World War III was supposed to start on July 1, 1945 with a sudden blow by the combined forces of the Anglo-Saxons against the Soviet troops ... Now few people know this, just like how Stalin managed to frustrate the plans of "probable allies", why we were forced to hastily take Berlin , against whom the British instructors in April 45 trained the undisbanded divisions of the Germans who surrendered to them, why Dresden was destroyed with inhuman cruelty in February 1945, and whom exactly the Anglo-Saxons wanted to intimidate with this.
In April 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the preparation of a war plan against the USSR. The assignment was preceded by conclusions that Churchill presented in his memoirs:
. first, Soviet Russia became a deadly threat to the "free world";
. secondly, to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance;
. thirdly, this front in Europe should go as far as possible to the east;
. fourthly, the main and true goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin;
. fifthly, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague is of the utmost importance;
. sixthly, Vienna, essentially the whole of Austria, should be ruled by the Western powers, at least on an equal footing with the Russian Soviets;
. seventhly, it is necessary to curb the aggressive claims of Marshal Tito towards Italy ...
Operation plan
The plan of operation was prepared by the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet and was provided to them on May 22, 1945, in 29 pages.
According to this plan, the attack on the USSR was to begin following the principles of Hitler - a sudden blow. On July 1, 1945, 47 British and American divisions, without any declaration of war, were to deal a crushing blow to the naive Russians who did not expect such boundless meanness from the allies. The blow was supposed to be supported by 10-12 German divisions, which the "allies" kept undisbanded in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark, they were trained daily by British instructors: they were preparing for war against the USSR.
It was then that Churchill gave orders to stockpile captured German weapons with an eye to their possible use against the USSR, placing the soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht who surrendered into divisions in the land of Schleswig-Holstein and in southern Denmark. Then the general meaning of the insidious undertaking begun by the British leader will become clear. The British took under their protection German units that surrendered without resistance, sent them to South Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. In total, about 15 German divisions were stationed there. The weapons were stockpiled, and the personnel were trained for future fights.
Oberleutnant Otto Carius, author of Tigers in the Mud, writes:
I drove the lieutenant back and said goodbye to the commander of the American armored forward detachment. He wanted to offer me a cup of coffee and was very surprised when I refused. Then he asked me why we kept fighting at all. In response, I told him: as a soldier and officer, perhaps I do not need to give an explanation on this matter. He advised me to take care of my people, since we will soon need every soldier to carry out joint tasks. This remark again gave me some hope. After all, it could have been about a joint campaign against the Russians. Probably, prudence will prevail over hatred between Western rivals. Maybe also taking into account the situation that has developed between the enemy combat detachments. Unfortunately, the politicians had the last word.
American General Patton- The commander of the tank armies directly stated that he did not plan to stop at the demarcation line along the Elbe, agreed upon in Yalta, but to move on. To Poland, from there to Ukraine and Belarus - and so on to Stalingrad. And end the war where Hitler did not have time and could not finish it. He called us none other than "the heirs of Genghis Khan, who must be expelled from Europe." After the end of the war, Patton was appointed governor of Bavaria, and was soon removed from his post for Nazi sympathies.
Dwight Eisenhower in his memoirs, he admits that the Second Front already at the end of February 1945 practically did not exist: the Germans rolled back to the east without resistance. The tactics of the Germans were as follows: to hold, as far as possible, positions along the entire line of Soviet-German confrontation until the virtual Western and real Eastern fronts closed, and the American and British troops, as it were, would take over from the Wehrmacht formations in repelling the "Soviet threat" hovering over Europe. Churchill at this time in correspondence, telephone conversations with Roosevelt, he is trying to convince at all costs to stop the Russians, not to let them into Central Europe. This explains the significance that the capture of Berlin had acquired by that time.
In theory, the war of the united forces of Western civilization against the USSR was to begin - later other countries, for example, Poland, then Hungary, were to participate in the "crusade" ... The war was to lead to the complete defeat and surrender of the USSR. Final goal was to end the war approximately in the same place where Hitler planned to end it according to the Barbarossa plan - at the turn of Arkhangelsk-Stalingrad.
The Anglo-Saxons were preparing to break us with terror - the savage destruction of large Soviet cities: Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Murmansk and others with crushing blows from the waves of "flying fortresses". Several million Russian people were to die in "fire tornadoes" worked out to the smallest detail. This is how Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo were destroyed... Now they were preparing to do this with us, with the allies. A common thing: the most heinous betrayal, extreme meanness and savage cruelty - the hallmark of Western Civilization and, especially, the Anglo-Saxons, who exterminated many people.
The naval forces of Great Britain and the United States then had an absolute superiority over the Soviet Navy: 19 times in destroyers, 9 times in battleships and large cruisers, and 2 times in submarines (http://www.respublika.info/4440 /history/article22384/). Over a hundred aircraft-carrying ships and several thousand carrier-based aircraft against zero from the USSR. The "probable ally" had 4 air armies of heavy bombers that could strike crushing blows. Soviet long-range bomber aviation was incomparably weaker.
In April 1945, the Allies presented our troops as exhausted and exhausted, and military equipment as worn out to the limit. Their military specialists were greatly surprised by the power of the Soviet Army, which it demonstrated in the capture of Berlin, which they considered impregnable. There is no doubt the correctness of the conclusion of the great historian V. Falin - Stalin's decision to storm Berlin in early May 1945 prevented the Third World War. This is confirmed by recently declassified documents. Otherwise, Berlin would have been handed over to the "allies" without a fight, and the combined forces of all of Europe and North America would have fallen upon the USSR.
Reasons for canceling the operation
However, on June 29, 1945, the day before the planned start of the war, the Red Army suddenly changed its location for the insidious enemy. This was the decisive weight that shifted the scales of history - the order was not given to the Anglo-Saxon troops. Prior to this, the capture of Berlin, which was considered impregnable, showed the power of the Soviet Army and the military experts of the enemy were inclined to cancel the attack on the USSR.
According to Professor of the University of Edinburgh D. Erickson, Churchill's plan helps to explain “why Marshal Zhukov suddenly decided in June 1945 to regroup his forces, received orders from Moscow to strengthen the defenses and study in detail the deployment of Western Allied troops. Now the reasons are clear: obviously, Churchill's plan became known to Moscow in advance and the Stalinist General Staff took appropriate countermeasures. The plan for Operation Unthinkable was indeed known to Moscow in advance, having been handed over to the Cambridge Five (the core of the network of Soviet agents in the UK)
Even after the capture of Berlin, plans for a treacherous strike continued to be developed at full speed. The only thing that stopped them was that they realized that their plans had been revealed and the calculations of the strategists showed that it would not be possible to break the USSR without a sudden blow.
The drafters of the "Committee of Chiefs of Staff" plan came to two main conclusions:
. starting a war with the Russians, it is necessary to be prepared for a long and costly total war,
. the numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes the possibility of achieving limited and rapid (military) success extremely doubtful.
Therefore, we believe that if a war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve a quick limited success and we will find ourselves embroiled in a long war against superior forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces may increase exorbitantly if American fatigue and indifference increase and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific.
- from the conclusion of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, sent to W. Churchill
It should also be noted that Churchill pointed out in comments on the draft plan presented to him that the plan was a "precautionary measure" for what he hoped was a "purely hypothetical case."
There was another important reason why the Americans objected to the British - they needed the USSR to crush the Kwantung Army in the Far East, without which the US victory over Japan on its own was in doubt.
Further plans in case of war with the USSR
In mid-July 1945, Churchill, having suffered a defeat in the elections, resigned. The Labor government led by Clement Attlee came to power in the UK. In 1946, the new British government, headed by C. Attlee, continued to develop plans for a war with the USSR, involving the United States and Canada for this. The negotiations were entrusted to the head of the British military mission in Washington, a participant in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Field Marshal H. Wilson, who discussed British military projects with President G. Truman, General D. Eisenhower, at that time the commander-in-chief of allied forces in Europe and Canadian Prime Minister M. King. In September, General D. Eisenhower met on a yacht off the coast of the United States with British Field Marshal B. Montgomery. The parties ultimately came to the conclusion that if the Red Army launched an offensive in Europe, the Western Allies would not be able to stop it. The plan for Operation Unthinkable, or rather what was left of it, was sent to the archive, subsequent plans for the war against the USSR were already developed at the NATO level.
1. We have analyzed (the possibility of carrying out) Operation Unthinkable. As directed, the analysis was based on the following assumptions:Target
2. The general political goal (operations) is to impose the will of the United States and the British Empire on the Russians.
Although the "will" of the two countries can be seen as a matter directly related only to Poland, it does not follow at all that the extent of our involvement (in the conflict) will necessarily be limited. A quick (military) success may or may not induce the Russians to submit to our will at least temporarily. If they want total war, they will get it.
3. The only way for us to achieve the goal in a definite and long-term way is victory in total war, but in view of what was said above, in paragraph 2, regarding the possibility of an early (military) success, it seems to us correct to approach the problem with two premises:
a) total war is inevitable, and we have considered the chances of success, taking into account this setting;
b) the political attitude is such that a quick (military) success will allow us to achieve our political goals, and subsequent participation (in the conflict) should not worry us.
TOTAL WAR
4. Since the possibility of a revolution in the USSR and the political collapse of the current regime is not considered by us and we are not competent to make judgments on this issue, the Russians can be taken out of the game only as a result of:
a) the occupation of such a (vast) territory of Russia proper as to reduce the country's military potential to a level at which further resistance (of the Russians) becomes impossible;
b) inflicting on the Russian troops on the battlefield such a defeat that would make it impossible for the Soviet Union to continue the war.
Occupation of Russian living space
5. It is possible that the situation will develop in such a way that the Russians will be able to withdraw their troops and thereby avoid a decisive defeat. In that case they may adopt the tactic they have used so successfully against the Germans and in previous wars, which consists in exploiting the vast distances with which the territory has endowed them. In 1942, the Germans reached the borders of Moscow, the Volga and the Caucasus, but the methods of evacuating factories, combined with the deployment of new resources and the help of the allies, allowed the USSR to continue the fighting.
6. In fact, it is impossible to talk about the limit of the allies' advance into the depths of Russia, at which further resistance (of the Russians) will become impossible. It is difficult to imagine the very possibility of such a deep and rapid penetration of the allies, as the Germans managed in 1942, despite the fact that such an advance did not lead to a decisive outcome.
Decisive defeat of Russian troops
7. Details of available forces and deployments of Russian and Allied troops are given in Appendixes II and III and illustrated on maps A and B. The current balance of power in Central Europe, where the Russians have an advantage of approximately three to one, makes the current situation unlikely a complete and decisive Allied victory in this territory. Although the Allies are better organized and slightly better equipped (troops), the Russians in the war with the Germans proved to be formidable opponents. They have a competent command, appropriate equipment, and an organization (troops) that may not meet our standards, but has stood the test (of war). On the other hand, only about a third of their divisions correspond to a high level (requirements), others lag far behind them, and in terms of mobility, all of them, without exception, are significantly inferior to the corresponding formations of the allies.
8. Inflicting a decisive defeat on Russia in a total war will require, in particular, the mobilization of human resources (allies) in order to counter the current colossal human resources (Russians). This exceptionally long-term project includes:
a) large-scale deployment in Europe of colossal American resources (manpower);
b) re-equipment and reorganization of the human resources of Germany and all Western European allies.
Conclusion
9. Our findings:
a) if the political goal is to achieve a certain and final result, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of Russia in a total war;
b) the result of an all-out war with Russia is unpredictable, one thing can be said with all certainty: victory in such a war is a task for a very long time.
FAST SUCCESS
10. Nevertheless, on the basis of a political assessment (of the situation), it can be concluded that a quick and limited victory will force Russia to accept our terms.
11. Before deciding to start hostilities, the following should be considered:
a) If the assessment is wrong and the achievement of any limited goal we have set does not force Russia to submit to our terms, we will actually find ourselves embroiled in an all-out war.
b) It is impossible to limit military operations to any one region, and therefore, as they unfold, we will have to reckon with the reality of a global battle.
c) Even if everything goes according to plan, we will not achieve the final result from a military point of view. Russia's military power will remain unbroken, and the Russians will always be able to renew the conflict at any moment that suits them.
12. Nevertheless, if we are ready, in view of all the above dangers, to take the risk of limited military action, we have analyzed possible steps to strike the Russians with a blow that would force them to accept our terms even in a situation where they can avoid a decisive defeat and militarily will still be able to continue the fight.
General strategic situation
Factors influencing our strategy in Eastern Europe
20. First of all, we will have superiority over the Russians in the air and at sea. The latter will allow us to control the Baltic, but in itself this will not play a significant role in achieving rapid success.
21. In the air, our advantage will be to a certain extent complicated by the fact that our strategic bomber forces will initially have to be based in England - even if intermediate airfields on the Continent are used. The exhausting workload of the Air Force and the long distances that they will have to cover will hardly allow them to be used with the same efficiency as during the war with Germany.
22. Russian industry is so dispersed that it can hardly be considered a winning target for air strikes. At the same time, the considerable extent of Russian communications, apparently, can offer us much more preferable targets (for bombing), especially on. important water crossings. However, to achieve any effective results, such attacks on communications must be coordinated with an offensive on land.
So, the only way for us to achieve quick (military) success is a land campaign that allows us to fully use our advantage in the air - both tactically and in attacks on Russian communications.
2Z. The study of the topographic (map) and general direction of communications indicates that the main efforts of the land offensive should be concentrated in the North (Europe). This provides us with additional advantages, since it allows us to use our naval advantage in the Baltic to cover our left flank and act against the enemy's right flank.
24. So, the campaign should be carried out in the North-East of Europe, first of all, by ground forces.
Overland campaign in northeastern Europe
25. The possibility of involving Allied troops in offensive operations will be largely determined by how many of them will be bound by the need to restore and protect communications in the destroyed areas of Germany.
26. Taking into account this part, as well as the forces necessary to ensure the security of the front north to the line Dresden Chemnitz, we, according to our estimates, get about 47 divisions, including 14 armored divisions, which can be involved in offensive operations.
27. In response, according to our estimates, the Russians will be able to deploy forces equivalent to 170 Allied divisions, of which 30 divisions are armored. Thus, we will face a power disparity of about two to one in the armored forces and four to one in the ground forces.
28. It is difficult to assess the extent to which our advantage in tactical air and command and control would help to restore the balance (of forces), but given the above disparity, it would be definitely a risky undertaking to launch an offensive.
If, in spite of everything, this option is chosen, it can be implemented through two main attacks: - northern, along the Stettin - Schneidemühl - Bydgoszcz axis; - southern, along the Leipzig - Cottbus - Poznan and Breslau axis.
29. The main tank battles are likely to unfold east of the Oder-Neisse line, and the outcome of the campaign may depend on their outcome. With a favorable outcome, we will probably be able to reach the common line Danzig - Breslau. Any subsequent offensive, however, would mean stretching the front line to be held through the winter, and increasing the threat posed by the salient that had taken shape in the area of Bohemia and Moravia, from which the Russians would not necessarily have to retreat. Consequently, if we fail to win the victory we need west of the Danzig-Breslau line, then it is quite likely that we will actually be drawn into a total war. Z0. So, the success of the land campaign will depend on the outcome of the battles west of the above line before the onset of winter cold. Our strategic position is not strong in itself, and in fact we will be forced to rely on one major battle with an extremely unfavorable balance of forces for us.
CONCLUSIONS
Z1. According to our conclusion:
a) starting a war with the Russians, we must be ready for an all-out war, long and costly at the same time;
b) the numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes it extremely doubtful whether limited and rapid (military) success can be achieved, even if, according to political views, this will be consistent with the achievement of our political goals.
J. Grantham,
J. S. Thompson,
W. Aawson
Attached:
Appendix I - Campaign Evaluation in Europe
Appendix II - Russian forces and their disposition
Appendix III - Allied forces and their disposition
Annex IV - German reaction
Annex I
GOAL
1. The goal of this campaign is to achieve quick, albeit limited, success (in the war) with the Russians.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ALLIES' STRATEGY
Air Force use
2. In the air, our advantage will be to a certain extent complicated by the fact that our strategic bomber forces will initially have to be based in England - even if intermediate airfields on the continent are used. The exhausting workload of the Air Force and the long distances that they will have to cover will hardly allow them to be used with the same efficiency as during the war with Germany.
3. Russian industry is so dispersed that it can hardly be considered a winning target for air strikes. At the same time, the considerable extent of Russian communications, apparently, can offer us much more preferable targets (for bombing), especially important crossings through water barriers. However, in order to achieve any effective results, such attacks on communications must be coordinated with an offensive on land in order to make it difficult to supply the Russians (units).
4. An analysis of vulnerable positions in Russian lines of communication is given in Appendix 1. These positions, however, are located largely out of range of heavy bombers based in the United Kingdom. Consequently, if it is necessary to attack these targets, bomber aircraft must be deployed on airfields in North-Western Europe, or they will have to use temporary airfields.
5. The complex system of ground organization of bomber aircraft, however, makes it practically impossible for several months to move the latter from the United Kingdom to North-East Europe, and during this time the possibility of delivering a quick and decisive strike may well be lost.
The use of temporary airfields (and, as a result, the limitation of the force of strikes) may / will allow us to increase the power of strikes against important targets behind the Russian (troop) defense line.
6. When considering the question of our use of bombers, however, one should take into account the significant numerical superiority of the Russian armies and the tactical aviation they deploy against us. The superiority is such that we will mainly have to use heavy bombers for tactical purposes in order to provide direct support to the ground forces.
7. Bomber aircraft in the Mediterranean will have to be used in the same capacity.
Topography
8. The study of the topographic (map) and communications in Eastern Europe leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the main efforts on land should be made by us in the north. To the south of the imaginary line Zwickau - Chemnitz - Dresden - Görlitz, excluding the Danube Valley, there are not enough convenient ways to move from west to east, and the predominantly mountainous nature of the terrain limits the possibilities of waging war of maneuver.
Left flank security
9. It is important to prevent the Russians from moving back from the ports Northern Germany or Bornholm to Sweden and Denmark. Our naval advantage in the Baltic would prevent it, but it would still be wise to get Stettin to surrender quickly. The foregoing speaks in favor of delivering one of the main attacks on the coast of Northern Germany, supported by massive flank attacks, which would allow us to use our superiority in conducting large-scale military operations.
In addition to this, our navies in the Baltic will cut off the enemy's sea lanes and destroy any naval group that goes to sea. (Nevertheless) all this will not significantly affect the ability or will of the Russians to resist.
Logistics
10. In the German territory occupied by the Allied troops, the communication system is almost completely destroyed, while in the part of Germany occupied by the Russians, the destruction is much less extensive, and railways are functioning. Because of this, in the rear of the allies there will be difficulties in transport communication.
11. It is likely that great efforts of troops and resources will be required in order to prevent Germany from becoming a hindrance (to our actions). It is impossible to predict how serious they will be. Nevertheless, from a logistical point of view, if the offensive is undertaken at all, considerations of an organizational nature are unlikely to prevent our progress until we come to (transition line) from narrow to wide (railway) gauge. Now broad-gauge routes in the main directions, perhaps, reach the line of the river. Oder. The use of motor vehicles will allow us to provide a range of operations (troops) of about 150 miles beyond this line.
Summary
12. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that:
a) the (military) campaign (against the Russians) should initially be on the ground and unfold in North-Eastern Europe;
b) the best zone for an offensive is the territory north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Görlitz line.
FORCES THAT THE ALLIES CAN USE FOR THE OFFENSIVE
Ground troops
13. Appendix III shows that the total Allied forces in Northern Europe on 1 July should be:
- 20 armored divisions;
- 50 infantry divisions;
- 5 airborne divisions;
- armored and infantry brigades equivalent to 8 divisions.
The situation in occupied Germany
14. Occupied Germany is the base for any offensive we plan. Therefore, it is necessary to take adequate measures to ensure the security of this territory. The possible development of the situation there is considered in Appendix IV, from which it follows that we will need parts to maintain internal order.
15. The consequences of the chaos into which Germany will be plunged as a result of Allied operations will probably have a more serious influence on the possibility of attracting and mobility of our troops. e. to ensure the functioning of the allied lines of communication, it may be necessary to divert significant engineering, transport and management resources. It is currently impossible to give any reliable assessment of the degree of distraction.
16. Nevertheless, it will probably be necessary to exert maximum pressure on our Western European allies so that they assume ever-increasing responsibility (for the state of affairs) in Germany. Comparing what has been said with the above diversions, we consider ourselves justified in suggesting the possibility of reducing the occupying forces of Britain and the United States to:
- 10 infantry divisions;
- 1 armored division.
More cuts are possible as the nature and extent of cooperation with the Germans becomes clear. Since, however, preparatory steps in this direction are unlikely, if at all, the above figures can be regarded as the minimum at the initial stage of action.
Defense Requirements
17. Problems can be expected from Yugoslavia and, no doubt, the presence of (Russian) forces (capable of undertaking) an offensive in Austria. Since, however, the terrain up to the northern borders of Austria is mountainous and difficult to pass, the Supreme Allied Command, the Mediterranean (grouping), in our opinion, can organize the defense of this sector to the area north of Salzburg with available forces. For these purposes, 3 armored and 12 infantry divisions from among those available will be fully involved.
18. North of Salzburg we have strong defensive positions at our disposal along the line from the Bohemian Mountains to Zwickau. Nevertheless, in view of their length (250 miles) and taking into account the numerical superiority of the Russians, to ensure the security of this sector of the front, in our opinion, forces of the order of 5 armored and 20 infantry divisions will be required.
Assistance from the Germans
19. The possibility of assistance from the Germans is discussed in Appendix IV; according to calculations, in the early stages (military campaign) 10 German divisions can be re-formed and re-equipped. However, they should not be counted on by July 1st. Therefore, although they could be re-formed in time for combat by autumn, we did not include them in our calculations.
20. The reorganization of larger German forces would be a much longer undertaking, since it involves a large-scale re-equipment (of German units with equipment) from Allied sources.
Conclusion About available forces (allies)
21. Thus, according to our calculations, the Allied forces available for conducting offensive operations in the North are:
| Armored divisions | Infantry divisions | Airborne divisions | Division equivalent | Total | |
| Total cash on July 1 | 20 | 50 | 5 | 8 | 83 |
| internal security | 1 | 5 | - | 5 | 11 |
| Defense | 5 | 20 | - | - | 25 |
| Cash for the offensive | 14 | 25 | 5 | 3 | 47 |
Air Force
22. Provided that no reductions in the forward base force are envisaged, the Allied tactical air force in North-West Europe and the Mediterranean will be 6,714 first-line aircraft. The bomber capability is 2,464 aircraft, of which 1,840 are based in the United Kingdom and 624 in the Mediterranean.
23. There is no information about the redeployment of the US Air Force after June 1, 1945. Consequently, the given layout may undergo changes in the direction of reduction due to the ongoing redeployment (of American aviation) during June, if any.
24. Despite the restrictions imposed on ice operations during the winter months, the following forces will be needed in the Baltic: - 2 or 3 cruisers;
- 2 destroyer flotillas (including 1 fleet (mother country) flotilla);
- a flotilla of submarines (small class);
- several fleets of motorized batteries / armored boats;
- 1 assault connection.
25. These forces will apparently have to be based at Brunsbüttelkog with forward bases on the north German coast just behind the ground forces, and also in Sweden, where Karlskrona (the main Swedish naval base) and Lyde Fjord will suit this role.
26. Part of the above forces can be brought up from the fleet of the mother country, since the threat in the North Sea from the Russians is extremely weak, but the rest of them will have to be provided at the cost of building up our forces in the Far East.
27. Small-tonnage warships will be required only in the waters of the mother country and in the Mediterranean Sea to destroy any enemy ships that ventured out of the northern Russian ports or through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean Sea.
RUSSIAN CASH FORCES
Ground forces
28. Russian forces in Europe are discussed in Appendix II.
In general, the troops they have at their disposal are: - 169 shock divisions;
- Z47 conventional divisions;
- 112 shock tank brigades;
- 141 conventional tank brigades.
29. It is impossible to foresee changes in Russian deployment by July 1st. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that, due to the need to prepare Allied public opinion for a future war with Russia, any attack (on her) would not come as a complete surprise (to the Russians). They will probably come to the conclusion that an offensive from our side is most likely to be undertaken in the North.
Z0. The Russians are likely to have to deal with significant internal security problems in Poland. The vast majority of Poles are most likely anti-Russian; the Russians do not have to rely on the support or mere neutrality of even Beurling's army, which today has 10 divisions in its ranks.
31. But even with this assumption, we must take into account that our offensive will have to face the forces of the following Russian army groups:
- 2nd Baltic (front);
- 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian (fronts);
- 2nd Belorussian (front);
- 1st Belorussian (front);
- 1st Ukrainian (front).
32. In general, these fronts will amount to: - 100 shock divisions;
- 220 conventional divisions;
- 88 shock tank brigades;
- 71 conventional tank brigades.
33. According to rough estimates, this corresponds to the following equivalent of allied formations: - 140 infantry divisions;
- 30 armored divisions;
- 24 tank brigades.
34. The Russian Air Force in the West has approximately 14,600 aircraft at its disposal, of which 9,380 are fighters and attack aircraft and 3,380 are bombers of an unidentified type, of which about 1,000 are heavy bombers.
35. Thus, there are about 2 thousand aircraft of a heterogeneous or unidentified type, 800 of which are in service with Russian naval aviation.
POSSIBLE RUSSIAN STRATEGY
36. During the opening phase of hostilities, the Russian strategy is likely to be defensive. If the Russians are properly warned, they can reinforce forward positions to keep us on the line of contact. By virtue of their considerable numerical superiority, the Russians may well be able to prevent any advance of our troops. They will most likely keep the bulk of the armored units calmly in the rear as a strategic reserve in combat readiness for a counterattack in case we manage to organize a breakthrough. If the latter happens, the Russian strategy will probably consist in (organizing) a "viscous" defense up to the Oder-Neisse line, with the expectation that the main tank battle will be fought in the territory east of these rivers.
They will not necessarily need to withdraw their troops from Bohemia and Moravia in parallel (to the fighting on the front lines), and if they decide to maintain control of these areas, perhaps with the support of the Czechs, then as we move forward this ledge in our line (defence) will cause us more and more inconvenience.
37. During the opening phase of the land campaign, the Russians are likely to use their air force mainly to provide close support to the ground forces. It is possible that Russian long-range bomber aviation will be involved in the same role, as it has proved its complete ineffectiveness in the role of strategic aviation.
38. The Russians may try to organize massive sabotage on allied lines of communication, especially in France, Belgium, Holland and, to a lesser extent, Germany. The usual method here would be to use (for this purpose) local communists, to whom Russians, specially selected from among the repatriates who had been there for some time as prisoners or in forced labor, would be infiltrated for reinforcement.
Brief outline of the campaign.
39. In view of the superiority of the Russians in the ground forces, any offensive operation (against them) is definitely risky. If the decision to conduct a land offensive operation is nevertheless made, in order to achieve the effect of maximum surprise in order to knock the Russians off balance, it can be concluded, taking into account the foregoing, that it is expedient to deliver two main strikes by the following two army groupings:
- in the north along the Stettin - Schneidemühl - Bydgoszcz axis;
- in the south along the Leipzig - Cottbus - Poznan and Breslau axis.
40. The primary goal here would be (access to) the Oder-Neisse line. Further, an offensive along the general line Danzig - Breslau is possible. However, the degree of advance to the east from the Oder-Neisse line depends on the result of the main tank battle, which, as shown above, can take place in this zone, i.e., in the Schneidemuhl - Bydgoszcz - Breslau - Glogau section.
41. It should be borne in mind that if the Russians do not withdraw from Bohemia and Moravia, then as our offensive develops, our southern flank will also be stretched, which we will have to watch closely. Due to the extent of the mountains, starting from Görlitz, from south to east, the extent of the front will increase as we move forward.
42. Therefore, if by autumn we reach the Danzig-Breslau line and the fighting continues, we may find ourselves in a difficult situation, before a choice: either we move forward, stretching our communications in difficult weather conditions, or during (long) of the Eastern European winter, we hold a front that is too long for the available forces. If an advance beyond this line is unavoidable, we may well find ourselves drawn into a virtual all-out war, and therefore, following the premise on which the analysis is based, we need to win a victory sufficient to force the Russians to submit to our conditions, west of the Danzig general line - Breslau.
CONCLUSIONS
43. So, we come to the following conclusions.
a) The campaign in its initial form will have the character of a land operation in North-Eastern Europe.
b) Air operations will be carried out in the form of direct support to ground operations. We need to be ready to inflict a severe defeat on the Russian Air Force and create serious problems on the railway communications behind Russian lines.
c) We will have to actually consolidate our naval advantage in the Baltic and be ready to prevent any Russian movement towards Sweden or Denmark.
d) The main land operations will be in the nature of an allied offensive north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Dresden-Görlitz line, while the rest of the front will hold the line.
e) What kind of offensive forces we will have at our disposal depends to a large extent on the inevitable diversions associated with ensuring the functioning of allied communications in the destroyed German territories.
In the aforementioned (see paragraph "d") region, we will most likely encounter enemy superiority in tanks - twice and in infantry - four times.
f) In view of such superiority (of the Russians), any offensive operation becomes risky.
g) In the event that, having achieved the effect of surprise and knocking the Russians out of equilibrium, (we) recognize the possibility of further advance to the east, the result will depend on the outcome of the main tank battle, which can occur east of the Oder-Neisse line. Superiority in command and control of the air force may enable us to win this battle, but our strategic position will not be fundamentally strong, and in fact we will have to bet on the tactical outcome of a single big battle.
h) In the context of ongoing hostilities, any advance beyond the Danzig-Breslau line is fraught with dangerous complications. Failing to win the necessary victory to the west of the named line, we will actually be embroiled in an all-out war.
Annex II
FORCES OF THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION
ECONOMY
1. At present, Russia produces a huge amount of military materials for its ground and air forces. The lion's share of them is transported to army units along long and sparse lines of communication, especially vulnerable to air strikes.
2. Her (Russia's) military potential will increase substantially in the first half of 1945 at the expense of the industrial resources and raw materials of the territories she occupies, especially at the expense of Upper Silesia. These territories are now being reorganized by the Russians,. and much of the industrial equipment is now reportedly in the process of being dismantled and transported to Russia. Consequently, the Russians will not immediately benefit from the acquisition of these resources and will not be able to adequately compensate for the loss of allied supplies. On the other hand, the Russian military forces would gain some immediate benefit from the capture of German equipment - especially vehicles and anti-tank weapons.
3. In the war that ended, among the products on which allied supplies Russia relied on the largest scale, we can name motor vehicles and high-octane aviation gasoline, the import of which accounted for about half of all deliveries. to maintain the mass production of military products at the current level, Russia now largely needs allied supplies, especially explosives, rubber, copper, magnesium oxide and some ferroalloys. Nevertheless, even if she were to be deprived of these supplies, it could not be said with certainty that she would not be able, if she so decided, to continue the war with undiminished and all-encompassing efficiency for a period of several months with the spoils of war. Its losses will be most noticeable in such areas as the technical equipment of aircraft, military transport and explosive materials.
4. Russia is likely to be able to maintain its current level of rationing in the absence of Allied food supplies, even if this may require collecting heavy indemnities from all the territories it occupies in Europe.
5. Russia will face the exceptionally serious task of fully restoring communications by July 1st. The vast majority of bridges will still be temporary wooden structures, and it will not be possible to restore the railway network east of the Vistula and change the gauge on it, with the possible exception of the main highways leading from East to West. The latter will be vulnerable to air strikes.
She (Russia) will suffer from an increasing shortage of locomotives and vehicles, caused by their wear and tear and air strikes. This shortage will intensify due to the forced long run from the main industrial regions (located) in the Urals and east of Moscow.
The Russians will not have the problem of reducing manpower for work inside Russia due to the return of prisoners of war and displaced persons and the large-scale conscription of labor in the occupied territories.
RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
Army
6. If we assume that in the current war the Russians lost approximately 10-11 million people, then the total number of Russian ground forces mobilized by July 1 could be a little more than 7 million people. More than 6 million of them, according to our estimates, are involved in the European theater of operations. In addition, they will include about 600 thousand people (personnel) of special security units (NKVD). A capable and experienced Supreme High Command has developed in the Russian army. It is an extremely resilient army, costing less to maintain and deploy than any of the Western armies, and employs daring tactics largely based on a disregard for casualties while achieving their goals. The (system) of protection and camouflage (of Russians) at all levels is of a high level. The equipment (of the Russian army) during the war rapidly improved and is now good. Quite a lot is known about how it developed, and it can be argued that it is definitely not worse than that of other great powers. The demonstrated ability of the Russians to improve existing types of weapons and equipment and deploy their mass production is extremely impressive. There are examples of how the Germans copied the main characteristics of Russian weapons. During the war, a noticeable advance was noted (by the Russians) in the field of radio communications and technical means for forcing rivers, repairing armored vehicles and restoring railways. The training of engineering personnel is at a high level.
7. On the other hand, today the Russian army suffers from heavy losses and fatigue caused by the war. The tactical and educational level (of Russian soldiers) is generally lower than that of the German army. Due to the comparatively low general level of education, the Russians are forced to reserve the best human material for special branches of the armed forces: the Air Force, armored units, artillery and engineering troops. Because of this, from the point of view of the level of training of a soldier, the infantry was not at the height of the situation in comparison with Western standards. There is a noticeable shortage of highly educated and trained staff and middle-level officers, which inevitably turns into over-centralization (in management). There is abundant evidence that the Russian command faces significant discipline problems abroad. Looting and drunkenness are widespread, and this is a symptom that the army is war-weary (which is especially pronounced) when in contact with a higher level of material prosperity than that achieved at home. Any resumption of war in Europe will cause serious tension in the Red Army. Its units will have to fight outside of Russia, and the Supreme High Command may find it difficult to maintain morale among the rank and file, especially the lower-level infantry units. This factor can be strengthened through the effective use of allied propaganda.
8. The morale of the Russian Air Force is commendable. Russian pilots are intelligent and operate with unfailing competence, sometimes with brilliance, and have extensive experience in short-range tactical operations in support of army forces. It should (true) take into account that they have long been operating in conditions of numerical superiority over the Germans. their training and discipline are practically at the level of the allied air forces.
9. In general, the front line forces of the Russian Air Force are composed of 16,500 active aircraft, united in four armies:
Army Air Forces with over 14,000 aircraft equipped to provide direct support to army ground operations.
Naval aviation. These forces, consisting of over 1,100 aircraft, are close in nature to the command of the coastal command and the command of mine-laying forces of bomber aviation, rather than to our fleet air force. The (main efforts) of these (Russian) forces are primarily focused on anti-submarine operations.
Long-range bomber aviation consists of approximately 1,000 aircraft. So far, it has shown itself to be ineffective as a strategic destination.
Fighter Aviation Forces (Air Defense). These units, numbering approximately 300 aircraft, are designed to defend important targets in the rear areas. In addition, additional forces of defensive fighter aviation are part of the fighter units of the Air Force. These aircraft are designed to defend important targets and probably have little experience in defending them.
10. Russian aircraft have modern design and respond to the tasks they are called upon to solve. In general, however, they are inferior to the samples of the allied aircraft. The Russian Air Force is not organized or equipped to counter modern day or night long-range bomber forces, combat day forces, or operate in a strategic (bomber) role. In particular, Russian radar technology, as far as one can judge, is at a level significantly inferior to Western standards.
11. The production of aircraft (for the Russians during the war years) has grown. The output of 3,000 aircraft per month has been achieved. These production volumes are enough to make up for the losses suffered by the Germans. However, if the Allies deny (Russia) aluminum supplies and inflict heavy losses on them, according to our confidential plans, these production volumes will turn out to be completely insufficient in the light of the new requirements.
12. (Aviation industry) Russia is approximately 50 percent dependent on allied aviation fuel supplies. Within the next six months, it will hardly be able to receive significant volumes of it from the former German (oil) refineries.
13. The small naval forces of the Russians cannot be called a modern and effective instrument of warfare, and in the present state of affairs not one of their many fleets is in a position to take the initiative in a war at sea. Equipment (ships) is largely outdated, the level of education and training of personnel is low. Officers and sailors are not familiar with the latest developments in naval warfare, especially in terms of interaction (fleet) with aviation. Shipbuilding yards in Leningrad were damaged, similar shipyards on the Black Sea were completely destroyed.
Addendum 1 to Annex II
Red Army forces (excluding satellite armies)
| armies | divisions | tank brigades | ||||
| Fronts or territories | drums | ordinary | drums | ordinary | drums | ordinary |
| Finland and Norway | - | 3 | - | 9 | - | 1 |
| Leningrad and 3rd Baltic fronts | - | 3 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 12 |
| 2nd Baltic Front | 3 | 4 | 19 | 40 | 7 | 17 |
| 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian fronts | 3 | 8 | 25 | 54 | 9 | 19 |
| 2nd Belorussian Front | 2 | 5 | 16 | 40 | 20 | 12 |
| 1st Belorussian Front | 5 | 5 | 16 | 50 | 31 | 13 |
| 1st Ukrainian Front | 4 | 4 | 24 | 36 | 21 | 10 |
| 4th Ukrainian Front | 1 | 3 | 12 | 32 | 3 | 2 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front | 3 | 4 | 32 | 28 | 7 | 21 |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front | 1 | 4 | 19 | 36 | 7 | 6 |
| Caucasus and Iran | - | 1 | - | 11 | - | 1 |
| All in the West | 22 | 45 | 169 | 366 | 112 | 143 |
| Far East | 7 | - | 36 | - | 13 | - |
| TOTAL | 29 | 45 | 205 | 366 | 125 | 143 |
| 74 armies | 571 divisions | 268 tank brigades | ||||
Equivalent in allied divisions
Annex III
ALLIED FORCES AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION
On the whole, the general forces of the British Navy - even in the absence of support from the United States - are perfectly sufficient to deal with the Russian naval forces, and their disposition on July 1 should give them the necessary advantage in Europe.
Army
2. The distribution of allied forces that we estimate we have is shown in Appendix 1.
<...>
4. The above calculations are made on the following basis: - American redeployment plans allow for the withdrawal (from Europe) by July 1 of four divisions. (Hence) one armored and three infantry divisions should be deducted temporarily from the American forces stationed in northeast Europe. We note the significant scale of the redeployment (of American forces) planned after July 1: 10 divisions can be withdrawn in July alone.
- Taken into account the beginning of the withdrawal of Canadian (parts) to their homeland and the movement of Indian units from the Mediterranean.
- The (upcoming) demobilization (of the armed forces of Great Britain) was not taken into account, since, according to our estimates, even if it began to one degree or another, it would not reach such a scale by July 1 that it would significantly affect the combat capability of our troops.
morale
5. In the case of the implementation of the premise formulated in paragraph 1 (a) of the accompanying note, we should not, according to our estimates, expect a noticeable drop in the combat qualities of our troops.
Equipment and resources
6. Subject to the following reservations, the state of equipment (of the troops) must prove to be satisfactory. As far as British troops are concerned, however, immediate action must be taken to ensure that:
a) the production of artillery ammunition was maintained at the current level;
b) deliveries of Sherman tanks from American sources continued;
c) Canadian (military) production remained at the current level.
Consolidations that can be attracted for operations
7. It should be noted that in North-Eastern Europe - regardless of the position that the Germans take (in relation to the conflict), significant forces and resources, especially engineering (troops), will be tied (by problems that we will have to solve) in occupied areas of Germany.
8. The morale of the Allied Air Force is high. The level (combat readiness) of the crews is good in all respects, they are well trained, disciplined, and have the (necessary) experience. The training of new crews will continue.
9. The Strategic Air Forces are united in units and units, numbering 2464 long-range bombers, capable of accurately dropping a significant load of bombs both on strategic and tactical targets in the daytime and at night. Fighter escort of strategic bombers in daytime operations has reached the degree of efficiency at which one can expect them to act both on the Russian lines (defense) and beyond them with a minimum of losses. However, the effectiveness of these forces is associated with a complex system of ground organization, which is why they cannot be quickly moved from one theater of operations to another. This lack of mobility necessitates the (construction) of temporary airfields in the event that it becomes necessary to strike targets outside the range of currently used aircraft.
10. Tactical Air Force, consisting of 6,714 front-line aircraft, is capable of providing strong and continuous support to our ground forces. Tactical aviation is also capable of defending important targets from enemy air strikes.
12. The equipment of the Allied Air Forces is everywhere superior to the equipment of the Russian Air Force. With regard to the available number of Allied forward line aircraft, it should be noted that the number of American aircraft listed in Appendix II may be significantly reduced due to the redeployment that the Americans intend to carry out during June, information about which we do not have
13. The (volume) of aircraft and equipment production by the United States after July 1, 1945, is not known to us, but a reduction can be expected. The production of aircraft and equipment in the United Kingdom will decrease. There is no shortage of aviation fuel supplies.
14. Appendix II shows RAF, Dominion and Allied Air Force strengths and positions in the European and Mediterranean theaters by 1 July 1945. US Air Force figures are as of 1 June 1945. Since we have no data on the redeployment of American troops after June 1, the figures for the American (Air Force) should be treated with reservations,
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Annex IV
EVALUATION OF THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WESTERN ALLIES AND RUSSIA
Position of the German General Staff and officer corps
The German General Staff and officer corps will probably come to the conclusion that (the decision) to side with the Western Allies will be in their best interest, but the degree of their readiness for effective and active cooperation may be limited - primarily due to the fact that the German army and civilian population were tired of the war.
Position of the German civilian population
2. War weariness will become the dominant factor (influencing) the position of the German civilian population. The unwillingness to cooperate with the Western allies can be increased (under the influence of) Russian propaganda (led) from the Russian occupation zone. However, ingrained fear of the Bolshevik threat and Russian repression would most likely force the German civilian population to opt for Anglo-American over Russian occupation and thus sway them to the side of the Western Allies.
Possible problems of the Allies in connection with ensuring security inside Germany
3. In general, the attitude of the civilian population in Germany is unlikely to take the form of active and organized hostility towards Anglo-American troops, nevertheless the following factors are potential sources of unrest and sabotage:
a) Unbearable living conditions. Such a situation may arise if the means of transport that (we) now have in Germany will be sufficient either to maintain a tolerable standard of living for the civilian population, or to support the operational actions of the Allied forces, but not to solve both of these tasks at the same time.
b) German youth, who inherited from Nazi propaganda all their current ideas about Western democracy.
c) The unemployed in devastated areas such as ports and industrial centers, especially (if events occur) against the background of worsening living conditions. The discontent of this class can manifest itself not only in hostility towards the Anglo-American troops, but also potentially in pro-Russian sentiments.
d) A significant mass of German prisoners of war or potential prisoners of war, (caught) in the hands of the Anglo-American allies, who must either be kept under guard or released to take care of themselves. Once released, they can constitute an extremely serious source of potential unrest.
4. It is still too early to assess how the German administration, even with a willingness to cooperate, will manage these potential sources of unrest and sabotage, but it seems clear that Anglo-American troops will need to (establish) guard garrisons in German industrial areas and ports. In addition, the protection of our main communications may require significant (forces).
Potential military value of German troops
5. If Germany is required to fight on the side of the Western Allies, the German General Staff must be seriously reformed in order to be able to create, organize and control an army. Perhaps the General Staff will not cooperate with us until some kind of political agreement is concluded between Germany and the Western Allies.
6. Although in the early stages the Germans may welcome an alliance with the Western Allies in the name of a "crusade" against Bolshevism and their will to wage war will remain at least in the units that fought on the Eastern Front, the desire of the Germans to restore their military prestige may be limited by the following factors :
a) The attitude of veterans (especially German prisoners of war who have been in captivity for a long time) that the war, anyway, is over, even if Germany lost it.
b) Hidden anger for the defeat, exacerbated by the policy of non-entry (of the allies) into close friendly relations (with Germany).
c) The inevitable confusion (in mood) caused by the change of sides (in the conflict).
d) The difficult conditions of fighting on the Eastern Front, which (the Germans) are well aware of.
d) War fatigue.
e) Russian propaganda.
g) A certain amount of gloating at the sight of Western allies getting into trouble with Russia.
7. Thus, German generals, even if they choose to side with the Anglo-American forces, will have to face certain problems of bringing troops into battle at an early stage of the campaign against Russian significant (German) forces. Most likely, they will not be able to bring more than 10 divisions into battle at the very beginning (actions). But even to muster such a force would take considerable time, the degree of delay being determined by the dispersion of the German prisoners of war (who happened to be) with the Anglo-Americans.
Restrictions caused by lack of equipment.
8. For the following reasons, the supply of equipment may be a limiting factor:
a) A significant part of the German equipment is most likely unusable due to lack of maintenance and shelters.
b) Before the end of hostilities (the Germans) there was a shortage of equipment. The shortage cannot be eliminated immediately, although warehouses in remote areas such as Norway can be brought in for this purpose.
d) The armament of significant German forces (say, up to 40 divisions) from the German stocks is practically unfeasible due to the lack of usable heavy weapons and vehicles.
e) Even if the Germans come to the decision that assistance to the Anglo-American troops in more meets their interests, the production of military equipment will continue to be limited by: - war weariness;
- state of enterprises;
- lack of transport and, accordingly, shortage of raw materials.
9. Despite this, the Germans, most likely, will be able to equip and bring into battle the same 10 divisions, which were mentioned in paragraph 7 as a possible contribution on their part (to the allied campaign against the Russians).
In this form, the plan was submitted to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff - the highest body of military leadership of the armed forces of Great Britain. On June 8, 1945, the following conclusion was sent to W. Churchill:
TO THE PRIME MINISTER
In accordance with your instructions, we have considered our potential means of exerting pressure on Russia through the threat or use of force. We limit ourselves to what concrete facts and figures testify to. We are ready to discuss them with you if you so wish.
a) ground forces
The Russian division differs in its composition from the allied division. Therefore, we have recalculated the Russian divisions to their British equivalent. Our assessment of the overall balance of power in Europe as of July 1:
The superiority in the number of Russian aviation will be compensated for a certain time by the significant superiority of the Allies in its control and effectiveness, especially strategic aviation. However, after a certain period of time in operations, our air force will be seriously weakened due to a lack of replenishment of aircraft and crews.
c) Naval Forces
The Allies can certainly ensure the dominant superiority of their forces at sea.
3. It is clear from the ratio of the ground forces of the parties that we do not have offensive capabilities with the aim of achieving a quick success. Given, however, that Russian and allied ground forces are in contact from the Baltic to mediterranean sea, we must be ready for land theater operations ...
4. Therefore, we believe that if a war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve a quick limited success and we will find ourselves drawn into a long war against superior forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces may increase exorbitantly if American fatigue and indifference increase and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific.
The document was signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal A. Brook, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force.
JOINT MILITARY CABINET PLANNING STAFF
I have read the commander's remarks on the Unthinkable, dated June 8th, which demonstrate a two-to-one Russian land superiority.
2. If the Americans withdraw troops to their zone and transfer the bulk of the armed forces to the United States and the Pacific region, the Russians will be able to advance to the North Sea and the Atlantic. A clear plan must be drawn up on how we can defend our Island, bearing in mind that France and the Netherlands will not be able to resist Russian superiority at sea. What kind of navy do we need and where should they be stationed? What size army do we need and how should it be dispersed? The location of airfields in Denmark could give us a huge advantage and would allow us to keep open the passage to the Baltic, where the main naval operations should be carried out. Possession of footholds in the Netherlands and France should be considered.
3. By keeping the codename "Unthinkable", the command suggests that this is just a preliminary sketch of what I hope is still a purely hypothetical possibility.
To the 70th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War
66 years ago, the British were developing a plan for war with the USSR
This war could break out two months after the Victory, in July 1945. Half the world lay in ruins, the very idea that someone was thinking of grabbing a weapon again seemed unnatural. But in 1998, the National Archives of Great Britain declassified the plan for Operation Unthinkable ...
In May, we once again celebrated the Victory of our people in the Great Patriotic War. Farther away from us harsh years, there are fewer and fewer war veterans, home front workers among us. Several new generations have grown up.
And then, after unheard-of destruction and suffering, the Soviet people set about restoring villages and cities, factories and factories, cultural sites. Everything was successfully restored in a short period of time, not even by historical standards, and 12 years later, the first in the world was launched in our country. artificial satellite land, after another three and a half years soviet man flew into space.
But everything could have gone differently, and it’s hard to imagine what would have happened then ... 50 years after the war, authentic operational documents of the British military cabinet in the spring of 1945 became the property of specialists, which dealt with nothing less than preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. Union, a loyal ally of Britain in the fight against Nazi Germany. The statutory half-century period for the secret storage of Churchill's personal dossier, which was in the funds, has passed. State Archive Great Britain, and a number of other documents hit the press.
They are truly sensational. As early as May 22, 1945, the British Prime Minister was presented with a plan for an emergency operation “Unthinkable” (“Unthinkable”), developed on his direct orders by the joint planning headquarters of the military cabinet (Kulkov E., Myagkov M., Rzheshevsky O. War 1941-1945. Facts and documents, Moscow, 2001, p. 268). The plan gives an assessment of the situation, the objectives of the operation, the forces involved, the directions of attacks by the troops of the Western allies and their probable results. The main goal of the operation, according to Churchill's instructions, was to force Russia to submit to the will of the United States of America and the British Empire.
G.K. Zhukov writes in his “Memoirs and Reflections” that on the twentieth of May 1945 he was summoned by I.V. Stalin.
While we have disarmed all the soldiers and officers of the German army and sent them to prisoner of war camps,” he said, “the British keep the German troops in full combat readiness and establish cooperation with them ... I think the British are trying to keep the German troops in order to use later.
Marshal himself had similar information. The additional work carried out only confirmed the worst assumptions of the Soviet leadership. Intelligence obtained the text of W. Churchill's secret telegram, which he sent to Field Marshal B. Montgomery, who commanded the British troops, during the final campaign of the war in Europe. Its text read: "Carefully collect German weapons and military equipment and store them so that it would be easy to distribute these weapons again to German units with which you would have to cooperate if the Soviet offensive continued."
At one of the meetings of the Control Council for the Administration of Germany, which included the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, Soviet side made a sharp statement on this occasion, emphasizing that history knows few examples of such perfidy and betrayal of allied obligations. Montgomery at first tried to deflect the accusation, but after a while he was forced to confirm the fact of receiving such a telegram from Churchill, who was also the Supreme Commander.
Our leadership became aware that General of the General Staff of the German Army Jodl (hanged by decision of the Nuremberg Tribunal) was arrested only on the 20th of May after Stalin's indignation, and Goering, one of the most important criminals, was poured champagne during the arrest.
Churchill was the most important anti-Soviet and remained so to the end, even under the pressure of the events of the war and the impression of how consistently the Soviet Army fulfilled its allied obligations. Heavy fighting was still going on in the Berlin direction, and he wrote that "Soviet Russia has become a mortal threat to the free world." It is necessary, he wrote, "to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance," and "this front in Europe must go as far east as possible."
The influence of Britain and the United States in Central Europe, according to Churchill, was to ensure: the capture of Berlin by the Anglo-American army (they opened a second front in early June 1944), which was to be strived for as the main goal on final stage wars; the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Americans and the entry of their troops into Prague.
And literally on Victory Day, making his way through the crowds of jubilant Londoners, Churchill, by his own admission, was overwhelmed by one feeling - fear for the future: "In my eyes, the Soviet threat has already replaced the Nazi enemy."
But let's get straight to the plan.
It is not clear when Churchill commissioned the development of the plan, but given the complexity and scope, the famous Russian historian O.A. Rzheshevsky suggests that this happened no later than 1945. At the same time, tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers shed blood near Berlin, bringing the end of World War II closer and saving the lives of British and American guys with their lives.
Churchill also outlined the date for the start of hostilities against the USSR - July 1, 1945. At the same time, the prime minister gave the following initial installations:
The operation will be carried out with the full support of the public opinion of the British Empire and the United States, which will ensure the high morale of the Anglo-American armed forces;
Great Britain and the United States will receive the full support of the armed forces of the Polish government in exile and can count on the use of Germany's manpower reserves and the remnants of its industrial potential;
Do not count on the support of the forces of other allies European countries, but probably the use of their territory and resources;
One must bear in mind the possibility of an alliance between the USSR and Japan.
British staff officers to achieve the goal through local warfare, limited hostilities rejected immediately. Only total war: depriving the Soviet Union of the material possibilities of waging war and inflicting a decisive defeat on the Soviet armed forces, which will deprive the USSR of the opportunity to continue the war.
The authors of the plan, however, provided that the Red Army could retreat into the interior of the country. And how such a retreat ended for the Germans in 1942 to the Volga and the Caucasus, the whole world learned. And here the success of total war begins to be questioned. It is highly doubtful, thought the planners, that the Allied forces would be able to penetrate as deeply in such a short time as the Germans did in 1942.
The doubts of the authors of the plan grew when considering the question of the strength of the parties: "The existing balance of power in Central Europe, where the Russians have an approximately threefold advantage, makes it extremely unlikely that the Allies will achieve a complete and decisive victory." Therefore, the plan included, among other things, the rearmament and reorganization of the German units. That's when those contingents had to say their word fascist troops, about the preservation of the combat effectiveness of which (during their stay in captivity) Churchill was so baked.
Considering that the forces of the Red Army are concentrated mainly in Central Europe, the planners assumed the possibility of its occupation of Croatia, Greece, Turkey, the blockade of the Black Sea straits, and, consequently, opposition to the Allied naval forces in the Black Sea.
In the Middle East, British staffers assumed that the Soviet Union would certainly launch an offensive against Persia and Iraq. There are valuable oil resources and the exclusive interests of England, and eleven Soviet divisions will be opposed by only three British brigades. They also feared that the Russians would be able to organize unrest in Egypt and India. In the Far East, the authors of the plan proceeded from the possibility of concluding an alliance between the USSR and Japan.
After weighing everything, the planners came to the conclusion that the main theater of operations would be Central Europe and the region of Persia and Iraq, important for the Allies. In Europe, the most preferable was an offensive in its northeastern part, which would make it possible to use the naval advantage of the allies in the Baltic and secure the left flank of their armies. Calculations for success were also associated with the bombing of economic centers on the territory of the USSR and the use of aviation in general.
The British staff took into account that at the beginning of the campaign Soviet troops will be defended. In the event that they become aware of the plan, they will strengthen the defense and be able to prevent any advance of the allied forces.
They noted the experience and high skill of the high command of the Red Army, strict discipline and training at all levels of military cunning, a good level of weapons that improved during the war, progress in providing troops with radio communications and pantone equipment, and high engineering support.
The plan also stated that the Red Army had suffered heavy losses and was tired of the war. Tactics and combat training are inferior to the German army, and in terms of the level of education and personnel of specialists - to the armies of the West.
The resumption of the war in Europe, the authors of the plan concluded, would place a heavy burden on the troops of the Red Army. She will have to fight outside her own country. It was noted that the command may encounter difficulties in maintaining the morale of the rank and file. The Allies praised morale Air Force and the brilliant skill of the flight crew - but for some reason they considered that the Russians were inferior in combat training and discipline.
The morale of the Allied troops was highly valued. It was believed that by July 1, the military would be ready to start hostilities.
They only had ambiguities with the upcoming reduction in the number of American divisions in Europe (the information suggests that at this stage the plan was developed without the knowledge of the American side).
It was also said in the plan that in the first half of 1945 the military potential of the Soviet Union increased significantly due to the occupied territories, especially in Upper Silesia, but could be weakened due to the cessation of Lend-Lease supplies, including explosives, rubber , aluminum, copper, magnesium and forroalloys. However, it was noted that this could hardly seriously affect the ability of the USSR to continue the war.
A special section of the plan was devoted to the use of the troops of the Nazi Wehrmacht in the war against the USSR as part of the Anglo-American group. According to the planners, "the German General Staff and officer corps will most likely decide that their interests will be satisfied on the side of the Western Allies." As for the German civilian population, it was noted that unemployment and ruin could lead to an increase in pro-Soviet sentiment and possible sabotage.
At the beginning of hostilities, the authors of the plan wanted to bring ten German divisions and four Polish divisions (!). On June 8, 1945, a conclusion was sent to Churchill, signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal A. Brook and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force. It spoke about the balance of forces of the Red Army and the allies as of July 1:
a) ground forces: Allies - 103 divisions (including 4 Polish); Red Army - 264 divisions, including 36 tank divisions.
b) air force: Allies - 6048 tactical aircraft and 2750 - strategic; Red Army - 11802 tactical aircraft and 960 - strategic.
c) Naval forces: The Allies can certainly ensure the dominant superiority of their forces at sea.
Therefore, we believe, - summarized the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force, - that if war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve quick limited success, and we will find ourselves drawn into a long war against superior forces. Churchill was extremely annoyed, but what could he do?
Did Stalin know about the British plans? There is no direct answer to this question. But a number of indirect signs allow us to answer it in the affirmative. So, Zhukov turned out to have reliable information not only that the German armed forces continued to exist in the British zone of occupation, but also exhaustive information about their composition, structure and strength. The Soviet command had no doubts what they were created for.
In the Control Council, the Soviet marshal handed over to its participants a memorandum on the presence in the British zone of organized troops of the former Nazi army and demanded their dissolution. This weakened the potential of the attacking side, making the implementation of the Churchill plan even more unrealizable.
Stalin in June 1945 ordered Marshal Zhukov to regroup his forces and study in detail the deployment of the troops of the Western Allies. It was a large detailed plan (finalized May 22, 1945). it has recently appeared on the Internet, and those who wish to get acquainted with it in detail can go to the site: www.coldwar.ru/bases/operation-untihnkable.php.
What kind of “humanist” and “philanthropist” did you have to be in order to prepare a new campaign against a devastated and tormented country? There is not only dislike for Bolshevism, but for our people - the people who saved England too. However, there is nothing particularly surprising here, because in the First World War, England, together with France, betrayed their ally Russia, and then, together with the United States, organized an intervention with robbery.
The liberal press prefers not to talk about this, because all liberals love the West tenderly, ardently and passionately, and they say about the past: "It was, but it has grown over." No, it hasn't grown. How else to explain what M. Thatcher says: it is enough for thirty million people to live in Russia. And M. Albright thinks so: it is unfair that in Russia there are many forests in Siberia ...
I remember the Munich speech of V.V. Putin at a meeting with the leaders of Western countries in February 2007, the essence of which is as follows: “what are you, good gentlemen, doing whatever you want, but you don’t even allow us to move.” I would like to add: your “defensive” and “peace-loving” NATO is “defending” almost all over the world. This is the attitude of Western "partners" towards us and our country.
On the picture: 63rd British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
The third world war was to begin on July 1, 1945 with a sudden attack by the combined forces of the Anglo-Saxons on the Soviet troops. In early April 1945, British Prime Minister Churchill ordered the Chiefs of Staff to urgently prepare a plan code-named Operation Unthinkable. According to Churchill, the armed forces of England, the USA, France, Canada, the troops of the Polish government in exile - 2 corps and, most interestingly, Germany - 15 German divisions, assembled from prisoners of war, should have dealt a powerful blow to the Red Army in Central Europe. It was then that Churchill gave orders to stockpile captured German weapons with an eye to their possible use against the USSR, placing Wehrmacht soldiers and officers who surrendered into divisions in the land of Schleswig-Holstein and in southern Denmark. The weapons were stockpiled, and the personnel were trained for future fights.
Of course, the reality in the spring of 1945 did not favor the implementation of the "Unthinkable" plan. First, Japan was still very strong. Secondly, the Red Army occupied very vantage points. Thirdly, public opinion either overseas or in the British Isles would hardly have approved of such a turn of events. However, the developers of the plan did not care. So, General George Patton said that "... he and his troops will reach the Volga and Stalingrad ..." (probably in the footsteps of Paulus).
Nazi Germany was in complete political isolation. Its only ally, Japan, against which, according to the decision confirmed at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union was to act, was no longer able to exert any influence on the course of events in Europe. Through the efforts of the US Navy, Japanese troops were driven out of almost all the territories of the Pacific Ocean it had captured, and the Japanese navy was defeated.
The tasks were formulated as follows:
The plan of operation was prepared by the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet. The plan gives an assessment of the situation, formulates the goals of the operation, defines the forces involved, the directions of attacks by the troops of the Western allies and their probable results. The appendices to the plan contain information about the deployment of the Red Army troops (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and the Western allies, as well as cartographic material.
The military campaign was originally supposed to be land-based and unfold in North-Eastern Europe, the best zone for the offensive was the territory north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Dresden-Görlitz line. At the same time, it was assumed that the rest of the front would hold the defense. July 1, 1945 was considered as the start date of the operation in the plan.
The events and facts discussed in this article seem incredible and unthinkable. It is really hard to believe in them, how hard it is for a normal person to believe in the possibility of betrayal of someone whom he considered an ally and friend. And yet it was.
For a long time this information was kept secret and only now it is becoming available. We are talking about a plan for a surprise attack on the USSR in the summer of 1945, developed by the Allies, a plan that was thwarted almost at the last moment.
World War III was supposed to start on July 1, 1945 with a sudden blow by the combined forces of the Ango-Saxons against the Soviet troops ... Now few people know this, as well as how Stalin managed to frustrate the plans of "probable allies", why we were forced to hastily take Berlin , against whom the British instructors in April of the 45th trained the undisbanded divisions of the Germans who surrendered to them, why Dresden was destroyed with inhuman cruelty in February 1945, and whom exactly the Anglo-Saxons wanted to intimidate with this.
According to the official models of the history of the late USSR, the true reasons for this were not explained in schools - then there was a “struggle for peace”, a “new thinking” was already ripening at the top, and the legend of “honest allies - the USA and Great Britain” was welcomed in every possible way. And few documents were published then - this period was hidden for many reasons. AT last years the British began to partially open the archives of that period, there was no one to fear - the USSR no longer exists.
In early April 1945, just before the end of the Great Patriotic War, W. Churchill, the Prime Minister of our ally - Great Britain, ordered his chiefs of staff to develop an operation of a surprise strike on the USSR - Operation Unthinkable. It was given to him on May 22, 1945 on 29 pages.
According to this plan, the attack on the USSR was to begin following the principles of Hitler - a sudden blow. On July 1, 1945, 47 British and American divisions, without any declaration of war, were to deal a crushing blow to the naive Russians who did not expect such boundless meanness from the allies. The blow was supposed to be supported by 10-12 German divisions, which the "allies" kept undisbanded in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark, they were trained daily by British instructors: they were preparing for war against the USSR. In theory, the war of the united forces of Western civilization against Russia was to begin - subsequently other countries, for example, Poland, then Hungary, were to participate in the "crusade" ... The war was to lead to the complete defeat and surrender of the USSR. The ultimate goal was to end the war approximately in the same place where Hitler planned to end it according to the Barbarossa plan - at the Arkhangelsk-Stalingrad line.
The Anglo-Saxons were preparing to break us with terror - the savage destruction of large Soviet cities: Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Murmansk and others with crushing blows from the waves of "flying fortresses". Several million Russian people were to die in "fire tornadoes" worked out to the smallest detail. This is how Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo were destroyed... Now they were preparing to do this with us, with the allies. A common thing: the most heinous betrayal, extreme meanness and savage cruelty - the hallmark of Western Civilization and, especially, the Anglo-Saxons, who exterminated as many people as no other people in human history.
However, on June 29, 1945, the day before the planned start of the war, the Red Army suddenly changed its location for the insidious enemy. This was the decisive weight that shifted the scales of history - the order was not given to the Anglo-Saxon troops. Prior to this, the capture of Berlin, which was considered impregnable, showed the power of the Soviet Army and the military experts of the enemy were inclined to cancel the attack on the USSR. Fortunately, Stalin was at the helm of the USSR.
The naval forces of Great Britain and the United States then had an absolute superiority over the Soviet Navy: 19 times in destroyers, 9 times in battleships and large cruisers, and 2 times in submarines http://www.respublika.info/4440/ history/article22384/). Over a hundred aircraft-carrying ships and several thousand carrier-based aircraft against zero from the USSR. The "probable ally" had 4 air armies of heavy bombers that could strike crushing blows. Soviet long-range bomber aviation was incomparably weaker.
In April 1945, the Allies presented our troops as exhausted and exhausted, and military equipment as worn out to the limit. Their military specialists were greatly surprised by the power of the Soviet Army, which it demonstrated in the capture of Berlin, which they considered impregnable. There is no doubt the correctness of the conclusion of the great historian V. Falin - Stalin's decision to storm Berlin in early May 1945 prevented the Third World War. This is confirmed by recently declassified documents. Otherwise, Berlin would have been handed over to the "allies" without a fight, and the combined forces of all of Europe and North America would have fallen upon the USSR.
Even after the capture of Berlin, plans for a treacherous strike continued to be developed at full speed. The only thing that stopped them was that they realized that their plans had been revealed and the calculations of the strategists showed that it would not be possible to break the USSR without a sudden blow. There was another important reason why the Americans objected to the British - they needed the USSR to crush the Kwantung Army in the Far East, without which the US victory over Japan on its own was in doubt.
Stalin did not have the opportunity to prevent the Second World War, but he managed to prevent the third. The situation was extremely serious, but the USSR won again without flinching.
Now in the West they are trying to present Churchill's plan as a "response" to the "Soviet threat", to Stalin's attempt to seize all of Europe.
“Did the Soviet leadership have plans at that time to advance to the shores of the Atlantic and capture the British Isles? This question should be answered in the negative. This is confirmed by the law adopted by the USSR on June 23, 1945, on the demobilization of the army and navy, their subsequent transfer to peacetime states. Demobilization began on July 5, 1945 and ended in 1948. The army and navy were reduced from 11 million to less than 3 million people, the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were abolished. Number of military districts in 1945–1946 decreased from 33 to 21. The number of troops in East Germany, Poland and Romania. In September 1945, Soviet troops were withdrawn from northern Norway, in November from Czechoslovakia, in April 1946 from the island of Bornholm (Denmark), in December 1947 - from Bulgaria ...
Did the Soviet leadership know about the British plans for a war against the USSR? This question, perhaps, can be answered in the affirmative ... This is also indirectly confirmed by a prominent expert on the history of the Soviet armed forces, Professor of the University of Edinburgh D. Erickson. In his opinion, Churchill's plan helps to explain “why Marshal Zhukov unexpectedly decided in June 1945 to regroup his forces, received orders from Moscow to strengthen the defenses and study in detail the deployment of the troops of the Western Allies. Now the reasons are clear: obviously, Churchill's plan became known to Moscow in advance and the Stalinist General Staff took appropriate countermeasures "(Rzheshevsky Oleg Alexandrovich Military Historical Research
