Brest Peace 1918 - a peace treaty between representatives of Soviet Russia and representatives of the Central Powers, which marked the defeat and withdrawal of Russia from the First World War.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 3, 1918 and annulled in November 1918 by the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR.
In October 1917 another revolution took place in Russia. The Provisional Government, which ruled the country after the abdication of Nicholas 2, was overthrown and the Bolsheviks came to power, began to form soviet state. One of the main slogans of the new government was "peace without annexations and indemnities", they advocated an immediate end to the war and Russia's entry into a peaceful path of development.
At the very first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks presented their own decree on peace, which provided for an immediate end to the war with Germany and an early truce. The war, according to the Bolsheviks, dragged on too long and became too bloody for Russia, so its continuation is impossible.
Peace negotiations with Germany began on November 19 at the initiative of Russia. Immediately after the signing of the peace Russian soldiers they began to leave the front, and this did not always happen legally - there were many AWOLs. The soldiers were simply tired of the war and wanted to return to civilian life as soon as possible. Russian army could no longer participate in hostilities, as it was exhausted, as well as the whole country.
Negotiations on the signing of the peace proceeded in several stages, since the parties could not reach an understanding in any way. Russian government, although they wanted to get out of the war as soon as possible, they did not intend to pay an indemnity (monetary ransom), since this was considered humiliating and had never been practiced before in Russia. Germany did not agree to such conditions and demanded payment of an indemnity.
Soon, the allied forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary presented Russia with an ultimatum, according to which it could withdraw from the war, but at the same time lose the territories of Belarus, Poland and part of the Baltic states. The Russian delegation found itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, the Soviet government did not like such conditions, as they seemed humiliating, but, on the other hand, the country, exhausted by revolutions, did not have the strength and means to continue its participation in the war.
As a result of the meetings, the councils made an unexpected decision. Trotsky said that Russia did not intend to sign a peace treaty drawn up on such terms, however, the country would not continue to participate in the war either. According to Trotsky, Russia is simply withdrawing its armies from the field of hostilities and will not offer any resistance. The surprised German command said that if Russia did not sign the peace, they would start the offensive again.
Germany and Austria-Hungary again mobilized their troops and launched an offensive into Russian territories, however, contrary to their expectations, Trotsky kept his promise, and the Russian soldiers refused to fight and did not offer any resistance. This situation caused a split within the Bolshevik Party, some of them understood that they would have to sign a peace treaty, otherwise the country would suffer, while some insisted that the world would be a shame for Russia.
The terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were not too favorable for Russia, as it lost a lot of territory, but the ongoing war would have cost the country much more.
The last point caused especially a lot of controversy in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, since it effectively forbade the Soviet government to promote the ideas of socialism in other states and interfered with the creation of the socialist world that the Bolsheviks so dreamed of. Germany also obliged the Soviet government to pay all the losses that the country suffered as a result of revolutionary propaganda.
Despite the signing of the peace treaty, the Bolsheviks feared that Germany might resume hostilities, so the government was urgently transferred from Petrograd to Moscow. Moscow became the new capital.
Despite the fact that the signing of the peace treaty was criticized as Soviet people, and representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the consequences were not as dire as expected - Germany was defeated in the First World War, and Soviet Russia immediately annulled the peace treaty.
The Brest peace is one of the most humiliating episodes in the history of Russia. It became a resounding diplomatic failure of the Bolsheviks and was accompanied by an acute political crisis within the country.
The "Peace Decree" was adopted on October 26, 1917 - the day after the armed coup - and spoke of the need to conclude a just democratic peace without annexations and indemnities between all warring peoples. It served as the legal basis for a separate agreement with Germany and the other Central Powers.
Publicly, Lenin spoke about the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, he considered the revolution in Russia only initial stage world socialist revolution. In fact, there were other reasons as well. The warring peoples did not act according to Ilyich's plans - they did not want to turn bayonets against the governments, and the allied governments ignored the peace proposal of the Bolsheviks. Only the countries of the enemy bloc that were losing the war went for rapprochement.
Germany declared that it was ready to accept the condition of peace without annexations and indemnities, but only if this peace was signed by all the belligerent countries. But none of the Entente countries joined the peace negotiations, so Germany abandoned the Bolshevik formula, and their hopes for a just peace were finally buried. The talk in the second round of negotiations was exclusively about a separate peace, the terms of which were dictated by Germany.
Not all Bolsheviks were willing to sign a separate peace. The left was categorically opposed to any agreements with imperialism. They defended the idea of exporting the revolution, believing that without socialism in Europe, Russian socialism is doomed to perish (and the subsequent transformations of the Bolshevik regime proved them right). The leaders of the left Bolsheviks were Bukharin, Uritsky, Radek, Dzerzhinsky and others. They called for guerrilla warfare against German imperialism, and in the future they hoped to wage regular fighting we are creating the Red Army.
For the immediate conclusion of a separate peace was, above all, Lenin. He was afraid of the German offensive and the complete loss of his own power, which, even after the coup, was largely based on German money. It is unlikely that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was directly bought by Berlin. The main factor was precisely the fear of losing power. Considering that a year after the conclusion of peace with Germany, Lenin was ready even for the division of Russia in exchange for international recognition, then the terms of the Brest Peace would seem not so humiliating.
Trotsky occupied an intermediate position in the inner-party struggle. He defended the thesis "No peace, no war." That is, he proposed to stop hostilities, but not to sign any agreements with Germany. As a result of the struggle within the party, it was decided to drag out the negotiations in every possible way, expecting a revolution in Germany, but if the Germans present an ultimatum, then agree to all conditions. However, Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation in the second round of negotiations, refused to accept the German ultimatum. Negotiations broke down and Germany continued to advance. When the peace was signed, the Germans were 170 km from Petrograd.
Peace conditions were very difficult for Russia. She lost Ukraine and Polish lands, renounced her claims to Finland, gave away the Batumi and Kars regions, had to demobilize all her troops, abandon the Black Sea Fleet and pay huge indemnities. The country was losing almost 800 thousand square meters. km and 56 million people. In Russia, the Germans received the exclusive right to freely engage in entrepreneurship. In addition, the Bolsheviks pledged to pay the royal debts of Germany and its allies.
At the same time, the Germans did not comply with their own obligations. After signing the treaty, they continued the occupation of Ukraine, overthrew the Soviet regime on the Don and helped the White movement in every possible way.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk almost led to a split in the Bolshevik Party and the loss of power by the Bolsheviks. Lenin hardly dragged the final decision on peace through a vote in the Central Committee, threatening to resign. The split of the party did not happen only thanks to Trotsky, who agreed to abstain from the vote, ensuring the victory of Lenin. But this did not help to avoid a political crisis.
The Brest Peace was categorically rejected by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. They left the government, killed the German ambassador Mirbach and raised an armed uprising in Moscow. Due to the lack of a clear plan and goals, it was suppressed, but it was a very real threat to the power of the Bolsheviks. At the same time, in Simbirsk, the commander of the Eastern Front of the Red Army, the Social Revolutionary Muravyov, raised an uprising. It also ended in failure.
1. According to V.I. Lenin, an indispensable condition for the victory of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia was the urgent exit of the country from the First World War. Russia's exit from the war at the beginning of 1918 was possible only if allied relations with the Entente were broken and a separate peace was concluded with Germany - which in fact meant the surrender of Russia with all the consequences. This decision was difficult, clearly unpopular and unpatriotic both in terms of Russia's authority in the world and in terms of its perception by the people. It was the first major political decision of the Bolshevik leadership after the dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed. Since the temporary truce with Germany, concluded after the October coup, expired, in January - February 1918, fierce discussions broke out in the leadership of the Bolsheviks about the withdrawal or non-exit of Russia from the war. Three points of view prevailed:
- a war to a victorious end, which should finally kindle the world revolution (N.I. Bukharin);
— emergency termination wars on any terms (V.I. Lenin);
- not to make peace, but also not to wage war (“neither war, nor peace”), relying on the class consciousness of German workers in soldier's uniform (L.D. Trotsky).
2. Initially, the point of view of L.D. Trotsky, who was instructed to negotiate. However, this position failed - in February 1918, the German army, without showing any workers' solidarity, launched a massive offensive against the non-belligerent Russian army. There was a threat of a German offensive against Petrograd and Moscow and their capture. On February 23, 1918, units of the emerging Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) with great difficulty stopped near Pskov German advance. This day became the birthday of the new, originally Red, and then, Soviet army- Armed Forces of the RSFSR and the USSR.
3. At the beginning of March 1918, negotiations between the Soviet government and the German command were resumed in Brest-Litovsk. The negotiations proceeded on the basis of Lenin's accepted plan - peace on any terms. On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Germany, which went down in history as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. According to this agreement:
- Russia (RSFSR) was emerging from the First World War;
- left the Entente bloc and renounced allied obligations to it;
- handed over to Germany Ukraine, the western part of Belarus, the Baltic states;
- paid an indemnity in the amount of 3 billion rubles.
This treaty was one of the most humiliating that Russia has ever signed in its entire history. However, the Bolsheviks took this step, turning Special attention to the fact that Germany, with all its demands, agrees with the Bolshevik regime, and that the question is about saving the Bolshevik revolution, which the Bolsheviks put much higher than all other interests.
4. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had a small short-term benefit for the Bolsheviks - for several months the Bolshevik leadership received a respite from foreign war with Germany. Subsequently, the negative consequences of the Brest Peace significantly exceeded the positive ones.
- despite the actual surrender of Russia, the war ended after 9 months with a revolution in Germany and the victory of the Entente;
- Russia has lost all the economic and political advantages of the victorious state, which she could receive ha the long-term hardships of the war;
- the release from the front of a large number of soldiers who were used to fighting contributed to the growth of the civil war;
- The Brest peace did not save Russia from an external war - in March 1918, in response to the signing of a separate peace by the Bolsheviks, the Entente Council decided to intervene in Russia;
- instead of a war with one weakened Germany, Russia had to wage war with 14 states of the Entente, which invaded from several fronts at once.
5. The conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace split the coalition between the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs. The IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, held in March 1918, ratified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In protest, the Left SRs withdrew from the government. After 4 months of the Bolshevik-Left SR government coalition, the government of the RSFSR again became completely Bolshevik.
Peace delegation led by Ioffe And Kamenev, defended the principle of self-determination in relation to Ukraine and the peoples of the Baltic states, which only played into the hands of the Germans, who saw in this position of the Bolsheviks a convenient form for their aggressive plans. In addition, General Hoffmann demanded that this principle should not apply either to Poland or to the occupied part of the Baltic States, which were considered by the Germans as already separated from Russia.
At this point, the negotiations broke down. The Germans agreed only to extend the truce for a month, until 15 January.
On January 9, 1918, negotiations resumed. It was clear to everyone that the Germans would resolutely insist on their terms - the seizure of the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine under the guise of "the will of their governments", which, according to General Hoffmann, was understood by the German government as a "policy of self-determination."
Trotsky, who headed the new Soviet delegation, with the consent of Lenin, dragged out the negotiations in Brest. At the same time, hurried negotiations for help were being held in secret with the British representative, Bruce Lockhart, and the American Colonel Robins. B. Lockhart has already informed even his government that the resumption of war on the German front is inevitable.
Not only B. Lockhart, but also many Bolsheviks did not see the two main points why Lenin, at all costs, on any conditions, wanted to conclude a peace treaty with the Germans. Firstly, he knew that the Germans would never forgive him for violating the secret agreement and could easily find another, more convenient protege, at least like left SR Kamkov, who also collaborated with them during the war, back in Switzerland. With German support, however, was associated the receipt of significant monetary subsidies, without which, with the complete collapse of the old state organism, it was hardly possible to maintain the party and the new Soviet apparatus of power. Secondly, the resumption of the war with Germany, for the sake of at least the "socialist fatherland", in the conditions of the beginning of 1918, meant the inevitable loss of power in the country by the Bolsheviks and its transfer into the hands of the national democratic parties, primarily into the hands of the right SRs and Cadets.
After the German terms of peace became known, open indignation arose in the party. A majority was formed that considered it impossible to sign a peace treaty that would lead to the complete dismemberment of Russia - moreover, henceforth making the country completely dependent on Germany. This majority, which became known as " left communists”, threw out the slogan about “defending the socialist fatherland”, arguing that since the proletariat seized power, it must defend its state from German imperialism.
On January 10, the plenary session of the Moscow regional bureau of the party called for the termination of peace negotiations with Germany. Here they acted as "left communists" Bukharin, Lomov, Osinsky (Obolensky), Yu. Pyatakov , Preobrazhensky, Bubnov, Muralov and V. M. Smirnov.
The Moscow regional bureau, having demanded the convocation of a party congress, thereby expressed its lack of confidence in the Central Committee. The Ural Party Committee took the side of the "Left Communists". The Petrograd Committee split. Central Committee members Uritsky and Spunde took the side of the opponents of "peace at any cost", and the journal Kommunist, published in Petrograd not only as an organ of the Petrograd Committee, but also as a theoretical organ of the Central Committee, became an organ of the "Left Communists". The "Left Communists" actually had a majority in the party. In their theses, written Radek, they argued that the Leninist point of view is a reflection of the peasant populist ideology, "sliding down onto petty-bourgeois rails ...". It is impossible to build socialism on the basis of the peasantry, the theses asserted, the proletariat is the main support, and it must not make concessions to German imperialism...
These reproaches of the “left communists” against Lenin reflected reality, for he, as the main argument for the need to conclude peace, in his theses of January 20, brought to the fore the idea that the overwhelming mass of the peasantry would undoubtedly vote even “for an aggressive peace” . And what's more, if the war is renewed, the peasantry will overthrow the socialist government. Lenin denied that he had ever spoken of a "revolutionary war" and, as always in critical moments, with surprising composure, "did not hold on to the letter," as he put it, of what he had previously said.
The Left Social Revolutionaries, who were members of the Council of People's Commissars, believed that the Germans would not dare to go on the offensive, and if they did, they would cause a strong revolutionary upsurge in the country to defend the fatherland.
Trotsky and Lenin agreed with this and feared the continuation of the war, not so much in terms of a deep advance of the Germans, but because of the impossibility of preventing the mobilization of national, patriotic forces under war conditions. They foresaw the inevitable rallying of these forces around the Right Social Revolutionaries and the Cadets, around the idea of a Constituent Assembly and, as a result, the overthrow of the communist dictatorship and the establishment in Russia of a national democratic government based on the majority of the population.
This argument, which posed the question not of war or peace, but of the preservation of power, was put forward by Lenin later, on February 24, when he bluntly wrote that "risking war" means making it possible to overthrow Soviet power.
While Trotsky dragged out the negotiations (he returned to Petrograd on January 18), a meeting of the most prominent party workers was prepared, convened for January 21. It could have called itself a party congress with far greater justification than the 7th Congress convened in a hurry in March 1918.
The meeting was attended by 65 delegates, including members of the Central Committee. Reports on peace and war were made by Bukharin, Trotsky and Lenin. Each with their own point of view. Trotsky, like Lenin, understood the danger of the “left communists” slogan about “revolutionary war” (in terms of holding power at that moment) and at the same time, trying to fence off a separate peace with the Germans, put forward the formula “neither peace, nor war !" This formula, directed primarily against the supporters of the war, helped Lenin at that stage to fight for peace, because the decision on war, on which the majority stood, if adopted, would deal Lenin's policy and Lenin himself a mortal blow. At first glance, Trotsky's somewhat anarchic formula was nothing more than a temporary bridge between Lenin and his opponents, who had a majority behind them.
On January 25, in the Council of People's Commissars, with the participation of the Left Social Revolutionaries, the overwhelming majority also passed Trotsky's formula - "No peace, no war."
Therefore, Trotsky's later noisy accusations that he "treacherously", allegedly acting against the majority of the Central Committee, "arbitrarily" broke off negotiations with the Germans on February 10, are without any foundation. IN this case Trotsky acted on the basis of the decision of the majority in both the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. These accusations, made in 1924-1925 mainly by Zinoviev and Stalin in the course of internal party struggle against Trotsky, even then little reckoned with historical reality.
The tense week after the break in negotiations was spent in almost continuous meetings of the Central Committee. Lenin, who remained in the minority, tried in every possible way to find "such a formulation of the question" of a "revolutionary war" that would show its impossibility - putting, for example, on February 17, even before the German offensive, the question - "should a revolutionary war be declared Germany? Bukharin and Lomov refused to vote on such an "unqualifiedly posed" question, because the essence of revolutionary defencism lay in responding to the German offensive, and not in own initiative, whose fatality was not in doubt.
On February 18, the Germans went on the offensive. The remnants of the demoralized and, after the assassination of General Dukhonin, deprived of the head of the army (the “commander-in-chief” Krylenko devoted himself to the liquidation of those still surviving on separate sections front of headquarters and command) could not offer any resistance, and very soon Dvinsk, with its huge depots of weapons and supplies, and after him Pskov, were occupied by the Germans. In the center and especially in the south, the Germans quickly moved forward, meeting scattered resistance from the remnants of the frame of some units and volunteers. Czechoslovak Corps.
On the evening of February 18, Lenin achieved a majority of 7 to 6 on the question of sending a radio telegram to the Germans offering peace. Lenin owed his success entirely to Trotsky. Trotsky's buffer position was revealed at a moment of direct threat to the authorities themselves: he went over to the camp of Lenin, and his vote gave the majority. (For the offer of peace to the Germans voted: Lenin, Smilga, Zinoviev, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Sverdlov, Trotsky; against - Uritsky, Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky, Lomov and Ioffe).
The offer of peace was to be sent on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, where 7 people's commissars were Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Probably, the decision of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries would have been different if they had known that Lenin received the majority by just one vote and, moreover, by the voice of the author of the formula "no peace, no war." But not knowing the results of the vote in the Bolshevik Central Committee and also afraid of losing power, the Left SR people's commissars voted for the peace proposal by 4 votes to 3.
The German command saw that it could quickly move deep into Russia and easily occupy Petrograd and even Moscow. However, it did not take this step, limiting itself to the occupation of Ukraine, where a sham "hetman" government was created. As indicated Ludendorff, the German command was most afraid of an explosion of patriotism in Russia. Even during the Tarnopol breakthrough in July 1917, Ludendorff gave the order not to develop the offensive, so as not to cause the threat of a deep German invasion to improve the Russian army. A deep invasion now, in 1918, the occupation of Petrograd and the exit to Moscow could lead to the overthrow of the Bolshevik government, could justify the efforts of the generals Alekseeva And Kornilov who collected volunteer army in Rostov-on-Don.
First two pages of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Russian
Thus, the German strategy and policy towards Russia fully coincided with the Leninist policy of peace at all costs.
It is interesting to note that in his report on peace and war at the 7th Party Congress in March 1918, Lenin proved the need for peace by the collapse of the army, devoting a significant part of his report to characterizing the army as a “sick part of the body”, capable only of “flight”, “panic” , "selling their own guns to the Germans for pennies," etc. Lenin nowhere now says that the main blame for the disintegration of the army under the slogan of immediate peace "without annexations and indemnities" lay with the Bolshevik party itself. Having deceived the soldiers with the chimera of the possibility of such a world ( Peace Decree), Lenin now shifted the blame for the shameful conditions of the German world for Russia.
Lenin, speaking of the army, deliberately concealed the facts; the demobilization conference in December showed that those units that retained the best combat capability were the most anti-Bolshevik. That is why Krylenko did absolutely nothing for two months, did not want to, and could not do, despite the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on measures to organize and strengthen the army. During the days of the February crisis, the regimental committee of the Preobrazhensky regiment proposed, on behalf of the regiment, which was already stationed in Petrograd, to speak to the Pskov front, but after negotiations with Smolny, it received not only a refusal to do so, but also an order to demobilize.
At the call of Lenin, Krylenko and Raskolnikov made reports to the Central Executive Committee on the state of the army and navy, impressing the Left SR Steinberg that both deliberately exaggerate and dramatize the situation in the army and navy. A decree was issued on the organization of the Red Army, but this army was not intended by Lenin to fight the Germans : already on February 22, a German response was received with consent to sign peace, but on even more difficult conditions. The borders of Russia were thrown back to Pskov and Smolensk. Ukraine, Don, Transcaucasia were separated. Huge, multimillion-dollar indemnity, paid in grain, ore, raw materials, was imposed by the Germans on Russia.
When the terms of the peace became known, Bukharin, Lomov, V. M. Smirnov, Yu. Pyatakov and Bubnov in Moscow, and Uritsky in Petrograd resigned from all their responsible posts and demanded the right to free agitation in the party and outside it against peace with Germans (Lomov, Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov were members of the Central Committee). On 23 February, after discussing German terms, a decisive vote took place. Lenin won again only thanks to Trotsky and his supporters who abstained - these were Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe, Krestinsky. Voted against: Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov, Lomov. For the immediate signing of peace: Lenin, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Stalin, Smilga, Sokolnikov and Stasova, who was the secretary. Thus, Lenin had 7 votes in favor (actually, excluding Stasova's vote, 6) against 4, with 4 abstentions.
During the discussion, Stalin tried to offer not to sign the peace, delaying the negotiations, for which he was cut off by Lenin:
“Stalin is wrong when he says that we can not sign. These terms must be signed. If they are not signed, this means a death sentence for the Soviet government "...
Again, Trotsky played a decisive role, splitting in half the majority that was against the signing of the treaty.
Lenin's concession was the decision to convene the 7th Party Congress, since, according to the decision of the Central Committee to convene the congress, "there was no unanimity in the Central Committee on the issue of signing peace."
The next day, upon learning of the Central Committee's decision, the Moscow Regional Party Bureau announced that it considered the Central Committee's peace decision "absolutely unacceptable." The resolution of the Moscow Regional Bureau, adopted unanimously on February 24, read:
“Having discussed the activities of the Central Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the RSDLP expresses its distrust of the Central Committee, in view of its political line and composition, and will, at the first opportunity, insist on its re-election. Moreover, the Moscow Regional Bureau does not consider itself obliged to obey at all costs those decisions of the Central Committee that will be connected with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria-Germany.
This resolution was adopted unanimously. Members of the Moscow Regional Bureau - Lomov, Bukharin, Osinsky, Stukov, Maksimovsky, Safonov, Sapronov, Solovyov and others believed that the split in the party "can hardly be eliminated in the near future." But at the same time, they avoided what the Stalinist “ Short course All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" - collusion of the "Left Communists" with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. If such an agreement had taken place, then, without a doubt, the bloc of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries with the "Left Communists" had every chance of winning. The "Left Communists" were led by faith in the German revolution, without which they saw no possibility for the continued existence of socialist Russia. Lenin shared this view, which he repeatedly repeated in his report at the 7th Congress, and only did not connect the issue of retaining power, as did, for example, Kollontai, with the German Revolution over the next three months. He considered the time before the revolution only as a period during which it was necessary to strengthen power in every possible way, to use a respite. This orientation of the "Left Communists" to the revolution in the West, ignoring national problems Russia was their main weakness. Lenin remained for them, for all their disagreements with him, the only possible ally. They did not look for support in the forces of national democracy, moreover, they repelled from it, and therefore, in the real balance of forces outside the party, they were not any significant factor.
The signing of the Brest Peace meant the defeat of Soviet Russia in the First World War. Lenin called this agreement obscene, because Russia was deprived of most of its territories, and it was also obliged to pay a large indemnity. The signing of this document caused sharp criticism from the Entente countries, since Russia actually renounced its allied obligations. Why such an unfavorable peace was signed and whether it could have been avoided, our experts argued.
Igor Chubais
The fact is that the situation changed very quickly. The situation deteriorated greatly with the advent of the Bolsheviks. The Brest-Litovsk peace was necessary for Lenin. But if the Bolsheviks did not corrupt the Russian army, did not act as foreign agents, did not take money from the Germans to push Russia into chaos, Russia would inevitably win this war. This is clear if only because even after Russia left the Entente, the latter, as you know, won. And if Russia had not left the Entente, it would have won all the more.
Yuri Emelyanov
The situation was terrible for the country, because by that time the army had completely collapsed, and when our delegates went to Brest to negotiate, they saw completely empty trenches. In general, by this time the army fled. There was no possibility of defending the country from the very likely invasion of the Germans, Austrians and others. The country at that time was in ferment, actually began Civil War, although it has not yet acquired a full-scale character. Therefore, the country desperately needed peace.
Igor Chubais
Because the Bolsheviks behaved like traitors. They had various agreements with the Germans. Some time after February Revolution The Bolsheviks began to actively operate within the army. Kerensky refused any restrictions. The army abolished the death penalty. In general, it is impossible to imagine that the army would conduct military operations in conditions of absolute democratization. Even in peacetime, in any state, including a democratic one, there are some limits and restrictions. Then there were no restrictions.
Yuri Emelyanov
The Soviet government already in the first days announced its intention to end this war. The coming of the Bolsheviks to power was caused by the crisis that was generated by the First World War. The war led to the bankruptcy of all the powers that participated in it. They promised to end the war in a few months, but this did not happen. The war has become incredibly brutal. The most destructive methods of struggle were used. The people are tired of war. This became clear after it ended, when it turned out that except for the United States, everyone was ruined by this war. Russia suffered especially, which was blatantly unprepared for war and bore a significant part of the burden, not only sending a large army to fight against the German and Austro-Hungarian troops, but also sending its troops to France to fight on the western front. But most importantly: the recruitment of 16 million people into the army and the units that served the army bled the village. Women and teenagers worked there, which led to a colossal drop in agricultural production. The country was in a desperate situation.
Igor Chubais
After the Bolsheviks seized power, the situation steadily deteriorated. If there were no Lenin and the Bolsheviks, then Russia would be a signatory of the Versailles Peace and would receive all the dividends from the Versailles Peace. World War II would have been absolutely impossible after that. Was there an alternative to the Brest Peace? When it was signed, there was no particular alternative, but there was an alternative before. It consisted in the fact that Russia did not have the right to withdraw from the Entente. She also violated the contract. She separately withdrew from the Entente. One of the clauses of this agreement was that none of the countries could conduct separate negotiations and withdraw from this union, it must act jointly with the rest of the countries. That is, Lenin violated everything. Bolshevism began by violating international treaties, international rules.
Yuri Emelyanov
The alternative was to continue the war. Among the Bolshevik Party there were very strong supporters of its continuation. Because the terms of peace that Germany introduced were devastating for the country. Here is one of the alternatives. Trotsky voiced another alternative - no peace, no war. We will not sign a humiliating peace, but we will stop the war. Here are three alternatives. Lenin was in the minority, the majority was in favor of continuing the war. Only after the failure of the Brest Treaty led to decisive offensive German and Austro-Hungarian troops at the front, which led to the fact that Russia lost the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, that's when Lenin received a very shaky majority and peace was signed.
Igor Chubais
Of course, the Bolsheviks were negotiating with the Allies to withdraw from the Entente. Already 2-3 weeks after seizing power, Lenin began to warn London and Paris that Russia wanted to withdraw from the treaty. Of course they reacted. First, they supported, as much as possible, the white movement that had arisen. Some military landing was sent to Russia to support those forces that resisted the Bolshevik power. Also, more than ten years after the proclamation of the so-called Soviet power none in Russia western country did not recognize this quasi-state.
Yuri Emelyanov
The Allies were categorically against it, because, from their point of view, the military actions of Russia were the only thing that kept the Germans from defeating the Allies on the Western front. But they did not take into account that the Germans had largely exhausted their forces. Nevertheless, it was quite obvious that as soon as peace was concluded on the eastern front, the Germans were able to transfer to western front a significant part of their troops, huge offensives were organized, offensive operations. To say, like some, including the President of our country, that Germany at that time was the losing side, means to show complete ignorance of the events of 1918. Because in fact, after the Brest Peace, Germany was on the verge of victory. But, unfortunately for the Germans, their strength was exhausted. In addition, by this time the Americans began to pull up their forces.
Igor Chubais
The Brest Peace is a 100% betrayal of Russia. For the Bolsheviks, there was neither a homeland nor a people - they had a fanatical idea that they were ready to defend at any cost. That is, if the war is for the interests of the people, for the interests of their country, then the Bolsheviks fought to maintain their power. This was their only true purpose. Therefore, they were ready to make any concessions, to lose territories. As a result of the Bolshevik putsch, not only Finland and Poland were lost, but also the Baltic countries were formed, which did not exist before, Bessarabia separated. That is, all this was given away in order for the Bolshevik power to be preserved. Moreover, because of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, two rogue states emerged: Germany, which paid reparations for the outbreak of the First World War, and the great thousand-year-old Russia, which became known as Soviet Union which no one recognized. These two outcasts quickly found each other, and from the beginning of the 20s they entered into secret contacts. We agreed on mutual assistance, on the violation of all military restrictions that were imposed on Germany. This eventually led to World War II.
Yuri Emelyanov
Lenin called this world obscene. And indeed: it turned out to be predatory. We paid an indemnity, however, we did not fully pay it. We have lost huge territories. This greatly weakened the country's economy, especially Agriculture. But it must be taken into account that the Brest-Litovsk peace did not last long. The signing of this peace was a forced historical necessity.
