army died in the tens of thousands in fierce continuous battles with the enemy. 
So let's consider the question of enemy strength. Germany's 8.5 million armed forces included 1.2 million civilians who were employed in all countries of Europe, and possibly in non-European countries. Of the 8.5 million people, the ground forces accounted for about 5.2 million people. The number of 8.5 million did not include the number of armies of the European allies of Germany, which have their own armed forces: Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland. And this is a considerable force - only, for example, the armed forces of royal Romania numbered from 700 thousand to 1 million 100 thousand people, and the armed forces of Finland - 560-605 thousand people. If we accept that on average the armies of these allies totaled 625 thousand people , and this is the minimum possible number, then we will see that, in fact, on 06/22/1941, Germany and its allies had at least 11 million trained, armed soldiers and officers, and Germany could very quickly make up for the losses of its army and strengthen its troops. Our Red Army 5 million people in 1941 were opposed by armies subordinate to Germany, with a total number of at least 11 million people. And if the number of only German troops exceeded the number of Soviet troops by 1.6 times, then together with the troops of the European allies it exceeded the number of Soviet troops by at least 2.2 times. Such a monstrously huge force opposed the Red Army. That is why Krebs informed Halder: “Russia will do everything to avoid war. He will make all concessions, including territorial ones. "The fact is that the number of "new Germany", that is, united Europe, amounted to more than 300 million people and by 1941 was more than 1.5 times the number of the USSR, in which at that time time lived 194.1 million people. 
The question may arise: why did the USSR in the pre-war period not bring the size of its army to 11 million people? It must be understood that these 11 million men had to be removed from National economy at a time when industry and agriculture cherished every pair of workers, it was necessary to arm them and train them in military affairs, dress them, put them on and provide them with normal food. Russia, which had just risen to its feet after two devastating wars, did not have the means to maintain the armed forces , equal in number to the armed forces of a rich and huge state in terms of numbers - Europe united by Germany. With the outbreak of war, enterprises switched to work with extended working hours according to wartime laws, some workers and specialists were drafted into the army, and women and children replaced them at the machine tools of factories, as a rule, performing work that did not require high qualifications. Skilled workers were booked, continued to work. The bulk of the peasants had no armor. 8.5 million people of the German army were armed with 5639 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand combat aircraft, over 61 thousand guns and mortars. The navy by June 1941 consisted of 217 warships of the main classes, including 161 submarines. On June 22, 1941, 5.5 million soldiers and officers of Nazi Germany and its satellites crossed the border of the USSR and invaded our land. Of the 5.5 million people in the armies of Germany's allies, there were at least 800 thousand people. 
During the war, the number of troops of states allied with Germany changed upwards. During the war, only 752,471 Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Finnish soldiers were taken prisoner by us. The 5.5 million army of Europe that attacked the USSR was armed with about 4300 tanks and assault guns, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4980 combat aircraft and over 190 warships. By June 1941, the number of Soviet Armed Forces was over 5 million people (5 080 977 people): in the Ground Forces and Air Defense Forces - over 4.5 million people, in the Air Force - 476 thousand people, in the Navy - 344 thousand people. The Red Army was armed with over 67 thousand guns and mortars, 1860 new tanks and over 2700 (3719 pieces, according to G.K. Zhukov) combat aircraft of new types. In addition, the troops had a large number of obsolete armored and aviation equipment. The Navy had 276 warships of the main classes, including 212 submarines. The number of troops that attacked us was approximately 500,000 greater than the number of all the armed forces of the USSR. But it must be borne in mind that in June 1941, the troops that were in the Far East in the event of a Japanese attack, in the Caucasus in the event of a Turkish attack, and in other dangerous directions did not participate in the war with Germany. I believe that at least one million military personnel were in the service in these places. Thus, the number of troops of the Red Army, intended to repel the attack of Germany with its allies, was no more than 4 million people on 06/22/1941 against 5.5 million people of German troops and its satellites. In addition, Germany from the first weeks of the war transferred fresh divisions from Europe to the Eastern Front. As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army at the beginning of the war, compared with the troops of Germany and its allies that attacked the USSR, had 19,800 units more guns and mortars, 86 units more than warships of the main classes, and also surpassed the attacking enemy in the number of machine guns. aviation, our army had them in quantities far exceeding the number of units of this equipment that the enemy had at the beginning of the war. But the main number of our tanks and aircraft, in comparison with the German ones, was an “old generation” weapon, obsolete. Most of the tanks were only with bulletproof armor. A considerable percentage were also defective aircraft and tanks to be written off. At the same time, it should be noted that before the start of the war, the Red Army received 595 KB heavy tanks and 1,225 T-34 medium tanks, as well as 3,719 aircraft of new types: Yak-1 fighters , LaGG-3, MiG-3, bombers Il-4 (DB-ZF), Pe-8 (TB-7), Pe-2, attack aircraft Il-2. Basically, we designed and produced the specified new, expensive and high-tech equipment in the period from the beginning of 1939 to the middle of 1941, that is, for the most part during the validity of the non-aggression pact concluded in 1939 - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During the 19 peaceful pre-war years, the USSR built 11,500 large industrial enterprises. With the outbreak of the war, most of these enterprises began to work for the front, for victory. And before the war, the main amount of weapons was made thanks to the built new plants and factories: blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces for steel smelting, enterprises for the production of guns, aircraft, tanks, ships, submarines and other enterprises of the military-industrial complex. It was the presence of a large number of weapons that allowed us survive and win. For with the huge losses of weapons in the initial period of the war, we still had enough weapons for resistance during the retreat and for the offensive near Moscow. A short-term shortage of artillery, small arms, automatic weapons was felt in certain sectors of the front, as was a shortage of ammunition, due to the untimely appearance of artillery units in the right direction and violations in the supply, delivery of weapons and ammunition to the troops. As a result of bloody battles and the retreat of the army, there were loss of a large number of aircraft and especially tanks. Many tanks were lost due to lack of fuel. Especially often for this reason, tanks were left when our troops left the encirclement. We lost planes both in battles and at airfields. It must be said that in 1941 german army did not have equipment similar to our heavy KB tanks, armored attack aircraft Il-2 and rocket artillery such as BM-13 ("Katyusha"). To be continued…
The opinions expressed in the publications of Leonid Maslovsky are the opinions of the author and may not coincide with the opinions of the editors of the Zvezda TV channel website.
The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon
The Barbarossa plan is a plan for Germany's attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to be ended by November 1941 at the latest.
Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, a 12th century emperor who became famous for his conquests. This traced elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.
Germany prepared 190 divisions for war and 24 divisions as a reserve. For the war, 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated. The total number of the contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.
The apparent advantage in the technology of the USSR should not be taken into account, since by the beginning of the wars, German technical tanks and aircraft were superior to Soviet ones, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.
The Barbarossa plan defined 3 main directions for the strike:
| SOUTH | CENTER | NORTH | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus | Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow | Baltic States, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk |
| population | 57 divisions and 13 brigades | 50 divisions and 2 brigades | 29 division + army "Norway" |
| Commanding | Field Marshal von Rundstedt | Field Marshal von Bock | Field Marshal von Leeb |
| common goal | Get on line: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan (Northern Dvina) |
||
Approximately by the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga-Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan of the blitzkrieg. After the blitzkrieg, the lands beyond the Urals should have remained, which, without the support of the center, would quickly surrender to the winner.
Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks were left before the end of the war with the USSR is the speech of Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans additionally collect warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.
The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army advanced rapidly, winning victories, Soviet army suffered huge losses.
During the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops inland was 30 km per day.
By July 11, the army group "North" occupied almost the entire territory of the Baltic states, providing access to Leningrad, the army group "Center" reached Smolensk, the army group "South" went to Kiev. These were the last achievements that fully corresponded to the plan of the German command. After that, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.
The army "North" occupied the Baltic states without problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. It turned out that the Wehrmacht was not capable of this task. The city did not capitulate to the enemy, and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany failed to capture it.
The "Center" army reached Smolensk without any problems, but got stuck under the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advance of the troops, since such a delay under the city, which was planned to be taken without heavy losses, was unacceptable and cast doubt on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.
Historians today evaluate the battle for Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, as they managed to stop the advance of troops on Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.
Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement of Belarus.
The army "South" reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like the army "Center" near Smolensk, got stuck in battles. In the end, they managed to take the city in view of the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.
Above is a map showing the plan of the German command for the offensive. The map shows: green - the borders of the USSR, red - the border to which Germany planned to reach, blue - the deployment and the plan for the advancement of the German forces.
Germany failed the blitzkrieg because the Wehrmacht was preparing the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, on false intelligence. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.
The lightning war tactics were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then rapidly move inland without encountering serious resistance.
In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed, and Germany could not win the war. The fact that World War II lasted until 1945 only proves that the Germans fought very organized and brave. Due to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they managed to fight successfully.
I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, because the lightning war did not work, german troops bogged down in battles. Local(landmark - intelligence data) - the plan was implemented. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan on the basis that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country's border, there were no additional defense echelons. There are no reserves and reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command has reserves, not all troops are located on the border, mobilization brings quality soldiers into the army, there are additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.
Therefore, the disruption of the Barbarossa plan must be regarded as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians associate this person with the agents of England, but there is no evidence for this. But if we assume that this is indeed the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris slipped an absolute “linden” to Hitler that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.
